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For my mother, who, like so many others, succumbed to 
Covid-19 during lockdown, isolated from her loved ones.
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One of the areas more severely affected by emergencies in general, and by the 
Covid-19 pandemic in particular, is that of the vertical division of powers and 
the idea of federalism more broadly. Fighting a pandemic requires quick and 
coordinated action, for which national governments are better suited. The con-
sequence is often both a horizontal (from parliaments to governments) and a 
vertical centralisation of powers, from subnational (and local) to the central level. 
However, the way this happens deeply differs from country to country and is 
most likely one of the indicators for the rootedness of the federal principle in 
societies and institutions.
Federalism has no doubt been subject to a stress test by the Covid-19 pan-
demic. Criticism has been voiced not only in countries where the ‘federal spirit’ 
(Burgess) is lacking, that is, a rooted culture, tradition, and acceptance of fed-
eralism, but also where this is undoubtedly present. The existence of separate 
health-care systems with different authorities introducing potentially different 
regulations is easy to be seen as an obstacle rather than an asset. Similarly, poten-
tial differences in solutions that might impact on the very fundamental right to 
life are likely to be met with scepticism. And the very essence of federalism – 
negotiation and dialogue – is often portrayed as a factor slowing the adoption of 
decisions rather than improving their quality.
A closer look at the comparative practice, however, shows a different picture. 
This is what this book is doing. By analysing in depth a wide range of multi-tiered 
systems in managing the pandemic, highlighting the different responses, their 
different effectiveness, and their different reasons, it provides a unique oppor-
tunity to learn and reflect on the very essence of federalism and what it is for: 
a better, more nuanced, more pondered, and more democratic way to make 
decisions. Not infrequently, a multi-level structure helps correct fatal mistakes 
made by national governments and as a matter of fact, during the Covid-19 
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pandemic, federal countries resorted to states of emergency and derogations from 
the constitutional order less frequently than non-federal states did, which could 
provide evidence of more resilience of federal structures. Importantly, federal 
decision-making does not mean that decisions must be different. It means that 
they might be different when and where this proves meaningful: tailoring solu-
tions to the different needs of different territories might be conducive to more 
efficient responses.
Be that as it may, this book offers a nuanced, informed, and data-based insight 
on what the virus did to federalism and what federalism did and can do to tackle 
emergencies such as a pandemic. It is not by chance that the idea of the book 
has originated within the framework of the worldwide network of federal schol-
ars, most of whom are members of the International Association of Centres for 
Federal Studies (IACFS), and is edited by one of its most distinguished members 
and former president, Professor Nico Steytler. The book is not only a valuable 
academic exercise. It also testifies of the possible contribution that a community 
of experts can offer to decision-makers and opinion leaders when addressing 
dramatic challenges: the provision of informed analysis.
Francesco Palermo, President of the IACFS
In mid-March 2020 as the Covid-19 pandemic rapidly swallowed the world, 
universities, like other public institutions, closed and we, members of the 
International Association of Centres for Federal Studies (IACFS), stayed at 
home, trying to work. We all watched how the pandemic spread throughout our 
respective federal countries. It then struck me that we should take a collective 
look at how the governments in federal systems were dealing with the pandemic. 
It provided a unique opportunity for true comparative research to analyse how 
very different types of federal systems dealt with exactly the same issue at the 
same time, and in real time as the pandemic unfolded in each country. It also 
compelled us to make sense, not only of how governments have responded to 
the pandemic but also of our daily lives in isolation. The planned research would 
give us an insight into the workings of federal systems under stress and how they 
could/should respond to similar disasters in the future.
The project received an overwhelmingly favourable response and academics 
from 19 IACFS member centres participated. It was a truly collective effort, 
and in this regard the contributions of Cheryl Saunders and John Kincaid to the 
development of the template are gratefully acknowledged.
To cover all the major federations in the world, 19 case studies were commis-
sioned. As the country studies covered the many aspects of federalism, teams of 
researchers were assembled and 45 persons eventually participated in the produc-
tion of the text. The collaboration of experienced professors with young research-
ers is a gratifying feature of this volume. The assembled 19 case studies provided 
us with a truly global picture of the working of federalism in times of stress.
The first milestone was the presentation of draft papers at IACFS’s annual 
conference, which was virtually hosted from 14 to 16 October 2020; the con-
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How federations combat Covid-191
Nico Steytler
1 The pandemic
On 31 December 2019, the first cases of the coronavirus, Covid-19, were iden-
tified in Wuhan City, China. Its dramatic rate of transmission and deadly effects 
soon led to the city’s shutdown, but not before it took wing and, borne by trav-
ellers, began alighting in other countries. Very quickly it spread throughout Asia 
and Europe and then further afield to North America, South America, Africa, 
and Australasia. By the beginning of March 2020, nearly every country in the 
world had recorded cases of infection, and on 11 March 2020 the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared Covid-19 a pandemic.
Major initiatives were taken globally to treat the infected and curb further 
infection. After a first wave of infections and mortalities during March and 
April, infection rates eased off as well as containment measures. However, in the 
latter half of the year, the ‘second wave’ of infections grew in size to exceed in 
most cases the numbers of the first wave. By the end of October 2020, the num-
ber of infections reached 44 million, with more than 1 million deaths attributed 
to Covid-19 (WHO 2020c).
To prevent the spread of the virus, most countries imposed lockdown meas-
ures, including the cessation of international travel and, with that, tourism; 
domestically, stay-at-home orders resulted in the closure of factories, shops, and 
offices. As a result, all economies showed a dramatic downturn, leading to a 
world recession – the World Bank (2020) forecasted a 5.2 per cent contraction in 
global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020.
As a pandemic, the Covid-19 outbreak of 2020 differed both in nature from 
other national disasters typically experienced over the past decades, such as 
flooding, earthquakes and tsunamis, and in magnitude from previous pandemics: 
the SARS coronavirus (2002–2003) and the swine flu (H1N1) (2009–2010) were 
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contained effectively internationally and locally (Hassan et al. 2020). It was both 
a threat of a disaster, requiring preventative measures, and a disaster in actuality, 
requiring emergency health care. Moreover, due to the preventative measures 
taken, innumerable people were indirectly affected by the virus through the cur-
tailment of social and economic activity and limitations on rights to movement, 
education, religion, democratic governance, and so forth.
Governments thus battled on several fronts. First, preventative measures were 
put in place to prevent or minimise the spread of the virus – limiting or cancel-
ling international travel, testing, tracing and quarantining suspected carriers of 
the virus, and eventually imposing internal movement restrictions, the so-called 
lockdowns. Secondly, emergency curative measures were instituted to treat the 
seriously ill, many of whom required hospitalisation. Accepting the spread of 
the disease as inevitable, governments aimed to slow down the infection rate in 
order not to overburden their health-care systems to a point of collapse. Thirdly, 
governments instituted ameliorative economic measures to shield businesses and 
the population from the worst effects of the lockdown measures. In developing 
countries, the latter had a devastating effect on a large sector of the population 
already living below the poverty line. Governments had to juggle two competing 
concerns: containing the virus through preventative lockdown measures, while 
at the same time easing restrictions to bring economic activity back to life. The 
early lifting of restrictions inevitably led to renewed escalation of the pandemic.
Small in number, but home to 40 per cent of the world’s population, the feder-
ations or hybrid federations of the world (in this volume, referred to collectively 
as federations) were also impacted on by the pandemic. By 31 October 2020 (the 
end date of the period covered in this study), the Covid-19 pandemic had hit 
hard the federations selected for this study; among the top 15 countries ranked 
according to mortalities recorded, are 11 federations, and when mortality rates 
are compared the numbers are the same (WHO 2020a). However, the selected 
federations exhibited very different trends in the spread of infection and mortal-
ity associated with the virus (see Table 0.1).
Plotting the infection and death trends in Table 0.1 reveals the wide variation 
in extent of infections officially reported, and also in associated deaths recorded 
(see Figure 0.1). Furthermore, the relationship between recorded infections and 
deaths shows that the number of known Covid-19 infections does not perfectly 
predict the number of known Covid-19 deaths – the more infections the more 
death – suggesting other factors are at play. While some of the variation in the 
trends in the data can be ascribed to factors such as the age and health structure 
of the population, the timing of the arrival of the epidemic, and the nature and 
extent of recording of infections and deaths, a government’s response may also 
have played a role in the observed trends.
The management of the pandemic in federations brought to the fore key 
elements of their federal systems: federal governments’ responsibility over 
national emergencies and coordination; the autonomy of states over critical 
areas such as disaster management and health-care services; and at grassroots 
Introduction 3
level, municipalities’ responsibilities for public hygiene and the provision of 
certain health-care services, as well as for the continued delivery of public 
utilities such as water, sanitation, waste removal, and control of public spaces. 
The multilevel structure of government also places emphasis both on coordi-
nation and cooperation between governments vertically and horizontally and 
on the democratic accountability of each of them individually. Finally, the 
intergovernmental fiscal system became critical: how is the cost caused by the 
pandemic covered?
While the role of subnational governments – that is, the collective of states 
and local governments – is, of course, much dependent on the character of a 
specific federal system, there may be common patterns in and approaches to 
managing pandemics. The literature on comparative federalism has, however, 
given scant attention to this form of disaster or the impact it can have on the 
functioning of federal systems.
The situation was thus: at the beginning of 2020, the federations were func-
tioning according to their own dynamics, which are forever changing. Out of the 
blue came a virus with no cure, one which spreads rapidly and has deadly conse-
quences, and suddenly federations – unsuspecting and mostly unprepared – found 
TABLE 0.1 Population and Covid-19 infections and deaths (31 October 2020), selected 

















 1 Belgium 11.590 19 442,508 11,716 2.6 3,818 101
 2 Spain 46.755 20 1,243,052 38,648 3.1 2,659 83
 3 Brazil 212.559 9 5,494,376 158,969 2.9 2,585 75
 4 Mexico 128.933 7 912,811 90,773 9.9 708 70
 5 United 
States
331.003 16 8,852,730 227,178 2.6 2,675 69
 6 United 
Kingdom
67.886 19 989,749 46,229 4.7 1,458 68
 7 Argentina 45.196 11 1,143,800 30,442 2.7 2,531 67
 8 Italy 60.462 23 647,674 38,321 5.9 1,071 63
 9 South Africa 59.309 5 723,682 19,230 2.7 1,220 32
10 Canada 37.742 18 228,542 10,074 4.4 606 27
11 Switzerland 8.655 19 171,116 2,236 1.3 1,977 26
12 Russia 145.934 15 1,618,116 27,990 1.7 1,109 19
13 Germany 83.784 22 518,753 10,452 2.0 619 12
14 Austria 9.006 19 101,443 1,079 1.1 1,126 12
15 India 1,380.004 6 813,7119 121,641 1.5 590 9
16 Australia 25.500 16 27,582 907 3.3 108 4
17 Ethiopia 114.964 4 95,789 1,464 1.5 83 1
18 Nigeria 206.140 3 62,691 1,144 2 30 1
Source: WHO (2020a, 2020b), World Bank (2019), UN Population Dynamics (2019).
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themselves confronting a major crisis. This gave rise to critical questions of how 
federal systems, with decentralised decision-making at their core, responded.
2 Research questions
The immediate question is: how did federal systems respond to the Covid-
19 pandemic during the first critical period of 2020, when quick, concerted, 
and effective action was required to limit and eliminate the virus and the dire 
socio-economic consequences it caused? What were the modalities of action of 
each level of government? How did they affect the constitutional distribution of 
powers – did they lead to an increase in centralisation or decentralisation? Did 
intergovernmental relations (IGR), the lifeblood of federal systems, work effi-
ciently or at all? What happened to intergovernmental fiscal relations?
A second, more evaluative question then follows: how well (or badly) did 
federal systems perform in combating a pandemic of this scale? What do the 
individual experiences tell us generally about how federalism fared as a system 
of governance in the modern age, when confronted unexpectedly with such a 
global crisis? Were the federal systems resilient governance systems that could 
manage the fight against Covid-19? Were good health results attributable to a 
well-functioning federal system and poor results to failures in another one? For 
example, with the dispersal of powers between the levels of government, were 
there sufficient and effective coordination and cooperation?
FIGURE 0.1 Relationship between recorded infections and deaths per 100,000 (31 
October 2020) selected federations
Source: Table 0.1
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Having answered these two questions, a third question arises: are the particu-
lar federal dynamics – a movement towards decentralisation or centralisation – 
that may have emerged in each country likely to have long-term consequences 
for the federal system itself ? Will the system return to its old pattern of function-
ing, or did the management of the pandemic trigger longer-lasting reform? Will 
the pandemic provide a policy window where more fundamental change may 
be forthcoming?
It is also important to point out the issues that the study does not engage 
with, as intriguing as they may be. This is not a comparison between federal 
and unitary systems to see which of them did better. The study is not designed 
for such a purpose, and at any rate, it would be extremely difficult to tease out 
the explanatory value that the ‘federalism factor’ may have had. Moreover, 
‘federations’ is an umbrella term encompassing many variations of federal-
ism: for example, some in effect are close to unitary states for the purpose of 
combating the pandemic, while many unitary states exhibit strong features of 
decentralisation.
Our interest is in what combating the pandemic in federal systems revealed 
about the nature of federalism in a particular country in a particular period. The 
aim is to reflect on how the federal system functioned between the time in early 
2020 that the coronavirus first broke out in a country and the latter part of the 
year (October). It covers the period prior to the introduction of vaccines and the 
dynamics that that triggered. Although the full significance of the pandemic and 
its management will become apparent only in years to come, the first 10 months 
of 2020 were highly revealing.
In most countries, the first wave of Covid-19 came and went during that 
period, with many of the preventative measures being eased; a second wave 
emerged in the second half of the year, putting a new set of dynamics in motion 
and typically seeing federations adopt a more differentiated response to the pan-
demic that brought subnational governments to the fore. During the window 
of time under review, the essential federal dynamics of each country manifested 
themselves and became visible for analysis and comparison.
During this pre-vaccine period, the studies revealed a number of failures 
in federal systems that had dire consequences in the battle against Covid-19. 
Without having to wait for closure of the pandemic, remedial action could be 
taken to address these failures.
3 Research methodology
3.1 Selecting federal systems for case study
These questions above have been addressed in 19 case studies that cover 6 con-
tinents and represent all the main federations in the world. While ‘federations’ 
is used as a term of convenience to refer to the group collectively, not many call 
themselves federations. What they have in common, and what is critical for this 
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study, is the decentralisation (in a broad sense) of decision-making between two 
or more levels of government.
In the case of Europe, all the major federations and hybrids are included in 
this study: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain. They are members of 
the European Union (EU), a supranational governance structure labelled as a 
‘confederation’ and, as such, an object of study here in its own right. Falling 
outside the EU are Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Turning to 
North America, all three federal countries are examined: Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico. In South America, Argentina and Brazil come under review, 
in Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, and in Asia, India. Australia is 
also covered in the study.
Grouped together in this volume is thus a range from highly decentralised fed-
erations to federal-type (quasi-federal, hybrid-federal) systems exhibiting strong 
centralised tendencies. The response to the Covid-19 pandemic would be much 
influenced by both the constitutional framework and importantly by the practice 
guided by the presence or absence of a ‘federal spirit’. Painting with a very broad 
brush, the majority of countries can be grouped under the category of central-
ised federations: Italy, Spain, Austria, Russia, Mexico, Argentina, India, Ethiopia, 
South Africa, and Nigeria. Clear cases of decentralised federations are Belgium, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Australia. 
Somewhere in between lies Germany with its system of executive federalism.
The case studies are presented in groups according to continent: Europe/
Eurasia, North America, South America, Asia/Australia, and Africa. In some 
respects, the geographical grouping may have also been a factor in how a particu-
lar country responded to the crisis. For example, EU countries were influenced 
by what their neighbours were doing (or not doing) and by the EU structures 
themselves. In North America, the US president’s approach to the pandemic 
enjoyed no traction north of the border, but it bore uncanny similarities to 
Mexico’s approach. The two South American federations – Brazil and Argentina – 
showed similarities to each other as well as with Mexico and the United States. 
Whereas the EU may have played some role in a common approach to the pan-
demic through its economic packages, the African Union, lacking the EU’s 
integrative structures, may have had only very limited influence on a common 
approach to health care in the context of Covid-19.
3.2 Giving the case studies a consistent structure
The aim of the book is to get the story of countries told cogently and ana-
lytically. To facilitate comparative perspectives, the case studies are structured 
according to a detailed template. The template seeks to guide and structure that 
story. It begins with the geophysical, demographic, economic, social, and polit-
ical background: how did these features of the country and society play out in 
the fight against the pandemic? What constitutional and legal framework was in 
place when governments had to spring into action to combat the virus? What 
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were the institutional arrangements for dealing with a pandemic of such a mag-
nitude? What was the state of preparedness?
Then, when Covid-19 arrived, which of the levels of government reacted 
first and took the initiative? How did the different levels – federal, state, and 
local – play their allocated roles? Since combating the pandemic inevitably fell in 
the jurisdiction of all three levels in one way or another, what was the nature of 
the ensuing intergovernmental relations? In most countries, the levels are bound 
together in an intergovernmental fiscal system – how, then, did the pandemic 
impact on it? Finally, could the way the federal system functioned under the 
stress of the pandemic have long-term consequences for the system itself ?
3.2.1 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
In many federations, matters of health care and disaster management are subna-
tional or concurrent functions, while the federal government has emergency pow-
ers allowing it extraordinary powers, inter alia, over subnational governments. 
The first substantive section of each country study looks at the legal situation prior 
to the pandemic by sketching the constitutional framework for the division of 
powers and functions between different levels of government, in particular pow-
ers and functions concerned with health care and disaster management.
Furthermore, given the exceptional circumstances caused by a pandemic, 
most federal governments are vested with emergency constitutional powers to 
override subnational powers. Also, without having to resort to a declaration of a 
national state of emergency, federal governments can use ordinary legislation to 
declare a public health emergency. In some federations, such powers can also be 
exercised by the states. Thus, what was the legal arsenal available to governments 
at the outbreak of the pandemic?
3.2.2  Preparedness for a national disaster: The institutional 
framework
In learning from past disasters, most federal countries have developed institutions 
and processes – political and technical – to deal with such emergencies. These 
institutions and processes are sometimes of an intergovernmental nature because 
health care and disaster management are in the main concurrent responsibilities – 
for example, a national coordinating body is established with representation from 
federal and state governments. The second section thus outlines the state of pre-
paredness that existed prior to the first wave of the coronavirus. Of importance 
is the question of whether they played their intended role or were replaced by 
other, newly created bodies.
3.2.3 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
As countries were alerted to the outbreak of the virus in China, governments 
across the globe started to take measures, some more quickly than others, in the 
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form of travel bans, testing for the virus, and tracing and quarantining infected 
individuals. Soon, more severe measures were proclaimed, including the social 
and economic lockdown of cities and towns, while health services were ramped 
up to cater for the seriously ill. With the announcement of the lockdown strat-
egy, governments formulated plans on how to cope with the strategy’s social and 
economic consequences. When countries reached peaks in infections during the 
first wave, governments took the difficult decision of easing restrictions, only to 
be confronted by the same question during the second wave of infections.
Before detailing the measures taken, two important factors relevant to such 
measures are discussed. First, how did political parties respond to the crisis 
and how did that response affect each country’s federal system, and vice versa? 
Secondly, in countries with a diversity of communities (some marginalised), 
were there any indications of marginalisation (or further marginalisation) of any 
communities in the government responses to the pandemic?
3.2.3.1 Taking the initiative
With decision-making on health care and disaster management dispersed across 
the levels of government, a critical question in a federal system is who the first 
responders were to the looming crisis – the federal or subnational governments. 
Was there effective coordination and cooperation from the start, and did pre- 
existing (intergovernmental) institutions spring effectively to life? After the ini-
tial response, the focus shifts to the actions of the different levels of governments.
3.2.3.2 Federal action
In most countries, the federal government moved to centre stage with a raft of 
measures to contain the spread of the pandemic. At its disposal were an array of 
emergency powers, the military, and its superior financial resources. In the meas-
ures it took, did the federal government intrude into state domains, and if so, to 
what extent? Were the usual accountability structures maintained, or was there 
a shift to executive rule marginalising parliament? How did the courts deal with 
challenges relating to measures taken?
3.2.3.3 State action
As states usually have jurisdiction over health care, disaster management, and 
a host of other related functions such as education, questions arise about how 
they used their powers and performed their functions. Did states assert their 
autonomy with regard to their responsibilities, or did they readily follow the 
directions of the federal government and become primarily implementers of 
federal measures? Did federal measures obliterate the ordinary constitutional 
division of powers and thus override the relative autonomy of subnational 
governments?
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Also of interest is whether states used their constitutional space to devise inno-
vative measures to deal with aspects of the pandemic. Were they the proverbial 
laboratories for managing the pandemic more effectively? Conversely, were there 
instances where states were an obstacle to implementing much-needed preventa-
tive measures? Did some, in the name of autonomy, engage in counterproductive 
measures? Did states cooperate horizontally with each other in joint efforts and 
measures? Were internal border controls imposed? Were the usual accountability 
structures maintained? Did state legislatures meet and have a say, or were they 
suspended? What role did the courts play in scrutinising the measures taken?
3.2.3.4 Local government action
The role of local governments varies considerably according to their size and 
place within the federal system. Were large metropolitan municipalities with 
powerful mayors active in leading the way with preventative measures? Were 
local authorities – large and small – a crucial cog in the wheel in implement-
ing federal and state measures as well as providing basic services? Did organ-
ised local government facilitate cooperation and mutual assistance among local 
authorities?
3.2.3.5 Intergovernmental relations
In view of the measures taken by the different levels of government, a key vari-
able with regard to the success or otherwise of pandemic management was both 
vertical and horizontal coordination and cooperation between governments. 
Such coordination may have been embedded in pre-existing disaster manage-
ment systems, or, in general, cooperative government forums and procedures. It 
may also be the case that such institutions and processes were ignored due to the 
exigencies of the pandemic.
Questions addressed include the following: Did intergovernmental relations 
become irrelevant where the federal government dominated? What role did 
intergovernmental relations play other than coordination? Did it also facilitate 
understanding of differences around the country, dissemination of innovative 
measures, or the harmonisation of responses, without (necessarily) effecting uni-
formity? Did horizontal cooperation among states and local authorities blossom, 
or did it degenerate into competition for resources?
3.2.3.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Managing the Covid-19 pandemic was a costly business. The need for health-
care budget items – hospitals, equipment, medical staff, and medicines – grew 
exponentially. Furthermore, the consequences of lockdown measures for indi-
viduals and the economy as a whole were dire, necessitating huge economic stim-
ulus packages and social relief payments for persons slipping into unemployment 
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and poverty. As providers of health-care services and social assistance, subna-
tional governments experienced extraordinary pressures on their revenue.
In most federations, financial transfers of one kind or another are made from 
the federal government to states and local governments, and from states to local 
governments, usually through fiscal equalisation systems. In the case of national 
disasters, the federal government has access to contingency funds for distribution 
to states and local governments in distress. Subnational governments also experi-
enced a dramatic decline in their own revenues due to the economic downturn.
Key questions include the following: Did federal aid to state and/or local 
governments take the form of enhanced equalisation payments, block grants, 
or conditional/tied grants? What mechanisms of accountability were built into 
pandemic expenditure? Did corruption flourish?
3.2.4 Findings and policy implications
In the light of their findings, the chapters conclude by probing the possible long-
term impact the pandemic governance may have on each federal system. Although 
it may be too early to tell, could the way in which the pandemic was managed lead 
to fundamental changes in how the system may function in the future? It has been 
said that ‘the world before Coronavirus and the world after Coronavirus cannot be the 
same’. Can the same be said about each federal system?
4 Conclusion
This volume seeks to understand how the Covid-19 pandemic affected federal 
dynamics during the first but crucial period of pandemic governance. It provides 
an early slice of analysis when federal systems experienced a major shock; the 
need for quick, concerted, and effective central action placed the principle of 
decentralised decision-making under severe pressure. As the Covid-19 pandemic 
has, contrary to early hopes and expectations, persisted in 2021 and is bound 
to continue in 2022, this volume might provide some useful lessons on how to 
correct current systemic failures. Since Covid-19 is unlikely to be the last pan-
demic or disaster to engulf the world on such a massive scale, this volume may 
too, provide useful lessons on how to combat pandemics in federal countries in 
the future.
Notes
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Italy’s functional ‘health federalism’ 
and dysfunctional cooperation
Elisabeth Alber, Erika Arban, Paolo Colasante, 
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1.1 Introduction
Italy was severely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, with a disproportionately 
high number of infections and an even higher mortality rate (due to the large 
number of elderly people who died). As of 31 October 2020, 709,335 people 
in a population of about 60 million had been infected, with 38,826 fatalities. 
The impact of the first wave of infection was extremely uneven across Italy’s 
territories, with most of the cases concentrated in a handful of urbanised and 
industrialised regions in the north of the country. In the second wave, in autumn 
2020, the prevalence of the virus was instead more evenly distributed among the 
territories.
When the pandemic reached the country in January 2020, Italy’s hybrid 
territorial set-up, falling in between a fully fledged federal system and a uni-
tary state, was undergoing reforms aimed at strengthening its regional and local 
system. Although reforms were put on hold as a result of the emergency, they 
succeeded in raising concerns and generating proposals for counter-reform, not 
least because the country’s pandemic management laid three issues bare.
First, cooperation mechanisms across and within governmental levels are 
deficient and underutilised; secondly, while Italy’s 20 regions have a wide range 
of powers, including over health matters, in many cases they lack the capacity to 
face a major crisis; and thirdly, issues of insufficient capacity also afflict the coun-
try’s highly diverse and fragmented system of local government.
This chapter assesses the legal framework put in place at the national (state), 
the subnational (regional), and the municipal levels to face the Covid-19 emer-
gency. It seeks to identify how different measures and actors in the management 
of the pandemic relate to each other and points out inconsistencies and synergies 
as well as their impact on Italy’s asymmetric regionalism. The different responses 
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by the territories revealed both the potential of the country’s asymmetric ter-
ritorial governance and the weaknesses of its incomplete, quasi-federal system, 
especially as far as the unclear division of powers and inadequacy of intergovern-
mental relations (IGR) are concerned.
1.2 The constitutional and legal framework
1.2.1 Distribution of powers
Italy is a regional state blending together unitary and federal features, with 20 
regions being the main, though not the only, players at the subnational level. 
Article 5 of the Constitution promotes autonomy and decentralisation, while 
article 114(1) provides that, in addition to the state, Italy is composed of munici-
palities, provinces, metropolitan cities, and regions, all of which are ‘autonomous 
entities having their own statutes, powers and functions’.
The regional model is asymmetrical, in reflection of the numerous socio- 
economic, cultural, geographical, and other cleavages that characterise the country. 
Of the 20 regions, five – Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto 
Adige/Südtirol, and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste – have special forms of auton-
omy in terms of their form of government, distribution of legislative and adminis-
trative powers, and financial arrangements. These features are entrenched in their 
statutes of autonomy, which were bilaterally negotiated with the national gov-
ernment and have the rank of constitutional law (unlike the case with ordinary 
regions). Article 116(2) of the Constitution mandates, furthermore, that Trentino-
Alto Adige/Südtirol (Trentino-South Tyrol) ‘is composed of the autonomous 
provinces of Trento and Bolzano/Bozen’. Unlike other regions, in Trentino-
South Tyrol, most powers are vested with the two autonomous provinces, and 
not with the region (which results in two health-care systems in one region).
A constitutional reform in 2001 sought to reduce the gap between special and 
ordinary regions. Article 116(3) of the Constitution, introduced in 2001, allows 
ordinary regions to negotiate ‘additional special forms and conditions of auton-
omy’ with the national government, something which three regions – Lombardy, 
Veneto, and Emilia-Romagna – have been doing. This process, known as 
‘differentiated regionalism’, entails further regionalising powers in health mat-
ters, as a result allowing, for instance, for the possibility to tailor training courses 
to local needs, and for the creation and management of complementary health 
insurance schemes (Grazzini et al. 2019).
The division of legislative powers between the national government and ordi-
nary regions is enshrined in article 117(2) of the Constitution, which lists powers 
falling within the exclusive competence of the state. Article 117(3) enumerates 
powers shared by the state and the regions. In shared areas, legislative powers are 
vested in the regions, while the fundamental principles governing these powers 
are laid down in national legislation. Regions enjoy residual powers by virtue of 
article 117(4) of the Constitution. This division of legislative powers applies only 
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to ordinary regions, since the powers of autonomous regions are spelled out in 
their statutes of autonomy.
In practice, regional autonomy is conditioned by the financial relations that 
each region or entity has with the centre. Special regions are financed differently 
to ordinary regions: each special region enjoys a bilaterally negotiated financial 
regime based on a share of state taxes referable to the territory (from 25 to 90 
per cent), while ordinary regions depend largely on the centre. Such asymmetry 
is also reflected in how the local government level is financed: special regions in 
the north run local finance, whereas in Sicily and Sardinia local finance remains 
with the centre.
1.2.2 Distribution of powers in health matters
Article 32 of the Constitution protects the right to health, mandating that ‘[t]
he Republic safeguards health as a fundamental right of the individual and as a 
collective interest ….’ Law No. 833/1978 introduced universal health coverage, 
providing uniform and equal access to the National Healthcare Service (NHS) 
(Cicchetti and Gasbarrini 2016).
The NHS is organised at national, regional, and local levels and comprises an 
intricate web of responsibilities. Health protection is a competence shared between 
the state and the regions in an arrangement in which the national government 
‘sets the fundamental principles and goals of the health system, determines the 
core benefit package of health services guaranteed across the country … and allo-
cates national funds to the regions’ (Scaccia and D’Orazio 2020: 109). Regions, 
in turn, ‘are responsible for organising and delivering health care’ (Cicchetti and 
Gasbarrini 2016: 1). At the local level, local health authorities deliver community 
health services and primary care directly, while secondary and specialist care is 
delivered directly or through public hospitals and accredited private providers.
This arrangement has given rise to 21 regional health-care systems, all quite 
different in their effectiveness in service delivery and the efficiency with which 
they operate. In this regard, there is high patient mobility between regions along 
the north-south divide; at the same time, the national government acts as a 
(financial) watchdog imposing corrective policies based on a set of indicators for 
all those regions that are not able to guarantee the core benefit package of health 
services. In recent times, regions in the centre-south in particular (though not 
exclusively) have been subject to recovery plans that include actions to address 
the structural determinants of costs (Toth 2014).
Since 2001, different regions have made different choices as to their govern-
ance models in health care, models that range from the heavily centralised, such 
as in Tuscany, to the heavily privatised, such as in Lombardy. The latter opted 
for a so-called choice and competition model (Nuti et al. 2016: 18–19), while 
Tuscany (followed by other regions such as Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, and Veneto) adopted a model that combines hierarchy and targets, trans-
parent public ranking, and pay for performance (ibid: 21–2). From a substantive 
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viewpoint, it has thus been argued that in the last 10–15 years, the NHS has been 
strongly decentralised even though this evolution is not yet recognised formally 
(Neri 2019: 166).
1.2.3 Declaration of emergencies or disasters
Italy’s Constitution does not include any specific emergency provision. Article 77 
allows the national government to legislate, without previous delegation by 
Parliament, in cases of ‘necessity and urgency’. In such event, it can adopt, under 
its own responsibility, a temporary measure (law decree), one which needs to be 
converted into law by the national parliament within 60 days, otherwise it loses 
its validity from the outset.
The declaration of a state of emergency for public-health reasons is regulated 
in ordinary legislation in article 24 of the Code of Civil Protection. The Code, 
however, does not define the powers that the national government may exercise 
under a state of emergency, nor does it authorise to limit fundamental freedoms. 
It indicates simply the type of emergency events that can activate civil protection 
powers at local, regional, or state level.
In the case of Covid-19, the nature of the threat required the use of national 
civil protection powers. The head of the Civil Protection Department (CPD) 
was vested with the power to issue special orders in derogation of any cur-
rent provision and in compliance with the general principles of the legal sys-
tem (extraordinary ordinances of necessity and urgency) (Raffiotta 2020). While 
administrative in nature, these acts can derogate legislative provisions: in this 
way, the legal machinery was equipped to intervene at any given moment.
1.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
In Italy, civil protection responsibilities are not assigned to a single level of gov-
ernment but involve the entire territorial organisation. Although the country is 
frequently exposed to natural hazards, the civil protection system currently in 
place was established only in the early 1990s. In 1992, Law No. 225 established 
the civil protection system, dividing its actions into three categories (article 3): 
forecasting and prevention, relief and assistance, and management of state of 
emergency and recovery programmes.
Since its inception, the civil protection system has been an integrated one 
based on the principles of vertical and horizontal subsidiarity and thus entailing 
the involvement of all governmental levels and many actors across, within and 
beyond levels (with a highly mobile force of volunteers). Within the civil protec-
tion system, regions and local governments, acting in terms of national frame-
work regulations, formulate and implement their own emergency programmes 
and transmit data to the CPD as the operative arm of the national govern-
ment. In 2010, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Italy 19
(OECD) gave this decentralised system a positive evaluation, especially in 
regard to monitoring risks and providing efficient first-on-site response actions 
in case of earthquakes. However, in terms of health-related emergencies, in the 
absence of any major emergency in the past five decades prior to Covid-19, Italy 
has not been put to the test and its authorities have neglected to update their 
pandemic plans.
At a national level, the CPD was consequently forced to implement the 2006 
national plan against pandemics when Covid-19 entered the scene. Unlike 
other European Union (EU) member states, Italy’s authorities failed to update 
their pandemic plan in 2017 when the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control issued new guidelines. 
Regional health authorities were forced to apply outdated regional pandemic 
plans to the best of their knowledge.
Though it differed in extent from one region to another, this lack of 
preparedness – rather than decentralisation – compromised the effectiveness 
of responses to the emergency in the first half of 2020. Resources to face the 
pandemic were missing (for instance, personal protective equipment), as were 
risk-prevention protocols in care facilities and the capacity for mass testing and 
contact tracing. Intergovernmental data-sharing was, and remained, deficient; 
different territorial systems were, and remained, poorly interconnected and coor-
dinated. All of these issues triggered off various quarrels between the north and 
south and eventually turned into an intense political battle, one in which the 
weak coalition government became entrammelled and which cast its shadow over 
regional politics.
1.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
1.4.1 Taking the initiative
Caught unprepared, Italy followed an incremental ‘mitigation path’ rather 
than a ‘containment path’ in its pandemic management. It tried to dampen the 
pandemic’s impact on the health system and the resultant mortalities within a 
territorial system that, thanks to political gamesmanship, typically does not ben-
efit much from intergovernmental institutional learning capabilities. Overall, 
Italy’s pandemic response was impaired chiefly by three issues: first, the national 
government’s moderate to low capacity to implement its decisions collabora-
tively and launch relief and recovery packages speedily; secondly, incoherent 
policy-making tenuously based on evidence; and thirdly, deficient IGR struc-
tures (Capano 2020: 327–30).
Although experts had been warning of the severity of the coronavirus outbreak 
since the beginning of the year in 2020, the national government was unable to 
contain the virus whilst it was still in its infancy. It was only from early March 
2020 – following the recommendations of the National Health Institute (NHI) 
and an ad hoc expert committee formed on 5 February including the president 
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of the NHI – that a flood of measures were adopted at the national level. The 
expert committee was to be supplemented several times with further experts, in 
addition to which its gender representation was improved (initially it was male-
only). Numerous other taskforces were also established in individual ministries 
and at the subnational level.
From 18 March 2020, a special commissioner appointed by the national gov-
ernment coordinated all actions. For instance, until the end of April, the expert 
committee had been setting the standard for how tests were administered (for 
instance, only to persons with symptoms). This was considered controversial. 
The policy of the Veneto region at that point was to opt against such an approach 
in favour of mass testing and tracing (Lavezzo et al. 2020). In hindsight, Veneto 
is an example of how regional organisational autonomy in health care played 
out well in comparison to other regions such as Lombardy (even though the lat-
ter was under the same regional party-political leadership). Generally, pandemic 
management was, from the outset, caught up in a blame game between the 
national government and the opposition, one that unfolded in the context of an 
already volatile political situation.
Following the 2018 general elections, the anti-establishment party, the Five 
Star Movement (M5S), and the populist League (Lega per Salvini Premier, headed 
by Matteo Salvini), agreed on a government programme led by the independent 
Giuseppe Conte, who had never before held political office. After months of 
internal bickering, the ill-fated coalition government broke down when Salvini, 
in early August 2019, withdrew the League from the alliance and called for a 
snap election with the aim of becoming Prime Minister. The M5S, however, 
teamed up with the Democratic Party (PD), and in less than a month the new 
coalition government, again under the prime ministership of Giuseppe Conte, 
was sworn in.
It fell to this alliance, composed by traditionally staunch rivals, to navigate 
through the 2020 pandemic year, with polls showing an increase in popular sup-
port for centre-right parties. The second half of 2019 had suggested how fractious 
this alliance was – as part of the coalition government, former Prime Minister 
Matteo Renzi, elected in 2018 with the PD, left the PD in mid-September 2019 
to form his own party, Italia Viva. Throughout autumn 2020, dissenting opin-
ions on how to manage the pandemic and the resources connected to the EU 
Recovery Fund continued to weaken the coalition government, one which, in 
essence, managed the pandemic by decree while stressing that all measures taken 
were based on the recommendations of experts – a reading of the expert com-
mittee’s protocols shows, however, that many of its recommendations were dis-
regarded. At the beginning of the new year, a new crisis within the government 
arose, whose consequences have been the end of the second Government of 
Giuseppe Conte, succeeded by Mario Draghi, supported by almost all political 
parties in the Parliament.
Policy responses at regional level were likewise informed by volatile polit-
ical dynamics. Some regions took the lead in clearly voicing their strategies to 
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contain the pandemic and its impact; however, party allegiances alone were 
not an indicator or predictor of how effective (or ineffective) the strategies 
adopted were. Generally, many factors determine to what extent regional (and 
local) governing practices are dependent on and affected by the political situa-
tion at the national level. The most important are differences in fiscal capacity; 
differences in health-care models and the capacities of regional administra-
tion (in the case of the pandemic in 2020); and differences in personality and 
character of regional political leaders (all except two presidents are directly 
elected).
After the regional elections in 2020 (Emilia-Romagna and Calabria voted 
on 26 January and Aosta Valley, Veneto, Liguria, Tuscany, Marche, Campania, 
and Puglia on 20–21 September), the centre-left held on to five regions, while 
the centre-right retained 14 regions (among them the autonomous province 
of Trento, led by the League). Aosta Valley and the autonomous province of 
Bolzano/Bozen are led by autonomist political parties. In brief, the September 
elections saw victories for those presidents who performed well during the first 
wave of Covid-19 infections, such as Luca Zaia in Veneto from the League.
1.4.2 National action
On 31 January 2020, one day after the WHO declared the Covid-19 outbreak 
a public emergency of international concern, the Italian government declared 
a state of emergency. The country’s first cases of infection were reported on 17 
February in two small towns in Lombardy and Veneto. At that time, the national 
strategy was to contain the pandemic by local ordinances. Likewise, a regional 
ordinance introducing quarantine measures was issued on 21 February regarding 
the outbreak of the coronavirus in some municipalities in Lombardy.
As the coronavirus rapidly began to spread, the national government issued 
Law Decree No. 6 of 23 February 2020 which vested subnational authorities 
with the power to ‘adopt all containment and management measures that are 
adequate and proportionate to the evolution of the epidemiological situation’ 
(article 1(1)). Thereafter, further decrees and ordinances by the Prime Minister, 
CPD and Minister of Health provided detail as to who the ‘competent authori-
ties’ were and what their margin of action was.
Regarding lockdowns, a series of Prime Minister’s Decrees (DPCM) were 
issued from 23 February to 4 March 2020 with the aim of gradually tightening 
restrictive measures for the containment of the pandemic and providing for the 
isolation of the affected areas (‘red zones’). These containment measures, initially 
limited to some municipalities, were also imposed on the residents of Lombardy 
and of 14 provinces in other northern regions. The nationwide lockdown was 
regulated by the DPCM issued on 8 and 9 March (and subsequently extended 
until May). It included severe travel restrictions (with exceptions for work or 
health-related grounds, or any exigency, always to be stated in a self-certification), 
a ban on outdoor gatherings, the closure of educational facilities (and transition to 
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online learning), smart work procedures for the public and private sectors, and the 
suspension of all public events (including religious ceremonies).
The DPCM of 11 March 2020 tightened the lockdown measures, closing res-
taurants and the like (except for home deliveries) and retail commercial activities 
(except for essential ones such as grocery stores and pharmacies). As for local 
public transport, the decree left it to the presidents of regions to determine how 
they would maintain minimum essential services. On 20 and 22 March 2020, 
ordinances by the Minister of Health closed parks and public gardens as well as 
restricted exercise and sports activities (to be done individually and in proxim-
ity to one’s home). The DPCM of 22 March 2020 suspended all non-essential 
industrial and commercial activities, while several DPCMs in March and April 
extended the duration of the lockdown measures until 17 May 2020, when a 
further DPCM lifted some of the restrictions and allowed for an incremental 
reopening of businesses and resumption of activities.
In regard to economic aid and relief, a first small package was adopted at the 
beginning of the pandemic. On 28 February 2020, the national government 
enacted a law decree supporting families and commercial activities with EUR 
5.7 billion. Much more important was the second package, the Law Decree ‘Cure 
Italy’ of 16 March 2020, the purpose of which was to strengthen the health sys-
tem and grant economic relief to families and commercial enterprises (especially 
in sectors such as tourism, logistics, and transportation). During the first hard 
lockdown, an additional law decree was issued on 6 April 2020 that supported 
businesses by providing loan guarantees, tax relief, and government assumption 
of non-market risks. Law Decree No. 19/2020 (‘Relaunch Decree’) of 19 May 
2020 injected EUR 55 billion in support of health care, employment and the 
economy, and social policies. The last major act in support of the economy before 
autumn was Law Decree No. 104/2020 of 14 August 2020.
In autumn 2020, the national government found itself in political deadlock in 
deliberations over the national plans for recovery and resilience that Italy, like all 
EU members, had to submit to the European Commission by April 2021 as part 
of the requirements of the EU Recovery Fund. The national government con-
tinued to rule by decree, doing so in terms of calculations linked to a catalogue 
of 21 indicators, and imposed a phased lockdown policy on subnational entities 
that involved a shift from stricter to softer measures. The focus was on supporting 
the economy, with the regions given greater latitude in combating the pandemic.
1.4.3 Regional action
In declaring a state of emergency, the national government seized a significant 
extent of power from the regions or at least was formally entitled to do so. In 
the first half of 2020, a long list of national measures were enacted regarding the 
rules of the strict lockdown (from 8 March 2020) and its gradual easing (from 
4 May 2020, with the lifting of the inter-regional travel ban as first measure). 
The roll-out of various measures at the national, regional, and local levels made it 
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difficult to distinguish between the measures taken at different levels of govern-
ment, not least because of the lack of coordination among all the various actors.
During an initial series of vague national measures and a proliferation of 
regional ordinances, the first half of 2020 was characterised by acrimony 
between the national government and the presidents of the regions. Many of 
the regional presidents issued regional ordinances aimed at imposing restrictive 
measures beyond those adopted at the national level, such as the clearly unconsti-
tutional closure of regional borders in Campania, obligatory flu vaccinations in 
Lazio, and the closure of all educational institutions in Marche. Other examples 
of regional ordinances in the first phase include the identification and delimita-
tion of red zones that were to be isolated from the rest of the regional territory for 
a limited period (e.g., in Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, and Abruzzo). A similar trend 
re-emerged in October 2020 during Italy’s second wave of infections.
Both article 32 of Law No. 833/1978 (the one introducing the NHS) and arti-
cles 6, 11, and 25 of the Code of Civil Protection vest regional presidents with the 
power to issue ordinances in the field of civil protection whenever a health-re-
lated emergency occurs. The mayors have the same powers for their respective 
municipal territories under the law on local authorities (Legislative Decree No. 
267/2000). The multiple powers assigned to the regions in the field of civil pro-
tection, especially in the event of health emergencies, and the proliferation of 
‘insufficiently coordinated’ (Baldini 2020: 985) national and regional measures, 
made it very difficult to ascertain who was responsible for which measures. While 
some regional ordinances were suspended, others with the same content were not.
The tug of war between the national government and the regions continued, 
increasing in April and May 2020 with the relaxation of the lockdown. Regions 
governed by centre-right coalitions (thus opposing the centre-left national gov-
ernment in Rome) and those less affected by the pandemic were especially eager 
to put their own spin on the rules specifying the exact timetable for easing meas-
ures (e.g., in regard to reopening bars and restaurants, or allowing visitors to 
access public beaches).
Calabria serves as an example: on 29 April, its president signed a regional 
ordinance easing the lockdown by reopening bars, restaurants, and pizzerias with 
outdoor-table service. The national government challenged these measures and, 
on 9 May, the administrative court of Calabria found in its favour, on the ground 
that it is the responsibility of the central authorities to identify measures to limit 
the spread of Covid-19, whereas regions are entitled to intervene only within the 
limits outlined in these national measures.
Likewise, the autonomous province of Bolzano/Bozen (South Tyrol) is note-
worthy for its individuality of style. The national government intended to be the 
one to ease the lockdown and to allow regions to do so from 18 May 2020, but – 
uniquely among the regions – South Tyrol jumped the gun by passing its own law 
on the resumption of activities (Law No. 4 of 8 May 2020) several days before then. 
In doing so, its provincial authorities clearly intended to demonstrate the politi-
cal autonomy that their region enjoys. In November 2020, Aosta Valley followed 
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suit by adopting its own regional law, which was however struck down by the 
Constitutional Court in February 2021, while other regions kept intervening by 
way of administrative measures (ordinances) rather than by passing their own laws.
Another example of dysfunctional intergovernmental cooperation is provided 
by the unilateral decision of a regional health authority that, in September 2020, 
decided to ban a professional football team of the first division from travelling 
to another region to play a match because a few players had tested positive for 
Covid-19; it thereby flouted a special protocol negotiated by the national gov-
ernment and the football league which regulates such cases in the interests of 
regular championship matches.
1.4.4 Municipal action
The evolution of the pandemic shows that regional and municipal ordinances 
are critical to tailoring containment measures to the needs of different territories 
(Boggero 2020: 362). After the state of emergency was declared, the national 
government set a centralist tone at the outset when its first law decree, No. 6 
of 23 February 2020, essentially appropriated the power of local authorities to 
issue ordinances and attempted to regulate local government’s scope of action in 
managing the pandemic (Cerchi and Deffenu 2020: 671). Thereafter, in March, 
the national government sought to introduce clarity to the regulatory chaos that 
had reigned since the pandemic began and individual local authorities had acted 
independently of the national government.
Law Decree No. 9 of 2 March 2020 established that municipal ordinances 
that stood in contrast with national measures were to be considered unlawful, 
while Law Decree No. 19 of 25 March 2020 stressed the relevance of measures 
issued at the central level. It also explicitly defined the area of competence of 
local and regional authorities. In the absence of any DPCM on the same matter 
and only in case of aggravated health conditions, the presidents of the regions and 
the mayors were granted the power to introduce additional and more restrictive 
measures. However, any action by local and regional authorities that could limit 
activities strategic to the national economy, such as the production of medicines 
or health-related equipment, along with any action that could compromise civil 
and social rights, or any action in health preventive measures at the international 
level, were unlawful and remained the sole prerogative of the state.
Within this regulatory framework, local authorities had little room for 
manoeuvre during the hard lockdown of March to May 2020, though it began 
to expand again as the lockdown was relaxed. Local authorities in Italy were thus 
insufficiently involved in pandemic management. Several scholars claimed that, 
in keeping with the law on local authorities (Legislative Decree No. 267/2000), 
local government should have been granted the power to issue ordinances ‘as 
a matter of principle’ during the emergency (Luciani 2020: 22). In terms of 
articles 50(5) and 54 of Legislative Decree No. 267/2000, in the event of local 
health emergencies, mayors can enact urgent and necessary ordinances. The 
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same law also grants the mayor the power to enact ordinances acting as officer 
of the national government in situations when public safety and urban security 
are under threat (Sabbioni 2019: 304). Furthermore, article 32(3) of Law No. 
833/1978 also raises the possibility for mayors to adopt urgent emergency ordi-
nances in areas that normally fall under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Health.
Examples abound of how the tug of war between local authorities and the 
national government unfolded. On 23 February 2020, the municipalities of the 
island of Ischia restricted access to the island for specific categories of citizens. 
On that same day, the ordinance was nullified by the prefect (De Siano 2020: 
3–4) on the ground that municipal ordinances cannot contradict national leg-
islation: in the absence of any specific health risk, local authorities cannot limit 
freedom of movement.
Another example was the ordinance of the Sicilian municipality of Messina 
(5 April 2020), which restricted access to the city harbour that connects the island 
to continental Italy – a vital route. The provision required any boat to register 
online 48 hours before its departure and await the municipality’s authorisation 
to enter the harbour. The national government challenged the ordinance in the 
administrative court, which nullified it (Pignatelli 2020a) for violating several 
constitutional provisions, among them the principle of equality (article 3), per-
sonal liberty (article 13), freedom of movement (article 16), and state jurisdiction 
over public order, security, and disease prevention (article 117(h)–(q)). The court 
observed that a national emergency demands unitary management of the crisis 
and thus regional or local measures cannot undermine the national strategy.
In general, local actions in the first half of 2020 mainly concerned the issu-
ance of ordinances aimed at closing public areas and ensuring social distancing. 
Despite centralisation, the power of municipalities was not seized entirely and, 
indeed, proved to be an essential part of the engine of Italy’s emergency legisla-
tion (Pignatelli 2020b).
In regard to social-economic action, (in)activity at the local level showcased 
how unprepared local authorities were but also how much potential they hold 
as institutions. Solidarity and socio-economic relief measures were implemented 
through public-private partnerships and territorial networks that mobilised infor-
mal relationships among communities, often so in cooperation with volunteers 
from the Red Cross and the civil protection system. Several municipalities organ-
ised volunteers to provide basic services for persons and families hard hit by the 
pandemic or its consequences. Italian local government demonstrated innova-
tiveness and cost-effectiveness in drawing on active citizenship and community 
volunteerism in the contribution it made to the country’s pandemic response.
1.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
The management of the first wave of the pandemic in early 2020 was strongly 
centralised, mainly due to two reasons. First, capacity was often lacking at the 
regional and local levels of government. Secondly, the national government 
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was unable to make effective use of the extant but deficient IGR mechanisms. 
Consultation and cooperation initiatives with regional and local authorities were 
rare and implemented only half-heartedly, with the lack of transparency in man-
aging the pandemic being ill-received by the authorities of subnational govern-
ments as well as by experts and the public.
More generally, dysfunctional cooperation between levels of government is 
the reason that many of Italy’s federalising reforms since the late 1990s remain 
little implemented. Given that the 1948 Constitution was silent on mecha-
nisms of collaboration between the regions and the state, it fell to the Italian 
Constitutional Court (ItCC) to introduce a few such mechanisms judicially, 
among them the principle of loyal cooperation between state and regions 
(Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012: 384). For the ItCC, loyal cooperation should 
apply in areas of shared powers but also, more broadly, to all institutional rela-
tions between regions and the state ( Judgment No. 242/1997), the aim being 
to limit conflict and solve complex governance issues collaboratively both in 
ordinary and extraordinary times. Decisions taken by the national government 
that are based on a merely formal consultation with the regions are illegitimate 
( Judgment No. 246/2019).
The principle of loyal cooperation, eventually entrenched in article 120(2) 
of the Constitution in 2001 and confirmed as a core principle by the ItCC in 
many rulings, is embodied in a system of intergovernmental conferences. These 
are consultative bodies for meetings of the regional presidents, the presidents of 
the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano, and the Prime Minister (who 
chairs it), or competent regional and national ministers. The conferences were 
introduced to compensate for the fact that the Italian Constitution does not pro-
vide for a federal second chamber: the national parliament is bicameral (Chamber 
of Deputies and Senate), but the Senate does not function as a typical ‘federal’ 
upper chamber, since it does not represent regions or other territorial autono-
mies. Over the past few decades, a number of proposals have been advanced to 
change the Senate into a ‘regional’ chamber, but to no avail.
During the first wave of the pandemic, the ‘Permanent Conference for the rela-
tions among state, regions and autonomous provinces’ (Permanent Conference), 
created in 1983 and regulated by law in 1988, met even less frequently than usual 
and could not serve as a viable body for negotiating policies (Cortese 2020: 5). 
Empirical evidence shows that in the first half of 2020 neither the state nor the 
regions adhered properly to the principle of loyal cooperation. They did not make 
the best use of the Permanent Conference to coordinate responses to the pandemic. 
Regulatory chaos and court litigation were the consequences. Wisely, however, 
the national government never appealed to article 120 of the Constitution which 
enables it to ‘act for bodies of the regions, metropolitan cities, provinces and 
municipalities … in the case of grave danger for public safety and security’.
During the second wave of the pandemic, the use of the Permanent 
Conference became much more frequent, even though the regions preferred to 
resort as far and often as they could to bilateral relationships with the national 
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government while, for its part, the national government continued to rule by 
decree. Regional presidents maintained a stance in favour or against the central 
government mainly on the basis of their financial dependence from Rome and 
their leadership capacity within the region. This in part explains why even those 
regions governed by the same political leadership approached both IGR and 
regional management of the pandemic so very differently.
1.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Although the full impact of the pandemic is yet to be reckoned, the dangerous 
‘scissors effect’ of rising expenditure and falling revenues in subnational financ-
ing is significant. What is more, when the pandemic struck Italy, the south of 
the country had not yet recovered from the effects of the 2008 financial crisis: 
the gross domestic product (GDP) was still substantially lower than before the 
financial crisis, given that since 2008 the economy had entered a recession with 
plummeting productive capacity, employment levels, and consumer demand.
Thus, although the south experienced a less severe health emergency in early 
2020 than the north, the impact of the pandemic on household incomes, fac-
toring out government support, was larger there than in the north. In addition, 
unemployment in 2020 grew more in the south than in any other part, with 
disastrous consequences for all those unable to profit from governmental relief 
packages because they were engaged in the informal economy that is typical of 
Italy’s south (Banca d’Italia 2020). When the second wave of infection hit the 
south, the economic impact was even more devastating than in the first wave.
The Association of Italian Municipalities developed three scenarios for the 
loss of revenue among municipalities, with the high-risk scenario entailing a 
projected drop of almost 21 per cent compared to 2019 and consequences that 
cause severe recovery difficulties for all economic sectors (ANCI 2020). The 
low-risk scenario with a drop of 9 per cent compared to 2019 was projected in 
case of a relatively rapid exit from the emergency starting in May 2020, while the 
medium-risk scenario was associated with a drop of 14 per cent. Regional gov-
ernments faced significant financial difficulties too, as most of their expenditure 
was concentrated on health (85 per cent on average) while at the same time they 
lost much of their income from the regional tax on productive output (IRAP), 
the regional surtax on personal income tax, and the regional tax on vehicles. 
In health matters, concerted policy-making between central and regional gov-
ernments has decreased significantly in recent years, as a result of which health 
systems have been under-financed compared to those in central and northern 
European countries (Neri 2019: 158).
The case of the health-care system in Calabria, which has been subject to a 
recovery plan for more than a decade, is an example of the deficiency of inter-
governmental fiscal relations in health governance. The special commissioner 
nominated by the national government failed to implement basic aspects of 
the centrally directed regional Covid-19 mitigation strategy (such as collecting 
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accurate data on hospital beds, one of 21 indicators on which the national gov-
ernment based its regionally differentiated lockdown policy in autumn 2020). 
The pandemic could not but worsen Calabria’s financial dependency on the state, 
with the situation clearly showing how dysfunctional cooperation was between 
different levels of government.
Under these kinds of circumstances, most subnational governments were una-
ble to fulfil costly responsibilities in pandemic management on their own and 
became more dependent on the state. The national government set up techni-
cal committees to monitor the pandemic’s effects on the adequacy of revenue 
to cover the expenditure needs of subnational governments. These committees 
assisted the national government in deciding how best to provide additional 
funds to subnational governments – such funds had no conditions attached to 
them other than the requirement of extra accountability and transparency in 
their management.
More generally, it is important to stress that in Italian intergovernmental fiscal 
relations, central authorities retain considerable control over financial resources. 
In health matters, complex negotiations between the national government and 
regional authorities normally determine financial allocations to the regional-
ised health-care systems, with the allocations channelled through the National 
Health Fund (NHF) and the national government discussing its proposal in the 
Permanent Conference. Basically, the national government annually allocates to 
the regions a budget for the provision of health-care services by calculating the 
essential assistance levels in the budget law on the basis of a population-based 
formula only partially weighted by demographic factors and the health status of 
the population.
The total amount of resources to be allotted to the NHF is calculated initially, 
then split up among the regions after they have been heard. On average, the 
capitation rate represents 97 per cent of the total health-care resources availa-
ble to regions, while the remaining 3 per cent of resources are made up by the 
regional systems through own-source funding, including fees paid by patients 
and co-payments for specialised treatments. Local health units are funded mainly 
through capitated budgets, albeit in the absence of clear guidelines applicable 
throughout the country. Funding schemes for special regions differ to a certain 
extent from these arrangements (Balduzzi and Paris 2018).
No systematic datasets are available yet to shed light on how effective the 
2020 relief and aid packages were. Evidence based on observation and scattered 
(ministerial) documentation, however, suggests they were so only to a very lim-
ited extent. The main reasons for this are, first, that bureaucratic obstacles hin-
dered speedy processing of applications and provision of aid, with these obstacles 
compounded by corruption scandals and the lengthy court proceedings to which 
they gave rise; secondly, the national government tried to navigate the crisis in 
a short-term, ad hoc way by adopting small relief packages rather than bigger 
ones that would support Italy’s subnational authorities and their very different 
economies in a more holistic manner.
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By and large, the effects of the pandemic on subnational financing and fiscal 
relations were shaped by five factors (OECD 2020: 16). First, the degree of 
decentralisation and spending responsibilities: intergovernmental fiscal rela-
tions in Italy are characterised by a centralised tax system and a significant 
decentralisation of spending responsibilities. This gives rise to a noteworthy 
vertical fiscal gap that applies to both the local and, above all, the regional 
level. Resources in ‘health federalism’ are channelled to regions through their 
own tax revenues, shares of national taxes and national equalisation transfers 
sustained by central value-added tax (VAT) revenue. Given that the regions 
have markedly different fiscal capacities, and that health care varies widely 
across the country, equalisation is crucial. Secondly, the characteristics of sub-
national government revenue: subnational governments in Italy rely heavily 
on grants and subsidies.
The remaining three factors to which the OECD points when addressing the 
territorial impact of the pandemic are the ability of subnational governments to 
absorb exceptional stress (‘fiscal flexibility’); the fiscal health conditions of sub-
national governments; and the scope and efficiency of support policies. Empirical 
evidence shows that all these factors were highly compromised in Italy, a state 
which for the past 10 years had suffered from severe fiscal consolidation measures 
and in which the debt burden (reaching 134.8 per cent of GDP in 2019) has been 
posing serious constraints on government public spending and on the implemen-
tation of expansionary fiscal reforms.
1.5 Findings and policy implications
When the Covid-19 pandemic hit Italy, the country was about to celebrate the 
50th anniversary of the establishment of ordinary regions – special ones having 
been in place since 1948. With the powers of the regions having been enhanced by 
reforms over the course of more than seven decades, the time was ripe for recon-
sidering Italy’s territorial structure. In this regard, three sizeable and politically 
and economically strong regions in the north – Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia-
Romagna – were about to conclude agreements with the national government 
on the transfer of additional legislative powers (and related funds) in a long and 
significant list of areas, one ranging from environmental protection to education, 
from airports to labour security and protection, and from foreign trade to disaster 
management, among other things. The process was stalled by the pandemic – but, 
ironically, these regions were the worst affected by it, which raised the question of 
whether greater regional autonomy is indeed desirable or not (Malo 2020).
Finally, in September 2020 a national referendum endorsed a constitutional 
reform that reduces the size of both chambers of the national parliament by one-
third, thereby further limiting the already feeble link between the Senate and the 
regions and making it politically more difficult to table a reform that transforms 
the Senate into a chamber of regional representation – a proposal that, as noted 
above, has been on the agenda unsuccessfully for decades.
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The pandemic is likely to impact strongly on these ongoing reform processes. 
It is too soon to tell what its institutional consequences will be, particularly given 
that at the time of this writing Italy was still in the midst of an unfolding health 
and economic emergency. Nor is it possible to say whether a more centralised or 
more decentralised structure of the country would have led overall to better or 
worse management of the pandemic, since performance varied markedly among 
the regions. It is certainly the case, however, that the emergency revealed the 
main weaknesses of the Italian regional system: the unclear division of pow-
ers between the centre and the regions; weak intergovernmental relations; and 
the high degree of asymmetry in powers, administrative capacity, and political 
strength among the regions (Clementi 2020).
As regards the division of powers, the constitutional reform adopted in 2001 
increased the role of the regions but also created a number of overlaps and poten-
tial conflicts; above all, it by no means enhanced the ‘federal spirit’ (Burgess 
2012). Rather, in the political and academic debates, sentiments against regional 
autonomy are generally on the rise. As happened after the global financial crisis 
of 2009/10, the pandemic confirmed that the division of powers in Italy is not 
sound enough to resist a moment of crisis – indeed, Covid-19 has amplified 
the debate between those advocating greater centralisation and those supporting 
greater regional autonomy.
With regard to IGR, the absence of a territorial chamber and the structural 
weakness of the existing bodies for intergovernmental cooperation, notably 
the Permanent Conference, reduced regional involvement to a mere formality, 
with the state having appropriated all powers at the height of the emergency. 
At times like these when strong coordination is needed, the role of mechanisms 
that are effective in representing the voice of subnational entities becomes cru-
cial. If the mechanisms are ineffective, as in the case of Italy, joint decisions 
simply become top-down impositions and the involvement of regions, a sham. 
The inefficiency of multilateral IGR mechanisms encourages the more power-
ful regions to engage in bilateral negotiations, thus accentuating the asymme-
try inherent in the design of the territorial set-up and arousing jealousy among 
the regions.
Strong pre-existing de jure and de facto asymmetries among the Italian 
regions became ever more acute during the pandemic. Regional performance in 
tackling the emergency, especially in the area of health care, was mixed. Some 
regions fared extraordinarily well despite severe cuts over the past decade due 
to the debt-cutting policies, while others made serious mistakes, such as placing 
Covid-19 patients in elderly homes. Differences in performance were reflected 
in the political sphere, with some regional presidents increasing their popular 
support and others losing it in elections held in September 2020.
In sum, Covid-19 has placed the tensions between calls for further decentral-
isation and for re-centralisation under the spotlight. At the same time, ongoing 
reform processes stand to be significantly impacted, and their trajectory will not 
be the same as it would have been without the pandemic. The main pressure is 
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no doubt for public health care to undergo a certain degree of re-centralisation. 
Even though most regions reacted well, the dominant discourse focuses on their 
large differences in terms of services, resources, and performance, and it is not 
unlikely that the opportunity will be seized to introduce stronger national con-
trol (Ciardo 2020). For some reason, the predominant sentiment in both politics 
and academia is the fear that regional differentiation might impair the equal 
protection of social rights.
Some reforms in the Italian regional system are indeed necessary, and the pan-
demic has made this all the more evident. As to the content of the reforms, how-
ever, opinions that were all but unanimous before the pandemic became ever 
more divided during it. These divisions of opinion will probably slow down, 
rather than speed up the necessary reforms and intensify, rather than subdue, 
conflicts between the centre and the territories.
Note
 1 Sections 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.4.3, and 1.4.5 were written by Elisabeth Alber and Erika 
Arban; Section 1.2.3 by Paolo Colasante; Section 1.4.2 by Paolo Colasante and Adriano 
Dirri; Section 1.4.4 by Adriano Dirri; and Sections 1.3, 1.4.1, and 1.4.6 by Elisabeth 
Alber. The Introduction and section 1.5 were written by Francesco Palermo. 
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Stress-testing the Spanish territorial system
Mikel Erkoreka, Mireia Grau Creus and Mario Kölling
2.1 Introduction
In mid-March 2020, the Spanish government triggered the constitutional 
mechanisms that were necessary for it to declare a state of alarm and embark 
on drastic measures to combat the spread of Covid-19, measures that involved 
curtailing fundamental rights. This was the first time the country had faced a 
deadly nationwide pandemic. It took the institutional and political system by 
surprise, deprived as it was of any experience of reacting to crises of this kind 
as a decentralised entity; moreover, Spain was far from placid when the virus 
struck, finding itself amidst turbulence blowing in from different social and 
political fronts.
This chapter sets out to examine how the country’s governance system and 
territorial model responded to the stress test forced on it by the Covid-19 pan-
demic. The analysis covers the period from March to October 2020, which 
allows us to consider how institutional responses and intergovernmental relations 
(IGR) evolved between the domestic outbreak of the coronavirus and the start of 
a second declared state of alarm.
To set the scene, Spain has an area of 506,000 km2 and a population of 
46.3 million, making it the second-largest country by size in the European 
Union (EU) and the fifth largest by population. A high proportion of the popu-
lation lives in urban areas, and the country has a number of sizeable cities – the 
two largest are Madrid and Barcelona, which have populations of 6.2 million and 
5.2 million, respectively. Spain’s population density is lower than that of most 
other Western European countries.
The 1978 Constitution introduced a form of political organisation that saw 
the country shift from a highly centralised system to, according to some, a quasi- 
federal arrangement. At present, Spain is divided into 17 autonomous communities 
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(ACs) and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. Decentralisation has 
been moderately successful, although for years experts have been calling for the 
Constitution to be revised in order to reflect the current reality of the territorial 
model and establish a federal framework ensuring an equilibrium between unity 
and diversity, shared rule and self-rule.
Spain is credited with one of the best-performing health systems in the 
world, having been ranked 15th in the Global Health Security Index in 2019 
( Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 2019). Life expectancy 
in Spain is the highest in the EU, and social inequalities in health are less 
pronounced than in many other countries. However, an ageing population 
and the associated increase in chronic diseases pose some risks to the system’s 
sustainability.
After the global financial crisis of 2008 and the prolonged recession that 
ensued, public spending on health decreased for several years before begin-
ning to increase again recently. Since 2014 the trend has been towards an 
increase in expenditure per capita in all ACs. However, the differences 
between the ACs are important. There is in 2019, on the one hand, a group 
of ACs with expenditure of about EUR 1,200 per inhabitant (Andalusia, 
Madrid, Catalonia, and Murcia) and, on the other, a group where it is about 
EUR 1,700 (Basque Country, Navarre, and Asturias). In general terms, in 
2019 health spending per capita in Spain was more than 15 per cent lower 
than the EU average (OECD and European Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies 2019).
As regards the political landscape, Spain has been in crisis mode for a decade. 
The economic and financial crisis has led to the so-called crisis of representative 
institutions in which there has been a huge loss of popular confidence in aspects 
of the democratic system. At the same time, the secessionist conflict in Catalonia 
intensified in 2012, culminating in 2017 in a unilateral declaration of independ-
ence. This was followed by the application of article 155 of the Constitution, 
which empowered the central government to remove the Catalan government, 
impose direct rule, dissolve the parliament, and call for snap elections that took 
place on 21 December 2017.1 In parallel, the leaders of the independence move-
ment were prosecuted and jailed.
The conflict in Catalonia has hindered reforms of the territorial model, for 
example, of the Senate or the territorial funding system. More widely, reform 
initiatives in general have not been successful, due to, among other things, 
party politics. From the mid-1980s to the mid-2010s, Spain’s party system was 
dominated by a straightforward competition between the social-democratic 
Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the conservative People’s Party 
(PP). Since 2014, however, the leftist Podemos party and the centre-right liberal 
Ciudadanos have entered the national arena, the moderate nationalist Catalan 
forces have collapsed, and a radical-right populist party, Vox, has emerged 
with strength. Due to the fragmentation and polarisation of the party system, 
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since 2015 no party has been able to form a stable governmental majority after 
elections.
The fragmentation of the party system intensified after the 2019 general elec-
tions, when 22 parties obtained representatives in the Congress of Deputies, the 
lower house of the Spanish parliament. In January 2020, a minority left-wing 
coalition government consisting of the PSOE and Unidas Podemos (‘United We 
Can’) came to power. This first Spanish-wide coalition government since the 
Second Republic (1931–1939) had a long to-do list. After years of austerity pol-
icies, the new government wanted to increase public spending; it was also ready 
to start a dialogue with political parties in Catalonia on how to resolve the crisis 
in the region.
In contrast to the turbulent political panorama, economic growth remained 
solid before the outbreak of the 2020 pandemic. Nevertheless, in November 
2019, the European Commission decreased its gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth forecast for Spain from 2.6 per cent to 1.9 per cent. Growth rates were 
expected to slow down even further in 2020 to 1.5 per cent, which was already 
worrisome given the size of the country’s public debt burden.
The coronavirus’s entry into Spain was confirmed on 31 January 2020, when 
a German tourist on the Canary Islands became the country’s first case of Covid-
19. Community transmission had begun by mid-February; at the beginning of 
March, Spain recorded its first Covid-19 fatality, and by 13 March, cases had 
been confirmed in all the ACs, with the death toll rocketing. At the start of 
June, there were no reported fatalities, but afterwards the number of cases again 
increased. In September, health authorities were detecting greater numbers of 
new infections than they had witnessed in April and May.
Nevertheless, July had marked a turning point. The situation in that month 
was very different than in the months before it. During the first wave of 
infections – only serious cases were recorded; from July onwards, many of those 
who tested positive had but minor symptoms or were asymptomatic, a shift that 
pointed to the onset of a second, and more expansive wave of the pandemic. As at 
the end of October, health authorities had detected more than 1.2 million cases, 
and there were more than 36,500 confirmed deaths (Centro de Coordinación de 
Alertas y Emergencias Sanitarias 2020). These statistics placed Spain among the 
worst-affected countries in the world.
2.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
Since the 1980s, Spain developed from a unitary state with a long-standing cen-
tralist tradition into a highly decentralised state. However, the Constitution does 
not clearly establish a decentralised system; instead, it contains rules and proce-
dures to be followed in order to achieve self-government. Some competences are 
expressly attributed to the central state (Constitution, article 149), whereas all 
matters not allocated to it may be assumed by the AC (Tudela and Kölling 2020). 
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In 2020, the ACs had assumed most of the competences available to them, such 
as health, disaster management, education, and regional economic development. 
Nevertheless, the central state continued to maintain, as it does generally, the 
responsibility of coordinating state-wide policy-making.
In regard to the health-care system, it is based on the principles of univer-
sality, free access, and equity. Coverage is funded mainly by taxes, and care is 
provided predominantly within the public sector (Bernal-Delgado, et al. 2018).
Responses to the Covid-19 crisis were based largely on the constitutional 
provisions regulating one of the three types of states of exceptionality: that of 
the state of alarm. Of the three exceptional regimes provided for in article 116 of 
the Constitution and in Organic Law 4/1981 – the states of alarm, emergency,2 
and siege3 – only the state of alarm expressly provides that it may be declared 
in the event of health crises such as epidemics and situations of serious pollution 
(Organic Law 4/1981, article 4(b)). However, the Constitution establishes several 
limits (article 116(2)): measures taken under a state of alarm must be temporary, 
confined to a specific area, and restricted to what is necessary to contain the 
emergency.
Furthermore, if the emergency is limited to a specific AC, the latter can 
request that the central government declare a state of alarm in its territory. The 
central government or the government of the affected ACs may serve, in case 
of a state of alarm, as the competent authority. Accordingly, the authorities have 
a wide margin of discretion to determine measures under a state of alarm – for 
example, the first state of alarm was decreed in 2010 solely to maintain control of 
Spanish airports following a strike by air-traffic controllers.
The Organic Law 3/86 on Special Measures in Matters of Public Health lists 
the conditions under which the central or AC health authorities may, within their 
jurisdictions, adopt public health measures in times of emergencies. According to 
article 3, health authorities may, in addition to general preventative actions, take 
appropriate measures for the control of persons who are or have been in contact 
with infected persons or their immediate environment, as well as take measures 
necessary to prevent the risk of transmission.
2.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
As mentioned, Spain had no experience of dealing with a disaster like Covid-19. 
For instance, unlike the rest of Europe, it had not been affected by either SARS 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) or MERS (Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome). The country has, however, been embroiled in a long-term conflict 
with the terrorist organisation ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty) and, since 
the early 2000s, with international jihadism. The Madrid terrorist bombings of 
11 March 2004 led (temporarily) to improved coordination among the National 
Intelligence Agency, the armed forces, and the police and security forces of 
the ACs.
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In 2013, the National Early Warning and Rapid Response System, or Sistema 
Nacional de Alerta Precoz y Respuesta Rápida (SIAPR), was created. Within this 
system, the Coordination Centre for Health Alerts and Emergencies – a Spanish 
health ministry department – assumes the functions of coordination, notifica-
tion, and evaluation of epidemiological or pandemic crisis. SIARP was favourably 
evaluated in the Global Health Security Index 2019, although it was ranked low 
for its ability to prevent and react to pandemic challenges – in particular, because 
the only intergovernmental relations for which it provides involve meetings at the 
lower administrative level rather than engagement between the central govern-
ment and ACs (Arteaga 2020). As it proved, the Coordination Centre for Health 
Alerts and Emergencies was quickly overwhelmed by the Covid-19 crisis at its 
outset in March 2020 and unable to collect data in a timely, orderly way.
2.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
In analysing the evolution of the framework of action at federal and state level, 
it is necessary to differentiate between four consecutive stages of pandemic 
response, as shown in Figure 2.1:
1. the period of the appearance and spread of the virus prior to the declaration 
of the first nationwide state of alarm (late January–13 March);
2. the period in which the first state of alarm was in force and was then de- 
escalated (14 March–21 June);
3. the period of the ‘new normality’ (22 June–24 October); and
4. the period of the second nationwide state of alarm (25 October–9 May 2021).
FIGURE 2.1 New Covid-19 cases in Spain per week, March–October 2020
Source: Spanish Ministry of Health (2020).
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2.4.1 Taking the initiative
The virus began to spread erratically and unevenly across Spain and its ACs at the 
end of January 2020. In this first stage, the ACs played a leading role in taking 
measures to contain it, albeit in an uncoordinated, under-planned fashion, with 
each AC applying measures of its own depending on the prevalence of the virus 
in its territory. The measures failed to curb the increase and spread of cases in the 
country as a whole.
On 9 March, by which point there were already more than 1,500 confirmed 
cases, the central government issued initial warnings and countrywide recom-
mendations; on 13 March, when the figure had exceeded 7,500, Prime Minister 
Sánchez (in office since June 2018) announced a nationwide state of alarm. In 
a comparative perspective, Spain was a notable laggard in raising the level of 
response, given that other countries had done so when they reached 1,000 con-
firmed cases (Timoner 2020).
2.4.2 Federal action
Spain’s state of alarm was declared under Royal Decree 463/2020, which came 
into force on 14 March 2020 and conferred full responsibility on the national 
government to manage and implement measures for addressing the Covid-19 
crisis. Such measures included placing the country under a lockdown compelling 
people to stay at home, as well as ensuring the supply of goods and services needed 
for health, food, and power. On 29 March, under Real Decreto-ley 10/2020, all 
non-essential workers were ordered to remain at home for 14 days. In addition, 
the central government adopted legislative measures addressing health matters 
and the economy at large, with the focus on small and medium-sized enterprises, 
the self-employed, persons affected by the lockdown, and the tourism industry.
The declaration of the state of alarm allowed the central government to sus-
pend, and then assume, the powers of the ACs for a period of 15 days. The Prime 
Minister delegated authority to the ministers of health, defence, internal affairs, 
and transport, mobility, and urban affairs in their respective areas of responsi-
bility, with any residual responsibility being assumed by the Minister of Health.
With the creation of the mando único (single command), the Minister of 
Health formally assumed the responsibility for decision-making and coordina-
tion of health policy decisions in the 17 ACs. The ministry was supported by the 
research organisation, the Institute of Health Carlos III (ISCIII), which managed 
the country’s epidemiological surveillance in coordination and collaboration 
with the ACs.
Considering that health competences have been in the hands of the ACs for 
almost two decades, the central government’s position to undertake coordination 
was weak. During the first weeks, the Ministry of Health could not obtain and 
provide operational data, let alone coordinate joint actions with the ACs in, for 
example, the procurement of protective clothing and masks (Kölling 2020).
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The economic and social costs of the lockdown were very high. To address 
this situation, the central government approved the mobilisation of nearly EUR 
200 billion, an amount to account for about 20 per cent of the Spanish GDP 
(see section 2.4.6 for a fuller discussion). The pandemic also caused serious inter-
ference with the Congress of Deputies, as the latter’s parliamentary activity was 
reduced to a minimum – basically, to voting several times to extend the state of 
alarm. This reinforced the traditionally weak position of the Spanish parliament 
vis-à-vis the executive, all the more so given that the proclamation of the state 
of alarm further strengthened the executive. Nevertheless, the Congress retained 
important leverage by virtue of its role in approving the state of alarm and its 
extensions (Kölling 2020).
At the request of the government, the Congress authorised six extensions of 
the state of alarm, which ended on 21 June 2020 (see Table 2.1). The first exten-
sion, from 25 March to 11 April, was passed with the support of 269 of the 350 
members of the Congress; only the members of Vox abstained. However, in sub-
sequent votes the level of criticism increased, with the PP, which abstained in the 
votes for the third and fourth extensions, voting against the fifth and sixth exten-
sions. In addition, the pro-Catalan independence parties, the left-wing Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and conservative Junts per Catalunya ( JxC), voted 
against the fourth extension after unsuccessfully trying to get the central gov-
ernment to agree to convene a ‘negotiation table’ with the Catalan government 
in exchange for a vote for another extension.
The increasing polarisation in Parliament was also reflected in major demon-
strations against the Spanish government in April and May 2020. These were 
organised mainly by Vox and partly by the PP; however, neither party was able 
to benefit significantly from the crisis.
On 28 April 2020, the Spanish government presented a four-phase ‘Plan for 
the transition to a new normality’. The first phase – entailing reopening small 
shops and allowing café terraces to operate at 50 per cent capacity and places of 
worship, at one-third – came into force in some provinces on 4 May. The restric-
tions were thus gradually lifted by 21 June. Although the ACs did not participate 
in the declaration of the state of alarm, the plan to move from the state of alarm 
TABLE 2.1 Spain: Congressional voting on extensions of the state 
of alarm
Extensions and dates Votes in favour Votes against Abstentions
1. 25/03/2020 321   0 28
2. 09/04/2020 270  54  25
3. 22/04/2020 269  60 16
4. 06/05/2020 178  75  97
5. 20/05/2020 177  162 11
6. 03/06/2020 177  155  18
Source: Congress of Deputies (2020).
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to the ‘new normality’ in late June was developed in close collaboration between 
the central government and the governments of the ACs (Marcos 2020a).
In May, the central government announced new legal mechanisms that would 
facilitate the implementation of measures in ‘co-governance’ with the ACs with-
out having to impose another state of alarm, albeit that at the time of this writ-
ing in October, the government had not submitted any legislative proposals to 
Parliament. During the ‘new normality’, it thus decided to coordinate decisions 
with ACs and clarify the ways in which they could adopt the state of alarm in 
their territories. For example, after an emergency meeting with health officials 
from the ACs, the government on 17 August announced new social-distancing 
measures across Spain, but it was in the hands of the ACs to implement them. 
Similarly, until mid-September, central government efforts were directed largely 
towards engaging with ACs to coordinate minimum standards for reopening 
schools.
However, some of the measures by the autonomous and local administra-
tions were annulled in the courts, especially those restricting fundamental rights 
(mobility and social gatherings, for example), as it was ruled that they could be 
valid only in a constitutionally provided state of alarm. From August to October 
2020, the number of new infections increased sharply, marking the second wave 
of the pandemic, and during this period, the government reached agreement 
with most of the ACs on thresholds for local lockdowns. The Community of 
Madrid, one of the ACs with the highest rates of infection early in the second 
wave, imposed local lockdowns in terms of these criteria, but the Madrid High 
Court ruled that the central government could not limit fundamental rights 
without resorting to a state of alarm. As a consequence, the central government 
imposed a selective state of alarm of 15 days in parts of the AC Madrid – this 
was a ‘surgical’ intervention that restricted entry and exit only in the concerned 
municipalities.
By mid-October, the second-wave pattern of spiked rates of infection had 
spread throughout the country. Faced with this situation, 11 ACs – including 
Catalonia and the Basque Country – asked that the central government declare a 
new general state of alarm to avert the need for court approval of their measures 
and thereby improve their speed of response and ability to take further action, 
such as imposing nightlife curfews and additional mobility restrictions.
On 25 October 2020, the central government declared a second nationwide 
state of alarm in Spain, doing so with the approval of the Congress (194 votes 
in favour, 53 against, and 99 abstentions), and, controversially, ordering it until 
9 May 2021. The measures attendant on the declaration were set out in Royal 
Decree 926/2020 of the same date and included perimetral lockdowns, restric-
tions on social and religious gatherings, and a mandatory nationwide curfew 
between 23:00 and 6:00. In contrast to the first state of alarm in March, the sec-
ond was implemented in a decentralised manner and managed primarily by AC 
governments. Measures taken under it were less severe than those under the first, 
as no lockdown was involved.
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2.4.3 State action
Before the declaration of the state of alarm, the ACs played a leading role in 
adopting preventative measures. In the most affected ACs, measures were decreed 
that closed educational centres (for example in Madrid and the Basque Country), 
placed restrictions on social gatherings, and introduced the first perimetral lock-
downs (in La Rioja and Catalonia). On 13 March 2020, merely a few hours 
before the declaration of the state of alarm, the Basque government decreed 
a state of health emergency that enabled it to take drastic measures at the sub-
national level. The least affected ACs, by contrast, delayed taking measures to 
contain the pandemic and, when they did, imposed relatively lax restrictions.
The situation changed dramatically when the first state of alarm came into 
effect on 14 March. Finding themselves under the sole command of the cen-
tral government, the autonomous administrations lost their decision-making 
capacity albeit that they remained responsible for the management of centrally 
issued instructions. In other words, this intervention in self-government did not 
bring the activities of autonomous administrations to a halt at either the parlia-
mentary or executive level but instead placed them at the service of the central 
government.
Working as they did within the limits established by the central government, 
the autonomous governments still had a certain margin of discretion in planning 
and implementing their public policies. This led to, among other things, compe-
tition between ACs in acquiring medical resources on the international market, 
an uneven ratio of detection tests per inhabitant and territory, heterogeneity in 
the statistical data provided by ACs, differences among the ACs in models of 
cooperation between the public and private health-care sector, and obstacles to 
transferring patients and resources between ACs.
In addition to the improvement of the health indicators, the transition plan to 
the ‘new normality’ referred above was driven largely by pressure from the AC 
governments in the face of wishes by Congress to extend the state of alarm. The 
plan, agreed with the ACs, involved a gradual de-escalation in four phases. The 
transition from one phase to the next was decided by the central government 
on the basis of public health indicators such as an AC’s number of cases and the 
capacity of its health-care system. In this fashion, restrictions were lifted phase 
by phase, territory by territory.
Having met the requirements, Galicia was, on 15 June 2020, the first AC to 
obtain central government authorisation to move to the ‘new normality’. On 
19 June, the Basque Country and Cantabria also made this transition, and free 
movement between these neighbouring ACs was re-established. On 21 June, 
after 98 days, the state of alarm ended throughout the country. In the new nor-
mality, free movement between ACs was restored.
During the transition to the new normality, the ACs gradually recovered the 
competences and functions that had been centralised under the single command 
of the central government, giving way to a scenario of co-governance of the 
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pandemic between the central government institutions and the ACs. After the 
end of the state of alarm, the AC executives exercised their powers in manag-
ing their health-care systems, in organising Covid-19 tracking mechanisms, in 
developing and implementing containment measures, and in applying policies 
on social protection and economic reactivation. For example, ACs could decide 
on the use of masks, restrictions on gatherings, and certain social distancing 
requirements. They also developed their individual procedures for managing 
the start of the academic year and, in cases, imposed restrictions on mobility or 
selective confinements. Although there were differences among them, especially 
with respect to efficiency and periods of implementation, the ACs all applied 
similar measures and restrictions.
The second countrywide state of alarm, decreed at the end of October 2020, 
provided the ACs with the legal instruments to enforce more severe measures in 
fighting the pandemic. Furthermore, the ACs preserved the power to approve 
and implement measures at the regional level within the general framework set 
by the state of alarm. After the declaration of the second state of alarm, the ACs 
introduced new restrictions on mobility – including perimetral lockdowns – and 
social life, for example by limiting social gatherings to six people or closing bars 
and restaurants.
2.4.4 Local government action
Local governments in general kept a low political profile. The pandemic did 
not significantly alter the framework of either their functional or administrative 
competences, and as a result, they continued to take responsibility for providing 
basic everyday services and goods.
Given that local governments do not have relevant competences in health 
matters, their role in containing the pandemic focused on implementing and 
enforcing restrictive and preventative measures – notably, municipal police forces 
were central in this undertaking – and in regulating economic activity within 
the scope of their competences, for example in matters related to the customer 
capacity and opening hours of bars and restaurants.
Similarly, depending on the needs and characteristics of each municipality, 
local governments adopted and funded social measures to help especially vul-
nerable groups and facilitate social cohesion, for instance through assistance in 
paying for housing or support to poor families. They also promoted plans and 
policies to aid economic recovery at the local level, for example through local tax 
incentives and reductions or by subsidising bonds to stimulate local commerce. 
Finally, it is worth noting the work of local governments in supporting cultural 
activity and cultural agents, a sector that was severely affected by the lockdown 
restrictions.
Local governments, mainly from the de-escalation onwards, had to adapt to 
the decisions of the respective AC executives. Nonetheless, with the exception of 
some isolated episodes, relations between local and autonomous administrations 
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were generally collaborative. During the pandemic in 2020, no additional or 
extraordinary mechanisms of horizontal municipal cooperation were developed 
that exceeded the autonomous sphere; one way or another, organised local gov-
ernment did not play any significant role in this regard.
2.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
In the absence of any constitutional provision of shared rule involving the ACs, 
Spanish intergovernmental relations (IGR) were developed at the initiative of 
the central government authorities. IGR was envisaged initially in terms of 
inter-administrative interaction (and was contained in legislation on adminis-
trative cooperation) and it developed a strong administrative profile and func-
tioning. Actually, most of the intergovernmental political interaction took place 
within parliamentary and intraparty arenas. In 2004, the central government 
established an intergovernmental forum of premiers, the Premiers’ Conference 
(Conferencia de Presidentes), in order to promote an IGR institution that poten-
tially could absorb some of the intergovernmental interaction usually debated in 
other arenas.
Spain’s IGR system has at least six characteristics: hierarchical structure and 
functioning; a strong bilateral approach (central government and each individ-
ual AC); a lack of horizontal interaction; a deeply sectoral approach; a focus on 
administrative implementation; and large diversity (Arbós et al. 2009; Pérez-
Medina 2020). Over the past decades, two mechanisms have fostered IGR: 
intergovernmental sectoral and multilateral forums, which are meant to bring 
the central government and AC ministries together to discuss and agree on pol-
icy issues, and the compacts (convenios), that is, administrative mechanisms for 
financing the implementation of central government policies in the ACs.
Intergovernmental sectoral forums accord central government authorities a 
commanding role (for instance, they set the agenda and call meetings) and, in 
some cases of fundamental importance, such as the forum on financing ACs, a 
casting vote that overrules the others. As for convenios, they are always welcome 
in that they provide ACs with external financing, but they reveal the influence 
of central government spending-power in policy areas that do not usually receive 
media attention. These features explain, at least in part, the very limited impact 
that Spain’s IGR system has made in building solid political and institutional 
trust. Shared rule has never developed in its strict sense of involving subnational 
governments within nationwide decision-making processes.
In a decentralised country like Spain, where implementation powers in health 
matters fall exclusively under the ACs, it was clearly impossible to manage the 
Covid-19 crisis without intergovernmental cooperation (León 2020). However, 
as Capano (2020) said in remarks on Italy’s management of the pandemic, ‘If 
you are not prepared for the (un)expected, you can be only what you already 
are’. This meant that the first response was a hierarchical one that centralised all 
powers in a single decision-making unit by declaring the state of alarm. The ACs 
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were left on the sidelines because, leaving political considerations aside, there are 
no legal or institutional provisions for them to play any role at all.
The IGR system came into play right after the declaration of the state of alarm 
and the publication in the Official Gazette of all measures that were adopted, 
when the Prime Minister called for a meeting with the AC premiers. As said, 
meetings of the Prime Minister and AC premiers were institutionalised in 2004, 
but prior to Covid-19, only six of these had been held, with the meetings rarely 
attended by all of the AC leaders – facts which reflect the weakness of Spain’s 
federal culture and the problems of trust that have beset IGR for many years.
In a videoconference on 15 March 2020, two days after the declaration of 
alarm, the Prime Minister informed the AC premiers (17 out of 17 ACs) of the 
measures and asked them to commit to ‘unity of action’ and loyalty. An institu-
tional manifesto confirming their commitment was released after the meeting, a 
benchmark in the history of this high-profile IGR mechanism. All the premiers 
signed it except the Catalan leader, who voiced his disagreement with the unitary 
command structure and what he regarded as an encroachment on subnational 
powers (Marcos 2020b). Although the premier of the Basque Country signed 
the manifesto, he too expressed strong opposition to what he saw as Spain’s hier-
archical and centralised approach to the crisis, declaring that ‘cooperation and 
collaboration do not mean [acceptance of or entitlement to] imposition’ (Vega 
and Segura 2020).
As the extensions of the state of alarm were approved one after another by 
the Congress, the perception that the central government’s idea of cooperation 
was entirely top-down in orientation started to spread, in the process sparking 
criticism by other premiers. Given that these criticisms arose across the political 
spectrum and that the central government – a minority coalition – was in need of 
support in parliament on issues other than Covid-19, the federal-level approach 
to cooperation was reappraised, with the central government opening the door 
to some degree of participation by ACs in decision-making on the pandemic.
The wording used to describe this new approach was itself a novelty in the 
Spanish context. In view of the hierarchical connotations that the phrase ‘inter-
governmental cooperation’ had acquired over the decades, the new word – 
‘co-governance’ – was chosen to stress the sense of an equalising or levelling of 
the status of the participants. In early May, the Spanish Ministry of Health issued 
a ministerial order (Order SND/387/2020 of 3 May 2020) aimed at regulating 
the role of the ACs in decision-making on the de-escalation phase. Although 
for some it was far too much, and for others far too little, the point is that it was 
acknowledged that the lack of institutional instruments for enabling the ACs to 
participate in state-wide decision-making processes was a problem linked to an 
unfit decentralised setting and not just to an ‘incomplete’ institutional setting, as 
it used to be defined.
In any case, and in spite of all the ups and downs, during the 98 days of 
the state of alarm, the Prime Minister and AC premiers’ meetings stood out 
as the main forum for coordination, consultation, and reaching agreement on 
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managing the pandemic. Virtually inoperative until the onset of Covid-19, this 
forum met on 16 occasions (15 of them online) while the state of alarm was in 
effect. In addition, the Inter-Territorial Council for the Health System had a 
prominent role. Throughout the state of alarm, it met online twice a week to 
exchange information and reach agreement on, for example, common standards 
for tests for Covid-19, closing bars, restricting smoking in public spaces, and 
measures in residences for the elderly.
Other lower-profile intergovernmental mechanisms also saw a revival – more 
than a hundred sectoral meetings were held between March and September 
2020, whereas in the whole of 2019 there had been less than 50 (Marcos 2020a). 
Nevertheless, due to their entrenched sectoral perspectives and traditionally com-
partmentalised vision of public administration, these mechanisms did not con-
tribute to providing the breadth of perspective the pandemic response required.
As regards the views of the actors on the functioning of the IGR mechanisms, 
most of the AC premiers stressed the usefulness of the Premiers’ Conference 
despite its purely informative nature and their passive, subordinate role in pan-
demic management. The regularity of the meetings and the need for a problem- 
solving approach probably had its benefits, one of which seems to have been to 
re-humanise political adversaries after years of polarisation. In a television inter-
view with the premier of Castilla La Mancha, a PSOE leader, the presenter asked 
him to rate the behaviour of the Catalan premier at these meetings on a scale of 
‘bad, very bad, worse’, a question intended to elicit the antagonism the PSOE 
customarily has towards leaders of the Catalan government. To the surprise of 
the TV presenter (and no doubt the audience), he replied that the atmosphere 
of the meetings was actually always constructive and that many of the Catalan 
premier’s proposals were sensible (Costas 2020).
Even allowing that this is a single anecdote without empirical data to support 
it, what should not be underestimated, in a context as polarised as Spain’s, is the 
potential importance of high-profile IGR mechanisms as a means to pave the 
road towards de-polarisation by bringing tough adversarial politics into a space 
of fair play. In this regard, relationships between ACs traditionally have been 
poor; however, during the pandemic no additional or extraordinary instruments 
of horizontal cooperation among them were established. Horizontal cooperation 
was limited mainly to bilateral agreements between neighbouring ACs.
2.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
The system of financing the ACs in Spain has an asymmetrical character and is 
regulated under two differentiated regimes: the so-called common regime and 
the foral regime. The common regime is applied uniformly to all the ACs on 
the Spanish peninsula,4 except for the Basque Autonomous Community and 
Navarre, which are ruled under the foral regime. Based on their historical and 
political circumstances, the Basque Country and Navarre preserve a singular 
and privative foral system of financing and self-government, which provides 
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them with broad fiscal and financial power in contrast with the common regi-
men ACs. Questions related to the system of financing the ACs occupy a large 
part of the debates on the territorial organisation of power in Spain. With regard 
to social security, its economic management falls under the exclusive powers of 
the central government, which finances the pension system and unemployment 
benefits, among other things.
Following the declaration of a state of alarm, the central government played 
a prominent role in initiating measures on social protection, economic recovery, 
and employment. The range of measures was extensive and includes institut-
ing the mechanism, Temporary Employment Regulation Dossiers (Expedientes 
de Regulación Temporal de Empleo); the creation of a minimum living wage (safe-
ty-net income of between EUR 462 and 1,015 for the neediest of families); the 
mobilisation of more than EUR 150 billion in public guarantees to ensure the 
liquidity and solvency of the business sector; and various plans for reactivating 
consumption (De la Fuente 2021; KPMG 2020).
Pending the arrival of European funds and fiscal reforms that might be imple-
mented in the 2021 budgets, these measures were funded mainly through the 
deficit and public debt. The Spanish central bank, Banco de España, predicted that 
the deficit would be above 10 per cent of GDP and that public debt would rise 
by more than 20 points to greater than 115 per cent of GDP in 2020 (Banco de 
España 2020). The ACs and local governments also formed their own plans of 
action to confront the health crisis, strengthen the health and social protection 
systems, and apply measures to support the revival of economic activity and con-
sumption. The tax authorities of the Basque Country and Navarre, like those of 
the central government, also used fiscal policy to introduce flexibility into tax 
obligations and establish fiscal incentives to boost economic recovery.
The budgetary policies of the public administrations were conditioned by the 
Budgetary Stability Law, which was passed in 2012 in the context of the European 
rescue in Spain and sets strict targets for deficit, public debt, and expenditure. 
The deficit targets set for 2020 were 1.8 per cent for the public administration 
as a whole (0.5 per cent, the central administration; 0.2 per cent, the ACs; 0 per 
cent, local governments; and 1.1 per cent, social security). However, in March 
2020 the EU activated the ‘general escape clause’, which allows member states 
facing severe economic shock not to meet the deficit and debt objectives required 
by the Stability and Growth Pact.5
Due to the ACs’ limited financial autonomy, the central government had to 
provide financial assistance to them through advances on accounts, down pay-
ments from the liquidated 2018 fiscal year, and other extraordinary funds and 
resources. These transfers made it possible to reduce the margin of deviation 
in the deficit and debt targets of the ACs of the common regime. In summer, 
the Basque Country and Navarre, whose regime of financing is independent of 
the pattern of flows described above and is ruled by the principle of unilateral 
risk, bilaterally negotiated the adjustment of their deficit (which increased to 
2.6 per cent) and debt targets for 2020 with the central government. Later, at 
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the end of September 2020, the government suspended the application of the tax 
rules in 2020 and 2021 for all public administrations (La Moncloa 2020a). This 
decision authorised public administrations to relax their budgetary policies, allow-
ing them to increase public spending. However, the central government urged 
the common regime ACs to limit their deficit in 2021 to 2.2 per cent; of this, the 
centre would assume 1.1 per cent through an extraordinary transfer of funds.
Aside from the regular system of financing, the central government approved 
a non-repayable fund of EUR 16 billion so that ACs could confront the impact 
of the pandemic (Ministry of Finance 2020). The Covid-19 Fund, made up of 
four sections of unconditional transfers, created tensions among the governments 
of ACs due to the criteria for revenue-sharing established by the central govern-
ment. The distribution to ACs of the first and third sections (EUR 9 billion in 
total) was based on health variables. The second section, of EUR 2 billion and 
associated with education, was shared out according to the youth population 
ratios of each AC. The fourth section of the fund, to which EUR 5 billion was 
assigned and which excludes the Basque Country and Navarre, was aimed at 
compensating for the drop in tax revenues.
With the precedent of the Covid-19 Fund on the table, the sharing of EU 
recovery funds led to a new debate among ACs and the central government 
about determining the distribution criteria. Spain was to receive close to EUR 
140 billion from the EUR 750 billion Next Generation EU recovery plan. On 7 
October 2020, the central government presented the Recovery, Transformation 
and Resilience of [the] Spanish Economy Plan to guide the deployment of EUR 
72 billion from EU recovery funds between 2021 and 2023 (La Moncloa 2020b). 
The plan is structured around four priority areas: the ecological transition, digital 
transformation, gender equality, and social and territorial cohesion. It does not, 
however, determine the territorial distribution of funds.
2.5 Findings and policy implications
The Covid-19 pandemic was an unprecedented challenge and severely tested both 
the Spanish territorial model and the national health system. The delayed reaction 
by the central and AC governments, poor coordination among governments, and 
the variance in measures and test frequency may help to explain the strong impact 
Covid-19 had on the country. However, many other endogenous and exogenous 
factors were crucial in their effect on crisis management, among them a tendency 
towards physical proximity and greetings, or the urban environment – Spain has 
one of the largest urban population concentrations in West Europe.
In such a context, the Spanish government opted for an initial response based 
on a centralised control, one that rapidly unveiled the institutional weaknesses 
of the IGR system. The political and institutional management of the first wave 
of infections alerted the central authorities to the logistical as well as legitimacy 
problems of exercising sole, unitary command; as a result, there was a switch-over 
to integrating the ACs in decision-making processes. Thus, managing the crisis 
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brought into relief the tension between, on the one hand, the constitutionally 
determined framework legislation of the central government and, on the other, 
the reality of a country consisting of heterogeneous regional health systems. Due 
to a combination of party politics, territorial cleavages and long-standing insti-
tutional deficits, such as poor coordination among governments and an unclear 
division of competences, decisions were taken very late and slowly. However, 
the crisis may have been a turning point in regard to these deficits in Spain’s 
territorial model.
In relation to funding the pandemic, as happened in earlier crises, exposed 
the cracks in the system for financing the ACs of the common regime and 
underscored their dependence on central government transfers when there 
is a budgetary emergency. In analogous terms, the principles of fiscal co- 
responsibility and unilateral risk continued to guide the framework of bilateral 
fiscal and financial relations between the foral ACs and the central government, 
once again revealing the deep differences that exist in the asymmetrical Spanish 
funding model.
In debates about Spain’s management of the pandemic, there were calls for 
reform of the national health system and the strengthening of the Ministry of 
Health. According to these demands, the Ministry should improve its consti-
tutionally determined coordination function and ensure national standards in 
health-care delivery. However, this debate should also be seen in the context of 
balancing institutional trust and the demand for institutionalised co-governance 
between the ACs and the central government, and the demand of preserving the 
self-government margin of the ACs, as well as the future role of the EU in crisis 
management. A future European Health Union may improve preparedness and 
resilience for cross-border health threats, but it would also affect the territorial 
distribution of responsibilities at the national level.
As a general conclusion, the Covid-19 crisis has made evident the structural 
deficits in the institutional design framing decentralisation in Spain and has 
changed the central government’s perception on IGR. For long, the system had 
been analysed in terms of its assumed progressive adaptation towards federalism, 
as if institutions could evolve on their own. The Covid-19 crisis, by unveiling 
the weakness of shared rule, has brought about the questioning of traditional 
IGR approaches. The promotion of shared rule, at least in health matters, seems 
to be the most relevant institutional output. Time will tell whether this new 
institutional output would generate new policy dynamics and would expand to 
other policy areas and institutions or would stay encapsulated within the man-
agement of the pandemics.
Notes
 1 Article 155 allows the central government to take measures in exceptional cases to 
restore constitutional order or prevent major harm to Spain’s interests. In 2017 the Sen-
ate granted the government these powers to enable it to impose direct rule on Catalonia. 
The interpretation and application of article 155 have been widely debated.
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 2 A state of emergency may be declared by the government when ‘the free exercise of the 
citizens’ rights and freedoms, the normal operation of the democratic institutions, that 
of the public services that are essential to the community, or any other aspect of law and 
order, are so seriously altered that the use of ordinary authorities is insufficient to estab-
lish it and maintain it’ (Organic Law 4/1981, article 13).
 3 A state of siege may be declared by the Government ‘when an uprising or act of force 
occurs against the sovereignty or independence of Spain, its territorial integrity or the 
constitutional system that cannot be solved by other means’ (Organic Law 4/1981, 
article 32).
 4 The Canary Islands and the two North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla have a 
special tax regime.
 5 In this volume, see Chapter 6 on the European Union.
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3
GERMANY’S FIGHT AGAINST 
COVID-19




As happened throughout the world, Germany’s society and economy suffered 
as a result of restrictions that were imposed to combat the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Although infection and fatality rates in Germany in 2020 were relatively low 
in international comparison and its economic crisis less grievous than in other 
countries, the burdens of the pandemic weighed heavily on those who fell ill or 
lost income and livelihoods due to lockdown measures. The question at issue in 
this chapter, then, is whether Germany’s federal multilevel system of government 
was a help or hindrance in managing the pandemic. In particular, it examines 
the country’s efforts not only to cure the ill, prevent infections, and control the 
spread of the virus but also to provide compensation for economic damages and 
avoid a deeper depression.
To begin with, Germany is a federal country with a population that stood 
at 83.2 million at the end of 2019: 18.3 per cent of people were younger than 
20 years, 53.3 per cent were between 20 and 60 years, and 28.4 per cent were 
older than 60. The fastest-growing age group – which increased by 33 per cent 
in the last decade – were people of age 80 years and older. Seventy-seven per cent 
of Germany’s inhabitants live in areas of high-to-medium population density; 
overall, the country has 107 free cities, 1,951 cities, and 8,056 villages, all of 
which are located within 294 counties.
In the German federal system, local governments are the lowest level of gov-
ernance and lie within 16 states (Länder), of which three are city states. In terms 
of the Basic Law, the federation (Bund) and the Länder have full constitutional 
powers and their own institutions; accordingly, local governments have the right 
of self-administration in all local matters. The federal government in office dur-
ing the pandemic was a ‘grand coalition’ led by Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
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bringing together the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties. At 
the state level, the governments were likewise coalitions made up of the coun-
try’s various parties with the exception of the right-wing group, Alternative for 
Germany.
As regards health care, medical services are split between, on the one hand, 
private-sector medical practices and hospitals – either commercial or owned by non-
profit organisations – and pharmacies, and, on the other, local-government-owned 
hospitals and state-owned university hospitals. Patients may choose where they 
receive medical treatment. The majority of the population has health cover through 
either the country’s Social Health Insurance or private insurance.
The first case of Covid-19 in Germany was recorded on 27 January 2020. At 
this early stage, given that there were so few patients and that they and the people 
they had been in contact with were soon isolated, the public was not overly wor-
ried; but at the beginning of March, the rate of infection grew as infected persons 
took part in mass events and there were increasing numbers of people returning 
from skiing trips to Ischgl in Austria (see Chapter 4, in this volume). On 25 March, 
the federal parliament declared an ‘epidemic situation of national importance’ 
and, two days later, specified the Law for Protection against Infection by passing 
the Law to Protect the Population during an Epidemic Situation of National 
Importance, thereby imposing a nationwide lockdown.
By the end of May, infection rates had declined and Germany began to relax 
its restrictions incrementally, with inner-European frontiers being reopened to 
spare the domestic tourism sector and revive trade and industry. However, in 
late summer, when more and more people returned from holidaying abroad in 
countries with significant levels of infection, the number of new infections again 
increased – indeed, at the beginning of October, the number exploded within 
only a few days to more than 19,000 a day and the seven-day incidence to 130 per 
100,000 inhabitants. Berlin, Bremen, and several cities and counties surpassed 
the critical number of 50 cases per 100,000 inhabitants; many cities and counties 
even experienced a seven-day incidence of more than 200 new infections per 
100,000 inhabitants.
As at 1 November 2020, Germany’s total number of infections had reached 
532,930 (or 649 per 100,000 inhabitants), with 356,410 recoveries in that figure 
and 10,481 deaths (or 13 per 100,000 inhabitants). Infection rates varied substan-
tially among the states, although, in general, during the first wave of infection 
they were higher in Western Germany than in East Germany, whereas in the 
second wave that emerged in October they were at their highest in some East 
German counties.
Although the Covid-19 pandemic caused the sharpest recession in the history 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, the economy recovered quite well until 
the beginning of October. This stabilisation was in good part the result of the 
numerous support programmes rolled out at all levels of government, as well as 
the use of a Keynesian-style fiscal policy accepting of the fact of a decline in tax 
revenue and willing to fund additional expenditure by means of public debt.
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3.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
Multilevel governance in Germany takes the form of an executive federal system 
in which the federal level is generally responsible for legislation (both exclusive 
and concurrent) and the state and local levels are responsible for administration 
and the execution of laws (Huegelin and Fenna 2015; Färber 2015). That is to 
say, the Länder regulate only some policy fields as their own competence – these 
mainly involve the police, some aspects of environmental law, and education 
in schools and universities; however, the Länder decide on the way in which to 
execute federal law and on the institutions through which this is accomplished.
Government actions against infectious diseases are among the concurrent 
competences set out in the Basic Law (article 74(19)); in terms of these provi-
sions, the federation can pass legal regulations if and insofar as they are necessary 
either for the unity of the law or economy or for the provision of equivalence of 
living conditions in Germany. The Länder convert federal law into regulations 
for implementation and then often transfer the associated administrative respon-
sibilities to their local governments. If federal law does not furnish details about its 
administration, the Länder are free to determine this within their broad scope of 
action. Cities and counties are usually responsible for civil protection and emer-
gency management. Municipalities have to follow the regulations laid down in 
federal and Land laws and decrees; conversely, they can act freely only if what 
they want to do is not (yet) regulated.
In the event of pandemics, a high degree of centralisation obtains, given that 
they invariably impact on economic development and that the Bund has the 
competences relevant in taking ameliorative measures, including competences 
in taxation and expenditure management, the regulation of social insurance (in 
regard to pensions, health and long-term care, and unemployment), and in cov-
ering state- and local-level deficits if necessary. In all cases in which the details 
of administration are regulated or the states are obliged to pay for measures, the 
approval of the Bundesrat – the federal second chamber representing state gov-
ernments – is compulsory.
Not least because of the strong position of the Länder governments in the 
Bundesrat, a coordinated decision-making process among the federal chancellor 
and all 16 minister-presidents is a common occurrence in many areas. These par-
ties decide on political measures that would apply more or less uniformly across 
Germany. Particularly in cases where the issues are thorny – such as imposing 
lockdowns on citizens and enterprises – this coordinated process is advantageous 
in building consensus and facilitating unified communication about the meas-
ures decided upon; the disadvantage is that this tends to leave the federal and 
state parliaments, in particular its non-governing parties, partly excluded from 
decision-making.
Finally, as all measures are part of administrative law, they fall under the 
jurisdiction of the administrative courts. Given that pandemic restrictions 
very often conflict with basic rights, the courts have to decide whether the 
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actions are proportionate to the goal of protecting the population and whether 
the constraints on basic rights are necessary for achieving this goal. In prac-
tice, the courts often check whether the explanatory statements provided in 
regulatory documents warrant limitations on the individual’s rights to free-
dom of action.
3.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
In Germany, institutions that manage natural disasters are separated from those 
dealing with epidemics or pandemics, albeit that disasters often include medical 
problems and vice versa. The relevant regulations and institutions can never-
theless be orchestrated in cooperation with each other and across all levels of 
government if necessary. Since 2001, the Law to Protect against Infections – a 
merger of several pre-existing laws – has regulated measures to prevent and curb 
infectious diseases. To achieve these goals, it empowers the responsible ministries 
and agencies to pass decrees to restrict basic rights such as freedom of assembly, 
freedom of movement, and the inviolability of the home.
The central actor at the federal level – besides the Ministry of Health – is 
the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), which is one of three administrative succes-
sors of the former Federal Health Agency. The RKI cooperates with the other 
responsible federal and Land agencies and scientific institutions, as well as with 
foreign institutions, particularly so the World Health Organisation. It produces 
Germany’s official epidemiological statistics, publishes them, and advises political 
institutions. It undertakes its own research and provides technical assistance to 
Land health agencies.
The 2001 Law to Protect against Infections also regulates compensation where 
people are forced into quarantine due to contact with an infected person or to 
entry from a country with high epidemic risks. Such persons receive the same 
financial compensation as they would have if they were ill, namely six weeks of 
full payment, followed by 90 per cent of net income; however, their employers 
are refunded by the responsible Land administration. The same compensation is 
paid if schools and kindergartens are closed in terms of pandemic regulations and 
parents have to stay home from work to take care of their children.
Land governments usually include ministries (often those for social affairs) 
which are – among other fields of action – responsible for health matters. They 
coordinate their policies, if necessary, in a Conference of Ministers of Health. 
As the Länder have to transfer federal regulation into Land law that often affects 
several Land ministries, the state chancelleries have a central role not only in 
regulation but in their ‘public relations’ function of declaring and explaining the 
special Land regulations.
The local level is the most important in administering a pandemic; some 
local governments may be even more deeply involved than others because they 
own a local hospital. In the implementation and administration of pandemic 
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measures, local health agencies and local regulatory offices are the decisive 
actors. The former collect data and produce local disease statistics, trace the 
contacts of infected persons, place them under quarantine, and determine 
whether they stay at home; they also receive information about travellers from 
countries with high infection rates and control their observance of quarantine 
measures. In turn, the local regulatory offices monitor compliance with pan-
demic regulations.
All the necessary functions and responsibilities existed prior to the Covid-
19 pandemic. However, whereas all levels of governments routinely undertake 
exercises to stay prepared for natural disasters, the health authorities did not 
undertake comparable exercises for the eventuality of an infectious disease like 
Covid-19.
This pandemic, in particular the lockdown that was imposed to curb it, not 
only affected public health but also impacted, severely, on the economy. In this 
regard, the key institutional actors were the Federal Ministry of Finance and 
Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, both of which drew on their experience 
of managing the global financial crisis of 2008.
3.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
3.4.1 Taking the initiative
Local governments, particularly the affected counties, were the first to react 
when the virus began to spread in February following an increase in infec-
tions due to large public events such as carnivals and beer festivals. The Länder 
governments requested quarantines in the municipalities concerned. Although 
the head of the county authority was responsible, the regional boards of the 
Land administration were involved in all measures at the local level to combat 
epidemics.
When infections escalated in late February both in number and rate, it was 
time for the Bund to take action. On 27 February 2020, a crisis management 
group, including medical experts and the RKI, was established by the Federal 
Ministry of Health and Federal Ministry of the Interior. All of the country’s 
governments nevertheless attempted for a long time to convince the public that 
infections in Germany could remain purely localised incidents, but this strategy 
failed when holidaymakers returned ill from skiing in Ischgl in Austria and the 
rate and spread of infections escalated again.
Given that the measures contemplated in the Law to Protect the Population 
during an Epidemic Situation of National Importance need the approval of the 
Bundesrat, the Länder were directly involved in the decision-making process. 
Being part of the ‘grand coalition’ government, the heads of the governing fac-
tions of the Bundestag and the heads of the Social Democratic Party participated 
in developing the measures. The final decision to impose a nationwide lockdown 
under common rules was taken in a meeting between Chancellor Merkel and 
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the minister-presidents of the Länder. Public life was severely restricted: all shops 
not necessary for essential supplies had to close, as did schools, universities, res-
taurants, theatres, opera houses, and the like. Face masks were made compulsory 
in all places where people were in close proximity to each other, as was social 
distancing of least 1.5 m; and people were allowed to work from home if their 
employers agreed to it.
The debate in the Bundestag took place under extreme time pressure. At 
that point, only the right-wing party Alternative for Germany was critical of 
the lockdown regulations. By law, the Ministry of Health was authorised to 
regulate by decree, inter alia, the requirements for entry to the country; rules 
for public transport; data gathering for the identification and early registration 
of infected persons; measures in special institutions, such as long-term nurs-
ing homes; the provision of medicines; and health care for outpatients. The 
Ministry’s powers were limited until 31 March 2021 but could be extended 
for another year.
3.4.2 Federal action
The actions of the Bund had two main goals: combating Covid-19 infections and 
stabilising the economy. In regard to the first, the Federal Ministry of Health 
(Bundesgesundheitsministerium 2020) not only passed the necessary decrees for the 
lockdown but also arranged additional medical equipment for all hospitals, long-
term nursing homes, and medical practices. In March 2020, Germany ran out 
of masks and protective clothing because the federal government had not built 
up reserves of the necessary equipment in case of a pandemic. Consequently, the 
Ministry bought 1.7 billion FFP2, KN95, and FFP3 masks, along with about 
4.2 billion simpler medical masks.
The Ministry also coordinated a nationwide database on intensive-care beds 
with ventilators and offered subsidies for hospitals that converted normal hospital 
beds into ones for intensive care. By July 2020, 32,400 beds had been registered, 
with the Federation paying for 39,700 more (RBB Online 2020). The RKI took 
‘normal’ measures of health protection and regularly reported to the public. The 
head of the RKI and its experts advised federal and state governments to prepare 
for the near future and consider the necessary measures to take. In addition, 
the Ministry organised digital information systems – by the end of October, its 
Covid-19 cell phone app had been downloaded by 40 million people.
As people hesitated to consult their medical doctors and dentists due to fear of 
infection, medical service providers suffered economic losses; as a result, by the 
end of April 2020, a programme of financial support was set up for all decentral-
ised medical services; it included compensation to all hospitals for empty beds 
(Covid-19-Krankenhausentlastungsgesetz).
Germany introduced border controls from 16 March 2020 with several, 
though not all, of its neighbouring countries (e.g. not for the Netherlands); this 
regulation was based on the new Covid-19 Law. People who wanted to enter 
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from high-risk countries had to stay in quarantine for 14 days. Where borders 
were closed, foreign commuters living across the border were de facto excluded 
from their workplaces unless they arranged accommodation in Germany. Couples 
and family members were separated from each other. Long-distance truck driv-
ers who transported food to Germany, for example from southern Europe, had 
to stay in their vehicles to avoid quarantine. From early February, passengers 
returning by plane from high-risk regions had to provide their travel and Covid-
19-related health information that was sent to their local health administration 
in control of quarantine.
The Bundestag also changed its own rules of procedure to enable it to continue 
operations. The quorum was lowered to one-quarter and virtual participation in 
committee meetings was allowed, with written votes cast during session weeks. 
This exemption was terminated on 30 September 2020, but then later renewed 
until the end of 2020 (Deutscher Bundestag 2020).
Because lockdown measures and later restrictions impacted on economic 
activity not only in Germany but in other countries from which German enter-
prises import materials for their production processes and to which they export 
their products, the economy experienced its deepest decline since the Second 
World War. Three federal ministries – finance, economic affairs, and labour and 
social affairs – took steps to help prevent businesses from going bankrupt and 
those who could not work, from sinking into poverty (Bundesfinanzministerium 
2020a), among them the following:
• The regulations for prolonged short-term allowances were reactivated. The 
number of registered recipients boomed by 624,977 between March and 
June 2020 but declined afterwards. Despite the Bund’s efforts, Germany’s 
unemployed increased from 2.335 million in March to 2.955 million in 
August 2020 but has since then started to decline slightly.
• The self-employed were offered increased access to basic security benefits 
for jobseekers.
• People in under- or unemployment were protected from losing their accom-
modation if they could not afford to pay their rent for the three most bur-
dened months (March to May).
• Small enterprises and the self-employed received subsidies to keep them 
financially liquid. The duty to declare insolvency was suspended until 
December 2020.
• Severely affected large enterprises, including Lufthansa and TUI, a lead-
ing tourism company, received substantial financial subsidies in the form of 
credits and/or government shareholding. The Bund had permission from the 
EU for an exemption from the latter’s ban on public financial aid to such 
enterprises.
• A special programme to the value of EUR 1 billion was established for eco-
nomically damaged cultural enterprises; the programme included subsidies 
for investments in providing for hygiene measures at events.
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In addition, the federal government initiated an economic stabilisation pro-
gramme to the cost in 2020 of EUR 103 billion. The programme focused on 
four areas:
• Families received an additional children allowance and a tax reduction for sin-
gle parents. There was wage continuation for parents with ill children or nurs-
ing family members. The turnover tax declined from 19 per cent/7 per cent 
to 16 per cent/5 per cent for the second half of 2020.
• Various forms of tax relief sought to lower the tax burden and improve 
liquidity. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) received a bonus of 
EUR 2,000 if they maintained the same number of vocational training 
places. Subsidies of another EUR 150 million were allocated to accelerate 
digitalisation. A special credit programme was introduced to support non-
profit organisations suffering from the Covid-19 restrictions.
• Local governments that cover a share of the accommodation costs of the 
basic security benefit allowances were supported by a higher federal trans-
fer. Together the Bund and Länder provided EUR 12 billion to compensate 
for losses of local business tax. Additional transfers sought to mitigate the 
pandemic’s impact on local public transport enterprises, local sport organi-
sations, and local investments in climate protection.
• ‘Investment expenditures for a better future’ covered a bonus for electric 
cars and electric loading infrastructure, subsidies for the modernisation of 
automobile industries, and the purchase of low-emission vehicles. German 
Railway received additional government investment of EUR 6 billion. A 
further billion euros were spent on investments in climate change, research 
in general, and medical research related to Covid-19.
A special factor in federal crisis policies was that Germany presided over the 
EU Council of Member States in the second half of 2020. The federal govern-
ment was therefore deeply involved in developing and negotiating the EUR 
750 billion EU programme. For many German politicians, the fact that the EU 
intended for the first time to take on own debt – which is forbidden in the 
Treaty – is not only a political problem but a legal question. It can be expected 
that the German Federal Constitutional Court will again be involved in the 
‘interpretation’ of the content of the European competences.
3.4.3 State action
As the Länder have competences in many fields that deal with the fight against 
Covid-19, particularly in the implementation of federal regulations, they had an 
important influence on the management of the pandemic. During the first lock-
down in April and May 2020, they all applied the same restrictions, but by mid-
April divergent ideas were already appearing in regard to the speed and details of 
reopening economic activity and social life.
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When, in May, the number of infections had declined, the political initiative 
shifted to the Länder. The minister-presidents, fearing that local enterprises – 
particularly shuttered retail outlets, hairdressing salons, hotels, and restaurants – 
would not survive a longer lockdown, began to develop hygiene regulations for 
these enterprises. The first divergences in regulation thus appeared in an effort to 
safeguard regional economic sectors.
For instance, when retail outlets reopened, North Rhine-Westphalia allowed 
furniture stores and kitchen studios to do so too because many of their man-
ufacturing suppliers operate in this state. Länder with a high share of tourism 
– such as Bavaria, Mecklenburg-Pomerania, and Schleswig-Holstein – tried to 
reopen hotels and restaurants as quickly as they could under strict hygiene reg-
ulations. Similarly, Mecklenburg-Pomerania initially restricted hotels to longer 
stays in order to prevent crowds of weekend guests from entering the state. Later 
the states held cultural and sports events for in-person spectators – all under 
hygiene and social-distancing regulations that varied from state to state. Angela 
Merkel expressed disapproval of such risky events but was unable to coordinate 
the divergent state policies.
Finally, when infection rates increased again in certain regions from the end 
of August 2020, the minister-presidents of those states where the incidence had 
been below average refused to implement decisions taken in the meetings of the 
federal chancellor and the minister-presidents: they argued that divergent rates 
of infections called for differences in policy. For example, Saxony-Anhalt tried 
to march to the beat of its own drum and, among other things, refused to fine 
people for not wearing masks. Indeed, in all matters of state competence, the 
state governments passed regulations that differed from each other’s to one extent 
or another, whether it be in the opening of schools and universities, guidelines 
for hotels and restaurants, the number of people and households allowed to meet, 
the size of social, cultural and sports events, and more.
The reasons for the divergence stem from several factors: differences among 
states in infection rates; the economic composition of a state and how the 
pandemic response affected its chief industries; and the federal and state elections 
in 2021 that were to take place in Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, 
Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt, Berlin, and Mecklenburg-Pomerania.
The most conspicuous public conflict was that between the minister- 
presidents of Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, Markus Söder and Armin 
Laschet. Both states were among the first to witness Covid-19 infections, with 
Bavaria having, until October 2020, the highest number of confirmed cases 
(874 per 100,000 inhabitants vs. 807 in North Rhine-Westphalia) as well as 
the highest death rate (22 per 100,000 inhabitants vs. 12 in North Rhine-
Westphalia). Söder argued for a stricter regulation, Laschet, for a liberal policy. 
As the two were in consideration to be the chancellor candidates of the Christian 
parties [Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria and Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) in all other states] in the federal elections in September 2021, they 
represented two policy styles in open competition with each other.
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Generally, the divergences were minor, did little to compromise the equiva-
lence of living conditions in Germany, and reflected the usual kinds of intergov-
ernmental dynamics at work in federal states:
• Some states topped up the first federal enterprise support programme with 
their own state subsidies in administering the programme’s payment process. 
The efficiency of these procedures varied depending on the digitalisation 
of the state administration concerned. False applications for support were a 
common problem, with some state administrations being less capable than 
others of identifying them.
• In April and May 2020, Mecklenburg-Pomerania ‘closed’ its state borders to 
all tourists – including Germans – who did not have reservations for seven 
days or more. It sought to exclude day-trippers and weekend tourists to 
avoid overcrowding at its beaches.
• When infection rates in counties started to rise again in October 2020, 
Mecklenburg-Pomerania, Schleswig-Holstein, and Bavaria initiated or 
maintained bans on overnight stays by travellers from high-infection coun-
ties and cities (ones with 50 infections per 100,000 inhabitants in the past 
seven days). Given that the autumn holidays begin at the same time in many 
of Germany’s states, travellers who had made hotel bookings in the men-
tioned states protested at the measures – some went to the administrative 
courts, which decided that the state actions were inappropriate. After but a 
few such judgments, the state governments withdrew their regulations.
• Schools and kindergartens did not reopen in summer at the same time. The 
states decided individually on the opening date, the number of in-person and 
digital lessons, and the like. Later, they all agreed that, in spite of increasing 
infection rates, it was important to keep schools and kindergartens open 
and avoid repeating the experience of a total lockdown. Nevertheless, the 
regulations varied from state to state in their details regarding, for example, 
whether pupils needed to wear masks during lessons, or whether to close a 
whole school or only parts of it in case of infections.
• The states diverged with regard to permits for cultural and sport events, 
particularly in respect of the maximum number of spectators. After long 
discussion, they agreed on a common policy for spectators at first- and 
second-league soccer matches: a restricted number of spectators, with 
electronic tickets for special seats, were allowed as long as infections rates 
remained low. However, rising infection rates led again to soccer and tennis 
matches being played in empty stadiums.
• In spring, Mecklenburg-Pomerania paid accommodation bonuses to work-
ers from Poland who had to reside in Germany given that the requirement 
that they spend a fortnight in quarantine on crossing the border meant they 
could no longer commute daily to their places of employment in Germany. 
The regulation was reintroduced in autumn after the infection rate in Poland 
placed it on the list of high-risk countries.
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• When in August 2020 the Federal Chancellor and minister-presidents 
decided to introduce a fine of a minimum of EUR 150 for people not wear-
ing a mask or refusing to do so, the minister-president of Saxony-Anhalt 
declared that he would not follow this agreement. By contrast, other states 
imposed even higher fines for so-called mask deniers (EUR 500 in Berlin). 
A mask denier taking a long-distance train trip thus ran the risk of a multi-
tude of different fines on one and the same journey.
All the states endeavoured to prevent total lockdowns and instead adopt 
context-specific management for cities and counties with high infection rates. 
There were also identifiable factors behind the growing number of infections from 
August 2020 onwards, such as foreign labourers in large slaughterhouses working 
under insufficiently hygienic conditions and living together in cramped accom-
modation; numerous people living together in refugee homes; travellers return-
ing from summer holidays in high-risk countries, particularly in the Balkans; 
wedding parties with more than 400 guests; and illegal parties where hundreds 
of young people would revel without masks or social distancing. Usually, it was 
enough to reduce local infections within a few weeks by identifying sources of 
infection, tracing contacts, conducting tests, and quarantining all of the identi-
fied contact persons – that is, until mid-October 2020 when Germany too was 
caught in the long-dreaded ‘second wave’ of Covid-19 infections.
This led to a unanimous agreement among the states to impose a new, partial 
lockdown in November. To reduce unnecessary contact between people, the 
states closed restaurants, gyms, cinemas, theatres, and opera houses; expanded 
the duty to wear masks (with a fine for mask deniers); and restricted the num-
ber of contacts in public to 10 persons from two households; in addition, hotel 
accommodation was available only for business purposes.
3.4.4 Local government action
Because local governments are the lowest level of administration in Germany, 
they played an important role in combating the pandemic. Within the legal 
frameworks set by federal and state laws and decrees, they gave Covid-19 restric-
tions further detail applicable in their respective territories:
• Local health agencies tested people for Covid-19 infection, traced their con-
tacts, placed them under quarantine, and controlled whether these observed 
the restriction. They conducted testing not only by using their staff but also 
by acting in cooperation with non-profit organisations and private labora-
tories. They collected data on infections and sent them via the state health 
administration to the RKI.
• Local regulatory agencies, which included local auxiliary police, monitored 
observance of Covid-19 regulations, in particular whether restaurants and 
cafés complied with minimum distances and maximum numbers of visitors, 
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whether masks were worn and whether customers’ details were recorded for 
contact tracing in case any of them proved to have been infected. The agen-
cies enforced compliance with closing hours in high-infection communities 
and issued fines if regulations were violated.
• Local administrations authorised local events ranging from concerts and 
sports events to markets of various kinds, fairs, carnival parades, and politi-
cal demonstrations, doing so without regard to whether the organisers were 
public or private actors or even the local government itself: permits could be 
granted only if the application complied with all the regulations. These pro-
cesses held the potential for conflict given that the events in question were 
often of considerable importance not only for restaurants and hotels but so 
too for a local retail trade keen to attract spendthrift foreign guests.
Problems arose due to staff shortages in local health administrations. The federal 
government and Länder discussed a goal in terms of which local health agencies 
would establish groups of five staff members per 20,000 inhabitants to trace the con-
tact persons of infected citizens. In April 2020, the federation offered to pay EUR 
150,000 per agency to modernise their digital equipment, and, in September, EUR 
4 billion for recruiting more personnel. The agencies, however, were unable to hire 
staff as quickly as necessary. Berlin, for example, had 200 vacancies in its health 
administration (Heim 2020), while in Covid-19 hotspots, local governments asked 
the military for support – as a result, by the end of October 2020, several thousand 
members of the military were working in local health agencies. In the same period, 
Rhineland-Palatinate asked state civil servants if they were willing to work tempo-
rarily in local health agencies involved in tracing contact persons.
Not everyone obeyed the restrictions. In summer, youngsters shifted their 
night-life activities to parks, squares, and pedestrian zones in the cities, seldom 
wearing face masks or adhering to minimum distances between people. The 
situation was difficult to control. When police in Stuttgart and Frankfurt tried 
to enforce the regulations, crowds of young people became aggressive and the 
police had to quell street violence; in Stuttgart, shops were damaged and plun-
dered (Stuttgarter Zeitung 2020).
Moreover, Berlin as well as other state capitals had to contend with demon-
strations by Covid-19 deniers. In the name of civil liberties, alternative groups 
and right-wing supporters staged protests against the restrictions. They denied 
the dangers of Covid-19 or even the existence of the pandemic, which was var-
iously claimed to be a myth or biological experiment instigated by the likes of 
Chancellor Angela Merkel or a Bill Gates intent on world domination. During 
the demonstrations – allowed in principle by local governments as an exercise 
of basic rights – people did not practice social distancing or wear masks, never 
mind mounting an ideological challenge to the very foundations of pandemic 
governance in Germany. Although the police tried to make them comply with 
the regulations, success was anything but assured. It was unknown how many 
new infections resulted from these demonstrations.
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The federal government and Länder decided in June 2020 to avoid nation- or 
state-wide lockdowns in future and rather impose restrictions on municipalities 
with high infection rates (initially, a high infection rate was considered to be 
more than 50 infections per 100,000 inhabitants in the past seven days, but the 
threshold was later reduced to 35 infections). Lord Mayors and county chief 
executives were frequently torn between imposing restrictions in order to con-
tain infections and facilitating local economic recovery, particularly in the case 
of restaurants, mass events, and sports matches, which were important as sources 
of revenue and job creation but severely damaged by the lockdown in early 
2020. The locally responsible politicians thus tried to ensure that the enterprises 
concerned could continue to operate at least in an alternative or reduced form. 
Until the Bund and Länder began a second nationwide lockdown on 2 November 
2020, local governments acted autonomously in working out the details of their 
control measures.
3.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
The pandemic in Germany was managed by way of established modes of inter-
governmental relations. The combination of a few common regulations and their 
implementation at state level allowed for slightly diverging measures, thereby 
giving regional actors space in which to respond differently from each other 
depending on the individual nature of the infection rates and economic concerns 
in their jurisdictions. Within this context, the meetings of the Conference of 
Ministers-President with the Federal Chancellor were an essential institution 
of intergovernmental coordination for ensuring that the spread of the corona-
virus did not become uncontrollable and exceed the capacities of hospitals and 
intensive care beds. Further such coordination took place in the conferences of 
the education ministers, the health ministers, and the ministers of the interior. 
Federal and state governments established so-called CORONA cabinets where 
the ministers with key responsibilities discussed measures to be taken and con-
sulted with national and regional medical experts.
The administration of the majority of restrictions and other measures took 
place at the local level, where it was regulated by national laws and state decrees. 
Important instruments at this level were weekly, or, if necessary, daily, crisis con-
ferences where all administrators involved at the state and local level in concrete 
pandemic responses decided on how to manage impending problems. In larger 
states, the state district offices provided support or intervened in cases where local 
governments did not follow the state regulations.
‘Physical’ intergovernmental support and cooperation took several forms:
• When infections increased in spring 2020 and hospitals, medical practices 
and nursing homes found themselves without enough protective equipment 
for their staff, the federation attempted to address this as quickly as possi-
ble. However, although it was the task of the federation to have a sufficient 
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reserve of such equipment in the case of a pandemic, it was not available. 
Insofar as the Bund had neglected its duties, it sought to rectify the situation 
as expeditiously as it could.
• When the number of critical infections exceeded the regional and local 
capacity of hospitals and intensive care beds, neighbouring jurisdictions 
absorbed the overflow of patients. The RKI’s database of available intensive 
care beds facilitated coordinated efforts of this kind. For the second wave of 
infections, cooperation among states was formalised to serve these purposes 
(NDR 2020).
For many weeks after the first lockdown, it was the states rather than the fed-
eration that dominated the field of play. When it became apparent in the summer 
of 2020 that the return of holidaymakers had caused a spike in infection rates, 
the Bavarian minister-president set up test centres for returnees near borders and 
in airports and offered tests for free. The Minster of Health had to follow suit a 
day later and roll this out as a measure for the entire territory (Hickmann et al. 
2020). There was similar pressure on the states to act speedily when it came to 
reopening society and the economy after the first lockdown in 2020, albeit that 
in this instance the conflict among the minister-presidents was obvious.
3.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Intergovernmental fiscal relations were an important dimension of pandemic 
management in Germany. This was so not only because of the need to stabilise 
the locked-down economy, but because the federation compensated for its lack 
of competences by making various grants to state and local governments. The 
impact of Covid-19 on public finance was threefold: the pandemic, and particu-
larly the lockdowns, (1) led to the country’s largest-ever drop in tax revenue, 
(2) generated additional public expenditures at all levels of government, and (3) 
increased public debt as it presented, without any doubt, a case for an exception 
from the constitutional ‘debt brake’.
The breakdown of tax revenue shows a divergence among the levels of gov-
ernment because their respective tax sources were affected in different ways. 
After years of continuing growth in tax revenue, the federation’s revenue 
declined by 16.3 per cent in 2020 and that of local government by slightly less 
(9.8 per cent). The states suffered the smallest percentage of losses (5.5 per cent), 
while the EU received a larger share of national tax revenue (+4.5 per cent) 
(Bundesfinanzministerium 2020b). Governments and economic experts anticipated 
that tax revenue would increase again in 2021, albeit remaining below the level 
of 2019.
Additional expenditure linked to Covid-19 caused ‘automatic’ stabilisers built 
into the tax and social security system to kick in. They varied among the levels 
of government. At the federal level, Covid-specific expenditure was covered 
not only by the normal budgets but by the social insurances, for which the Bund 
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has financial responsibility. In total, additional federal expenditure amounted to 
EUR 146.5 billion (for details, see Bundesfinanzministerium 2020c).
Länder governments supplemented federal programmes for SMEs and the 
self-employed by paying for add-ons. They compensated costs for closed kin-
dergartens and also administered federal transfers to private enterprises and local 
governments. These activities, for which they were refunded, counted as addi-
tional expenditure. In total, state expenditure increased by 39 per cent in the 
second quarter of 2020 compared to the same period in 2019.
Local governments had to cover additional expenditure for staff in the local 
health agencies as well as for the local ‘police’ services that were needed in some 
communities to enforce pandemic regulations – as they were not able to employ 
additional staff of their own, they would often employ private security firms. In 
addition, local governments paid for hygiene equipment in local administration 
workplaces and schools. Even garbage collection generated higher expenses than 
usual – a great deal of refuse had to be removed, given that many people used 
the lockdown as an opportunity to clear out their cellars and attics, in addition to 
which a surge in e-commerce generated a large amount of disposable packaging. 
The loss of revenue from locally owned enterprises due to lockdowns and other 
restrictions (including from amenities such as theatres, opera houses, museums, 
sport stadiums, swimming pools, public transport, fairgrounds, and airports) also 
made its impact felt.
Overall, the financial burdens of Covid-19 were unevenly distributed among 
the three levels of government, conceived vertically; such unevenness also 
became apparent horizontally within levels of government. This reflects the fact 
that differing epidemiological patterns and correspondingly differing restric-
tions on social and economic life generated diverse impacts on regional and local 
economies and hence on their tax revenue.
Fiscal equalisation schemes – federal-state and state-local – stabilised public 
budgets. They equalised the majority of horizontal divergences in loss of tax 
revenue, though not the vertical effects and differences in necessary expenditure. 
As such, the respective superior levels of government created additional vertical 
grants from the federal to state tier, from the state to local tier, and from the 
federal to local tier, the latter despite the constitutional prohibition of direct fed-
eral intervention in local governments. To enable constitutional grants from the 
federation to local governments, the federation used the changes of the Basic Law 
in 2019. This included particular grants from federal and state budgets (50:50) for 
the compensation of local losses in trade tax revenues.
Vertical differences in Covid-related expenditure increases and revenue losses 
were most apparent in regard to public debt. Fiscal policies of a Keynesian type 
stabilise economic development (Auerbach 2012). They imply an acceptance of 
using public debt to cover deficits arising from loss of tax revenue and/or the need 
for additional expenditure. The Bund and Länder stated the case for an exemp-
tion from the restrictive rules of the debt brake, which usually contemplates a 
credit maximum of 0.35 per cent of GDP for the Bund and balanced budgets for 
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the Länder. In addition, the Bund used its Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Credit 
Institute for Reconstruction) to provide additional funding through loan guar-
antees on behalf of endangered enterprises. The federal budget received approval 
from Parliament for new credit of up to EUR 218 billion, corresponding to 13 
per cent of GDP. The limit for guarantees was increased to 47 per cent of GDP 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2020). The debt finally borrowed was allocated to a special 
extra-budgetary fund and is to be redeemed over 50 years.
Likewise, all Länder had budgetary deficits, which were estimated to amount 
in total to about EUR 50 billion. The states administered an important share of 
their debt-funded programmes in special extra-budgetary accounts. They, too, 
decided on a long period for redemption. Local governments also wound up 
with high deficits, notwithstanding the transfers paid to them. ‘Unhealthy’ cash 
credit was far in excess of local borrowing for investment expenditure. The sole 
good news for public budgets in 2020 was that interest rates in the next few years 
seemed likely to remain low, meaning that additional redemptions would ‘only’ 
become payable in the years thereafter.
In summary, Covid-19 contributed to a higher degree of fiscal centralisation. 
It was an open question whether this would continue after the crisis or lead to 
new, and fundamental, reforms granting greater autonomy to lower levels of 
government. A majority of members of the various parliaments asserted that the 
enormous increase in public debt was sustainable – assuming that this Keynesian 
fiscal policy would succeed in preventing a deep(er) recession.
3.5 Findings and policy implications
During the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, the German federal system was 
successful in responding to its challenges and was fortunate to have a relatively 
low number of infections and deaths. The limited legislative powers of the cen-
tral government meant that state and local governments were not inhibited in 
their initial response. By the end of March 2020, however, the Bund had initiated 
the common action of a nationwide lockdown, with the Länder passing detailed 
regulations in this regard and local governments administering and enforcing 
them. From the outset, there was a policy emphasis on focusing on local hotspots 
and customising tighter restrictions there to prevent the virus from spreading out 
of control and to limit the number of critical cases needing intensive care. With 
the rise in autumn of a second wave of infections, the federal system was again 
faced with the challenge of doubling down to contain the pandemic – and, at the 
time of this writing, had once more proven itself capable of containing a threat 
of this nature and magnitude.
Usually, citizens take little note of state-by-state differences in regulations, 
particularly when it is the federation that holds the legislative competence. At the 
end of April 2020, though, when questions about the speed and extent to which 
the economy and education sector should be reopened became issues of debate, 
it was both apparent that the state governments were dominating the political 
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dialogue and plain to see not only that there were differences in state government 
actions but that these differences mattered. Citizens often expressed their lack 
of understanding that regulations in their home town were different to those in 
another Land where they had gone on holiday; all the same, they did not protest 
at the inconvenience of restrictions in local hotspots.
The intergovernmental decision-making that underlay this situation was 
nonetheless unusual. Conventionally, the federation passes the necessary legal 
regulations, the states transform them into state laws, decrees and administra-
tive prescriptions, and then, often along with local governments, execute them. 
Many competences necessary for combating pandemics are located at the state 
level, however, and even at the level of municipalities, which can opt to tighten 
restrictions if necessary. In response, the central government sought to influence 
the states into heeding its political preferences.
It did so in two ways: first, through the public communications of the 
Chancellor and Minister of Health and by inviting the Conference of the 
Ministers-President to consultations; and, secondly, by spending taxpayers’ 
money on a scale hitherto unknown in Germany – sometimes it was clearly 
apparent that it was only the Bund’s generous transfer payments that had bro-
ken the resistance of the minister-presidents to the plan to combat Covid-19 by 
means of a common, nationwide action. Neither feature of the intergovernmen-
tal management of the pandemic is without problem: the extreme dominance of 
executive decision-making led to sharp conflict in the federal and state parlia-
ments, while the public debt incurred will probably result in higher – perhaps 
much higher – taxes in future.
The upcoming election campaigns not only for the federal elections in 
September 2021 but also for several State Parliament elections in 2021 have 
already played an important role and will continue to do so in 2021 in the forma-
tion of Covid-19 policies. The prospective competing candidates for, on the one 
hand, the leadership of CDU/CSU (two of them Minister Presidents), and, on 
the other hand, the candidate of the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), 
the incumbent Federal Minister of Finance, may try to show their own special 
profile in fighting against the pandemic and its economic consequences.
Finally, observers were astonished at the divergent advice provided by aca-
demic experts working for the federal and state governments, the majority of 
them epidemiologists. Many of them advocated a strategy of reducing inter-
personal contact in the population the higher infection rates became. A minor-
ity, however, asserted that, on balance, the harm wrought by infections would 
not be severe enough to warrant heavy restrictions. It is unclear whether the 
‘opinion’ of a government invited the corresponding experts, or if the experts’ 
advice influenced the more rigid or more liberal measures that were adopted; at 
any rate, powerful groups no doubt employed the halo of expertise to legitimate 
their particular interests.
In conclusion, Germany’s executive federalism emerged as an adequate model 
for the management of the Covid-19 pandemic. Although a framework of legal 
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rules was necessary, the gravamen of the country’s actions did not lie in federal 
legislative measures but in the regionally and locally specified application of reg-
ulations and controls, including information management and communication. 
That Germany utilised the scope for decentralised action inherent in its model of 
federalism is probably the most important reason for its relatively low Covid-19 
mortality rate during the first wave of infection.
The German experience of the management of the first wave of the Covid-19 
pandemic thus merits further research, particularly in the light of events subse-
quent to the period examined in this chapter and relating to the second wave and 
later period of vaccination. Three questions come to the fore:
• First, what is the ‘ideal’ mixture of central regulation, on the one hand, 
and decentralised execution and administration, on the other? What ratio 
of uniformity and diversity is needed in order to control infection rates and 
secure the population’s compliance with restrictions?
• Secondly, what was the specific role of the civil service in managing the 
pandemic? What can we learn about new modes of working, particularly 
telework in home offices? What are the consequences of digitalisation not 
only for public administration but the education sector – the schools and 
universities – which, in Germany, fall under public sector management?
• Thirdly, what are the consequences of the pandemic’s huge financial bur-
dens for intergovernmental fiscal relations? Does Germany need greater 
decentralisation of tax-raising and -spending autonomy or greater central 
regulation, including more transfer payments? What was the role of mul-
tilevel tax-sharing and fiscal equalisation schemes in stabilising economic 
development and attempting to ensure the sustainability of public sector 
budgets?
Finally, the apparent contrast of the – relative – weakness of the federation in 
deciding restrictive measures, on the one hand, and its costly financial ‘generosity’, 
on the other hand, should be under further observance if that will continue after 
the pandemic or whether there will be decentralisation particularly of the inter-
governmental financial relations in order to fund state and local governments 
‘sufficiently’ by own (tax) sources.
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4
MANAGING THE COVID-19 
PANDEMIC IN AUSTRIA
From national unity to  
a de facto unitary state?
Karl Kössler
4.1 Introduction
After several months into the Covid-19 pandemic, few things are certain. But 
one of the key insights for any government response is the importance of demo-
graphic features. As of 2020, Austria had a population of 8.9 million, with 19.3 
per cent of its inhabitants between 0 and 19 years of age, 61.6 per cent between 
20 and 64 years, and 19 per cent over 65 years of age. Besides age, the degree 
of urbanisation is another relevant factor in pandemic management, and here 
Austria probably benefits from being characterised mostly by villages and small 
towns. As of 2018, 52 per cent of its population lived in municipalities with less 
than 10,000 inhabitants and 48 per cent in only 86 towns and cities with larger 
population sizes. Apart from the capital, Vienna, which has 1.9 million inhabit-
ants, no other city reaches a population size of 300,000.
In terms of its legal and political system, Austria is, under its Constitution of 
1920, a federal country, though a highly centralised one. The federal constitutional 
make-up was, of course, not the only factor influencing the response to the pan-
demic. A relevant political factor was the composition of government both at the 
federal level and in the nine Länder. Since January 2020, shortly before the onset 
of the pandemic, the federal coalition brought together the conservative Austrian 
People’s Party (ÖVP) and centre-left Green Party as a junior partner. Although the 
ÖVP chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, assumed a prominent role in communicating the 
response to Covid-19, a key cabinet member – Rudolf Anschober, the Minister of 
Health was from the Green Party. While the Länder had been ruled for decades 
either by the ÖVP or the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), all but one were ruled by 
coalitions and thus included various smaller parties in their governments.
Another crucial factor in addressing the pandemic was the presence of a 
well-developed public health-care system; this holds true despite an increasing 
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number of private profit-oriented providers. With 5.1 physicians and 7.6 hospital 
beds per 1,000 inhabitants (OECD 2020), Austria’s medical-service capacity is 
among the strongest in the world. In view of Covid-19, it is also important that 
the country has a relatively high number of beds in ICU units, that is, 28.9 per 
100,000 persons.
Due to Austria’s closeness to Italy, it is hardly surprising that when it reported 
its first ascertained cases of Covid-19 on 25 February 2020, the patients were a 
young couple from Lombardy living in Innsbruck in the Land Tyrol. However, 
the real epicentre of the outbreak in Austria became the Tyrolean ski resort of 
Ischgl. As many ski tourists from Northern European countries were tested pos-
itive upon their return from this alpine village, authorities from these countries 
– starting with Iceland on 5 March – began to classify it as a high-risk area. An 
indication of the size of the outbreak in Ischgl is that as many as 42 per cent of 
the village’s inhabitants already had antibodies by the end of April. As a result, 
Tyrol was Austria’s initial epicentre, with 3,352 coronavirus cases until 15 April 
(in a population of approximately 758,000) compared to only 2,101 in Vienna 
(with a population of 1.9 million).
Over time, the spread of infection tended to even out across the Länder, a 
development that prompted them to align themselves closely with the national 
government, at least initially. The central argument of this chapter is that – after 
early national unity – Austria’s brand of ‘pandemic federalism’ oscillated between 
attempts towards autonomy and differentiation, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the dynamics of a de facto unitary state.
4.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
4.2.1 Constitutional distribution of powers
Unlike subnational entities in other federal systems (Palermo and Kössler 2017), 
Austria’s Länder do not have extensive legislative competences in health care. 
In fact, article 10(1)(12) of the 1920 Constitution stipulates that public health is 
in principle a federal responsibility in regard to both its legislative and execu-
tive dimension. However, the same provision also foresees certain exceptions, 
such as municipal sanitation and, importantly for Covid-19, hospitals and nurs-
ing homes, even if these are under federal health supervision. Article 12(1)(1) 
specifies that, in relation to the latter health facilities, the federal government is 
limited to passing basic legislation on principles, whereas the implementation of 
laws falls within the jurisdiction of the Länder.
Thus, while Länder authorities execute federal and own laws concerning hos-
pitals and nursing homes autonomously, the execution of federal public health 
legislation, based on article 10(1)(12), falls within what is called ‘indirect fed-
eral administration’ (Constitution, articles 102–5). This means Länder officials 
execute federal law not as their own prerogative but as delegates of the federal 
government. The Land governor is subject to instructions from the competent 
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federal minister, with his or her autonomy confined mainly to organisational 
considerations of how to achieve the goals determined by the minister (VfSlg 
9507/1982). Instructions may be disregarded only for the reasons exhaustively 
listed in article 20(1) – that is, instructions issued by a minister without author-
ity and infringing the criminal code (VfSlg 10510/1985) – with the result that 
the Land governor is barred from weighing up different legal interests autono-
mously and making his or her own decision. In case of non-compliance with 
instructions, he or she may even be charged before the Constitutional Court 
under article 142(2)(e) of the Constitution. While this is the legal situation, indi-
rect federal administration makes the federal minister politically dependent on 
implementation by the Land governor and thus forces both government levels to 
cooperate and compromise.
Regarding the executive sphere, the district administrative authorities also 
play an important role. They comprise Austria’s 15 cities, each of which has its 
own city statute1 and 79 unelected district commissions (Bezirkshauptmannschaften) 
with a district commissioner appointed by the Land government. As subordinate 
units, these authorities carry out administrative tasks on behalf of their Land and – 
upon the instructions of the Land governor – tasks falling under indirect federal 
administration. Concerning health care, a district medical officer is, for example, 
responsible for health matters and supervision of the hygiene of hospitals located 
in the district. In comparison, the municipalities play a lesser administrative role, 
one focused mainly on health and hygiene inspections, and in view of their small 
size, often carry out their functions jointly with each other.
Importantly, health care is not an exclusive domain of the various govern-
ment levels mentioned so far; rather, it includes other actors within a corporatist 
scheme of governance relations, as is typical of a Bismarckian welfare-state sys-
tem based largely on mandatory health insurance through payroll contributions 
(Trukeschitz et al. 2013: 154). Whereas one category of employees is insured 
via medical aid funds based on occupation (e.g., railway workers, farmers, or 
civil servants), most employees are covered by the nine Länder medical aid funds 
(one fund per Land). This makes the medical aid funds key players, especially in 
corporatist negotiations regarding outpatient care. Concerning inpatient care, 
on the other hand, the Länder are, given their abovementioned responsibility for 
hospitals, the main actors (ibid: 158). Consequently, the Minister of Health lacks 
(in normal times) direct control over much of the country’s health care.
In terms of policy-making, the separation of powers outlined above is com-
plemented by intergovernmental agreements on health care based on article 
15(a) of the Constitution. Since 1974, this provision has enabled both vertical as 
well as horizontal accords which are binding though not self-executing (VfSlg 
9581/1982; 9886/1983), inasmuch as their content still needs to be adopted for-
mally by Parliament. Agreements under article 15(a) concerning hospitals first 
appeared in 1978, and since the late-1980s became a primary tool for regulating 
an extremely complex financing system that involves contributions from the fed-
eral government, Länder, municipalities and medical aid funds. A key agreement 
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in 1997 introduced a binding general hospital plan and gave rise to health funds 
at the federal level and in the Länder for the sake of better coordinating inpa-
tient and outpatient care. Austria pressed ahead with these reforms because the 
separation between two areas of care is, together with the complex financing 
arrangements, often seen as responsible for an overly fragmented health-care 
system (Kostera 2013: 151).
4.2.2 Constitutional emergency powers
A key question is whether the ordinary distribution of functions, as outlined, also 
prevails in the extraordinary circumstances of a pandemic. In fact, even though 
there has been much talk of ‘emergency ordinances’ issued by the federal and 
Länder governments, no one has ever declared a state of emergency in Austria 
due to Covid-19.
Article 18(3) of the Constitution grants the Austrian President (upon proposal 
by the federal government) the power to issue ordinances ‘necessary to prevent 
obvious and irreparable damage to the general public’ at a time when the first 
chamber of Parliament is not assembled, cannot meet, or cannot act as a result 
of force majeure. Yet, during the pandemic in 2020, the chamber did actually 
meet and play some role, albeit a very limited one (see section 4.2). Importantly, 
a presidential ordinance may change ordinary law but not constitutional law; 
nor may it entail a ‘permanent financial burden’ for the federal government or a 
‘financial burden’ for the Länder or municipalities (article 18(5)), which is obvi-
ously an illusion in times of a pandemic. In short, there are several reasons why 
the presidential emergency power is of no practical use in such circumstances.
Another avenue for ushering in a period of emergency would be article 15 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which has been incorporated into 
Austria’s legal order constitutional rank that is above ordinary legislation. This arti-
cle provides a possibility to derogate certain rights ‘[i]n time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation’. However, the Austrian government, 
unlike others,2 did not invoke this right of derogation (Lachmayer 2020), which 
would have required keeping the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe 
informed about the emergency measures taken and the reasons for them.
4.2.3 The legislative framework for addressing Covid-19
As for ordinary legislation, the Epidemic Diseases Act was most relevant at the 
outset of the Covid-19 pandemic. A key problem, however, was that this piece 
of legislation dates back to 1950 (and is based largely on an even older law passed 
in 1913), which makes it less than ideal for contending with an emergency in the 
21st century.
Several of its anachronistic features were identified, among them the obli-
gation to report a case of infection to the authorities only within 24 hours.3 In 
today’s highly mobile world, this time span is short enough for an infectious 
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disease to spread from Land to Land, or even to another country. Naturally, this 
old law also fails to pay adequate attention to more contemporary issues such 
as data protection, a dimension that was introduced only when the Act was 
amended during the pandemic in 2020 (BGBl. I Nr. 16/2020). Another aspect of 
the law that improved in response to Covid-19 was its harsh rules on gatherings 
and events. An amendment made it clear that, apart from outright prohibition, 
there are less intrusive measures that can be taken, such as limitations applicable 
to specific groups of persons, or stipulations in regard to physical distancing, face 
masks, and sanitary requirements (BGBl. I Nr. 43/2020).
4.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
Instead of specific institutions for public health emergencies, Austria has sev-
eral general health-care bodies on which the Minister of Health can rely for 
advice. The Health Austria Company (Gesundheit Österreich GmbH), owned by 
the Austrian government, is an applied research institute in charge of, among 
other things, health-care capacity planning, which is a matter of vital impor-
tance in pandemic management. Another institution, the Supreme Health Board 
(Oberster Sanitätsrat), brings together more than 40 health experts and provides, as 
do the Länder health boards (Landessanitätsräte) at the subnational level, technical 
support and guidance on major medical issues. However, the Minister of Health, 
allegedly due to the need to focus on the pandemic, failed to re-nominate the 
members of the Supreme Health Board, which is an unlawful state of affairs. 
Instead, he relied for advice on an ad hoc ‘coronavirus taskforce’. For coordi-
nation with the Länder and local governments, the federal government utilised 
general mechanisms of intergovernmental relations.
4.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
4.4.1 Taking the initiative
Although Austria recorded its first two cases of Covid-19 in Innsbruck on 25 
February 2020, a comprehensive response was triggered only later on by the 
events in Ischgl. On 4 March, Icelandic authorities sent an e-mail to Austrian 
colleagues warning that eight of their positive cases had travelled to the ski 
resort, information which the Ministry of Health forwarded to Tyrol’s health 
authorities. However, it was only on 12 March that tourists were informed that 
ski resorts would be closed, and even so, not immediately but two days hence. 
On 13 March, the national government placed the valley around Ischgl under 
quarantine.
Reconstructing these events – in particular, determining who acted first, 
acted at all or failed to act – takes on a legal dimension which is highly inter-
esting from a federalism perspective. This is because more than 6,000 Ischgl 
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tourists joined the Austrian Consumer Protection Association in its efforts to 
claim damages, while over a thousand of them were joined as private parties in 
criminal charges against the relevant authorities, charges that were ongoing at 
the time of this writing.
The main claim is that the authorities knew, or should have known, about 
the risk of mass infection but responded too slowly out of greed and the priority 
given to the interests of the tourism industry (Consumer Protection Association 
2020). The significance of tourism becomes evident from the facts that roughly 
one-fourth of jobs in Tyrol are tied to this sector and that a village like Ischgl, 
with 1,600 inhabitants, hosts as many as 10,000 tourists in the skiing season. 
Article 23(1) of the Constitution stipulates that authorities are, under civil 
law, liable for injuries inflicted in executing laws through illegal and culpable 
behaviour. As the potential wrongdoing would have occurred within the scope 
of indirect federal administration (see section 2.1), the claim goes against the 
Republic of Austria for alleged mistakes made by both the national as well as 
Tyrolean authorities.
4.4.2 Federal action
As part of a dual strategy, the federal government amended the Epidemic 
Diseases Act to make it fit for the 21st century and adopted ad hoc legislation. 
Although measures during the first few days of the federal response from 10 
March onwards – for example, restrictions on travel and events, the closure of 
schools and universities, and the ending of the skiing season – were still based on 
the Epidemic Diseases Act, 15 March witnessed a rather extraordinary episode 
in Austrian parliamentarism.
On this Sunday, a set of bills, among them the Covid-19 Measures Act, was 
adopted by both chambers of Parliament within less than 24 hours, authenti-
cated by the President and published in the law gazette. The Covid-19 Measures 
Act, which contains a sunset clause providing for its termination at the end of 
2020, was since then at the core of efforts to combat the pandemic. It was this 
Act which allowed for the closure of businesses except for shops providing basic 
services, imposed limitations on entering public places, and made it obligatory 
to wear face masks. Some restrictions, especially those regarding access to public 
places, expired on 30 April 2020, after which a new ordinance came into force, 
the so-called easing ordinance (Lockerungsverordnung) (BGBl. II Nr. 197/2020).
In terms of institutions that shaped federal action, a key body was a newly 
established ‘coronavirus taskforce’. It was curious that this taskforce, nominated 
and chaired by the Minister of Health, included national authorities and experts 
such as health professionals and mathematicians but had no representatives of 
the Länder.
Among the first federal measures were business closures affecting in particular 
hotels and cable-car businesses in Tyrol. These measures, as noted, were based on 
the 1950 Epidemic Diseases Act, which promised full compensation for losses in 
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the amount of ‘comparable extrapolated earnings’. To avoid such costly compen-
sation, the Covid-19 Measures Act of 15 March not only enabled the Minister of 
Health to prohibit, through an ordinance, customers, and economic operators 
from entering business premises, but also simply excluded, once this ordinance 
was in force, the applicability of the compensation rules under the old law of 1950.
In a seminal judgment, the Constitutional Court held that this provision is no 
violation of the right to equality but is proportionate, given that the Covid-19 
Measures Act established a substantial crisis management fund for the compen-
sation of businesses closed after the ordinance (VfGH 14.07.2020, G 202/2020). 
This was not the only aspect of business closure that raised legal concerns. Shops 
with a sales area of less than 400 m2 were allowed to reopen on 14 April 2020 
and others only on 1 May. The Constitutional Court ruled that the relevant 
ordinance of the Minister of Health was against the law, as it had failed to justify 
this differentiation (VfGH 14.07.2020, V 411/2020).
The Covid-19 Measures Act did not allow for bans on entering business 
premises but enabled more far-reaching restrictions of freedom of movement. By 
means of an ordinance, entering public places may be prohibited by the Minister 
of Health throughout the country, by a governor for the territory of the respec-
tive Land, and by a district administrative authority for its district or parts thereof. 
The crux of the matter was that the relevant section 2 of the law explicitly 
referred to banning access to ‘specific public places’. However, section 1 of the 
‘entry ordinance’ (Betretungsverordnung) of the Minister of Health (BGBl. II Nr. 
98/2020), which like the Covid-19 Measures Act came into force on 16 March, 
decreed a general curfew with only few exceptions, such as movement for cover-
ing the basic needs of daily life or for professional purposes. The Constitutional 
Court did not agree with the argument that the Act was unconstitutional due to 
a violation of article 18(1), which stipulates that ‘[t]he entire public administra-
tion shall be based on law’. It did hold, however, that the ‘entry ordinance’ was 
partly unlawful because its general prohibition was indeed too extensive to be 
covered by the Covid-19 Measures Act (VfGH 14.07.2020, V 363/2020).
A third controversial area of the federal response to the pandemic was the 
obligation to wear face masks. With effect from 15 June, masks were required 
only for public transport and in health-care facilities such as pharmacies, and no 
longer in shops, schools and restaurants. However, this easing of measures would 
not last for long. The fact that the duty to wear masks was broadened on 24 July 
to include postal offices, banks, and grocery stores – but not, for example, clothes 
shops and restaurants – again ignited public debate. A point of controversy was 
whether this differentiation was objectively justifiable and if the ordinance pro-
vided a credible explanation – all of which was exactly the same as what the 
Constitutional Court had demanded a little more than a week before then in 
its ruling (mentioned above) on the privileged reopening of smaller businesses.
The federal actions described above illustrate a double centralisation of 
decision-making, that is, an accumulation of power vertically at the national 
government level and horizontally in the hands of the executive branch. Indeed, 
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conventional wisdom has it that emergency situations lead to a predominance of 
the (national) executive because the latter can respond speedily and decisively 
to a sudden crisis. This ‘Schmittian’ or ‘post-Madisonian’ view of emergency 
governance has been opposed by a study based on data on Covid-19 responses 
from more than a hundred countries (Ginsburg and Versteeg 2020). The authors 
claim that the conventional wisdom applies only to a specific kind of emergency, 
namely a national security crisis. Other kinds of emergencies, such as the Covid-
19 pandemic, which are characterised by a dispersal of information with effective 
implementation depending to a much greater extent on local governments, the 
(national) executive would be structurally bound rather than unbound.
In Austria, the mostly unbound national executive was only occasionally chal-
lenged by the Länder, with the pushback again coming from the executive, only 
in this instance the subnational executive. The finding that Germany’s Covid-19 
governance entailed a ‘self-disempowerment of parliament’ (Selbstentmächtigung 
des Parlaments) (Möllers 2020) applies in Austria to both the national and subna-
tional levels of government. While the speaker of the first chamber from day one 
explicitly emphasised the continuity of parliamentary activities, Parliament had 
few high moments in resisting the executive, one of them being the opposition’s 
success in introducing a sunset clause to the Covid-19 Measures Act. However, 
the hasty enactment of complex omnibus bills and the, at best, ambivalent role 
of the second chamber, supposedly representing Länder interests, testify to the 
diminished role of parliamentarism.
Only in few instances did the Federal Council (Bundesrat) apply its tool of a 
suspensive veto (Constitution, article 42(1–4)). However, to see this as an expres-
sion of Länder influence would be a misrepresentation of the real circumstances. 
First, there was a strong partisan element, as two opposition parties, the social 
democratic SPÖ and the right-wing FPÖ, held a majority in the Federal Council 
(Palermo 2020). Secondly, the stated reasons for the veto were feared infringe-
ments of fundamental rights and a reduction of parliamentary scrutiny due to 
the hasty legislative process (Gamper 2020). Instead of federalism grounds, the 
vetoes were prompted by the traditional rationale of bicameralism as an oppor-
tunity to give bills a second thought, a line of argument key to the thinking of 
George Washington and other framers of the US Constitution. The broader 
problem of the concentration of power in the (national) executive (Lachmayer 
2020) is best illustrated by the federal government’s use of internal administrative 
orders to public officials (Erlässe) to regulate matters with external effects (which 
ought to be regulated through ordinances). Such a practice deprives people of 
legal remedies because internal orders are not subject to judicial review.
In response to mounting criticism, the Minister of Health promised to avoid 
legal missteps in the future, while the Chancellor’s reaction was rather nonchalant. 
He called on lawyers not to engage in ‘legal sophistry’ ( juristische Spitzfindigkeiten) 
and pointed to the fact that, at the next session of the Constitutional Court 
in June 2020, the legal measures would no longer be in force anyway, which 
was not necessarily true.4 This prompted observers to ask sarcastically whether 
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constitutional law is ‘for the Court only’ (Somek 2020) and emphasise that a 
‘good legislator’ would be obliged ex ante to weigh up the proportionality of 
measures in an effort to avoid unconstitutionality. Compared to earlier legal 
measures, the ‘easing ordinance’ (Lockerungsverordnung), entering into force on 1 
May, was indeed viewed positively by legal experts as ‘more differentiated and 
precise’ (Bernd-Christian Funk, quoted in Kroisleitner and Scherndl 2020).
Besides horizontal concentration of power in the hands of the executive, dou-
ble centralisation also entails – in its vertical dimension – the predominance of 
the national government. This is exemplified, in particular, by national Covid-
19 legislation regulating, on the basis of the competence for public health under 
article 10(1)(12) of the Constitution, a number of issues that normally fall within 
the responsibilities of the Länder. This continues to be the case even though some 
Länder demanded, in the run-up to the ‘easing ordinance’ of 1 May, more decen-
tralisation and differentiation regarding the roll-back of restrictions. However, 
this ordinance regulates, for example, the entry to sports facilities and the organ-
isation of events, matters usually falling within Länder responsibilities. As the 
federal competence for public health allows it in times of emergency to take 
measures otherwise reserved to the Länder, the competences of the latter are 
pushed into the background. When they would come to the fore again thus 
depends on the return to ‘normality’.
In this light, the comprehensive reform of both the 2020 Covid-19 Measures 
Act and the 1950 Epidemic Diseases Act, which the Austrian parliament passed on 
25 September (BGBl. I Nr. 104/2020), had the declared aim of partially reducing 
centralisation (see section 4.4.4). In contrast to earlier, hasty legislation during the 
pandemic, a comprehensive evaluation procedure took place, with some of the 
several thousand comments on the bill by private individuals and organisations 
leading to genuine improvement. Yet it was correctly observed, in a critical vein, 
that a thorough amendment of the two acts took as long as seven months since the 
start of the pandemic (Bußjäger, quoted in Marchart and Weißensteiner 2020).
Overall, the reform provided a legal basis for pandemic governance which is 
firmer, more precise, and in line with the proportionality principle. Importantly, 
sections 3–5 of the Covid-19 Measures Act now determine the modalities for 
restrictions on freedom of movement by ordinance more extensively and pre-
cisely and thus seek to remedy the problem of the ‘entry ordinance’ being declared 
unlawful. Another welcome change in regard to the rule of law is procedural, as 
an ordinance decreeing a future lockdown would have to be discussed with the 
Main Committee of the first parliamentary chamber and thus with all parties 
represented there. However, as the aim is to avoid countrywide lockdowns, more 
autonomy is henceforth granted to the Länder.
4.4.3 Länder action
The Länder adopted several measures, partly through ordinary legislation but 
above all through ordinances, to combat the pandemic. However, this did not 
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materially alter the predominance of the centralist approach. At the outset, Tyrol 
had lockdown rules that deviated for several weeks from those of the rest of the 
country, in addition to which it prohibited entry to other Länder. But as Covid-
19 spread more evenly across the country, subnational governments tended to 
align themselves with the national government. When restrictions began to be 
eased in a staggered way in mid-April and early May 2020, greater differenti-
ation was demanded by some Länder and academic observers in the interests of 
economic recovery and greater acceptance of the restrictions by the population. 
Still, Austria’s Covid-19 response largely remained uniform, even though infec-
tion clusters in some areas prompted certain subnational governments to take 
special measures, with school closures and stricter face mask regulations in early 
July in Upper Austria being a case in point.
The debate about greater Länder autonomy regained momentum as infec-
tion numbers grew in early September and coincided with the introduction of 
the abovementioned ‘coronavirus traffic light system’ (Corona-Ampel). Based on 
weekly risk assessments by a commission that assigned one of four colours – 
green, yellow, orange, or red – to each district, it was up to federal, Länder, and 
district authorities to adopt recommendations or legally binding measures. Local 
differentiation between districts was thus key to this plan.
However, the plan was derailed by two problems. First, the mixed composition 
of the commission – that is, five experts nominated by the national government, 
five civil servants from national ministries, and one representative from each of 
the nine Länder – resulted inevitably in tensions between scientific and political 
rationales for the risk assessments. While it was mostly the representatives of the 
federal and Länder governments within the commission that attempted to wield 
influence, one member suggested at the start of one of the first crucial meetings 
that the chief of staff of the Chancellor, without being part of the commission, 
briefly join in order to read out a declaration. This was rejected by the commis-
sion, on the argument that, to preserve its air of technocratic probity, political 
interventions should be avoided (even though political representatives outnum-
bered experts 14 to 5!). However, the Länder and local governments also tried to 
exert pressure on the commission. Whereas Vienna initially demanded a stricter 
risk assessment, the Mayor of Linz was outraged that his city was in the yellow 
and not green column and lambasted the ‘coronavirus traffic light system’ as 
arbitrary and a failure.
The second problem was that a sharp increase in infection numbers precisely 
at the time of the new system’s introduction prompted the federal government 
to throw regional differentiation overboard. On 12 September 2020, it resorted 
to countrywide measures by issuing another amendment, already the 10th, of 
the ‘easing ordinance’ (BGBl. II Nr. 398/2020). Thus, the assignment of colours 
to the single districts became rather symbolic and at most useful for risk-aware-
ness raising because the new uniform rules, which were lying – depending on 
the issue – between those districts initially categorised as yellow or orange, 
also entered into force in the many green districts. For example, the maximum 
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number of persons for indoor events was reduced to 50, as opposed to the 200 
initially foreseen for green and 100 for yellow, and a few days later was lowered 
further to 10.
Issues of autonomy and differentiation also emerged on another occasion, 
namely in late September 2020 during the reform mentioned above of federal 
Covid-19 legislation. The Minister of Health himself underlined that the reform 
was aimed at increasing Länder competences to enable them to co-define locally 
the measures that would best contain the pandemic (APA 2020). The new sec-
tion 7 of the Covid-19 Measures Act clarifies the power to issue ordinances based 
on this law at the federal, Land, and district levels and envisages regional differ-
entiation. A Land Governor may act, if there is no federal ordinance or decree, 
to provide additional measures, and a district administrative authority may act, if 
there is neither a federal nor a Land ordinance, to introduce additional measures.
Such autonomous decision-making runs into certain limits. First, Land and 
district ordinances that prevent people (with exceptions) from leaving their pri-
vate living spaces need the approval of, respectively, the Minister of Health and 
the Land governor. Secondly, the minister must be informed about both the 
Länder and district ordinances before they enter into force. Thirdly, legal hier-
archy is reflected in the provision that Länder ordinances may repeal district 
ordinances and that both can be repealed by ordinances from the Minister of 
Health. In practice, these hard instruments for restraining autonomy were not 
used during the period under review. Instead, the federal government merely 
expressed its misgivings when, for example, Vienna in September 2020 decided 
to go its own way by introducing guest registration in pubs and restaurants rather 
than following other Länder in setting closing hours at 22:00.
4.4.4 Local government action
Under the Constitution, district administrative authorities do not have the scope 
of autonomy comparable to that of the Länder, as they are merely subordinate 
units. Nevertheless, as instructions from the Land or federal governments can-
not and/or do not determine, even more so in a complex emergency situation, 
all district actions, the leeway they give to local governments is significant in 
practice. In fact, it is the health departments of the districts that decide in con-
crete cases whom to quarantine or which businesses to close. Inasmuch as the 
implementation of numerous competences, both federal and from the Länder, is 
concentrated in the district authorities, the role they play in the state machinery 
is undramatic and often even unacknowledged, yet for all that, crucial (Bußjäger 
et al. 2018).
In the context of Covid-19, the extent to which they made a difference 
depended critically on the staff capacities each Land assigned to them and their 
approach to tackling the pandemic. For example, Innsbruck’s authorities – which 
were in charge of dealing with the couple from Lombardy who were Austria’s first 
identified Covid-19 cases – were far more efficient in testing and quarantining 
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contact persons than the district commission of Landeck was in regard to the 
cases in Ischgl. Indeed, this comparison contributed to accusations that business 
interests hindered interventions by the authorities in Landeck. Precisely because 
they were so pivotal in implementing Covid-19 measures on the ground, dis-
trict commissioners complained to the Minister of Health about ever-changing, 
unrealistic rules that were difficult to put into practice and criticised a lack of 
communication by the federal government (Wiener Zeitung 2020). The minis-
ter reacted by inviting them to a direct exchange but also pointed to his intensive 
talks with the health boards of the Länder and their duty – within indirect federal 
administration – to keep the districts informed.
While the Constitution generally accords municipalities a lesser role in health 
care than it does the districts, they were of course still critical in the fight against 
Covid-19, for instance in their efforts to provide information and coordinate the 
activities of local stakeholders, including volunteers. With local governments 
at the forefront of providing basic services, they were key to keeping crucial 
public sector activities running during the lockdown. There were urgent needs, 
for example, to switch to digitalised services and to reorganise child care and 
public transportation to suit the conditions dictated by the pandemic. Quite 
often municipalities came to the rescue of crisis-ridden local companies by defer-
ring the payment of fees or even availing direct financial assistance. The role of 
municipalities was thus less concerned with the health emergency itself than with 
its impact, not least of all its economic impact.
4.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
Relations between governments were marked on the whole, especially in the 
early stages of the pandemic, by a high level of cooperation. However, this 
was not collaboration on an equal footing, as the Länder long felt comfortable 
with letting the federal government take the lead. Given the lack of significant 
pre-existing institutions of emergency management (see section 4.3), cooperative 
governance took place by means of general mechanisms of intergovernmental 
relations. Informal contacts as well as the Conference of the Länder Governors 
(Landeshauptleutekonferenz) played a role. At a gathering on 15 May 2020 of this 
conference, which is much more powerful in representing subnational interests 
than the second chamber (Kössler 2016: 363f ), the governors expressly referred to 
‘successful federalism’ as the recipe for making Austria ‘healthy and strong again’.
This relatively harmonious picture does not mean, of course, that relations 
were devoid of failures of cooperation or outright conflict; indeed, intergov-
ernmental tension increased over time. Early examples concerning restrictions 
of free movement included an internal order (Erlass) issued by the Minister of 
Health shortly before Easter to the Länder governors that they prohibit ‘all meet-
ings in a closed room attended by more than five persons not living in the same 
household’. Even though the federal government retracted the order, explaining 
that it had meant only to ban ‘corona parties’ and not families’ Easter celebrations, 
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there was a time lag during which district administrative authorities upheld the 
ordinances based on this order. The resultant confusion could have been avoided 
by more efficient intergovernmental communication.
Another controversy revolved around an ordinance in which Burgenland’s gov-
ernor stipulated that this Land’s most popular lake could be visited only by people 
who resided within 15 km of it. This was to avoid large crowds and thus a higher 
risk of infection. While section 2 of the Covid-19 Measures Act certainly allowed 
the governor to regulate access to a specific public place such as a lake, the federal 
government demanded uniform rules regarding swimming lakes. This episode is 
emblematic of how relations between single Länder and the national government 
differed because they showed different levels of subnational activism. For example, 
whereas Burgenland pushed to have its own solution, the Land Carinthia called for 
the national government to act and establish countrywide rules.
Subsequent conflicts related to measures imposed at Austria’s borders when 
fears that holiday returnees would ‘import’ the virus led to the introduction of 
health checks. While the health departments of the districts carried out fever 
measurements and, where necessary, a coronavirus test, they were, from an 
organisational perspective, subject to their Land government and assisted by mil-
itary troops sent by the federal government.5 With traffic jams of several hours 
occurring at certain border crossings, the intergovernmental blame game would 
soon start. The Minister of Health stated that this Land had misinterpreted the 
relevant ordinance by performing more than just random checks, but Carinthia 
complained about a lack of clear communication.
When infection numbers increased rapidly in early September 2020 (despite 
the border checks), another field of intergovernmental friction came to the fore. 
The federal government accused certain Länder and the health departments of 
their districts of being too slow regarding so-called TTI (‘testing, tracing, and 
isolating’). In turn, Vienna not only blamed everything on the allegedly pre-
mature lifting of the federal lockdown but also frantically started to increase 
staff capacity dedicated to these tasks. The Länder had been free to find different 
solutions. Indeed, some supported understaffed district health departments with 
civil servants from other departments or other districts, or with military troops 
provided by the federal government, while others relied primarily on hiring 
(medical) students on a short-term basis.
4.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
In Austria, most of the revenue at all levels of government is generated as part of 
a shared taxation system, and fiscal resources depend, in the absence of exten-
sive constitutional regulations,6 on an ordinary federal law, that is, the Financial 
Equalisation Law, which is adopted every four years and determines for each 
single tax the revenue portions of the various government levels. Even if the 
legislative process involves tripartite talks, negotiators are in fact not on an equal 
footing, and Länder and municipalities ‘really have no legal alternative but to 
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accept the determination of fiscal relations by the federal government’ (Bußjäger 
2005: 61). Eighty-four per cent of the total revenue raised in Austria falls within 
this shared taxation system, and from these funds 68 per cent have gone since 
2018 to the federal government, 20 per cent to the Länder, and 12 per cent to the 
municipalities (Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.). The fact that virtually all lucra-
tive sources are shared taxes entails that the economic downturn in the wake of 
Covid-19 would have an equal impact on all three government levels, especially 
due to diminishing receipts from corporate and personal income taxes.
However, revenue shortages from joint taxes are, in relative terms, particu-
larly damaging for the Länder because they do not enjoy much fiscal autonomy. 
Admittedly, they are allowed to ‘invent’ taxes not mentioned in the Financial 
Equalisation Law. But the latter is so comprehensive that it does not leave much 
space for this. Despite perennial discussions (or sham fights), increased tax auton-
omy has never been realised due to a certain reluctance on the part of the Länder 
and to the fact that the federal government offers them only marginal taxes with 
limited revenue.
As for Austria’s municipalities, they faced significant income losses in shared 
taxes, which in 2018 accounted for 39 per cent of their revenues,7 as well as in 
certain exclusive local taxes. Receipts from a municipal tax (Kommunalsteuer) 
that employers have to pay based on the gross income of their employees were 
expected to shrink by 20–40 per cent. Reduced payments due to rising unem-
ployment and a widely used partial furlough scheme (Kurzarbeit) account for that. 
Tight municipal budgets were also the result of reduced income from tourist 
taxes or fees for public services, such as child care. At the same time, municipali-
ties are responsible for many basic services, such as water supply, so their room for 
manoeuvre in cutting costs was limited. Clearly, the financial impact of the pan-
demic on municipalities was highly differentiated, with those reliant on tourism 
or other businesses hard-hit by Covid-19 bearing the brunt.
As early as 15 March 2020, when the Austrian parliament passed the first pan-
demic-related bills, a support package was announced, including direct emer-
gency help, credit guarantees, and tax deferments. For municipalities, EUR 1 
billion was to be provided to cover local investments under a 50 per cent co- 
financing scheme. However, it was likely that some municipalities would fail to 
reach the co-financing quota. Moreover, the aid received was forecast to be in 
effect equalised by EUR 1.1 billion that municipalities would lose in revenue 
due to tax cuts envisaged in Austria’s recovery package to stimulate the economy 
(Mitterer 2020). In view of shrinking resources, it was certain that intergovern-
mental fiscal relations would remain tense.
4.5 Findings and policy implications
When it comes to health care and federalism, it has been a mantra of critics, espe-
cially health economists (Trukeschitz et al. 2013: 174) but so too the Austrian 
Court of Auditors (Rechnungshof 2010), that far-reaching Länder competences 
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have resulted in fragmentation and an inefficient proliferation of hospitals with 
more beds than are actually needed. The irony is that the high numbers of hos-
pital beds, not least of all in ICU units, turned out to be a major asset in Austria’s 
Covid-19 response. There is a good chance that decentralised service provision 
will come to be appreciated again and that the creed of efficiency, often idolised 
as an undisputed guiding principle within mindsets strongly inclined towards 
centralisation, will be re-assessed. A question, then, is whether this will be lim-
ited to the era of Covid-19 or lead to lasting long-term change.
This same question of permanent or merely temporary change is also key 
when it comes to considering the centralisation that the Covid-19 emergency 
brought about. There can be little doubt that a double centralisation of deci-
sion-making occurred in the early stages through an accumulation of power 
horizontally in the hands of the executive branch and vertically at the national 
government level. In May 2020, it was claimed, for good reason, that Covid-19 
turned Austria into a ‘decentralized de facto unitary state’ (Bußjäger 2020b). 
Nevertheless, these tendencies – set in motion without using constitutional 
emergency powers – do not reflect a profound change but rather re-emphasise 
trends towards centralisation that were already in existence in ‘normal times’. To 
be sure, there were certain cautious efforts to reduce centralisation for the sake 
of more autonomy and differentiation in autumn 2020, namely the ‘coronavirus 
traffic light system’ and the new rules for ordinances under the reformed federal 
Covid-19 legislation. But the sustainability of these efforts is in doubt and they 
are unlikely to alter the underlying centralist tendencies.
It is therefore nearly impossible to assess whether Austria’s federal dispensation 
has been a boon or bane in managing the pandemic. The truth is that federalism 
has hardly been noticeable in the making of key decisions at the time of this writ-
ing. It is thus somewhat misleading to argue that the country ‘fared surprisingly 
well in the current crisis’ despite its ‘strong federalism’ (Czypionka 2020). First, 
the largely centralised management of the pandemic follows from the fact that 
the public health competence of the national government under article 10(1)(12) 
of the Constitution overshadows for the duration of the emergency the Länder 
competences and enables it to intervene in what are otherwise subnational pre-
rogatives. Second, this key provision envisages public health as a matter for indi-
rect federal administration. On the one hand, this form of mixed administration 
compels all authorities to cooperate; on the other, the federal government has 
legal instruments to enforce its will vis-à-vis the state governors, even if their 
power of instruction meets factual limits, for example in the staff capacities of 
the subordinated authorities (Bußjäger 2020a). While district administrative 
authorities have considerable functions in practice, even more so in a complex 
emergency like Covid-19, and the Land Governor is central because of his or her 
instructions to the districts and other members of the Land government, one per-
son remains at the top of the legal hierarchy: the Minister of Health. Politically, 
of course, he is also dependent on these subordinate authorities for implementa-
tion and is thus to some extent forced to compromise.
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It is true that the Minister of Health came to be challenged more and more 
and that intergovernmental relations suffered increasingly from disputes as the 
pandemic dragged on. However, these conflicts were not as numerous and fun-
damental as they were in many other countries. To some extent, this is linked 
to the well-known argument that Austria, due to its societal homogeneity, 
has a higher tolerance for centralism than other countries because there is, 
compared to multinational federations with territorially based distinctiveness, 
clearly less pressure towards decentralisation (Erk 2004). On closer inspec-
tion, many of what appear to be intergovernmental conflicts are skirmishes 
following the logic of party politics. Several of the disputes in autumn 2020 
concerned Vienna and have to be seen in the context of tensions between 
the conservatives leading the national government and the Social Democrats 
ruling the capital which were further amplified in the run-up to elections in 
Vienna on 11 October. True intergovernmental conflicts based on ambitions of 
the Länder to go their own way remained relatively limited compared to other 
countries. Nonetheless, the onset of a second wave of infection saw increasing 
tension, with subnational governments being more proactive in some instances 
and the national government explicitly urging them to be more active and 
adopt stricter measures in other instances. Austria therefore still oscillates 
between, on the one hand, cautious attempts towards greater autonomy and 
differentiation and, on the other, the move from national unity to a de facto 
unitary state, one which has characterised the country’s particular brand of 
‘pandemic federalism’.
Notes
 1 From a legal point of view, these are, at one and the same time, municipalities and district 
administrative authorities. On their role, see Kössler and Kress (2021).
 2 Several countries made use of this right in spring 2020, among them, for instance, Esto-
nia, Romania and Serbia.
 3 The constitutional lawyer Bernd-Christian Funk quoted in Brickner (2020).
 4 The Constitutional Court could also have decided to hold an extra session until 30 
April 2020 when the legal measures were still in force. Moreover, even legal acts not 
in force anymore in June could still have had legal effects and thus have been far from 
irrelevant. For instance, the ordinance regulating entry to public places was the basis 
for fines challenged in ongoing administrative penalty proceedings; the fact that the 
Court invalidated parts of this ordinance meant that these fines were not payable 
anymore.
 5 The involvement of the army might seem odd to an external observer. But beyond mil-
itary defence (Constitution, article 79(1)), the civilian administration may assign to the 
Austrian army several additional tasks, among them ‘to render assistance in the case of 
natural catastrophes and disasters of exceptional magnitude’ (article 79(2)(2)).
 6 Article 13 of the Constitution merely refers to the Financial Constitutional Law of 1948, 
which provides only general principles for tax allocation and abstract types of taxes and 
itself authorises the federal legislator to assign taxes concretely through the Financial 
Equalisation Law.
 7 For an examination of the shares of various municipal income components and how 
they are affected by Covid-19, see Biwald and Mitterer (2020).
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MANAGING THE COVID-19 
CRISIS IN A DIVIDED BELGIAN 
FEDERATION
Cooperation against all odds
Patricia Popelier and Peter Bursens
5.1 Introduction
When it recorded its first case of Covid-19 on 3 February 2020, Belgium was in 
the midst of a political crisis. Since the fall of its government in December 2018 
and elections in May 2019, political parties had still not succeeded in forming 
a new federal government. The antagonism between the two major parties, the 
Flemish nationalist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie and the francophone social demo-
cratic Parti Socialiste, was intensified by the elections, which resulted in deep-
ened division between Flemish and Walloon voters and an unprecedented rise of 
extremist parties on either side of the spectrum. Meanwhile, a caretaker minor-
ity government stayed on, backed by temporary parliamentary support, until a 
new government was formed eventually on 1 October 2020, now backed by a 
parliamentary majority of seven parties – a transition that took place at a moment 
when infections were on the rise again.
This chapter examines how a divided Belgian federation responded to the 
Covid-19 pandemic, with the period of analysis extending from February to 
October 2020 and thus covering the full cycle of the first wave – including the 
outbreak in February, the peak in spring, and the low point in summer – and the 
beginning of a second outbreak at the end of summer. The shift from the first to 
the second wave coincided with the start of a new federal government, a turn of 
affairs that was accompanied by some changes of response, among them to the 
approach taken to intergovernmental relations (IGR).
With a population of 11.5 million, Belgium is a relatively small country, 
but it is deeply divided along converging cleavages between the north (Dutch-
speaking, prosperous, and voting predominantly centre-right) and the south 
(French-speaking, less prosperous, and voting predominantly left). To accom-
modate these tensions, the country transformed itself over three decades from a 
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unitary, decentralised state into a dyadic federation with confederal traits; subse-
quent reforms decentralised it further.
Belgium thus consists of six overlapping federated entities: three commu-
nities with language- and culture-related competences (Flemish, French, and 
German) and three regions (Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels) with economic- 
and territory-based competences. However, politics revolves around the two 
major (French-speaking and Dutch-speaking) linguistic communities. When the 
Covid-19 crisis hit Belgium, even the French-speaking press, hitherto centralist 
in spirit, agreed that the country was split into two separate democracies.1
Public concern in Belgium about the coronavirus mounted during the spring 
break at the end of February when Covid-19 case numbers began to rise dramat-
ically, especially in the north of Italy, where many Belgians go skiing; as they 
returned from their travels, so the number of domestic infections increased. It 
was nevertheless only on 13 March 2020, two days after Covid-19 claimed its 
first fatality in Belgium, that the federal government initiated health measures, 
following which a more drastic lockdown was imposed on 18 March.
By mid-April, at the height of the crisis, Belgium was at the top of the list of 
Covid-19 deaths per capita worldwide, with a fatality rate of 359 per million res-
idents.2 Unlike those of other countries, its statistics included fatalities – mostly 
in elderly homes – that were probably caused by Covid-19 but not officially con-
firmed as such (Wilmès 2020: 5). Still, the coronavirus undoubtedly hit hard in 
Belgium. The country’s high population density, its open economy at Europe’s 
crossroads, and the return of tourists from heavily infected areas in the Italian, 
Austrian and French Alps, help to explain this fact.
In April, reports emerged that the economy was beginning to stagnate due to 
the pandemic, and in May, Belgium announced its first exit measures from the 
nationwide lockdown. Others followed in quick succession, until the signs of a 
second outbreak came to notice at the end of July. Further relaxation measures 
were put on hold, and new restrictions were introduced, or older ones reinstated. 
However, in September, schools were able to reopen for the new school year, 
albeit under tight conditions. At that point in the year, the government decided, 
in spite of a rising number of infections, not to impose stricter measures but to 
relax contact arrangements again in order to keep citizens motivated.
As Belgium has a high-performing health-care system, the maximum capac-
ity of its hospitals was never exhausted. The main problem lay in the area of 
prevention: it had no strategic supply of face masks and lacked testing capacity. 
Consequently, and despite a travel ban, the virus spread quickly in elderly homes 
and residential care centres. Many of the subject-matter domains relevant to the 
crisis were competences of the federated communities, but there was immediate 
and widespread consensus that, for the country to fight Covid-19, the federal 
government had to take the lead.
At first, no distinction was made between regions, in that public data did not 
specify the location of infections and hospitalisations. This changed at the start 
of the second wave of the pandemic, when a ministerial decree ordered local 
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authorities to determine in which shopping streets it would be mandatory to 
wear face masks, and also empowered them to take additional preventative meas-
ures (Ministerial Decree of 24 July 2020, article 13). Local governments, until 
then subordinate implementers of central policy, now came to the fore.
In the sections that follow, this chapter explains the Belgian system of power 
allocation and IGR and provides an overview of government action at the federal, 
federated, and local levels of authority. This will reveal three important findings. 
First, Covid-19 – perhaps temporarily – turned dual federalism into cooperative 
federalism, with the federal government occupying a prominent position in inter-
governmental decision-making. Secondly, the local level of authority popped up 
as a relevant actor that should be factored into the design of future systems of pan-
demic crisis management. Thirdly, calls in Belgium for institutional reform should 
keep in mind that, whatever the result of such reform, it is crucial to provide clarity 
in the allocation of competences and to develop a scheme for more efficient inter-
governmental coordination and cooperation, especially in the case of pandemics.
5.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
5.2.1 The allocation of competences
Belgium follows a model of dual federalism, with an allocation system based 
on exclusivity. This means that, as a rule, matters lie within the legislative and 
administrative competence of the federal authorities, the communities, or the 
regions, to the exclusion of the other entities. A side effect of exclusivity is frag-
mentation: if the federal government loses control over transferred matters and 
is not able to intervene in the general interest or secure inter-regional solidarity, 
it is inclined to transfer only parts of the matter and set restrictions on its use 
(Popelier 2021a). This entails that parts of a policy field are attributed to the 
federated entities, whereas others remain within the ambit of central powers, 
making it difficult to develop coherent and encompassing policies without coop-
eration among entities (Happaerts et al. 2012: 444). It also means that compe-
tences are formulated in a detailed way, with specific conditions and exceptions.3
Several of the matters related to preventing and containing Covid-19 were 
transferred to the communities, albeit with many exceptions. Together, there 
are four categories of community competences: person-related competences and 
competences in education, culture, and languages. Each is discussed below.
In terms of the Special Majority Law on the Reform of Institutions, health 
care, including residential-care institutions, is a community matter that falls 
under the category of person-related competences (article 5, section 1, I). 
However, in the development of this law, only specific aspects of health care 
were transferred to the communities, and even those aspects contained several 
exceptions that remained federal. For example, organic laws and financial laws 
on hospitals remain federal, as do basic and financial rules pertaining to medical 
institutions as well as to health and disability insurance. Also, only the federal 
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government can impose an obligation to vaccinate. By contrast, promoting and 
providing vaccinations and taking quarantining and contact tracing measures are 
(mostly) community matters, whereas the federal government has the power to 
issue basic rules, for example with regard to the right to privacy.4 In addition, the 
communities have the power to issue preventative regulations only for specific 
matters and institutions, while general rules remained a federal competence. A 
number of social-welfare community competences are closely associated with 
health care, including child care, family care, and elderly care.
Education is the sole competence that was transferred in its entirety by the 
Constitution itself, barring only three exceptions: determining the beginning 
and end of compulsory schooling, setting minimum standards for granting diplo-
mas, and administering the teachers’ pension scheme; the latter all remained 
federal competences (Constitution, article 127, sections 1, 2). Finally, cultural 
competences – applying to areas such as youth policy, libraries, museums, fine 
arts, and sports and leisure activities (Special Majority Law on the Reform of 
Institutions, article 4) – were transferred to the communities, mostly without 
specific exceptions.
Preventative measures that impact on business operations and labour condi-
tions, such as the closure of shops and promotion of telework, are federal matters. 
In turn, measures to mitigate the economic consequences of pandemic response 
fall under both federal and regional competences. Economic affairs such as tour-
ism and commercial rentals are a regional competence, but many of their aspects 
remain federal, such as financial policy, commercial law, labour law, and social 
security (Special Majority Law on the Reform of Institutions, article 6, section 
1, VI). As a result, during the 2020 pandemic, different subsidy mechanisms were 
developed at the federal and regional level. Preventative measures in response 
to Covid-19 also affected other regional competences, such as public transport.
Finally, at supranational level, the European Union (EU) limited Belgian 
authorities’ discretion in combating the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, the 
regulation of medicines remains a residual federal competence but is controlled 
mostly at the EU level. Also, the principles of free movement prohibit border 
control and closure, except in the case of serious threat and for a limited period 
of time. On that basis, the federal government, by ministerial decree, closed the 
country’s borders on 20 March 2020 (Vanheule 2020: 1448). Further restric-
tions arose from coordinated action by the European Council; the European 
Commission also engaged in coordination efforts, in its case ones that were 
directed, for instance, at public procurement of protective gear and at repatriat-
ing EU citizens from countries throughout the world.
5.2.2 The absence of an emergency clause
Belgium is a dual federation, which means that the federal and federated juris-
dictions are conceived as separate entities with exclusive powers and on an equal 
footing; by implication, the federal government has no overriding powers. 
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Fittingly, the Constitution does not even mention a state of emergency, con-
ventionally the occasion for centralisation of power in the national executive 
branch – an emergency situation is only implied where it provides that it is the 
King who declares the existence of a state of war (article 167, section 1). The 
federal government does have residual powers, but these must respect the consti-
tutional allocation of powers.
This raises the question of whether the federal government may invoke police 
powers to encroach upon federated policy domains, for example when closing 
schools and museums, prohibiting cultural and sports events, or deciding under 
which conditions such organisations and activities can resume. One could argue 
that crisis management in the case of a pandemic is inherently part of the gov-
ernment’s residual emergency powers, given that the risk of infection threatens 
the entire country, which though small is densely populated.
However, the Council of State, the supreme administrative court in Belgium, 
warned on various occasions that the federal government does not have the 
exclusive residual competence to take all urgent matters but that each govern-
ment is instead responsible within its own field of competences.5 Its suggestion 
that a cooperation agreement or explicit legal solution be adopted was not acted 
upon, though. Indeed, one could argue equally that because sources of infection 
are concentrated in specific regions, a differentiated approach is what is called 
for, and that police powers are inherent to the executive office at all tiers of 
government.
5.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
Following an EU Decision, member states are under a duty to communicate 
information to the EU network operated by the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) (EU Decision 2013). To this end,6 a Protocol 
was concluded between the federal government and the communities to establish 
a National Focal Point.7
The same Protocol also established a Risk Management Group (RMG) and 
a Risk Assessment Group (RAG). The first is composed of representatives from 
the federal and subnational ministries of health and decides on notification and 
control measures. The second is an advisory body composed of experts from 
the health authorities and epidemiologists of the Belgian Institute for Health 
(Sciensano), along with medical scientists from universities on both sides of the 
language divide, who are invited ad hoc to the body. The RAG takes care of 
the daily surveillance of potential health threats and prepares risk assessments. 
The politically responsible body is the Inter-ministerial Conference on Public 
Health, composed of the ministers responsible for public health at the federal and 
community levels; the coordinating crisis manager is appointed by the federal 
government. It is, however, up to each entity to implement the decisions within 
its respective range of competences (Protocol 2018, article 6, section 1).
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5.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
5.4.1 Taking the initiative
As mentioned, the Covid-19 health crisis struck Belgium in the middle of a 
political crisis. Given the dual nature of Belgian federalism and the extensive 
powers communities have in health policy, one would have expected them to 
take the initiative in response to the pandemic. Nonetheless, there seemed to be 
wide consensus that – in consultation with the communities and regions – it was 
the federal government that had to take the lead.
The most visible body during the first wave of infection was the National 
Security Council (NSC), the composition of which reflects that it was established 
with terrorism threats in mind. It consists of the Prime Minister, the minis-
ters of justice, defence, home affairs and foreign affairs, the vice-ministers, and 
other ministers in matters under their competence (Royal Decree of 28 January 
2015), in this case the Minister of Health. To deal with the Covid-19 pandemic, 
the NSC was extended to the regional minister-presidents. It was supported by 
the National Crisis Centre, which has three monitoring and advisory bodies: the 
RAG, the RMG, and the Scientific Committee Coronavirus. These bodies 
report to an Evaluation Cell (CELEVAL) consisting of representatives of health 
administrations and advisory bodies at national and subnational levels; in turn, 
CELEVAL reports to the different governments.
The NSC convened for the first time on 10 and 12 March 2020. On 13 
March, the federal phase of the coordination of Belgium’s pandemic response 
was announced and the first measures taken: cultural, social, festive, sports, and 
youth activities as well as religious services were prohibited; cultural, festive, 
recreation, and sports establishments as well as bars and restaurants were closed; 
and non-food stores were closed on weekends (Ministerial Decrees of 13 March 
2020). Only four days later, several political parties, still unable to form a gov-
ernment, agreed to give the minority government of Sophie Wilmès full powers, 
with the promise to request a new vote of confidence after six months (Royal 
Decree of 17 March 2020).
Then, on 27 March, the government received special powers to take measures 
to address the crisis and mitigate its consequences, if need be by passing Acts of 
Parliament (Laws I and II of 27 March 2020 authorising the King to take meas-
ures to combat the spread of the coronavirus (Covid-19)), albeit with several 
formal and informal guarantees. For example, special power decrees have to be 
ratified by Parliament within one year, in addition to which 10 political parties 
acted as watchdogs in weekly meetings to discuss the Covid-19 decrees.
In the end, these special powers have not been used for preventative measures. 
They were taken by ministerial decree, even though their constitutionality was 
doubtful (Popelier 2020a, 2020b). On 18 March, the Minister of Internal Affairs 
decreed a more severe lockdown, one that included the closure of schools, fur-
ther restrictions on shops, and a ban on travelling abroad other than for essential 
purposes (Ministerial Decree of 18 March 2020).
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CELEVAL was replaced on 6 April by a multidisciplinary expert group, the 
Group of Experts in Charge of the Exit Strategy (GEES), consisting of medical, 
economic, statistical, legal, and financial experts and tasked with developing an 
exit strategy from Belgium’s initial lockdown. At the start of a second wave of 
infections, GEES was replaced by CELEVAL, the membership of which was 
broadened and included representatives of scientific research institutes, busi-
ness, and the event sector, as well as medical, psychology, and health economics 
experts.
Political parties in power at both the regional and federal level, aware of the 
need for urgency, seemed to agree that the federal government has a residual 
power in regard to health crisis management; it was less clear, though, on how 
far this power extends. For example, the federal government started a pro-
gramme for contact tracing but had to leave it to the communities once the 
Council of State made it clear that this competence (mostly) remained with the 
communities.8 In another example, protective masks and equipment were simul-
taneously procured at several levels of government, with major issues arising in 
mid-April 2020 about quality requirements for materials and the use of testing 
kits. The responsible federal minister himself complained about ‘absurd’ situa-
tions regarding competences and coordination (Andries 2020).
Either way, the proportionality (or loyalty) principle demands that measures 
cannot make it impossible or arduous for other entities to pursue their poli-
cies unless these entities are involved in the decision-making. This means that 
regardless of who has the final say in which matter, governments are forced 
to cooperate. In practice, political actors in 2020 chose to allow the federal 
government to take the lead, but communities and regions could implement 
the measures according to their competences. This sometimes led to awkward 
results as when, for example, a federal ministerial decree stated that communities 
should plan for a resumption of teaching activities on the basis of expert advice 
(Ministerial Decree of 15 May 2020, article 4): even though it was undisputed 
that emergency measures should rely on expert advice, it was not for the federal 
minister to impose procedural requirements.
In a third phase of pandemic governance, a differentiated approach was taken 
after all, one that hence brought local entities to the fore. Mayors and provincial 
governors have police powers of their own, but in March 2020 a ministerial 
decree announced the federal phase of the coordination of the coronavirus crisis 
(Ministerial Decree of 13 March 2020a), a regime in terms of which local entities 
were to be merely implementers of federal and federated decisions.
In July, however, more detailed information was made available as to where 
exactly new outbreaks were situated. A ministerial decree that ordered face 
masks to be worn in specific places, including in shopping streets, required that 
mayors delineate those streets; it also allowed mayors and provincial governors to 
take ‘complementing’ and, where necessary, ‘additional’ measures.
On this basis, the provincial governor of severely hit Antwerp province made 
it compulsory to wear face masks in public and imposed a (controversial) nightly 
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curfew (Ordinance of 29 July of the Governor of the Province of Antwerp). In 
addition, the Flemish government, when its own system proved inadequate, 
reluctantly permitted local entities to develop their own system of contact 
tracing.
The discussion above presented the chronology of the measures taken. In 
the following sections, we dig deeper into the type of measures taken by the 
different government levels and then turn to IGR. Federal actions were taken 
mostly by the government – the federal parliament remained largely absent. Also, 
whenever a ministerial decree touched upon the powers of the federated entities, 
the executives of the regions and communities took care of the implementation 
without much involvement from the respective parliaments. This was the trend 
particularly in the French Community and the Walloon and Brussels regions.
5.4.2 Federal action
At the federal level, five types of measures were taken: (1) preventative, (2) health 
care, (3) exit, (4) socio-economic, and (5) measures to mitigate other measures. 
Several measures were challenged in the Council of State.
5.4.2.1 Preventative measures
Preventative measures to contain the spread of the virus in 2020 came in two 
waves. In the first wave, shops were closed, with some exceptions for essential 
services such as food shops and pharmacies; firms were ordered to close or switch 
to teleworking; bars and restaurants were closed (except for takeaways); school, 
cultural, sports, recreation, and social establishments were closed and (almost) 
all activities forbidden; people were ordered to stay at home except for essential 
activities (including walks); and travel abroad was forbidden.
These decisions were taken after long negotiations, with Flemish politicians 
preferring the Dutch approach that gave more consideration to economic activi-
ties, and French-speaking politicians leaning more towards the French approach 
which prioritised public health. In the end, all parties agreed on a drastic lock-
down, even if this intruded in subnational domains. For example, although 
Flemish political parties preferred to keep schools open and it is the case that edu-
cation is a community competence, they agreed that teaching activities should be 
suspended by a federal ministerial decree.
When a second wave was looming in mid-July, measures were less drastic 
(Ministerial Decree of 10 July 2020). Shops, bars, and restaurants stayed open 
conditional on certain preventative measures; the wearing of face masks was 
obligatory in specific public places and shopping streets; dance halls, discotheques, 
wellness centres, and hammams were forbidden; people could gather only in 
groups of a maximum of 10 persons, with some exceptions; non-essential travel 
was allowed within the EU with the exception of ‘red zones’; and close contact 
was limited to five persons per household. Some local authorities, at the municipal 
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level as well as at provincial level used the opportunity provided by the ministe-
rial decree to take additional measures to counter local surges of infections.
5.4.2.2 Health-care measures
Steps were taken to give health-care providers full capacity in terms of staff, 
infrastructure, and equipment. These included regulations on the sale, distri-
bution, commissioning, and use of rapid self-tests, medical devices, personal 
protective equipment and biocides, and on the triage of potentially infected 
persons.
5.4.2.3 Exit measures
Exit measures enabled the relaxation of initial controls and reopening of business 
and other services. On 24 March 2020, the NSC announced a phased exit strategy 
that would begin in early May and gradually allow greater social and economic 
activity, including the phased reopening of schools (a community competence). 
In its decision-making, the NSC relied on the advice of the multidisciplinary 
expert group GEES. The measures followed one after the other at a surprisingly 
fast pace until, at the end of July, signs of a new outbreak forced the government 
to put further relaxations on hold and take a new set of preventative measures.
5.4.2.4 Socio-economic measures
Steps were also taken to mitigate the pandemic’s socio-economic consequences. 
Among these were measures to support (‘viable’) firms by means of government 
guarantees for credit granted by credit institution, lower value-added tax (VAT) 
rates for restaurants, or subsidies for self-employed persons who were temporarily 
unable to pursue their activities. Employees could fall back on temporary unem-
ployment relief, a system already in existence but now amended with simplified 
procedures and increased wages.
5.4.2.5 Measures to mitigate other measures
Measures were adopted to deal with the repercussions that preventative measures 
had for ongoing activities, obligations, and requirements. For instance, the func-
tioning of essential services such as federal administrations and the national rail 
network had to be ensured, and measures put in place to discontinue or extend 
terms, for example in litigation procedures.
5.4.2.6 Challenges in the council of state
The special powers above were used mainly for type 5 measures and only occa-
sionally for type 3 or 4 measures. Most type 4 measures were based on Acts 
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of Parliaments, whereas all type 1 and 2 measures were issued by a ministerial 
decree. The ministerial decrees were challenged before the Council of State on 
several occasions. Within the period under review, the Council ruled on suspen-
sion requests only in urgent procedures and dismissed them all.
In these cases, it showed great reluctance to interfere with the government’s 
crisis management. At first, it held that the Minister of Health has ‘the widest 
discretion to fight an unprecedented and most serious international health crisis’ 
(Council of State, No. 247.452 Stihl and Fedagrim, 27 April 2020, para. 30). 
This was not repeated when it came to the exit measures. Here, the government 
was given merely ‘wide’ discretion, but a duty of care was imposed on it which 
required that crisis measures do not depart from relevant facts, be established 
with care, and be weighed against all the interests at stake (Council of State No. 
248.151 Vandonghen, 17 August 2020).
However, the Council referred to expert advice and consultation only as an 
aid to support the crisis measures – it accepted that the government took an even 
stricter position than what was recommended by experts (Council of State Nos. 
248.131 BV The Masters, 10 August 2020; 248.132 BV Harman, 10 August 
2020). In addition, when fairground stallholders criticised measures for being 
disconnected from the realities of their sector, the Council reiterated that the 
government was advised by expert committees but it did not examine whether 
in this instance the fairground sector had been consulted (Council of State No. 
248.151 Vandonghen, 17 August 2020). The Council thus missed an opportunity 
to give the government guidance on how to balance safety concerns and funda-
mental rights.
5.4.3 State action
Actions by the communities and regions fell into the same five categories as did 
federal action.
• All three communities implemented the ministerial decrees by closing 
down primary and secondary schools within their respective jurisdictions 
and prohibiting visits in retirement homes.
• Regions simplified procedures for the construction and utilisation of infra-
structure for medicines or medical equipment and activated emergency 
plans for hospitals. All levels of government (including some municipalities) 
simultaneously engaged in the procurement of medical supplies such as face 
masks and protective gowns.
• The communities implemented federal exit measures for those establish-
ments within their sphere of competences, such as schools, museums, and 
residential care centres.
• The regions put in place a series of financial compensations and guarantee 
schemes for businesses that were closed or limited in operation, in addition to 
administering the federal temporary unemployment scheme for employees 
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of these businesses. They also provided for rental price adjustments, subsidies 
for day-care, and the like.
• The regions guaranteed minimal public transport services by bus and tram 
and facilitated the extension of rental agreements. Regions and communities 
extended terms for ongoing administrative procedures and made arrange-
ments for the functioning of administrations and other public services.
The Flemish and German-speaking communities took action mostly on the 
basis of specific legal authorisations. By contrast, the Walloon Region, the French 
Community, and the Brussels Region quickly adopted a Special Powers Act on 
the basis of which the governments made arrangements without prior parliamen-
tary involvement and with the possibility to amend or bypass parliamentary acts. 
The scope of these special powers was unheard of; moreover, the parliaments of 
regions and communities that granted special powers had either adjourned or 
substantially reduced their activities (Bouhon et al. 2020).
We can conclude that the communities and regions were, to a large extent, 
the implementers of federal type 1 and 2 measures. At the same time, they were 
closely involved in the federal decision-making that led to these measures. Also, 
they had wide discretion to take measures in the other categories, within their 
sphere of competence. Interestingly, communities chose to coordinate their 
actions even where they had some policy discretion, for example in the reo-
pening of schools. This was welcomed especially in Brussels, where both the 
French and Flemish communities have jurisdiction – indeed, it would have been 
difficult to explain why measures were more stringent in one (Francophone) 
school or cultural establishment than in a similar (Flemish) establishment around 
the corner.
Overall, the communities did not always give evidence of better crisis man-
agement than the central government. They were criticised in particular for slow 
progress in contact tracing, to the point that municipalities were eager to take over.
5.4.4 Local government action
The regions are responsible for local authorities; accordingly, regional gov-
ernments inform and support local authorities. The ‘federal phase’ of cri-
sis management implied the coordination of measures at the federal level and 
implementation and enforcement at the local level (municipalities and prov-
inces). As a result, local entities predominantly played a role in the enforcement 
of type 1 measures; in regard to type 4 measures, they pledged to support local 
businesses.
In addition, the ministerial decree of 24 July 2020 allowed mayors and pro-
vincial governors to take measures in case of a local surge in infections. They 
had to notify the competent regional administration, as well as the provincial 
governor, who has a coordinating function. Mayors could, for instance, make 
it compulsory to wear face masks in crowded environments over and above the 
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places already indicated in the ministerial decree. The latter stipulated that local 
measures were enforceable through criminal sanctions.
In one instance, the NSC called on the governor of the Province of Antwerp to 
take additional measures to address the deteriorating epidemiological situation in 
the province in the final weeks of July 2020. This resulted in the governor issuing 
an ordinance on 29 July that, among other things, made face masks mandatory in 
all public and publicly accessible places, changed the closing hours of bars and res-
taurants from 01:00 to 23:00, and imposed a curfew from 23:30. The latter was the 
most contested of these measures and was challenged before the Council of State. 
However, the petitions were rejected without a decision on their merits.
Several mayors of municipalities also took additional measures (for instance, 
in regard to closing hours of cafés and obligatory facemasks in public), depending 
on the epidemiological situation. They had police powers to act in urgent cir-
cumstances, but the measures had to be subsequently ratified by the city council. 
By stepping in in this way, local government showed its usefulness in addressing 
health crises, an observation which may inform future state reform.
5.4.5  Intergovernmental relations: A virus-driven push for 
cooperation
In Belgium, IGR usually take place in the Concertation Committee and 
inter-ministerial conferences and through cooperation agreements (Popelier 
2021b). The central body is the Concertation Committee, which consists of the 
prime ministers and ministers from the federal and federated levels of authority. 
It is characterised both by linguistic parity (French–Dutch) and parity in fed-
eral and federated government representatives. The committee organises sectoral 
inter-ministerial conferences for the discussion of high-level policy issues such 
as state reform, the environment, or foreign policy, with these conferences often 
leading to cooperation agreements (Poirier 2002: 34).
Formal IGR is accompanied by informal IGR, which plays out mainly in 
interaction between the party elites of majority parties at different levels of gov-
ernment. Informal IGR functions as a mechanism for reducing conflict – before 
matters reach the Concertation Committee, they are usually addressed out of 
sight of the public eye and resolved among the governing party leaders or among 
ministerial cabinets (Poirier 2002: 34).
Belgium is designed as a fragmented, multinational, dyadic, and dual type 
of federalism where legislative as well as administrative powers are allocated on 
the basis of exclusivity. Transfers of powers to the communities and regions are 
the usual outcome of deadlock at the federal level, where antagonistic Flemish 
and French-speaking partners govern in a pseudo-confederal manner (Pas 2004: 
160). Belgian dual federalism was therefore designed to prevent IGR as much as 
possible (Adam 2019: 591; Swenden and Jans Maarten 2006: 886).
At the same time, as mentioned, exclusivity entails fragmentation: policy 
fields are broken down into detailed dimensions and scattered over different 
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levels of authority. As shown in a previous section, social and health policy, of 
crucial importance in the Covid-19 crisis, is one of these fragmented policy 
fields. Paradoxically, this fragmentation in turn forces the entities to cooperate 
and thus to engage in IGR.
Dual and dyadic federalism also explains the particular form that Belgian 
IGR takes, given that it is based on a multipolar playing field of federal and fed-
erated levels of authority but is also influenced by bipolar politics (Poirier 2002: 
26). IGR in Belgium, as elsewhere (Swenden 2006: 190; Trench 2006: 227), is 
confined mainly to the executive level, where it takes place through negotiations 
in informal inter-ministerial consultations, inter-ministerial conferences, or 
formally in the Concertation Committee and through cooperation agreements 
concluded by the executives. IGR is thus easier when the ruling parties at the 
regional level are also coalition partners in the federal government.
Incongruent government formations, however, have become more common. 
During the Covid-19 pandemic, the federal minority emergency government 
in no way reflected the regional governments. In particular, the major political 
parties – the socialist party Parti Socialiste in the Walloon Region and French 
Community, and the nationalist party Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie in the Flemish 
Community – were not part of the federal coalition.
Intergovernmental relations, generally speaking, are dominated by federal 
governments (Trench 2006: 229), but this is not so in Belgium: even in regard to 
EU policies, where the federal level plays a coordinating and gatekeeping role, 
the regions and communities have become dominant role-players (Beyers and 
Bursens 2006: 1062). This poses a risk in that the absence of a dominant federal 
actor creates a bias towards the joint-decision trap, which can limit the effec-
tiveness of governance (Trench 2006: 229); however, such IGR in the context of 
dual federalism may also engender a more integrated federalism.
In Belgium, this is particularly the case in matters that involve international 
decision-making. The intensity of intergovernmental cooperation and coordi-
nation has led scholars to argue that Belgium, in this arena, has moved towards 
cooperative federalism (Beyers and Bursens 2013: 277; Van den Brande 2012: 
429).
Nonetheless, securing cooperation and compromise during the 2020 pan-
demic was an arduous task. This became clear when Belgium was the only 
EU member state that had to abstain when the Union responded to Covid-19 
by mobilising funds from the European Structural and Investment Funds and 
making them available under cohesion rules. The reason was that the Flemish 
political party Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie argued that, under the logic of European 
cohesion policy, most of the funding to Belgium would go to the Walloon part, 
whereas the Flemish part was the most affected by the virus.
Initially, though, intergovernmental cooperation went surprisingly smoothly. 
As mentioned, there was consensus that the federal government should take 
the lead, with the NSC opening to involve the minister-presidents of the 
Communities and Regions. At press conferences, minister-presidents were 
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seated prominently next to the Prime Minister to demonstrate intergovern-
mental accord. In addition, the governments could fall back on the protocol 
and institutions mentioned in section 3. This activated, inter alia, the RMG, 
with representatives from the federal and federated entities as well as the Inter-
ministerial Conference of Health.
The press conferences, however, followed long and difficult meetings that 
were held to reach compromise on thorny issues such as the shutdown of schools. 
Experts who participated in the decision-making complained about the innumer-
able committees and officials who were involved and the absence of leadership to 
take charge in the event of disagreement. Also, there was some competition in 
the purchasing of face masks and protective gear, with both the federal and com-
munity governments having placed orders. When contact tracing at the commu-
nity level got off to a difficult start, the Flemish Minister of Welfare pointed a 
finger at deficient data inflow from the federal platform and unadjusted protocols 
for information-sharing, arguing that the Flemish system of contact tracing had 
been hampered by insufficient test capacity and appealing for the establishment 
of an intergovernmental committee and taskforce to solve the problem (Flemish 
Parliament 2019–2020). Likewise, local authorities complained about regional 
government failures in implementing track-and-trace policies, to the point that 
they threatened to install local systems.
As a result, prominent political actors put new state reforms on the agenda, 
albeit that they had differing views. Some advocated for the centralisation of 
crucial domains in order to combat future pandemics more effectively; oth-
ers demanded even further decentralisation to avoid complex and slow deci-
sion-making. Experts and health-care workers, having dealt on the ground with 
the consequences of Belgium’s complex system of governance, pleaded above all 
for unity of command, regardless of the direction future state reform takes.
5.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Needless to say, the impact of the coronavirus crisis weighed heavily on the 
budgets of the federal, federated, and local entities. The National Bank predicted 
that the Belgian economy would suffer permanent damage and public finances 
be hit hard. The outlook for 2020 showed a decrease in gross domestic product 
(GDP) of 10 per cent per resident and sovereign debt – already burdensome 
before the crisis – rising to 120 per cent of the GDP, that is, twice as high as it 
would have been without the crisis (National Bank 2020). In addition, it was 
forecast that the budget deficit of the Belgian federation would rise to 6 per cent 
of GDP, the bulk of which would be shouldered by the federal level.
The financial capacity to carry the costs differed among the regions, with 
the Walloon Region being the poorest entity in terms of GDP and the Flemish 
Community the most prosperous.9 A fiscal equalisation programme was in place, 
with fees for the communities (with social and cultural competences) on the basis 
of need, and for the regions (with economy and territory-based competences) 
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on the basis of performance. Still, the variation in wealth inevitably resulted in 
differing room for manoeuvre for regional subsidy mechanisms.
At the time of this writing, no changes to fiscal federalism principles were on 
the agenda. The new federal government agreement of 1 October 2020 entrusted 
only two federal ministers with the task of preparing a new state reform and gave 
little detail. Ultimately, however, a deal on future fiscal federalism mechanisms 
will have to be concluded. The differential impact of Covid-19 economic costs 
would undoubtedly complicate the operation of the new federal government 
with seven political parties on board.
5.5 Findings and policy implications
The core features of the Belgian federal system determine which actors and 
government levels come to the fore, how they respond, and how they inter-
act. Among these features are an intricate division of powers, dual federalism 
with exclusive competences, vertical IGR, and a split party system. Moreover, 
incongruent government coalitions resulting from split electoral constituencies 
probably hindered cooperation and information exchange, although their precise 
impact is difficult to assess.
The most crucial finding is that, similar to what happened in the policy 
domain of EU and foreign affairs, the Covid-19 pandemic in Belgium was an 
external factor that reshaped de jure dual federalism into de facto cooperative fed-
eralism. The legal scheme of competence allocation was interpreted creatively. 
As a rule, matters are allocated on the basis of exclusivity, with the federal and 
federated entities situated as equal partners. By contrast, crisis management in 
2020 was considered a federal competence cutting across exclusive community 
and region competences, contrary to previous Council of State opinions, and 
reducing the federated entities to implementers of federal policy. Only in a later 
phase, advising on a parliamentary Pandemic Act, did the Council of State (2021) 
develop a new theory to legitimize this situation, thereby fixing this behaviour 
for the future.
This occurred with the full agreement of the federal and federated authorities. 
While the federal level was put in charge, federal policies and decisions were made 
on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation and implemented by the federated 
entities whenever the policies and decisions applied to their competences. At 
the same time, intergovernmental cooperation and coordination lacked unity of 
command, resulting in slow, complex decision-making. Moreover, the absence 
of an adequate pre-existing legal framework for crisis management caused con-
fusion and, particularly at the outset of the crisis, made decision-making onerous 
in a situation requiring speed of response.
Another finding is the rise of local authorities as relevant actors in the Belgian 
multi-tiered system. Initially mere enforcers of federal measures, they gained 
a more prominent position at the start of the second wave of infections when 
Belgium 103
granted the power to enact additional measures in a system of differentiated crisis 
management; they also established partnerships when the Flemish contact trac-
ing system proved deficient. In a later phase, they would also contribute to a suc-
cessful vaccination campaign. The appearance on the scene of local authorities is 
quite remarkable. The successive state reforms of the last 50 years were designed 
to mitigate adversarial relations between regional entities and resulted in decen-
tralisation to the regional level. The Covid-19 health crisis revealed, however, 
that the designers of Belgian federalism neglected the potential contribution of a 
level further down – local government – not only in the implementation but the 
design of public policies.
The pandemic triggered calls for institutional reform, especially regarding the 
division of competences in public health policies. The new government agree-
ment envisaged a new state reform in 2024. In all likelihood, the reforms will be 
based less on an evaluation of how the Covid-19 crisis was managed than on the 
interests and demands of the parties that formed the new federal government. 
Despite the uncontested centralist approach to crisis management, the crisis did 
not appear to have enhanced Belgium’s federal ‘esprit’. The Flemish-nationalist 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie put on the table proposals for a further decentralising 
state reform. The party was not a member of the new government, but as the 
major Flemish political party it was very likely to influence the position of the 
coalition partners. Also, its support would be crucial for the next state reform, 
considering the special majority requirements.
Demands for further decentralisation, especially in the domain of health pol-
icy, were also voiced by the coalition partner, the CD&V (Christen-Democratisch 
en Vlaams). The precarious financial position of the French-speaking entities 
stood to facilitate such a development, as a deal would imply federal financing yet 
regional policy autonomy, the latter being favoured as well by the Parti Socialiste, 
the dominant French-speaking player.
Whether such an outcome would be sustainable in the light of an already 
ailing federal level seems doubtful. Moreover, decentralisation will not obviate 
the crucially important need for cooperation should Belgium be hit by another 
pandemic. One reason is that a pandemic cuts across a wide range of policy 
domains; another is that, considering the density of the Belgian population, crisis 
management in one region inevitably impacts on that in another – all the more 
so in the case of Brussels, where communities have overlapping competences.
The architects of a seventh state reform thus have the responsibility to pro-
vide clarity on the allocation of competences and to develop clear and efficient 
schemes for coordination, cooperation, and lines of command in crisis manage-
ment policies. Preferably, the local level should be factored in too. Belgium’s 
experience in 2020 shows that crisis management should combine, on the one 
hand, a centralist approach with unity of command and, on the other, a dif-
ferentiated approach respecting and utilising the autonomy of the regional and 
community level as well as local authorities.
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Notes
 1 The headline in La Libre Belgique read, ‘La Fracture’; in L’Echo, ‘La Belgique coupée en deux’; 
in La Capitale, ‘La fin de la Belgique’; and in Le Soir, ‘Deux Belgiques’.
 2 For epidemiological data, see Sciensano (2020).
 3 For an overview of the allocation of competences relevant to the Covid-19 pandemic, 
see Van Nieuwenhove and Popelier (2021).
 4 See Council of State, Legislative Branch Opinion No. 67.423/3 of 26 May 2020; 
Opinion No. 67.425–427 of 26 May 2020.
 5 See Council of State, Legislative Branch Opinion 47.062/1/V of 18 August 2009; 
Opinion 53.018/VR of 13 May 2013; Opinion 53.932/AV of 27 August 2013.
 6 The mandate of these three bodies also applies in case of health threats of national 
concern.
 7 Protocol to establish the generic structures for sectorial health management of crises 
for public health and their method for the implementation of the International Health 
Regulation (2005) and Decision No. 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to 
health of 5 November 2018’, Official Gazette 14 December 2018 (Protocol 2018).
 8 Council of State. 2020. Opinion No. 67.423/3 of 26 May 2020.
 9 See https://www.statistiekvlaanderen.be/nl/bruto-binnenlands-product-per-inwoner-0 
(after factoring in the commuting component to Brussels Capital).
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WEAK INSTITUTIONS,  
POSITIVE RESULTS
The European Union’s response  
to Covid-19
Beniamino Caravita, Simone Barbareschi,  
Francesco Severa, Sergio Spatola and Adriano Dirri1
6.1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) experienced two waves of infection during the 
Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. The first wave, extending from March to May, came 
to notice when infections began to be detected in northern Italy on 21 February, 
after which the coronavirus spread across all 27 EU member states, with Italy 
and Spain initially the hardest hit countries. At the end of summer in Europe, 
this was followed by a second wave of the pandemic, in which contagion again 
affected the entirety of the EU but was characterised by faster rates of infection 
and had a heavy impact even on states, such as Germany, which fared relatively 
well in the first wave.
As at 31 October 2020, the EU had recorded a total of 10,020,313 cases and 
273,734 deaths; economically, the effects of the first wave were keenly felt by 
the most fragile states, such as Italy and Spain, but during the second wave, it 
became clear that the pandemic was posing a serious economic threat to both the 
EU as a whole and each and every member state. The outbreak of Covid-19 put a 
major squeeze on the EU’s institutional and economic framework, and the crisis 
it brought about shook the foundations of European integration.
This was all the more so because the pandemic found the EU already divided 
from within, on the one hand facing contestation by numerous member states 
(notably Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary) and, on the other, 
deeply concerned by Britain’s exit, which came to pass on 31 January 2020, only 
a few weeks before the start of the pandemic. As a result, many reforms to the 
European Treaties were on the table, especially in regard to the empowerment 
of the European Parliament. In this context, the economic crisis underlined 
the division between the richer (the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany) and 
poorer (Italy, Spain, and Greece) EU countries.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003166771-8
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This chapter aims to highlight the impact of Covid-19 on the federalising pro-
cess of the EU. The main issues at stake are the dialectical relationship between 
the intergovernmental and supranational perspectives. The chapter describes the 
EU’s response to the pandemic by analysing the EU’s competence in disaster 
management and public health as well as the financial tools that exist for address-
ing economic crisis. Moreover, it assesses the role of the principle of solidarity 
and cooperation during the 2020 pandemic, with the focus on the European 
Commission and the financial measures that were adopted.
6.2 The EU institutional and legislative framework
6.2.1 The EU system
In this brief overview of the European institutional system, what is important to 
highlight is the constitutional nature of the EU: that is, it is not simply an inter-
national organisation, as it can enact legislation that is immediately applicable in 
its member states (Schütze 2020). The EU, in view of the economic scope of its 
federalising process, may be compared to a federal state. It is strikingly different, 
however, in its lack of two other typically federal areas: defence and foreign pol-
icy. Moreover, its notorious lack of strong democratic legitimacy prevents it from 
being traced back to the traditional liberal-democratic systems of government. 
Indeed, a true supranational dynamic fails to form in Europe, as EU institutions 
are forced to confront elected governments in member states.
As Fabbrini (2008) has argued, the EU may be defined as a ‘compound democ-
racy’, a term referring to an institutional model characterised by a multiplicity 
of separations of power. The idea behind such a model is that neither member 
states nor individual institutions can gain a monopoly of decision-making. This 
function is thus entrusted to a subtle equilibrium and balancing between the 
different influences of the various institutional and political actors. Therefore, 
the functioning of the EU system is based on a partnership between the various 
institutions and on a mixture of functions, bound by the principle of loyal col-
laboration (Treaty on European Union, article 13, para. 2). The legislative and 
budgetary functions, for instance, are entrusted to the concurrent participation 
of Parliament and the Council (Fabbrini 2008).
A key role is played by the European Council, composed of heads of state 
or government of the member states, which stems from its political function. 
Although the Council does not exercise legislative power, it is the engine of the 
EU in that, for instance, it is empowered to define its general political direction, 
examine any subject of common interest, and, above all, decide on the revision 
of the treaties.
The European Parliament is the representative unit of the citizens of the Union 
and is elected, in its current composition of 751 members, every five years on a 
proportional basis, in consultation with all member states. In turn, the Council 
of the EU (the Council) is composed of government ministers from each EU 
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country according to the policy area to be discussed. In regard to the approval of 
community acts, Parliament and the Council play an equal role in the ordinary 
legislative procedure; in regard to budgetary procedure, the two institutions have 
a co-decision role, both in the formulation and in the decision phase.
Next, the role of the European Commission is crucial because it retains the 
power of legislative initiative in the EU. According to article 17 of the Treaty on 
European Union, the Commission acts as the Union’s ‘government’. Its president 
is nominated by the European Council and elected by the European Parliament. 
Subsequently, the Council, in conjunction with the President-elect, adopts the 
list of commissioners. In addition to the role of proposal, which can be requested 
by Parliament and the Council, the Commission has other powers: (1) control 
over compliance with the obligations deriving from the treaties by the member 
states (infringement procedure); (2) administrative execution; and (3) inspection 
and supervision with respect to the division of responsibilities between the EU 
and the member states.
As for the European Court of Justice, it is a real judicial body. On the one 
hand, it exercises control over the lawfulness of the acts and conduct of EU insti-
tutions; on the other, it seeks to ensure correct and unambiguous interpretation 
of EU law.
The institutions above are supported by two financial institutions: the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 
The first, based in Frankfurt am Main, has the task of directing EU monetary 
policy and authorising the issuance of the euro. The second – directed by the 
central banks of each member state – has the task of controlling price stability 
and contributing to the EU’s general economic policies (Raffiotta 2020).
The complexity of the European institutional model makes it difficult for 
the EU to respond promptly and effectively in cases of extraordinary need and 
urgency. It is known that the supranational dynamic, flanked by and often 
opposed to the intergovernmental one, is not equipped with its own tools for 
immediate intervention. In fact, urgent measures must be agreed upon in the 
Council, even in the face of situations of grave risk and danger that involve the 
entire continent.
6.2.2 European health law and disaster management
The framework of EU health law derives from article 168 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The implications of the frame-
work are numerous (Hervey and Bishop 2017), but what is significant here is that 
it lays down the competences of the member states and that of the EU, which are 
exclusive, shared, and supporting competences (Azoulai 2014).
Article 168 states that health protection shall be ensured in all EU policies 
and activities, which makes health a transversal policy. Nevertheless, the pri-
mary role is played by the member states, with national governments retaining 
this responsibility in managing the pandemic. In fact, paragraph 1 of article 168 
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affirms that ‘Union action, which shall complement national policies, shall be 
directed towards improving public health’ and that, among other things, ‘[s]uch 
action shall cover the fight against the major health scourges’. The EU encour-
ages cooperation among member states by supporting their actions and seeking 
to strengthen and coordinate dialogue between them (article 168, para. 2). It has 
rightly been observed that the EU ‘mainly acts as a hub for rapid information 
exchange and coordination of national crisis’ (Pacces and Weimer 2020: 286).
The complementary nature of the power of the EU in health law and policy 
is also understood on the basis of article 2, paragraph 5 of the TFEU. In cer-
tain matters, including the protection and improvement of human health, the 
Union may carry out actions to support, coordinate, or supplement the actions of 
member states without superseding their competences as listed in article 6 of the 
TFEU. This balance of power between the EU and member states is exemplified 
by article 168, even though paragraph 4 of that article lays down two derogations 
to the general principle.
In fact, on one hand, the TFEU allows the EU to overcome the limited power 
of the EU in health policies, by stating that the EU, in order to achieve the objec-
tives in article 168, may adopt, through ordinary legislative procedure,
a. measures setting high standards of quality and safety of organs and sub-
stances of human origin;
b. measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields which have as their 
direct objective the protection of public health; and
c. measures setting high standards of quality and safety for medicinal products 
and devices for medical use.
In the second derogation, the EU is empowered to ‘adopt incentive meas-
ures designed to protect and improve human health and in particular to combat 
the major cross-border health scourges, measures concerning monitoring, early 
warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health …’ (TFEU, 
article 168, para. 5).
On the other hand, the same paragraph excludes any harmonisation of the 
laws and regulations of member states. In this regard, paragraph 7 further spec-
ifies that ‘Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States 
for the definition of their health policy and for the organisation and delivery of 
health services and medical care’, including ‘the management of health services 
and medical care and the allocation of the resources assigned to them’.
This short appraisal highlights the complementary nature of EU health law 
and policy and the constraints upon it, albeit that the power of the EU has been 
considered broader than what can be ascertained from the core provisions. It has 
been argued that the holistic approach may lead to a wider range of legal options 
for the EU through the interplay of the provisions of the treaties, such as the pre-
cautionary and proportionality principles and the right to health care in article 
35 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (Purnhagen et al. 2020). 
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Similarly, the scope of article 168, paragraph 7 may be broader, given the empha-
sis placed on cooperation between the Union and its member states and between 
the member states themselves. As the experience of Covid-19 has shown, it is 
better to speak in terms of interconnections and symbiotic relationships between 
the levels of the Union and the states (Guy 2020: 3).
During the 2020 pandemic, lack of cooperation and coordination between 
the Union and the member states emerged specifically in relation to one of the 
pillars of the EU: the free movement of persons. The Schengen Borders Code 
(Regulation EU 2016/399) allows the suspension of controls on external borders 
in case of a threat to public policy (article 2, para. 21; article 6, subpara. 6) and 
internal borders (article 25) in case of serious threat to public policy or internal 
security. The EU response in this regard was compromised in that internal bor-
ders were gradually closed by the member states.
The EU has no power to declare a state of emergency since this is not included 
among its exclusive competences. The coordinator of the European Emergency 
Response is the European Commissioner for Crisis Management, under which 
administration falls the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. In the context of 
Covid-19 and the economic crisis to which it led, the EU had to discuss and 
adopt new and broader economic mechanisms than it had in the past.
6.3 Preparedness for disaster: The institutional framework
As noted, the EU does not have competence in health matters and disaster man-
agement: it thus plays the role of coordinator for the member states. This is the 
operative logic of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the legal basis of which 
lies in article 196 of the TFEU. The Mechanism was established in 2001 and 
reformed in 2013 with the adoption of Decision No. 1313/2013/EU (Widmalm 
et al. 2019: 11–12). Its purpose is
to strengthen the cooperation between the Union and the member states 
and to facilitate coordination in the field of civil protection in order to 
improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing, preparing for and 
responding to natural and man-made disasters. (article 1, para. 1)
The Mechanism is clearly designed for a ‘classical’ disaster along the lines of 
a natural disaster (Bouckaert et al. 2020: 769), but it was strengthened in March 
2019 by RescEU, an ad hoc tool that uses EU internal funds, pre-committed 
national funds and Union co-financing to enhance the EU’s capabilities to face 
a major emergency (Purnhagen et al. 2020: 299; Widmalm et al. 2019: 177). 
RescEU was created particularly for providing assistance when member states 
are affected by unexpected disasters and collective capacity is insufficient.
The EU’s framework for crisis preparedness and responding to cross-border 
health threats was adapted after previous viral outbreaks such as severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) and bird flu (H1N1). The reform of 2013 was 
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aimed at providing rules on epidemiological surveillance, early warnings, and 
combating serious cross-border threats to health. At its core, once again, are 
cooperation and complementation of national policies in regard to managing 
epidemiological threats.
The main operative tools are the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) 
and Health Security Committee (HSC), composed of representatives of member 
states (generally health ministers) and tasked with exchanging information about 
disease outbreaks within and outside the EU. In addition, the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) monitors outbreaks and provides 
guidance on risk management. The ECDC, together with the HSC, plays an 
important role in managing pandemics, as it did during the Zika and Ebola 
outbreaks; nevertheless, the agency is hampered by, among other things, a lack 
of financial resources and cooperation among member states (Renda and Castro 
2020: 276–7).
Last but not least, the operative tool for providing medical equipment such as 
masks, gloves, and ventilators is the Joint Procurement Agreement ( JPA), intro-
duced in 2014. The JPA has the task of boosting the EU’s capacity to buy medi-
cation and vaccines before and during health crises. It is thus a further instrument 
aimed at fostering greater cooperation in matters of public health (Azzopardi-
Muscat et al. 2017).
Regarding economic aid, what tools did the EU have at its disposal when the 
pandemic began? We refer to the measures adopted in the aftermath of the 2008–
2012 financial crisis (Tuori and Tuori 2014; Morrone 2015) and their implemen-
tation until December 2019. There are two areas of intervention: the measures 
taken to overcome the financial crisis and those adopted to overcome the sov-
ereign debt crisis. Both can be summarised by grouping, on the one side, the 
institutional and regulatory responses and, on the other, those at the policy level.
At the institutional level, the EU established the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) and the Banking Union (BU) for member states which desire 
to participate. At the policy level, it enhanced micro-prudential and macro- 
prudential rules for banks; established a banking crisis management system; and 
strengthened the regulatory framework for the non-banking system, which 
includes insurance and occupational pensions, non-bank financial intermediar-
ies, and market infrastructure sectors (Hinarejos 2015: 15).
As for measures taken to face the sovereign debt crisis, in terms of policies 
the EU established the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), and the European Fiscal Board (EFB). Economic governance undoubt-
edly changed due to the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 (Fabbrini 2015). 
Thus, the EU was more than ready to face a further economic crisis, both in 
terms of coordination between member states and in terms of financial measures, 
thanks in particular to the policies of the ECB, with its injection of liquidity 
buffers and bail-in options, during the mandate of Mario Draghi, president of the 
ECB between 2011 and 2019 (Waibel 2020; Bofinger 2020).
112 Beniamino Caravita et al.
These were the main response mechanisms available to the EU for facing pan-
demic threats and economic crises. It has to be acknowledged that, in matters of 
health policy, the EU’s network of agencies was not designed for engaging directly 
with a full-scale pandemic like Covid-19; moreover, the economic crisis of 2020 
is regarded as the worst Europe has faced since the end of the Second World War.
6.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
6.4.1 Taking the initiative
Although it has been said that the EU lives off crises (Cassese 2016; Matthijs 
2020), the Covid-19 pandemic was an unprecedented situation for the EU. 
Therefore, it should not be a surprise that, at the outset, its response was inade-
quate, coordination was missing, and EU institutions hesitated to act. Indeed, the 
measures taken were not decisive in preventing the outbreak.
In January 2020, an alert was issued on the EWRS by the Directorate General 
for Health and Safety, after which the HSC met on 17 January. Subsequently, 
on 28 January the Council of the European Union decided to activate the 
Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) mechanism. The mechanism is, in 
particular, the EU framework for the coordination of cross-sectoral crises. The 
role of this body was later enforced when the Council, on 2 March, escalated the 
IPCR mechanism to full activation mode for coordinating EU response meas-
ures at presidency-led roundtables with the participation of the Commission, the 
European External Action Service, the office of the President of the European 
Council, affected member states, and relevant EU agencies and experts.
This was the first stage of coordination of the EU but, when the outbreak in 
Italy took place and the first red zones were declared, the main issue at stake was 
the closure of internal borders. In late February, within the EU, internal border 
control was under the spotlight. On 24 February 2020, with the outbreak in Italy 
already underway, the European Commissioner for crisis management was con-
fident in the capacity of Italy and the EU to respond to the outbreak. Likewise, 
the Commissioner for Health and Food Safety stressed that the key points would 
have been cooperation, coordination, and keeping the borders open, with the 
closure considered as a disproportionate measure.
Of the same view was the Council of the European Union, which on 
20 February 2020 highlighted the need for coordination between member states 
in the field of monitoring and surveillance, diagnosis and treatment and commu-
nications, research, and development. Furthermore, the Council, on the basis of 
Decision No. 1082/2013/UE, called upon the Commission to promote cross- 
sectoral information-sharing and cooperation on surveillance, risk management, 
and assessment, with the support of the HSC and UCPM, and to activate exist-
ing funding mechanisms to support member states in facing the outbreak; and to 
examine all available possibilities, such as joint procurement, to facilitate access 
to personal protective equipment (PPE) needed by member states.
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Hence, the EU’s initial action was to provide expertise and foster coordina-
tion. To this end, on 17 March 2020, the Commission appointed a new EU advi-
sory panel on Covid-19. It was tasked to advise the Commission president, Ursula 
von der Leyen, on the measures to be taken, and to help the Commission in the 
development of guidance for member states in order to ensure science-based and 
coordinated national risk management. In addition, the HSC added a further 
forum for coordinating measures against the Covid-19 outbreak, with this body 
composed of national health ministers and chaired by the Commission. This 
structure thus entails the Commission and the HSC supported by the ECDC, 
scientific and technical bodies, and the newly established advisory panel (Pacces 
and Weimer 2020: 291).
A more concrete instrument for providing medical supplies was the JPA, 
which emerged, with RescEU, as the main vehicle at the EU level for purchas-
ing medical equipment such as PPE, ventilators, and devices for testing. At the 
end of February 2020, the Commission launched the first of four joint procure-
ment competitions; these were concluded in March, even though the first went 
defunct (McEvoy and Ferri 2020: 8; Sdanganelli 2020: 2339). In the interim, 
the Commission created a strategic RescEU stockpile of medical equipment, 
the budget for which amounted to EUR 50 million, with 90 per cent of it 
financed by the Commission and the balance by member states; the stockpile was 
managed by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre. The Commission’s 
other initial measure was allocating EUR 232 million for boosting preparedness, 
prevention, and containment.
The more critical issue remained border control. The first member state to 
unilaterally close its border was Austria, which did so on 11 March 2020 when 
the World Health Organization declared the pandemic. Many others decided 
to follow suit. On 16 March, the Commission eventually introduced border 
controls in terms of article 25 of the Borders Code and established guidelines for 
an integrated approach. The closure of internal borders was a milestone in the 
management of the crisis, one that marked the moment when EU institutions 
became aware of the unique health and economic crisis they were facing (Brehon 
2020: 5; Maurice et al. 2020: 1–2).
6.4.2 EU action
The border closures in the EU may be considered the red line for awareness of 
the magnitude of the crisis; as such, the need for significant and coordinated 
action became the main concern. The first step was the meeting of the Council 
on 10 March 2020, at which the EU’s priorities were set out: limiting the spread 
of the virus, ensuring the provision of medical equipment, promoting research, 
and tackling the pandemic’s socio-economic consequences. The second confer-
ence, held on 17 March, focused on the provision of medical equipment, par-
ticularly masks and respirators, and helping EU citizens stranded in third-party 
countries.
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From this moment on, intergovernmental relations became the engine of 
the EU institutions. For instance, on 18 March 2020, EU transport ministers, 
together with the European Commission, joined forces to keep priority traffic 
moving in order to maintain economic continuity, protect the health and safety 
of transport workers, and ensure their free movement across borders (the situa-
tion was discussed further at a meeting of foreign affairs ministers on 23 March 
and 6 April). On the same date, the Council went on to give the go-ahead to 
support member states from the EU budget through the approval of legislative 
proposals that would free up funds to support small- and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) and strengthen investment in products and services necessary to 
bolster health services in response to the crisis.
On 19 March 2020, EU ministers relevant to the Commission’s proposal on 
the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII) presented their positions 
and plans for a possible reallocation of EU funds for new initiatives to address 
the social and employment consequences of Covid-19. Soon afterwards, finance 
ministers agreed to ease EU fiscal rules and apply maximum flexibility so as to 
allow member states to take all necessary measures to support health, the civil 
protection system, and the economy.
On 26 March 2020, after the extraordinary G20 leaders’ video conference, 
European Council members held a third video conference on Covid-19. Upon 
the assessment of the EU’s response to the pandemic, the member states invited 
the Eurogroup (the informal body for informal meetings of the ministers of the 
euro area member states) (Craig 2017) to present proposals within two weeks. 
Once a slot waiver2 was adopted to help airlines, the EU amended legislation on 
structural and investment funds to accommodate greater flexibility and release 
EUR 37 billion, which was allocated to the CRII and EU Solidarity Fund.
In April 2020, the contagion escalated, as did its socio-economic impact. 
On 8 April, the Council approved a further use of so-called cohesion resources, 
offering a second package of measures, the Coronavirus Response Investment 
Initiative Plus (CRII+), to free up other money from EU structural funds for 
crisis-related operations. The development ministers, for their part, gave the 
green light to a package with overall financial support amounting to more than 
EUR 20 billion drawn from existing external action resources. This aid was 
followed by two financial decisions. First, Eurogroup contemplated three imme-
diate safety-nets for workers, businesses, and member states and prepared the 
ground for a recovery fund; secondly, the Council adopted two amendments to 
the EU 2020 budget that made an additional EUR 3.1 billion available in funds 
to purchase and distribute medical supplies, boost the production of testing kits, 
build field hospitals, and transfer patients for treatment in other member states.
In May 2020, concrete action was taken. On 8 May, for instance, Eurogroup 
agreed on standardised terms for Euro-area countries to access the ESM Pandemic 
Crisis Support. Member states were allowed access to 2 per cent of their gross 
domestic product (GDP) to finance direct and indirect health care as well as pre-
ventative measures related to Covid-19. On 19 May, the EU adopted a temporary 
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scheme to help workers keep their jobs during the crisis. Under the scheme, the 
European Commission would raise funds on international capital markets on 
behalf of the EU, while the member states would be able to request up to EUR 
100 billion in loans under favourable terms to help finance sudden and severe 
increases of national public expenditure in response to the crisis in specific areas. 
Support to the audio-visual, cultural, and creative sector; aid to help transport 
companies and authorities, a EUR 3 billion assistance package for neighbouring 
partners; and recovery measures for the EU tourism, aviation, and railway sectors 
all followed from those actions.
May 2020 closed with two important events. In the first, the Board of 
Directors of the European Investments Bank (EIB) reached an agreement on the 
new pan-European guarantee fund to support businesses. This was the second 
of the three safety-nets, worth EUR 540 billion, for jobs and workers, busi-
nesses, and member states, after the Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks 
in an Emergency (SURE) was adopted by the Council on 19 May. In the second 
event, the European Commission issued its proposal for a recovery fund and the 
EU’s long-term budget, the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021–
2027. Consequently, the President of the European Council called for a meeting 
for this purpose in mid-July.
In addition, ministers dealt with the future of the EU in this recovery pro-
gramme. Specifically, they addressed research and innovation, space, safe sport 
activities, digital priorities, internal border controls and free movement of per-
sons, trade policy implications, and resilient labour markets. Last but not least, 
they considered how to shape Europe’s digital future and reinforce the EU4Health 
programme and its objectives for 2021–2027, with the focus on strengthening 
the resilience of health systems and promoting innovation in the health sector.
After the adoption of a recommendation on the gradual lifting of the tempo-
rary restrictions on non-essential travel into the EU for residents of some third-
party countries, the Council provided a temporary derogation from certain 
provisions of EU legislation in order to facilitate swift development of a vaccine 
against Covid-19.
The month of July 2020 was notable for a new proposal for the EU’s long-
term budget and recovery package ahead of the European Council session on 
17–18 July, in which, after bitter negotiations between two very distant positions, 
EU leaders agreed on an extraordinary EUR 750 billion recovery package in 
the context of the European budget for 2021–2027. That aside, a more decisive 
effort was prompted on the implementation of testing and tracing, as well as on 
research on a vaccine for the coronavirus.
6.4.3 Evaluating solidarity and cooperation
The issues of solidarity and cooperation flow like subterranean rivers in the EU, 
underlying every political and legal debate on its future (Battaglia 2020; Borger 
2020), be it in areas such as migration, tax policy, economic integration, or 
116 Beniamino Caravita et al.
even Brexit. Solidarity, federal loyalty, and cooperation are at stake in federal 
systems and federalising processes generally. This is true as well of the EU, where 
these principles were developed during the European integration, mostly by the 
European Court of Justice (Lanceiro 2018: 74 ff ).
The Lisbon Treaty introduced the principle of solidarity in article 3, paragraph 4, 
of the Treaty on European Union and of ‘sincere cooperation’ in article 4, 
paragraph 3, of the same, which imposes the duty that ‘the Union and the Member 
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other’. These provisions are inter-
linked with each other as well as with article 13, which enshrines the duty of 
loyalty and fairness between EU Institutions.
It is worth recalling that solidarity is often under the spotlight due to its link 
to the issue of migration, in regard to which solidarity is specifically enforced by 
articles 78, paragraph 3, and 80 of the TFEU; nonetheless, migration has been a 
key point of contention since 2015. Similarly, the principle of solidarity has been 
challenged in the field of political economy, in the context of the inadequacy, or 
‘austerity’ of approach which the EU, here largely influenced by its richer mem-
ber states, has adopted.
Consequently, tests of solidarity and cooperation in the EU have become rou-
tine (Casolari 2014). The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 was a further occasion for 
stress-testing the EU framework – in this instance, however, a framework under 
an extraordinary burden. On one hand, there were calls for solidarity among 
member states; on the other, differing economic interests, as well as the North-
South divide, overshadowed the development of inter-state trust and solidarity. 
Although solidarity is a yardstick for measuring the success or failure of the EU, 
it remains undefined in the Union’s policies. Hence, what shall be considered 
here is the institutional performance, the praxis, both of the EU institutions (in 
particular the Commission) and of member states (Beaucillon 2020a: 688).
Initially, the Commission’s response to the coronavirus was hesitant, but as the 
pandemic worsened, it acted on the basis of the principle of solidarity. That was 
evident in the case of the Civil Protection Mechanism and RescEU, described 
above, which aimed at coordinating member states and the collective response 
by the Commission. Denmark, Greece, Hungary, and Sweden joined Germany 
and Romania as host states of the RescEU medical equipment reserve which 
is available for distribution across Europe in medical emergencies (Beaucillon 
2020b: 395–98). In a similar vein, European public procurement is an addi-
tional soft-law tool for fostering solidarity in concrete ways, in this instance by 
supporting member states in purchasing medical equipment. The Commission 
highlighted the relevance of the tool by publishing a guide on using the public 
procurement framework in the context of Covid-19. The purpose of the guide 
was to foreground the advantages of the European procurement process, such as 
its flexibility and transparency.
The Commission demonstrated involvement and solidarity with mem-
ber states by underlining their common interests in combating the pandemic 
(Baratta 2020: 370–373). Another example is the Guidelines on EU Emergency 
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Assistance in Cross-Border Cooperation in Healthcare related to the Covid-19 
crisis, funded by the Solidarity Fund and developed to help national health-care 
systems under pressure. Among other things, the document provided for emer-
gency transfers of patients in intensive care and the coordination of requested and 
offered intensive care places for patients (Capuano 2020: 28). The Commission 
also took action by proposing the provision of emergency aid on the basis of 
article 122 of the TFEU in the matter of economic policy (financial assistance 
in case of exceptional occurrences) and by adjusting the general budget of the 
Union (Beaucillon 2020b: 398).
The Commission initiated these measures, but ultimately decisions in regard 
to them lay with the European Council, the forum of EU leaders (the Master of 
the Treaties). These remarks lead us to the more problematic intergovernmental 
relations that obtained between member states. From the outset of the crisis, the 
response to the most affected country, Italy, was uncoordinated and bilateral. Only 
Austria provided assistance to it on the basis of the Civil Protection Mechanism 
(Beaucillon 2020b: 388–91). Shortly afterwards, the bone of contention between 
member states was the EU budget. The North-South division between member 
states was pronounced, especially because the so-called frugal four (the Netherlands, 
Austria, Denmark, and Sweden) advocated a meagre recovery fund based on loans 
instead of grants. Hence, evaluating the EU’s solidarity in the face of the Covid-19 
crisis entails examining the financial measures that were taken.
6.4.4 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
This section considers the main policies the EU adopted to support employment, 
businesses, and the economy in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. These may 
be summarised in terms of three themes: introducing flexibility into tax rules 
and the EU budget, the mobilisation of the EU budget, and the expansion of 
monetary policies.
6.4.4.1 Flexibilisation of EU fiscal and budgetary rules
The first assessment on the pandemic’s socio-economic effects dates back to 
European Council conclusions on ‘Competitiveness’. In the document of 
27 February 2020, the Council, based on a note shared by the Commission, 
stated that the pandemic would have the effect of reducing the economic growth 
of the EU.
Upon the request of member states already affected at the time, the Commission, 
first of all, proposed to the Council that it deviate from the normal budgetary 
obligations of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Keppenne 2019) through the 
use of article 173, paragraph 3(b) of the TFEU (Domenicali 2020: 459–60). The 
latter, known as the ‘general escape clause’, allows for deviation from (1) the pro-
cess of approaching the medium-term objective, (2) the stability and convergence 
programmes, and (3) correction in the event of an excessive deficit.
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The choice to use this clause, rather than the so-called unusual event clause, 
is to be traced back to the involvement of the entire euro area in the pandemic 
crisis. This does not indicate that the EU has used a rule designed for this type of 
event. As we will see regarding other financial measures, the EU has interpreted 
the rules, taking advantage of the experience of the last decade. Indeed, it is cer-
tain that the clause was not designed to encourage an economic recovery of the 
euro area, but for the sole purpose of system stability.
Furthermore, the Commission accompanied the deviations above with 
derogatory measures from the European regulatory framework. A derogation 
was envisaged from the rules on state aid not because of individual programmes 
proposed by each member state but for cumulative and simultaneous adoption by 
all member states. This method of application freed the member states as regards 
the choice of ways to support their economies. The only constraints, in fact, were 
the temporary nature of the measures, the connection to the assumptions set 
by the Commission, and to the verifiability of the measures taken (Domenicali 
2020: 460).
It is precisely this last requirement that made it possible to affirm an expansion 
of the political orientation of each member state in this matter. The consequence 
is that the clause is transformed from an exceptional to a general instrument to 
safeguard the economic and financial stability of the euro area.
6.4.4.2 Mobilisation of the EU budget
The Commission, having realised that the crisis would be Europe-wide, com-
plained that the EU budget was too small for addressing its socio-economic 
dimensions. It thus reallocated part of the European funds to deal with the 
crisis, creating a package of EUR 37 billion of structural funds (CRII) and 
implementing it via the CRII+. The three measures considered strategic were 
supporting health care, protecting short-term employment positions, and assist-
ing SMEs.
The approval of the funding package made it necessary to amend the reg-
ulations governing the Common Provisions Regulation, European Regional 
Development Fund, and European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. The amend-
ing regulation grants flexibility to the states both in relation to the transfer 
of the sums allocated between the three cohesion funds (European Regional 
Development Fund, European Social Fund, and Cohesion Fund) and between 
different categories of regions, both in relation to the methods of expenditure 
and the criterion of thematic cohesion.
The same system of flexibility and modification of the destination of alloca-
tions was used for the EU Solidarity Fund. Finally, about EUR 3 billion in funds 
were used to directly support the health systems of the member states, through 
the EU emergency support instrument for the health-care sector. With regard to 
the mobilisation of the EU budget, this was the instrument for the extraordinary 
measure of the Next Generation EU recovery fund (discussed below).
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6.4.4.3 Expansion of monetary policies
The ECB confirmed, with the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme 
(PEPP), the use of unusual monetary policies previously developed in the after-
math of the global financial crisis of 2008. The PEPP, which had a total budget of 
EU 750 billion, was limited in duration to 2020 and it was flexible in the forms 
of debt it made available through the central banks that include the ESCB. In 
addition, the ECB provided for the extension of eligible assets for the purposes 
of the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme and interventions on interest rates 
and financing transactions as well as support measures for the disbursement of 
bank loans with the simultaneous relaxation of disbursement criteria.
6.4.4.4 Next Generation EU
The adoption of the Next Generation EU recovery fund was a major step for-
ward because its purpose was to increase the European budget by 0.6 per cent. 
The increase was to obtain liquidity in the financial markets through debt oper-
ations. Furthermore, a reform of the Union’s own resources was envisaged.
The debt of the Union must have a maximum threshold of EUR 750 billion. 
The sums obtained from the operation were to be diverted to the member states, 
in part through loans and partly through direct funding, for the achievement of 
the EU’s strategic objectives. One of the key features is the role of the European 
Commission: the latter’s role was strengthened in that the Commission sets the 
agenda and verifies the recovery plan of each member state.
The device for recovery and resilience, according to article 175, paragraph 3, 
of the TFEU, is a structural fund aimed at reinforcing cohesion. It should enable 
member states to recover more quickly and increase their future resilience. As for 
the timing of disbursement to the member states and the terms of commitment 
of the sums, 70 per cent had to be committed by the beneficiary countries in 
2021 and 2022 and the remaining 30 per cent by the end of 2023. However, all 
funds had to be spent by 31 December 2026.
Finally, as regards distribution criteria, for the two-year period 2021–2022 
funds were to be based on population, per capita GDP, and average unem-
ployment rate in the last five years (2015–2019) compared to the EU average. 
For 2023, on the other hand, the loss of real GDP observed over 2020 and the 
cumulative loss of real GDP observed in the 2020–2021 period would replace 
the average unemployment rate in equal percentages. That being noted, own 
resources constitute the real innovative core of the ‘extraordinary’ instrument; in 
fact, resources from carbon tax, financial transactions, and business income were 
often extolled as the beginning of this path.
In conclusion, Europe managed to capitalise on the decade spent consoli-
dating its regulatory framework after the 2008 financial crisis by harnessing 
these gains in order to offset the socio-economic impact of the pandemic more 
quickly. It is clear that the extraordinary increase of the EU budget represents 
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an opportunity to revive the process of European integration, pursue the uni-
fication of the political economy, and build a fiscal union that transcends the 
differences among member states (Fasone 2020). In fact, several studies now con-
sider the separation between economic and monetary policy to be irreconcilable 
(Howarth and Verdun 2020; Demertzis and Wolff 2019). The latter is no longer 
considered relevant to the economic development of the member states. An all-
too-recent and vivid example is provided by the repercussions that the monetary 
policies of the ECB have had on the economic policies of each member state.
6.5 Findings and policy implications
The Covid-19 pandemic was an important test for the EU and a turning-point 
in European history. It forced a rethinking of the EU’s fiscal and budgetary rules, 
as well as its instruments for providing financial assistance to ailing states. After 
an initial phase of weak coordination in managing the emergency, especially 
within the health-care sector, European institutions decided to implement more 
effective measures when it came to economic governance.
It can be argued that during 2020 a new political reasoning began to pre-
vail, one focused no longer on the intergovernmental dynamic but on a new 
centrality of European institutions and therefore on the more properly suprana-
tional dynamic. The European conundrum and its federalising process have been 
shaped by moments of integration and moments where the division between 
member states seemed to give way to disintegration (Vollaard 2018). Currently, 
the EU is fractured not only by economic differences between the North and 
the South but by diverse geopolitical interests (Atlantic, Continental, and 
Mediterranean). In juxtaposition to this, supranational institutions were created 
to mediate between member states, among them the Commission, the ECJ, and, 
more recently, the ECB.
This dialectical relationship may be measured by European policy, especially 
in times of crisis. In this perspective, then, the outcome of the European Council 
session of July 2020 may be considered a step forward more for the integra-
tion dynamic than for the intergovernmental dynamic. The latter has led, even 
perhaps in a despotic manner, European processes in the last decade; by the 
same token, enforcing the supranational dimension raises the issue of democratic 
legitimacy which has so weakened EU supranational institutions. Consequently, 
the risk is that the interests of the member states will prevail, along with their 
respective nationalisms. Indeed, even the European Parliament, the sole legis-
lative body directly elected by European citizens, plays only a marginal role in 
determining EU policies. In this regard, before the pandemic took the limelight, 
a Conference on the Future of Europe was planned and the call was for, among 
other things, the empowerment of the European Parliament.
The European Council decisions of July 2020 did not propose a definitive 
solution to the European integration process, but they did open a new perspective. 
This led member states of the Union to accept the guarantees and negotiations 
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of the European institutions in the management of economic tools for supporting 
the economy of the member states. Moreover, the pandemic showed that, despite 
the huge allocation of funds, the EU is not able to face emergencies as such. The 
issue on the table is, hence, to rethink the distribution of the EU competences in 
order to bolster the Union’s response in the future to emergencies such as pan-
demics. To sum up, the lesson that can be learnt from Covid-19 is that there is 
a need for concrete solidarity, and in this regard, the actions of the Commission 
have revealed that it is crucial in the management of crisis situations.
Notes
 1 This chapter is part of the research undertaken by ‘Osservatorio sui processi di governo e 
sul federalismo’ and also a product of the Project of Research of National Interest (PRIN 
2017): ‘Where is Europe going? Paths and perspectives of the European federalising pro-
cess’ (Principal Investigator: Prof. Beniamino Caravita).
 2 To control congestion at airports, airlines are assigned fixed periods, or slots, during 
which their planes may land or take off. The rule is that if an airline fails to use a certain 
proportion of its slots, it loses them to its competitors. Slot waivers were intended to 
allow airlines to reduce flights to only necessary ones, without the risk of forfeiting their 
commercially valuable slots.
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7
MANAGING THE CORONAVIRUS 
PANDEMIC IN SWITZERLAND
How federalism went into emergency 
mode and struggled to get out of it
Eva Maria Belser1
7.1 Introduction
Switzerland was a federation calmly polishing its aged edifice of power- 
dividing and -sharing when it was hit by the coronavirus pandemic. What 
occurred next felt like a hurricane blowing through the country’s institutional 
landscape. In mid-March 2020, three weeks after the first person tested posi-
tive for Covid-19, the venerable pillars of Swiss constitutional law – federalism, 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights – seemed to tremble. The Federal 
Council declared a state of emergency, and the country underwent a period 
of centralisation of power such as it had never witnessed before. Parliaments 
changed into speechless institutions, cantons into mere recipients of orders, 
and all simply waited for the next press conference by the national executive 
to find out what rules were to be obeyed and what rights and freedoms were 
still left. What had happened? Moreover, what are the consequences of a crisis 
in which federalism was regarded as too complicated, democracy too slow, the 
rule of law too flexible, and human rights too individualistic to protect public 
health effectively?
The Swiss coronavirus pandemic story starts at the end of February 2020. 
When Italy reported its first cases, Switzerland’s federal authorities – under the 
leadership of the Federal Office of Public Health – established a taskforce to 
carry out an information campaign on health-protection measures. At the same 
time, cantons started to prepare for the pandemic, with some declaring an emer-
gency situation, others banning large events, and others yet deciding to wait 
and see. When the first Swiss Covid-19 case was confirmed, the Federal Office 
of Public Health continued to assess the risk for the general public as moderate 
and recommended that the 8.6 million Swiss inhabitants regularly wash their 
hands and sneeze into their elbows. The Swiss population, benefiting from a 
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high-performing health system and mandatory social health insurance system, 
seemed well prepared to face a major health crisis.
However, the country’s age demographics – with only 20 per cent of the 
population younger than 20 years, 61 per cent between 20 and 64 years, and 19 
per cent over 65 – would soon prove to be one of the reasons for an increasing 
fatality rate (Federal Statistical Office n.d.). The high density of the population 
also posed a challenge to containing the spread of the virus. Only about 15 per 
cent of the population live in rural areas, while the rest are concentrated in urban 
areas, such as Zurich, Geneva, Basel, Bern, and Lausanne, or in agglomerations 
(Federal Statistical Office 2020). In addition, the population’s high mobility 
affected the pandemic and its management: given the small size of the coun-
try and its division into 26 cantons, thousands of workers and consumers com-
mute across cantonal borders daily, and even small and medium-sized enterprises 
operate across borders.
In examining the federal aspects of Switzerland’s pandemic management, I 
argue that federalism did not fail during the pandemic – as numerous actors 
claimed – but was put in emergency mode as foreseen in the Constitution and the 
Epidemics Act. Federal structures thus did not hinder prompt and effective pan-
demic responses but were flexibly adapted to new circumstances: since cantons 
were unable individually or jointly to act quickly to control a virus indifferent 
to cantonal borders, concentrating power at the federal level was in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity. Although it felt like a mighty storm severely disrupting 
the institutional landscape, the pandemic response putting federalism in emer-
gency mode at first worked to plan.
However, I will show that the country struggled to find its way into a 
new pandemic normalcy. One of the reasons for this is that since the end of 
the first wave in June 2020 when the epidemic regime was downgraded from 
being ‘extraordinary’ to being ‘special’, both tiers of government hoped for 
the other to introduce restrictive measures controlling the pandemic – and to 
pay for the ameliorative measures softening their effects. The principle of fiscal 
equivalence – namely that whoever decides, pays – thus seems to generate a 
negative struggle over competences (‘someone else should do it’). Hence, it 
seems clear that Switzerland should revisit certain aspects of its institutional 
setup in order to deal better with the federal dynamics that arise during pro-
tracted emergencies.
7.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
As happens in most aggregative federations, the Swiss Federal Constitution 
enumerates the federal competences while residual powers are vested with the 
cantons. Cantonal autonomy is extensive and includes institutional, legislative, 
administrative, and fiscal matters. With the Covid-19 pandemic, the constitu-
tional and legislative framework on epidemics and on emergency rules set the 
scene for the country’s response measures.
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7.2.1 Constitutional and legislative powers in health matters
Health, in general, is a cantonal matter. The Confederation, however, has a 
constitutionally limited mandate to issue legislation in enumerated fields, among 
them ‘the combating of communicable, widespread or particularly dangerous 
human and animal diseases’ (Federal Constitution, article 118, paragraph 2 lit. b). 
The Federal Act on Epidemics was adopted in 1970 but revised entirely in 2013 
to improve the country’s preparedness for fast-spreading diseases and to clarify 
emergency rules (Belser and Mazidi 2020). As the Act also provides a legal basis 
for introducing compulsory vaccination for specific groups, such as people at risk 
or particularly exposed in case of a health crisis, opponents of vaccines called 
for a popular referendum. However, the Swiss population, borne of its experi-
ences with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and other recent epidem-
ics, approved the law in a popular vote. All measures of the Federal Council 
preventing or combating the spread of Covid-19 are based on this law and thus 
cannot be said to lack democratic legitimacy.
The Epidemics Act applies a three-stage model. In ‘normal’ situations, the 
federal tier, in consultation with the cantons, determines aims and strategies, 
but it is up to the cantons to prevent and control diseases (Bergamin and Mazidi 
2020: 15–16; Stöckli 2020: 18–19). There is some evidence that the normal sit-
uation was not managed appropriately in the recent past (Zeltner 2018: 15–16). 
Apparently, numerous cantons have not complied with national aims (in particu-
lar regarding the stocking of protective materials), preferring to invest financial 
resources for the health sector in seemingly more urgent matters (such as cancer 
and dementia); in turn, the federal authorities have failed to use their surveillance 
powers to insist on observance of the national strategy. The Covid-19 pandemic 
thus hit a country that was not as prepared as it should have been.
In ‘special’ situations – in which the country found itself from 28 February to 
16 March 2020 and again since 20 June up to the time of writing – the Federal 
Epidemics Act entrusts the Federal Council with a clearly defined extra set of 
competences that otherwise would be cantonal matters. The council may ban 
or limit events, close schools and other public institutions or private enterprises, 
or restrict their way of operating, prohibit people from accessing or leaving a 
building or an area, and ban or restrict certain activities within defined zones. 
However, it may use these special competences only after consulting with the 
cantons – a rule ensuring, first, that the loss of cantonal autonomy is compen-
sated for by institutional cooperation and, secondly, that the cantonal govern-
ments, which are in charge of the health sector and aware of the situation on 
the ground in the areas under their jurisdiction, contribute appropriately to the 
making of special rules (Bergamin and Mazidi 2020: N17–20; Kley 2020: 272; 
Stöckli 2020: 19). During the crisis in 2020, it became clear that the special situ-
ation was not sufficiently regulated and that the concurrent competencies, com-
bined with the absence of joint bodies monitoring the disease and coordinating 
actions, raised the risk of conflicts in competence.
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Finally, when the situation is declared ‘extraordinary’, the Federal Council 
may take any necessary measure for the entire country or some parts of it; in such 
a case, prior consultation with the cantons is no longer mandatory according to 
the Epidemics Act, albeit still mandated by the Constitution to the extent possi-
ble. This situation – in which the country found itself between 17 March and 19 
June 2020 – is foreseen but not regulated by law and leaves numerous questions 
open (Bergamin and Mazidi 2020: N21–22; Stöckli 2020: 19–21). In particular, 
it is unclear how far the federal competences reach, whether the Federal Council 
is bound by federal law or may amend it and whether the cantons are allowed to 
go beyond the federal rules.
7.2.2 Constitutional and legislative emergency powers
The Federal Constitution provides the Federal Assembly and Federal Council 
with emergency powers. ‘If extraordinary circumstances require’, the parliament 
may issue ordinances or decrees to safeguard the external and internal security of 
Switzerland, with these ordinances or decrees exempted from the usual optional 
referendum that would otherwise delay parliamentary laws from entering into 
force (Federal Constitution, article 165). In the past and during the Covid-19 
crisis, parliamentary emergency powers have not been relevant.
In contrast, the slightly more restrictive executive emergency powers are 
deployed regularly. The Federal Council can use emergency power in inter-
national relations and in case of serious threats to external and internal security 
(Federal Constitution, articles 184 and 185) and may, in direct application of 
the Constitution, ‘issue ordinances and rulings in order to counter existing or 
imminent threats of serious disruption to public order or internal or external 
security’ (article 185, paragraph 3). The emergency ordinances must be limited 
in duration and necessary to protect fundamental legal values such as peace, life, 
and public health.
In recent times, the Federal Council has used its emergency powers on several 
occasions. For instance, in 2001 it issued an ordinance prohibiting Al-Qaeda. 
The ordinance was limited in duration – to two years – but was extended three 
times before it was finally transposed into an ordinance of Parliament in 2011 
and emergency legislation of Parliament in 2014, which itself was later extended. 
Numerous constitutional scholars claimed that such perpetuation of emergencies 
violated the Constitution (Biaggini 2017b: N10b; Künzli 2015: N43; Saxer 2014: 
N108). The Federal Council also used its emergency powers in 2007 and 2008 
to order the destruction of plans containing information about atomic bombs. 
Here, its use of emergency powers was criticised for interfering in the sphere 
of the judiciary (Biaggini 2017a: N17; Brunner et al. 2020: 688; Saxer 2014: 
N109–111).
Most famously, the Federal Council made extensive use of its emergency 
powers during the financial crisis of 2008. The executive adopted a comprehen-
sive programme to support the Swiss finance system and bailed out the private 
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bank UBS, arguing that the bank was ‘too big to fail’. This case was particularly 
controversial, as the claimed emergency was of an economic – and private – 
nature and views were deeply divided on whether the bankruptcy of a bank 
constituted a serious threat to national security (Kley 2011: 133–4). In the noto-
rious UBS case, the Federal Supreme Court supported the view that emergency 
situations were not limited to serious threats to peace, life, and public health but 
could result from an economic and social crisis (Federal Court Decision, BGE 
137 II 431, paragraph 4.1). Various scholars criticised the judgment, arguing that 
it opens the doors too widely to emergency powers.
The contentious use of emergency powers led to a number of legislative 
amendments. In 2011, a Federal Act on the Safeguard of Democracy, Rule of 
Law and Capacity to Act in Extraordinary Situations entered into force. It obliges 
the Federal Council to inform parliamentary commissions immediately when it 
uses emergency powers and states that executive ordinances cease to be effective 
if they are not submitted to Parliament within six months (Government and 
Administration Organisation Act, article 7(d), paragraph 2). There is, however, 
still no agreement on the limits of emergency powers. While most agree that 
emergency powers do not allow the Federal Council to violate the Constitution, 
there is an ongoing dispute as to whether they permit the council to break or 
amend parliamentary laws (Saxer 2014 N101–104; Stöckli 2020: 24–5). The 
Federal Council based all economic aid and Covid-19 recovery measures on its 
constitutional emergency powers. It informed parliamentary commissions and, 
after a few months, submitted the Federal Covid-19 Act to Parliament in com-
pliance with the six-month’ deadline.
In sum, two parallel emergency regimes unleashed unprecedented execu-
tive powers at the federal level. The Federal Council implemented the Federal 
Epidemics Act, on which it based all health-related measures and also used the 
general emergency clause of the Constitution for all economic-support measures.
7.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
As the cantons are competent to deal with health issues, they all have a minis-
try of health headed by one the members of the collegial cantonal government. 
The 26 ministers of health are represented in the inter-cantonal conference of 
cantonal health ministers, a crucial body of horizontal and vertical cooperation. 
All cantons have cantonal doctors in charge of the test-trace-quarantine- isolate 
approach and empowered to issue binding orders for individuals. Cantonal health 
laws provide for emergency rules, mostly by establishing taskforces, as do most 
security and police laws. When the Covid-19 pandemic struck the country, most 
cantons thus established special health, security, and coordinating taskforces. 
Some of them were foreseen by law, others were formed ad hoc. The composi-
tion, tasks, and procedures were not always transparent, with the mushrooming 
of bodies having led to some confusion about who was doing what.
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On the federal level, the Epidemics Act provides for a special taskforce oper-
ating under the leadership of the Federal Office of Public Health. It was headed 
by its director, but a senior official called Daniel Koch, omnipresent at press con-
ferences, soon became ‘Mr Corona’ and the public face of the federal pandemic 
strategy. In addition, an ad hoc taskforce was established with the mandate to 
coordinate action and support the Federal Council in its decision-making. In this 
body, all federal ministries and the army were represented to ensure horizontal 
policy coordination. The general secretary of the inter-cantonal conference of 
cantonal governments was also a member of this federal taskforce. The latter 
was supported by three affiliated ad hoc bodies, one representing the economy, 
one civil society, and a third, named the Swiss Covid-19 Science Task Force, 
academia. All of these bodies were rapidly set up to counter criticism that the 
Federal Council was neglecting the interests of private economic actors, failing 
to involve non-governmental organisations, and not being guided sufficiently by 
scientific evidence.
The burgeoning of emergency bodies can be taken as a sign that Switzerland’s 
institutions were not ideally prepared to face a major crisis. The institutions 
provided for by law were centred on health issues and not up to the task of coor-
dinating a comprehensive pandemic response. The cantonal and federal ad hoc 
taskforces suffered from other shortcomings. As they were not regulated by law, 
or regulated only by internal directives, their composition, competences, and 
procedures had to be contrived in a hurry. As for the supporting bodies that shot 
up out of the ground, it was unclear who had nominated whom and according 
to what criteria. Like the federal taskforce itself, they were composed predomi-
nantly of men, a reminder that, in the absence of rules, the old gentlemen’s club 
inexorably takes over. On 8 March, women activists were demonstrating with 
placards that read, ‘Not My Taskforce’.
7.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
Switzerland’s pandemic response can be divided into three phases. The cantons 
were the first to act, but when the Federal Council declared an extraordinary 
situation, most powers shifted to the central level. Once the situation was down-
graded to being special, the Confederation and cantons struggled to sort out their 
respective competences and coordinate their actions.
7.4.1 Taking the initiative
At the end of January 2020, the federal authorities established a special task-
force closely cooperating with the cantonal health authorities and immediately 
launching an information campaign about sanitary measures. Ticino and other 
southern cantons were soon expressing fears that the pandemic, then raging in 
Northern Italy, would cross the border and that federal measures were insuffi-
cient to contain it. However, their request that borders be closed was not taken 
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up by the federal authorities. On 25 February, the Federal Office of Public Health 
confirmed the first Swiss Covid-19 case, in Ticino. The patient was put in an 
isolation unit, and all contact persons were notified and placed in quarantine by 
the cantonal health authorities.
As the coronavirus spread, the cantons started to prepare for an epidemic by 
establishing special task forces (Uri and Glarus), or setting up quarantine apart-
ments (Bern). They traced infections and put hundreds of people in quarantine. 
Ticino was the first canton to issue preventative measures: it prohibited major 
events, such as popular carnival festivities, and banned spectators from hockey 
matches. At the outset, Ticino was hardest hit by the pandemic, with its health 
facilities conveying horrifying messages to the rest of the country. Later, the 
Lake Geneva region (Geneva, Vaud, and Valais) reached the highest numbers of 
cases and began to take measures. Other cantons, however, had not yet reported 
any cases.
After an extraordinary meeting on 28 February 2020, the Federal Council 
declared a ‘special situation’ under the federal Epidemics Act and immediately 
used its new powers to ban large-scale events involving more than a thousand 
people. The cantons enforced the federal ban and were allowed to issue stricter 
rules. Basel Stadt, Basel Landschaft, and Zug opted for a maximum of 200 per-
sons at events and Aargau, for 150; other cantons obliged event organisers to 
give notifications of events or carry out risk assessments; and others yet adopted 
a wait-and-see approach. However, as the infection rate increased exponentially, 
the test-trace-contact-isolate strategy broke down in some cantons and health 
care systems began to reach capacity. By mid-March, it was clear that, left to 
their own devices, the cantons were unable to cope with the pandemic.
7.4.2 Federal action
On 13 March 2020, the Federal Council decided to issue stricter national rules. 
It imposed border controls on persons entering from Italy and closed all schools 
throughout Switzerland. It also banned events with more than a hundred par-
ticipants, a rule which – after some hesitancy – also applied to ski resorts, thus 
abruptly ending the Swiss ski holiday season. In restaurants, bars, and discos, a 
maximum of 50 people was allowed. At the same time, the Federal Council made 
up to CHF 10 billion in emergency aid available to cushion the economic impact 
of the pandemic response. This aid was immediately available to enterprises, 
which could get government-backed loans from their banks within hours – the 
Federal Council insisted on prompt aid without bureaucratic hassles.
Only three days later, the Federal Council declared an ‘extraordinary situa-
tion’. The next day, lockdown rules were issued. All public and private events 
were prohibited, and all but essential shops were closed, as were markets, res-
taurants, bars, and entertainment and leisure facilities. Only pharmacies, petrol 
and railway stations, banks, post offices, hotels, public administrations and social 
institutions, food stores, takeaway outlets, canteens, and food-delivery services 
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stayed open. Hospitals, clinics, and medical practices had to forego non-urgent 
medical treatments. The Federal Council also authorised the deployment of up 
to 8,000 members of the armed forces to assist the cantons; introduced checks at 
the borders with Germany, Austria, and France; and imposed entry bans. Two 
days later, these rules were extended to Spain and all non-Schengen states, and 
visa processes were suspended. Again, two days later, on 20 March, the Federal 
Council issued a new series of measures. It banned gatherings of more than five 
people, prohibited the collection of signatures for popular initiatives and refer-
enda, and issued a standstill on deadlines on the collection of signatures. It also 
approved an impressive additional aid package of CHF 32 billion, bringing the 
total economic relief measures up to CHF 40 billion.
At the peak of the first wave of Covid-19 infections, the concentration of 
power in the hands of the Federal Council was extraordinary. The federal exec-
utive issued and amended one emergency ordinance after the other, with no 
obligation to consult Parliament or cantons. Only a few of these ordinances, 
such as the ones relating to border control or the deployment of the army, con-
cerned matters that were typically federal competences – most of them, such as 
those to do with health, education, the economy, and cultural activity interfered 
in spheres normally governed by the cantons. The federal government actions 
reduced cantons to mere implementation agencies that were no longer allowed 
to decide on their own how to run their hospitals, schools, or other institutions.
Although this upscaling of competences is provided for by the Constitution 
and the Epidemics Act, its effect took many by surprise. The concentration of 
power occurred not only vertically but also horizontally; as a result, it was not 
the Confederation which was in charge, only its executive. In mid-March, when 
the Federal Assembly decided to suspend its sessions, the chambers of Parliament 
were deserted. The members of both chambers returned home to their domi-
ciles and left the scene to the executive and its councillors (Caroni and Schmid 
2020: 211–12). It became clear that Parliament was ill-prepared to operate during 
a health emergency. There were few rules on the involvement of parliamen-
tary commissions in decision-making, and no preparedness for the legislature to 
function as an e-parliament.
In the cantons, the situation was equally concerning. With direct democratic 
mechanisms having been suspended, direct democracy in Switzerland was on 
hold as well. When some cantonal parliamentarians attempted to open their 
session, they were told by the federal authorities that their meeting fell under 
the prohibition of gatherings of more than five people (Bergamin and Mazidi 
2020: N51–4; Uhlmann 2020: N5–16). Local assemblies, crucial actors in local 
self-administration, were similarly prevented from operating. Everyone, except 
the Federal Council and its administration, seemed to obey the stay-at-home 
recommendation.
Most actors, including the media, seemed to approve of this dominance by the 
Federal Council. However, as time went by, and as people recovered from the 
shock and learnt how to work effectively from home, the executive’s extensive 
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use of emergency powers became a subject of controversy. The effects of the 
lockdown measures on fundamental rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and 
the autonomy and participation rights of cantons, on the other hand, were enor-
mous – and not all of the measures respected the principle of proportionality and 
subsidiarity (Belser et al. 2020: 5–7; Märkli 2020: 62–4). Some of the executive 
ordinances, for instance, were in conflict with federal parliamentary laws, while 
others, especially those relating to direct democratic rights, conflicted with the 
Federal Constitution (Biaggini 2020a: 254–6). The rule that signatures for a pop-
ular initiative must be collected within 18 months and for an optional referen-
dum within 100 days are provided for by the Constitution itself. If the Federal 
Council could simply override these constitutional rights, what else could it do?
Given that direct democracy constitutes the main instrument of government 
accountability, its suspension raised fundamental questions about the control of 
power (Biaggini 2020b: 281–2). Aggrieved Swiss citizens typically collect sig-
natures for referenda rather than applying to the courts. Notoriously, judicial 
review is limited: it applies fully to cantonal acts only and is limited when federal 
norms are at stake. As a rule, acts of the Federal Council may not be challenged 
in the Federal Supreme Court (Federal Constitution, article 189, paragraph 4). 
Thus, the judiciary has no mandate to review the declaration of special or 
extraordinary situations or emergency ordinances (Gerber 2020: N6–13; Märkli 
2020: 62). When local, cantonal, and national populations and their represent-
atives were silenced, scheduled referenda votes postponed, and the collection of 
signatures suspended, there was no one left to counterbalance the emergency 
powers of the Federal Council – and in such a situation, the limited powers of 
the federal judiciary seemed especially problematic.
The media customarily took it upon themselves to function as public watch-
dogs and urged federal civil servants to exercise their individual judgment rather 
than blindly follow orders from above. Nevertheless, the country was governed 
by central executive rule for three months in an unprecedented and largely 
uncontrolled way (Belser et al. 2020: 2–4). While it lasted, few actors seemed 
overly troubled, holding to the view instead that the exigencies of the pandemic 
necessitated fast and uniform action. The fact that there were few concerns about 
abuse of power was probably due to the generally high level of trust in institu-
tions as well as the unique structure of the Federal Council.
In Switzerland, the concentration of power at the federal level does not mean 
that one strong individual takes over – it means seven take over. Uncompromising 
and polarising personalities are typically not elected members of the Federal 
Council, as they cannot succeed in a collegial body. In addition, all the linguis-
tic groups of the country and all four major parties are represented, given that 
the government is elected by a ‘magic formula’ guaranteeing the inclusion of all 
relevant groups. During the emergency, the president of the Federal Council 
remained a prima inter pares member of a collegial body that continued to base its 
decisions on consensus. The composition of the Federal Council and its way of 
functioning thus served as an inbuilt check on power. The fact that the left-wing 
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Social Democratic Party, the centrist Christian Democratic People’s Party, the 
Liberals, and the right-wing Swiss People’s Party all had one or two federal coun-
cillors represented contributed to making the executive orders acceptable to most.
Indeed, at press conferences, the Federal Council took care to speak in sev-
eral languages and always be represented by more than one member. Attentive 
observers could tell that the Minister of Home Affairs and the President, both 
Social Democrats, would often have liked to issue stricter rules but that the 
Minister of Finance, a member of the People’s Party, prevented this from hap-
pening (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2020). The Federal Council hence seemed able to 
balance different interests, views, and priorities even in the absence of the usual 
checks and balances.
In April 2020, parliamentary commissions and chamber presidents resumed 
work, were consulted by the Federal Council, and made extensive use of parlia-
mentary mechanisms to get involved in the decision-making processes (Caroni 
and Schmid 2020: 712). While the Federal Council continued to issue or amend 
dozens of emergency ordinances, the Federal Assembly reconvened in May for 
an extraordinary session dedicated to Covid-19, one it used mostly to endorse 
and widen the Federal Council’s economic support programmes. During the 
regular session in June, Parliament approved the Federal Covid-19 Act, thereby 
creating a parliamentary basis for further economic support actions to be decided 
upon by the Federal Council. By delegating far-reaching spending powers to the 
executive, Parliament made it clear that it considered the Federal Council the 
most appropriate actor to manage the crisis.
Beginning in mid-April 2020, the Federal Council decided to ease its lock-
down measures. At this point it started to dawn on observers that although the 
Swiss constitutional and statutory framework was rather well prepared for lead-
ing the country through a carefully managed emergency situation, it gave no 
clue about how to get out of it (Belser and Mazidi 2020). Who was to decide on 
the transition to a more normal situation, or to design, plan, and finance it? As 
there were no clear answers and pressures were mounting to get cantons back in 
control, the Federal Council decided on 19 June, when infection and hospitali-
sation rates had stabilised at a low level, that the situation was no longer extraor-
dinary but special. Parliament was back in session, and cantons back in charge.
However, the rules applying to the special situation were unclear. While the 
Federal Council now insisted that cantons should act proactively, the same can-
tons asked the centre to take back control as soon as the weather cooled and 
case numbers rose. Precious time was lost in the summer months during which 
no one really seemed in control and official communication was scarce. While 
some cantons used the time in between the waves of infection to scale up their 
testing-and-tracing capacity, others hoped there simply would be no second 
wave – or that the Federal Council would again take over if they were wrong 
about this. When infection rates duly started to increase once more at the end of 
summer, the Federal Council agreed to issue an order for masks to be worn on 
public transport, as it seemed exceedingly impractical to expect train passengers 
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to adjust their behaviour to the dictates of a new jurisdiction every time they 
crossed another cantonal border. For the rest, the Federal Council leaned back 
and bade the cantons to go forth and craft tailor-made responses of their own. 
While some did so, others did not.
By the end of October 2020, Switzerland was about to become Europe’s lat-
est Covid-19 hotspot. The second wave of infection hit it badly, yet both the 
national and cantonal tiers were hoping for the other to intervene and issue more 
restrictive measures. Mandatory masks seemed to be the only thing they could 
agree on – mostly because masks do not harm business and consequently provoke 
no demands for economic aid. On 28 October, the Federal Council decided on 
light and flexible lockdown rules, and – after much hesitation – provided CHF 
30 million to cushion their economic effects. The cantons were asked to design 
their own rules and chip into the economic relief programmes. At the time of 
this writing, they were still pondering how far they should go.
7.4.3 Cantonal action
When the federal authorities took control of the pandemic response, the role of 
cantons was unclear. It was undisputed, even during the extraordinary situation, 
that it was up to them to implement the pandemic response. But could they 
issue their own emergency regulations? Could they be stricter, as the Canton of 
Ticino and most French-speaking cantons would have liked to be, or only more 
generous when it came to cushioning the economic shock? While this matter 
was being debated in scholarly commentary, the federal authorities expressed the 
view that the national-level pandemic response was exhaustive and did not allow 
cantons to go beyond it. The official argument was that diverse rules would lead 
to confusion, but the hidden concern was that cantons with stricter rules would 
ask for more financial support from the national emergency relief pot than oth-
ers. Scholars argued in vain that cantons more adversely affected by the pandemic 
should be allowed to issue stricter rules – at least if they agreed to take responsi-
bility for the economic effects of these rules (Belser et al. 2020: 4–7).
In order to resolve a serious conflict between the Federal Council and the 
Canton of Ticino, the Covid-19 ordinances opened so-called crisis windows 
allowing cantons to go beyond the national lockdown measures under defined 
circumstances, thereby retroactively legalising a cantonal ban on construction 
work (Bergamin and Mazidi 2020: N49–50; Bernard 2020: 63–4). The Lex 
Ticino, designed to accommodate an upset cantonal government, was removed 
as soon as the situation in the canton’s hospitals improved. Disputes about the 
respective competences and financial responsibilities persisted, however, getting 
worse even as the curve flattened.
The non-application of the usual institutional mechanisms produced other 
hiccups. The insufficient involvement of cantons in the making of rules shaped 
some norms which the cantons found difficult to implement. After all, the fed-
eral health authorities were used to strategic planning and coordination only and 
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lacked practical experience on the ground. When the Federal Council decided 
to ease measures and return from the extraordinary to the special situation, the 
country experienced an unprecedented, and disconcerting, struggle over com-
petences and roles. The cantons had been asking for greater involvement, but the 
sudden retreat of the Federal Council caught them by surprise. ‘Mr Corona’ took 
his retirement and so, seemingly, did the federal government.
As it turned out, the cantons were not overly eager to take measures. It was 
politically unattractive to ban events or close institutions – and there was heavy 
economic pressure not to do so. Given the small size of most cantons, expected 
free-rider effects also severely reduced cantonal willingness to act. Why should 
Basel, Zurich, or Vaud ban events – and contend with requests for economic 
relief by the organisers – when their sports and cultural offerings attracted vis-
itors from a large region? Why should national football games be allowed at 
some places and not in others? The federal authorities, however, did not share 
this interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity and continued to encour-
age the cantons to act – and to do so rapidly. Overall, the country seemed lost 
and its institutions incapable of taking timeous, appropriate action. It was then 
that journalists coined a new term for federalising, ‘ föderalen’, meaning to shift 
responsibility to the cantons when it is inexpedient to act (Karpiczenko 2020).
It was only in October 2020, when the country was already badly hit by the 
second wave of Covid-19 that cantons started to issue stricter rules, to limit the 
operation of institutions, and to impose cantonal lockdown measures. While the 
Federal Council still urged the cantons to do more, it announced new national 
measures at the end of October. On 28 October, it amended the Covid-19 ordi-
nance to prohibit discos and clubs, to require bars and restaurants to close at 11 
pm, to ban sporting and cultural events with more than 50 people, to expand the 
mandatory wearing of masks, and to oblige universities to suspend face-to-face 
teaching. With the exception of the increasingly active corona sceptics, most actors 
approved of the new national involvement, though while criticising the Federal 
Council for not simultaneously announcing an economic support programme.
7.4.4 Local government action
The role of local government in implementing pandemic control measures was 
crucial. Cities and villages were at the forefront of enforcing such measures. 
They adapted public buildings, in particular schools and health centres, to suit 
the new hygiene requirements, closed parks, removed benches, controlled events 
and enterprises, and enforced mask-wearing. At the same time, local govern-
ments did not issue their own pandemic responses, for instance by banning 
events or closing institutions on their own. The fact that this did not happen can 
probably be explained by the small size of most communes – Swiss territory is 
divided into 2,200 local governments, many of which have less than a thousand 
inhabitants. As for the large cities, they were able to voice their concerns within 
their respective cantons.
136 Eva Maria Belser
To look beyond pandemic regulations, local governments were often highly 
innovative when challenged by the health crisis. They set up health and support 
teams, operated emergency lines, called households, offered help, and encour-
aged and coordinated neighbourhood support. Numerous municipalities also 
sought to complement federal and cantonal economic relief measures, including 
by supporting local enterprises with direct aid, such as encouraging consumers to 
buy locally and by issuing and subsidising coupons. Undoubtedly, local govern-
ments were in the best position to provide rapid aid to individuals and enterprises 
in difficult situations. As most of the municipalities are in charge of social assis-
tance and thus of supporting those not aided by the federal social security system, 
they also had the greatest interest in timeously offering help and encouraging 
private support networks.
7.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
The participation of Swiss cantons in federal decision-making is generally strong. 
Cantons are represented in the second chamber of the Federal Assembly, and – 
more importantly – have the right to participate in the federal decision-making 
process, in particular in the legislative process (Federal Constitution, article 45). 
In 2020, consultation and information-exchange between the Confederation 
and the cantons always took place, even during the extraordinary situation. 
However, in the early phase, cooperation was patchy. The representation of can-
tons in the Federal Council’s ad hoc taskforce was clearly insufficient and a real 
coordination body lacking. The general secretary of the conference of cantonal 
governments had no mandate to speak on behalf of the cantons, which were 
affected differently by the pandemic and had differing views about the best way 
forward. He could play the role only of a transmission channel for information.
Over time, vertical cooperation improved. The return to the special situation 
made it clear that no federal measures were allowed to be taken without the 
involvement of the cantons. The experiences showed that this was not only a 
constitutional duty but a practical need. The federal administration was not well 
positioned to design effective measures in cantonal spheres of competences. It 
lacked data – a tremendous concern throughout the pandemic – and hands-on 
knowledge about testing capacities, information channels, and health and edu-
cation structures. Strong cooperation also proved to be necessary in the field of 
federal competences. The decision of the Federal Council to close the border to 
Northern Italy threatened the health system in Ticino relying on thousands of 
health workers commuting daily, while controlling the border to France severely 
affected all economic sectors of Geneva and the functioning of the international 
organisations based in the canton.
As most cantons are unreasonably small in the context of an increasingly 
mobile population, horizontal cooperation is a crucial feature of Swiss feder-
alism. Conferences of cantonal governments and conferences of ministers of 
police, health, and education coordinate and harmonise cantonal policies and 
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laws and seek to ensure that the concerns of the cantons are heard in Bern (Belser 
2020: 285 ff.). However, in February and March 2020, horizontal cooperation 
was largely dysfunctional. The members of cantonal governments were over-
whelmed by the task of dealing with the health crisis and its effects in their 
cantons. Although informal talks were never suspended, it was only after a few 
months that the inter-cantonal conferences resumed operating in their usual 
manner and that the conference of health ministers and the affiliated association 
of cantonal officers of health raised their voices and coordinated their actions.
7.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Switzerland’s federalism is characterised by a high level of fiscal decentralisation. 
Cantons issue and implement their own norms – and pay for it – and are in 
charge of implementing federal laws – and pay for it as well. Local governments 
adopt their own rules and fulfil federal and cantonal tasks delegated to them. The 
delivery and financing of most public services is thus heavily devolved to the can-
tons and local governments. The important role of the cantons and communes is 
also reflected on the revenue side, as each tier of government raises taxes and fees 
and none is over-dependent on transfers and grants.
Intergovernmental fiscal relations are guided by the constitutional principle 
of fiscal equivalence, composed of two elements: on the one hand, the collective 
body that benefits from a public service bears the costs thereof; on the other 
hand, the collective body that bears the costs of a public service may decide on 
the nature of that service (Federal Constitution, article 43(a), paragraphs 3 and 
4). Hence, fiscal equivalence ensures that those benefiting from, financing and 
deciding on the provision of public goods are the same. The system is com-
plemented by a scheme of vertical as well as horizontal financial equalisation 
designed to reduce the differences in financial capacity among the cantons, guar-
antee all cantons a minimum level of financial resources, and compensate for 
excessive financial burdens due to geographical or socio-demographic factors 
(Federal Constitution, article 135, paragraph 2).
The pandemic deeply challenged these intergovernmental fiscal relations. All 
of a sudden, federal authorities took costly decisions for which the cantons and 
communes were not prepared. National hygiene and sanitary norms made the 
running of all institutions significantly more expensive. More importantly, there 
were controversies about the sharing of the costs of economic recovery. What 
also upset the cantons was the fact that the Federal Council obliged hospitals and 
other health services to abstain from all non-urgent treatments, even in cantons 
which at that time hardly had any Covid-19 cases. At a high cost, all cantonal 
health services thus prepared for Covid patients and, while waiting for the wave 
to hit the hospitals, ran out of work and income.
Intergovernmental fiscal relations probably explain most of the hiccups in 
the Swiss reaction to the pandemic. For several months, for instance, the testing 
strategy was debated. The cantons used very different strategies to test people 
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and thus were more or less effective in applying the test-trace-quarantine-isolate 
strategies. Their point of view was that the federal tier would have to pay for 
extra costs when issuing a binding national test strategy. Worse, the transmission 
of data was disastrously dysfunctional. For a long time, no actor seemed able to 
come up with reliable information on tests, test results, the use of hospital beds 
and intensive care units, and fatalities. It was obvious that preparation and coop-
eration in this field were sorely needed and that the numerous taskforces were 
navigating in the dark. Improving the data situation was hindered by financial 
disputes: Who should be in charge of a reliable health data system and finance its 
speedy establishment? Although many actors expressed concern about data pro-
tection (Vokinger 2020: 420–2), the hidden concerns were of a financial nature.
When the Federal Council downgraded the situation from extraordinary 
to special and urged the cantons to take over, financial matters were crucial 
in preventing prompt pandemic responses. In fact, the Federal Council, which 
had adopted large financial-support packages and increased social payments, was 
eager to step back. The cantons, however, were not keen to ban events or issue 
lockdown rules, as those suffering from the effects would turn to them for relief. 
Even when infection rates started to increase rapidly in September 2020, cantons 
hesitated to act and hoped for the Federal Council to keep control. It was at this 
moment that federalism seemed to fail the country, by hindering timely and 
adequate responses to the health crisis. Both the federal and cantonal tiers were 
eyeing each other, hoping for the other to act – and take financial responsibility 
for these actions.
7.5 Findings and policy implications
In normal times, the limited role of the Confederation and the far-reaching 
autonomy of the cantons and the communes raise little interest. During the pan-
demic, though, federalism seemed to matter and hoary debates about the right 
balance between unity and diversity resurfaced. Should there be cantonal or 
national lockdowns? Should cantons be allowed to decide on their testing strat-
egies and tracing approach? Should they be allowed to control their borders, or 
at least discourage their populations from travelling? Such debates had not been 
witnessed in the country for a very long time.
The Swiss system of power-dividing and power-sharing impacted strongly 
on the management of the coronavirus pandemic. While the federal system had 
been put in emergency mode with ease, the real issue seemed to have been about 
how to adapt the system to an ongoing and dynamic emergency. The first reac-
tion, that of concentrating power at the centre, fortunately gave way to more 
nuanced views. After all, nationwide measures are rarely proportionate, and cer-
tainly not in pandemics – during 2020, they were not far-reaching enough for 
those regions severely hit by Covid-19, while going beyond the necessary in 
regions not yet or no longer experiencing peaks in case numbers. As far as they 
limit human rights, the constitutionality of national restrictive measures must 
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be questioned. Limitations of the right to education and health, to family and 
private life, and to economic activity and free movement must be kept to what is 
strictly needed at a particular time and place. The full implementation of human 
rights thus mandates tailor-made pandemic responses, which can be orchestrated 
top-down, as they are in some unitary states, or designed bottom-up. The lat-
ter has the advantage of being more legitimate and effective than the former. 
Regional and local actors, familiar with governing their region and resourced 
to do so, are in a better position than others to judge the necessity of restrictive 
measures and to lift them as soon as possible.
Although democracy had been suspended for months, it was back in opera-
tion by October 2020. The Federal Assembly operated behind Perspex panes, 
and its commissions reclaimed their right to be informed and consulted by the 
government. Direct democracy was also back, and the new Covid-19 ordinance 
made it clear that event bans did not apply to cantonal parliaments and other 
political assemblies, including demonstrations, which could take place provided 
that protection plans were in place. The profound challenges to the institutional 
architecture of the country, however, are very likely to leave traces.
At the federal level, it seems crucial to establish emergency-proof checks 
and balances. Among the options under discussion is that the Federal Council 
should no longer be allowed to empower itself by declaring a situation extraor-
dinary, or to disempower itself during an emergency; instead, a parliamen-
tary commission should be involved (Stöckli 2020: 49; Stöckli et al. 2020). 
During a crisis, parliament should be involved permanently and prepared for 
such involvement, in particular by getting ready to operate as an e-parliament 
(Caroni and Schmid 2020: 719–20; Stöckli et al. 2020). It has also been debated 
whether the mandate of the Federal Supreme Court should be expanded to 
allow for the abstract review of federal emergency ordinances (Stöckli 2020: 
46; Stöckli et al. 2020).
At the cantonal level, it is mostly inter-cantonal collaboration that raises ques-
tions. How crisis-resistant can a federal system be which relies so strongly on 
the horizontal cooperation of 26 autonomous actors? Is it possible to inform and 
consult all of them or to allow all of them to sit in a joint emergency body? While 
the current practice of including only one cantonal representative on the national 
taskforce seems clearly insufficient, opening up the body to 26 actors appears to 
be inappropriate. An improvement of the situation thus seems to require pro-
found changes in the field of intergovernmental relations and, eventually, the 
transformation of inter-cantonal conferences into supra-cantonal bodies. If such 
a change were successful, a representative delegation of the cantons could sit 
in a joint body with federal delegates and share responsibility for the planning, 
design, and implementation of the management of pandemics. Such stronger 
coordination seems essential to ensure a prompt and coherent response, to pre-
vent spillover effects and, just as importantly, jointly sort out financial matters. As 
the latter will have long-term effects on all tiers of government and affect their 
room for manoeuvre in the future, the current hide-and-seek under way at the 
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time of this writing must give way to negotiated solutions. After all, ‘let’s talk’ 
has always been the motto of Swiss federalism – the country’s political actors 
should walk that talk, even if they are wearing masks and visors.
Note
 1 The author wishes to express her gratitude to MLaw Simon Mazidi, research assistant 
and PhD student at the University of Fribourg, for his invaluable support in the prepa-
ration of this chapter.
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8
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM
A tale of convergence and divergence
Paul Anderson
8.1 Introduction
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a plurinational 
union state consisting of four parts: England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern 
Ireland. It has 66.8 million inhabitants, the vast majority of whom reside in 
England. As the largest nation, England accounts for approximately 85 per cent 
of the UK population (56.3 million), followed by Scotland (5.4 million), Wales 
(3.1 million), and Northern Ireland (1.9 million). The UK has an ageing popu-
lation with circa 20 per cent of the population aged 65 years and over, many of 
whom live in rural and coastal areas. The urban population of the UK is about 
56 million, while the rural population is approximately 11 million (ONS 2020a).
The plurinational nature of the UK state is manifest in the distinct and at 
times competing understandings of nation and statehood in the devolved ter-
ritories (Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), each of which has its own 
constitutional and political identity. In the late 1990s, a highly asymmetrical 
form of political devolution was implemented in Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland, while England, notwithstanding its status as the largest constituent 
nation, became a constitutional anomaly. Two decades after the implementation 
of devolution, ‘the English question’ continues to garner traction in territorial 
debates, but reforms to English governance remain limited; the UK government 
doubles up as both a UK-wide and English government.
The UK was one of the countries worst affected by the Covid-19 crisis in 2020. 
From the first case of infection on 31 January 2020 until 31 October of that year, it 
registered more than 46,000 deaths, the highest rate in Western Europe.1 Despite 
the warnings of the World Health Organization (WHO), the UK government was 
rather slow to respond to the threat of the crisis and sought to delay the imple-
mentation of social distancing measures until absolutely necessary. This delay was 
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compounded by support among some officials for ‘herd immunity’, that is, the 
notion that allowing the virus to spread naturally would ultimately build up enough 
resistance in the population. After a public outcry and strong condemnation from 
medical experts, the UK government abandoned this approach in favour of social 
distancing measures and, ultimately, a state-wide lockdown.
The National Health Service (NHS) is the collective name for the four 
health systems of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Health has 
been a devolved matter since 1999, but even prior to this, the health services 
in Northern Ireland and Scotland were managed by their respective territorial 
offices in the UK government. Safeguarding the NHS from being overwhelmed 
by the coronavirus pandemic was a primary reason advanced by the UK gov-
ernment in its moves to secure a state-wide lockdown on 23 March 2020. The 
government’s slogan ‘stay at home, protect the NHS, save lives’ reflected this pri-
ority. In keeping with it, temporary hospitals were constructed, retired health-
care professionals returned to work, and thousands of non-emergency operations 
were cancelled to free up space in hospital wards.
Public support and appreciation for the NHS and its staff were shown through 
a weekly ‘clap for carers’ during the first wave of the pandemic. Likewise, Prime 
Minister Boris Johnson repeatedly praised the dedication of NHS staff, espe-
cially after he was admitted to hospital while suffering from the virus. Despite 
acknowledgment that the NHS weathered the first wave rather well, this suc-
cess was overshadowed by a chronic shortage of personal protective equipment 
(PPE), a lack of testing capacity for NHS workers, and thousands of deaths in 
both hospitals and care homes.
This chapter examines the evolution of the UK response to the pandemic 
during the first wave from January to October 2020. At the time of writing, the 
UK was in the midst of a second wave of infections, but analysis of the first wave 
already reveals many of the dynamics and tensions within the devolved system 
that were continuing to gain traction in the second wave. The politics of the 
pandemic that played out during the first wave demonstrated the decentralised 
nature of the response in the UK, but while local capacity was harnessed at the 
national level (Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), local capacity in English 
regions was generally stifled by ineffectual central government direction. The 
main findings show how the pandemic raised the profile of devolution more 
than any other event in the last two decades. It points, however, to a limp federal 
spirit, particularly in the context of collaboration, and underlines the urgency for 
new and more imaginative thinking to reform and rejuvenate the Westminster-
centric model of intergovernmental relations (IGR).
8.2 The constitutional and legislative framework
The UK is neither a unitary nor federal state but a union of nations with autono-
mous executives and legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The 
Scottish Parliament, Welsh Parliament, and Northern Irish Assembly follow 
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the reserved-powers model of devolution, whereby legislative competence is 
granted in all areas not specifically ‘reserved’ in the respective statutes for each 
nation (Mitchell 2009).
In the two decades since the inception of devolution, the coronavirus pan-
demic is the biggest public health issue faced by all levels of government. In 
consonance with the devolution models in each territory, important juris-
dictions affected by the pandemic – health care and education, to name just 
two – are the responsibility of the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland. In England, the absence of a devolved institution means 
that the UK government is also the English government and thus the UK gov-
ernment’s Department for Health and Social Care focuses largely on health 
policy in England, albeit some aspects of health policy (e.g., human fertilisation 
and surrogacy) remain ‘reserved’ to the UK government. Emergency powers 
dealing with public health infections are detailed in different legislative acts 
for the different nations: the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act of 1984 
for England and Wales, the Public Health etc. (Scotland) Act of 2008, and 
the Public Health Act (Northern Ireland) of 1967. Other emergency legisla-
tion exists to deal with civil emergencies across the whole of the UK – the Civil 
Contingencies Act of 2004 – but this was developed to reflect the various devo-
lution settlements, involving concordats of agreed frameworks for cooperation 
with each devolved nation.
In recent years, political devolution has been strengthened by the devolution 
of further competences as well as fiscal levers and has also involved processes of 
‘power transfer’ in the shape of ‘devolution city deals’ in England (Sandford 2020: 
26). Fiscal devolution remains fairly limited for all three devolved institutions, 
but each enjoys broad competence over important policy areas such as economic 
development, as well as responsibility in areas to contribute to economic growth, 
including transport and infrastructure. Nonetheless, the devolved governments 
have access to limited reserves, and the fiscal frameworks of the Scottish, Welsh, 
and Northern Irish governments place significant constraints on the borrowing 
powers of the devolved governments. Consequently, the devolved governments 
had and have limited capacity and resources to mitigate the economic impact of 
Covid-19.
8.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
All four nations in the UK have existing legislation to manage the spread of 
infectious diseases. While legislation varies in the nations (except for England 
and Wales, which are covered by the same Act), the Acts share similar powers 
to prevent, protect, and control a significant risk to human health. Through a 
system of action and surveillance, these Acts endow government ministers, local 
authorities, and magistrates with powers to issue regulations to prevent onward 
transmission of infectious viruses.
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The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 is the main piece of legislation for 
responding to national emergencies in the UK. This legislation provides a frame-
work enabling public authorities to respond to a range of emergencies: environ-
mental disasters, health pandemics, protests, and terrorist attacks. In line with the 
Act, government ministers can use emergency regulations to introduce sweeping 
powers to deal with an emergency, but these are qualified with legal and parlia-
mentary safeguards to eschew disproportionate action. In lieu of invoking the 
Act to deal with the coronavirus pandemic, the UK government instead created 
new legislation. The Coronavirus Act of 2020, however, was more lenient in its 
requirements for parliamentary oversight.
All tiers of government in the UK have machinery in place to respond to issues 
of (national) emergency. At the apex of UK government machinery is the Civil 
Contingencies Committee (COBRA), a coordinating and decision-making body 
that brings together relevant personnel and authorities depending on the nature 
of the emergency. Located in the cabinet rooms of Whitehall, COBRA is essen-
tially an intra-governmental rather than intergovernmental body. Coordination 
with the devolved administrations takes place when required, but COBRA is not 
an intergovernmental forum. The UK does not have a specific intergovernmen-
tal emergency committee; during the coronavirus pandemic, traditional inter-
governmental structures were shunned in favour of COBRA and newly created 
ministerial structures (see Section 8.4.5).
8.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
The announcement of a UK-wide lockdown on 23 March 2020 was supported 
by all major political parties in the UK. Opposition parties, including Labour, 
the Scottish National Party (SNP), and the Democratic Unionist Party, all of 
which were in government in the devolved territories, supported the UK gov-
ernment’s lockdown. Among the public, there was ‘almost universal support’ 
for a full lockdown ‘with 93% of the public saying they were in favour of the 
decision’ (McDonnell 2020). As the lockdown was extended over April, both 
political and public support remained strong. In early May, however, as the UK 
government eased restrictions in England, divergence in approaches came to 
light in the devolved nations, with growing criticism among political parties that 
the lockdown in England was being eased too soon. The main opposition party, 
Labour, sought to balance its concern with the timeline for easing measures 
with consistent criticism that the government’s plans were vague and entailed 
unnecessary risk for workers being urged to return to work. This had the back-
ing of trade unions, smaller parties such as the Greens, as well as the devolved 
governments.
The divergence in approach to the easing of lockdown in May 2020 rein-
forced the status of the devolved administrations as autonomous governments. 
To the surprise of some, politicians and commentators alike, the Scottish, Welsh, 
and Northern Irish governments did not follow suit in lifting restrictions, 
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precipitating criticism and concern about cross-border cooperation and reveal-
ing a lack of knowledge about the powers of the devolved governments to set 
their own agendas and route-maps vis-à-vis lockdown. The devolved govern-
ments criticised the UK government’s approach to easing lockdown, which was 
pursued without significant consultation with the devolved leaders and thus did 
not take into consideration the impact that lifting restrictions would have on 
other parts of the UK. The confusion created by the easing of restrictions in 
England was compounded by the Prime Minister himself, who in a televised 
speech on 10 May addressed the population as ‘the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom – Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland’, failing to mention 
that the lifting of measures applied to England only ( Johnson 2020b).
8.4.1 Taking the initiative
The first Covid-19 case was identified in England on 31 January 2020, followed 
by confirmed cases in Northern Ireland (27 February), Wales (28 February), and 
Scotland (1 March). On 2 March, the UK government convened COBRA to 
discuss the UK response to the pandemic. Recognising the scale of the pandemic 
and the need for cooperation between the different governments, the first minis-
ters of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland also attended COBRA meetings. 
The involvement of the devolved administrations heralded the beginning of a 
collaborative approach to tackling the pandemic across the UK. This included a 
Coronavirus Action Plan jointly published by the four governments on 3 March, 
devolved support in the form of the Sewel Convention for the UK government’s 
Coronavirus Act (receiving royal assent on 25 March), and parallel announce-
ments of key decisions, such as the lockdown announced on 23 March.2 The 
much-heralded ‘four-nation approach’ entailed unprecedented levels of cooper-
ation and a degree of uniformity between the governments hitherto unknown. 
In a nod to the clear division of competences vis-à-vis policy jurisdictions such 
as health care and education, this was a decentralised response; uniformity did 
not entail centralisation.
As the government machinery reacted to increasing numbers of cases across 
the UK in early March, the UK government advised against ‘non-essential’ travel 
and gatherings in large groups and encouraged people to work from home. On 
12 March, the Scottish government announced a ban on gatherings of more than 
500 people, while elsewhere in the UK unnecessary social contact was discour-
aged. On 18 March, all four governments announced the closure of schools (to 
take effect from 20 March), while on 20 March bars, cafés, and restaurants were 
instructed to close. In a televised address on 23 March, the Prime Minister detailed 
further restrictions, including a stay-at-home order and the closure of non-essen-
tial shops as well as gyms, libraries, playgrounds, and places of worship ( Johnson 
2020a). Extra powers were rolled out to the police to enforce the strict measures. 
On 25 March, the Coronavirus Act of 2020 received royal assent and granted UK 
ministers broad legislative powers to respond quickly to the pandemic.
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8.4.2 UK government action
Analysis of the role of the UK government in managing the coronavirus pan-
demic necessitates discussion of its role as the government of the UK as well 
as England. Prior to the roll-out of preventative measures such as the lock-
down on 23 March, the UK government played a coordinating role between all 
four nations to respond to the pandemic. As noted earlier, this included using 
Whitehall machinery such as COBRA. Several COBRA meetings were con-
vened prior to the widespread transmission of Covid-19 and increased in fre-
quency throughout March and April 2020.
In early March, the government’s advice was limited to self-isolation for seven 
days for individuals who developed Covid-19 symptoms such as a continuous 
cough or fever. By mid-March, the period of self-isolation was doubled to 14 
days and extended to all individuals within a household in the event that one 
occupant tested positive for the virus. On 16 March, Boris Johnson announced 
further measures, including encouraging people to work from home and the 
cessation of non-essential contact and unnecessary travel. One week later on 23 
March, in coordination with the devolved governments, he announced the lock-
down. All non-essential businesses were closed, including bars, pubs, and res-
taurants (except for those that could offer food delivery and take-aways); places 
of worship were closed except for reduced-capacity funerals; nurseries, schools, 
colleges, and universities were closed; recreational activities were curtailed, 
including the closure of playgrounds, cinemas, museums, and art galleries; social 
events such as weddings and baptisms were prohibited; people were ordered to 
work from home where possible; and a stay-at-home order was issued.
To mitigate the economic damage caused by the pandemic, the government – 
which controls the lion’s share of fiscal levers in the UK – played a leading role 
in supporting employers and employees affected by the pandemic. This included 
various schemes applicable across all four nations of the UK. On 20 March, Rishi 
Sunak, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced the launch of the Coronavirus 
Job Retention Scheme to provide 80 per cent of employees’ salaries up to GBP 
2,500 a month for those unable to work due to the stay-at-home order, as well 
as the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme to support small and 
medium-sized enterprises with 12 months of interest-free access to loans, over-
drafts, and other financial assets. Further economic packages were rolled out, 
among them the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme to sup-
port large businesses with finance up to GBP 50 million over three years; the 
Self-Employment Income Support Scheme to support self-employed individuals 
with grants; and value-added tax (VAT) and income tax deferrals (administered 
by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs).
At an individual level, the UK government, which is responsible for employ-
ment rights and most benefits and social security, also implemented numerous 
measures: statutory sick pay was made available to people unable to work due to 
contracting Covid-19 or engagement in self-isolation or shielding; low-income 
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self-employed people were given access to Universal Credit, a benefit to help 
with living costs; and Universal Credit and other Working Tax Credit benefits 
were increased.
Owing to competition between different NHS boards in the different parts of 
the UK in procuring necessary PPE, other medical equipment, and coronavirus 
testing kits, in early April the UK government took the lead in the coordination 
and distribution of PPE across the UK. The government also introduced various 
measures to ensure the mass roll-out of a vaccine if and when it became available, 
including research at the government’s military research facilities at Porton Down.
On 10 May, after almost eight weeks of lockdown, the government announced 
a relaxation of restrictions in England. In a televised address to the whole of the 
UK, the Prime Minister announced a change in message from ‘stay at home’ 
to ‘stay alert’, unveiled a new Covid Alert System, and encouraged people with 
jobs that could not be done from home to return to work. In Scotland, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland, however, the devolved governments maintained the pre-
vious advice of ‘stay at home’ and kept lockdowns in force. The government 
announced plans for primary school pupils in England to return to school by 
1 June 2020, but many local authorities took the decision to keep schools closed. 
Between June and July, rules for the retail and hospitality sectors were eased. 
From 15 June, non-essential shops reopened, while in early July, bars, restau-
rants, pubs, and hairdressers reopened, having to adhere to a one-metre-plus rule 
in line with social distancing.
The reopening of the hospitality and retail sectors marked a crucial moment 
in the government’s economic-recovery phase. To spur on this recovery, on 8 
July the Chancellor announced a cut in VAT from 20 per cent to 5 per cent 
for accommodation, hospitality, and tourism services. The government also 
launched the UK-wide ‘Eat Out to Help Out’ scheme from 3 to 31 August, 
offering diners a 50 per cent reduction in their bills at participating cafés, pubs, 
and restaurants. The scheme certainly boosted economic recovery, but with only 
a 2.1 per cent rise in gross domestic product (GDP) in August, it fell short of 
more optimistic expectations.
By September 2020, shoots of economic recovery were cut short by an 
increase in Covid case numbers and the looming threat of further local lock-
downs. From 14 September, a ‘rule of six’ was introduced to limit gatherings of 
separate households. On 18 September, additional restrictions were announced 
in the North-east of England, including a ban on household mixing, and later 
rolled out to the Midlands, North-west of England, and West Yorkshire. By the 
end of the month, further restrictions applied across the rest of the UK, including 
a 22:00 closure for pubs and restaurants.
As case numbers continued to rise in October, the government introduced 
a new three-tier lockdown system in England to establish local and regional 
lockdowns and reopened several emergency hospitals constructed to deal with 
the first wave of the pandemic. By the end of the month, large parts of England 
(Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Liverpool city region, South Yorkshire, and 
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Warrington) were under the strictest tier 3 restrictions. On 31 October, the 
Prime Minister announced that the exponential growth in cases necessitated a 
further lockdown for an initial period of four weeks (until 2 December). The 
second lockdown was not as restrictive as the first (schools and universities, 
for instance, remained open), but pubs, restaurants, leisure facilities, and non- 
essential shops were closed.
In line with trends across the world (see Griglio 2020), there was a strong shift 
towards executive rule to manage the growing threat the pandemic posed. As 
mentioned, the Coronavirus Act granted UK ministers broad legislative powers 
to respond quickly to the pandemic. In addition, pre-existing powers, such as 
those in delegated legislation (legislation made other than by Parliament, but 
with the authority of Parliament), were also used. This was done mainly through 
statutory instruments (SIs), which at the end of October amounted to more than 
282. As analysis by the Hansard Society (2020) has shown, 69 per cent of SIs used 
the ‘made negative’ procedure, which does not require parliamentary approval 
for the measure to come into force. The wide discretion given to the government 
to implement emergency measures came under greater scrutiny as the lockdown 
was eased, but, even so, further measures were introduced (e.g., the mandatory 
wearing of face masks), while the boundaries were blurred between what was 
law (and thus legally enforceable) and what was government guidance (Select 
Committee on the Constitution 2020).
With the resumption of parliamentary activities after the Easter recess on 22 
April 2020, the House of Commons held its first virtual sitting. A hybrid model 
was adopted, with a limited number of parliamentarians present in the chamber 
and the majority following debate online. The hybrid parliament, however, was 
a short-lived endeavour and, in a controversial vote on 2 June, a majority of MPs 
supported the government’s proposals to reinstate physical proceedings.
The shift to executive rule facilitated by the Coronavirus Act in effect side-
lined Parliament during the pandemic, with there being limited opportunity for 
parliamentary oversight, and debate often occurring only after restrictions came 
into force. On 30 September, the House of Commons voted to extend the pro-
visions of the Act for another six months, but the vote was preceded by uncom-
fortable accusations that in its use of emergency regulations the government 
had ridden roughshod over democratic procedures and undermined the role of 
Parliament in scrutinising legislation (HC Deb 30 September 2020).
Responding to pressure from parliamentarians to ensure Parliament would 
have a greater say in major rule changes and a vote on measures prior to imple-
mentation, the government capitulated somewhat in its position and agreed to do 
so, having secured the necessary parliamentary support for a six-month extension 
of the Act until March 2021 (HC Deb 30 September 2020).
As noted earlier, the response to the pandemic was driven not by the UK 
government but by a collective effort on the part of the UK and devolved gov-
ernments. Many of the measures implemented by the UK government applied 
to England only, albeit the double role performed by the government created 
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confusion when approaches diverged in the easing-of-lockdown phase. In the 
days after the initial lockdown in March, public approval of the government’s 
handling of the pandemic reached a high of 72 per cent but gradually crumbled 
to 32 per cent at the end of October (YouGov 2020). The delayed response, weak 
communication, rising infection and death rates, and failure of government min-
isters and advisers to abide by the rules were oft-cited as contributing factors in 
the public’s dwindling support for the government’s handling of the pandemic 
(Waterson 2020).
8.4.3 Devolved government action
Working with the UK government, the devolved governments in Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland implemented a raft of measures within their com-
petence jurisdictions. In early March, first ministers from the three adminis-
trations attended various COBRA meetings and the devolved governments 
had significant input in the creation of the four-nation Coronavirus strategy 
and Coronavirus Act. The Act conferred enhanced functions not only on UK 
government ministers but so too on ministers from the Scottish, Welsh, and 
Northern Irish governments. On 1 April 2020, the Scottish Parliament also 
passed its own legislation – the Coronavirus (Scotland) Act – to enshrine further 
provisions on various issues regarding housing provisions and evictions, judicial 
operations, and health-care regulations.
As at the national level, legislatures at the devolved level continued to oper-
ate. On 1 April, the Welsh Parliament was the first legislature to instate virtual 
proceedings, although a hybrid model was eventually rolled out. Akin to the 
House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament operated using a hybrid model of 
online and in-chamber debates and question times, while the Northern Irish 
Assembly continued to function in person, albeit with social distancing rules in 
place (Nicholson and Paun 2020).
In regard to preventative measures, the devolved governments took the lead 
in prohibiting gatherings, closing schools, and advising the use of face masks in 
public places, while the lockdown of 23 March was implemented in lockstep 
by all four governments. Despite limited financial resources, the devolved gov-
ernments created financial support schemes for businesses, including loans and 
non-domestic rates relief. As early as 14 March, the Scottish government com-
mitted to a 75 per cent rates relief for the hospitality, leisure, and retail sectors 
from 1 April, as well as a GBP 80 million fund to provide grants to small busi-
nesses (Scottish Government 2020). Similarly, the Welsh government established 
the Economic Resilience Fund allowing small businesses to apply for rates relief 
as well as access to grants.
As discussed in the next section, the devolved governments also increased 
financial support for local authorities and worked with local stakeholders to har-
ness local knowledge and innovation to curb the spread of the virus. Akin to the 
UK government, the devolved governments played a role in promoting advice 
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and guidance related to preventing the spread of the coronavirus. The first min-
isters of Scotland and Wales, for instance, participated in daily press conferences 
broadcast on TV, while the first minister and deputy first minister of Northern 
Ireland held various joint and individual conferences.
Given the devolved governments’ responsibility for health care, they were 
charged with ensuring that hospitals and health-care professionals were equipped 
with the necessary equipment. As noted, the UK government ultimately took 
the lead in securing PPE, but the devolved governments were responsible for the 
construction of field hospitals, conducting testing and tracing, and monitoring 
infection rates.
Despite the four-nation approach of March and April 2020, divergence 
appeared in May in the aftermath of the UK government’s decision to ease the 
lockdown in England. In contrast with the jointly published Coronavirus Action 
Plan, each government published its own exit strategy for easing the lockdown. 
Divergence also emerged in regard to contact tracing and the adoption of digital 
approaches to making it more efficient. Both Northern Ireland and Scotland 
launched their own contact tracing apps in August and September, respectively, 
while a joint English and Welsh app was launched on 24 September.
As the second wave of Covid-19 began to rise in September, interaction 
between the UK and devolved governments increased, albeit it fell short of the 
unprecedented collaboration witnessed in March–April. The UK government’s 
COBRA machinery was reconvened and localised restrictions followed in all 
four nations of the UK, as well as identical policies regarding the imposition on 
22 September of a 22:00 curfew in bars and restaurants.
Divergence, however, appeared here too. The Scottish government was the 
first devolved administration to prohibit households meeting indoors in late 
September, and in early October, it introduced much tighter restrictions than 
any other government in the UK, including the closure of all bars, restaurants, 
and other social establishments in the central belt region for a period of three 
weeks. On 16 October, the Northern Irish government followed suit in clos-
ing pubs and restaurants for four weeks. It prohibited households from mix-
ing, and went further by closing schools for a period of two weeks. Days later, 
on 19 October, the Welsh government announced a two-week lockdown from 
23 October, requiring the closure of leisure facilities, places of worship and non- 
essential shops. By the end of October, restrictions remained in place in all three 
devolved territories.
The decentralised response to the pandemic in the UK unequivocally raised 
the profiles of the devolved governments. Responsibility for large swathes of pub-
lic policy necessitated direct intervention by the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern 
Irish governments, each of which imposed and eased measures in their territo-
ries at their own pace. Tellingly, public perceptions of the handling of the pan-
demic saw the devolved governments repeatedly outpoll the UK government, 
including among inhabitants of England. In Scotland, despite the constitutional 
divide between pro- and anti-independence supporters, First Minister Nicola 
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Sturgeon’s handling of the pandemic was repeatedly rated higher than Prime 
Minister Boris Johnson’s among both pro-independence and pro-union support-
ers (Panelbase 2020).
The devolved governments presided over similar problems as the UK gov-
ernment, including PPE shortages, low testing capacity, and a large number of 
deaths in both hospitals and care homes, but perceptions of how the governments 
managed the pandemic were dramatically different, with the devolved govern-
ments consistently polling higher than the UK government (Ipsos Mori 2020).
8.4.4 Local government action
In the UK, local government is a devolved matter and the organisation of local 
government and relations between local authorities and the devolved govern-
ments vary in all four nations ( Jeffery 2006). In England, Scotland, and Wales, 
local councils are responsible for several jurisdictions severely affected by the 
coronavirus, including education, housing, and social care.3 Working and liais-
ing with local authorities is thus the responsibility of each devolved government, 
and in the case of England, the UK government.
In all parts of the UK, governments issued guidance to local authorities and 
as such local government played an essential role in delivering and implement-
ing measures endorsed by the respective governments. The essential role local 
government played in dealing with the impact of Covid-19 on education, social 
care, and protection for vulnerable people (such as the shielding initiative and 
food provision) necessitated significant increases in local government funding 
across all areas of the UK. Throughout the pandemic, governments in all four 
nations sought to address local government shortfalls and relieve financial pres-
sures through multi-million-pound support packages for local authorities. By 
mid-August, the Welsh government had increased funding to local authorities 
to around GBP 500 million, while local authorities in Scotland benefited from 
additional spending powers and extra funding up to GBP 750 million. Likewise, 
the UK government increased local authority payments in England, but while 
financial packages of billions were rolled out to address local authority spend-
ing pressures, financial support for authorities in local lockdowns courted much 
controversy.
Introduced under Labour in 2009, but accelerated under the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government (2010–2015), eight mayoral combined 
authorities exist in England, with responsibilities and powers over housing, social 
care, and transport. Recent research argues that the public profiles of directly 
elected mayors remain rather limited (Fenwick and Johnston 2020: 18), but the 
coronavirus pandemic undoubtedly raised the profile of some of these mayors. 
The relationship between these metro mayors and the central government, how-
ever, was fraught with difficulties, resulting in vehement opposition to aspects 
of the UK government’s hyper-centralist approach in handling local outbreaks 
of the virus.
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In early October, for instance, in a letter to the Health Secretary, council 
leaders from Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, and Newcastle criticised the UK 
government’s side-lining of local government input and described the ensuing 
measures as ‘confusing’ and ‘counter-productive’ (BBC News 2020). For sev-
eral days in October, media headlines were dominated by a clash between the 
Mayor of Greater Manchester Andy Burnham and the government and a threat 
of legal action by the former over the imposition of further restrictions in the area 
without local authority agreement. While some government ministers dismissed 
the row as party political (Burnham is a Labour politician), some Conservative 
MPs were vociferous in their support for the demands of mayors and council 
leaders (Kenny and Kelsey 2020). Despite government rhetoric that alluded to 
a collaborative working relationship with local government (HC Deb 28 April 
2020), actions rarely matched the rhetoric. Centre-local relations were marked 
by imposition, not coordination.
8.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
There are various processes and structures for IGR in the UK, but the UK’s 
experience with intergovernmental interaction since devolution has been ‘largely 
bilateral, vertical and informal’ (McEwen et al. 2012: 189). Various forums 
have been developed at both a multilateral and bilateral level, such as the Joint 
Ministerial Committee ( JMC) which brings together all four governments. The 
JMC is the main body for IGR between the UK and devolved governments, but 
its functions are limited largely to knowledge-sharing and maintaining com-
munication between the different governments rather than co-decision-making 
(Anderson 2021a).
In recent years, intergovernmental interaction in response to the UK’s with-
drawal from the European Union (EU) has increased, including the establish-
ment of a new JMC (European Negotiations) to secure a pan-UK approach to 
EU withdrawal. In lieu of managing communal tensions on Brexit, however, the 
prevalence of governmental incongruence and competing constitutional visions 
have rendered IGR a source of tension (McEwen 2017): no pan-UK approach 
was secured prior to triggering the withdrawal process in March 2017, nor by the 
official withdrawal in January 2020.
In contrast to the strained relations that characterised IGR in the UK since 
the vote to leave the EU in 2016, the phase of initial response to the pandemic 
was marked by unprecedented levels of intergovernmental interaction. This cul-
minated in a coordinated approach to lockdown in late March, preceded by the 
Coronavirus Action Plan which had all the hallmarks of an intergovernmental 
report. Coordination and collaboration between the different governments was 
short-lived, though, and appeared to come to an end in the easing-of-lockdown 
phase. As the uniform approach dissipated, so did intergovernmental interaction.
Despite the JMC’s location at the apex of IGR structures, it was side-lined 
during the pandemic in favour of COBRA and newly created Ministerial 
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Implementation Groups (MIGs). The first ministers of all three devolved nations 
participated in COBRA meetings, while MIGs, typically convened daily, 
brought together ministers and officials from all governments to respond to 
particular policy areas (health, public sector preparedness, economy, and inter-
national response) and serve as vehicles to facilitate communication and coop-
eration between the governments. This was also achieved through frequent 
meetings between officials from the various administrations and the chief med-
ical officers and chief scientific advisers from different government departments 
and administrations.
The use of COBRA in lieu of formal IGR structures was easily justified given 
the emergency of the pandemic and the urgency of coordinating a response 
across the four parts of the UK. Tellingly, however, as the pandemic evolved and 
divergence in approach became apparent, COBRA was not convened, provok-
ing criticism from the devolved governments that the UK government was seek-
ing to ‘sidestep difficult conversations’ on diverging approaches (Savage 2020). 
In June 2020, the MIGs were disbanded and two new cabinet committees cre-
ated: Covid-19 Strategy and Covid-19 Operations. Unlike MIGs, membership 
of the cabinet committees was not formally extended to the devolved govern-
ments, lending credence to the perception that intergovernmental interaction 
had returned to the strained relations of the pre-pandemic era.
Besides vertical interaction between the UK government and the devolved 
administrations, there was also evidence of horizontal relations between the 
three devolved administrations. This tended to focus on policy-specific issues, 
such as collaboration between the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish finance 
ministers.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, even prior to the pandemic, IGR struc-
tures were in urgent need of ‘a radical overhaul’ (McEwen et al. 2020). Covid-19 
nonetheless underlined the need for serious reflection at all levels of government 
on the importance of constructive relations and the efficacy of the UK’s current 
institutional arrangements in facilitating them.
8.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
The UK economy was among some of the hardest hit of the world’s devel-
oped countries as a result of the pandemic. In the period from April to June 
2020, GDP contracted by 19.8 per cent and the UK economy fell by 21.5 per 
cent compared to 2019 (ONS 2020b). Since the easing of the lockdown in May, 
both GDP and the services, manufacturing and construction sectors saw sig-
nificant improvement, even though the economy faces a long road to recovery, 
with unemployment levels forecast to increase with the cessation of the UK and 
devolved governments’ economic intervention schemes and the prospect of con-
tinued disruption as a result of further lockdowns.
In a similar vein to the UK as a whole, the economic outlook for the devolved 
nations is also gloomy. A combination of limited economic activity and 
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significantly increased public spending saw projections of a deficit in Scotland of 
25–28 per cent of GDP, with potentially higher deficits in Northern Ireland and 
Wales due to their lower tax revenues and weaker economies (Phillips 2020). To 
ameliorate the economic impact of Covid, the UK Treasury increased funding 
via the Barnett formula (the block grant used to allocate funding to Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland) to all devolved governments. In March 2020, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced a package of GBP 1.5 million of extra 
funding for the devolved administrations. As well as receiving increased Barnett 
funding, the devolved nations also benefited from increased funding under 
Barnett consequentials.4 Increases in health-care spending and other policy 
ambits due to the pandemic therefore resulted in billions of pounds in increased 
funds for the devolved administrations.
Notwithstanding increased levels of funding to the devolved governments, 
the pandemic spotlighted the limited fiscal capacity of the devolved govern-
ments, particularly in terms of borrowing. Ministers in all three devolved gov-
ernments subsequently called for the further devolution of more fiscal levers, yet 
calls for additional powers went unheeded (Bol 2020). In line with the decentral-
ised approach to managing the pandemic, economic support on the part of the 
UK government was not given with strings attached: the devolved governments 
were able to prioritise the funding as they saw fit.
8.5 Findings and policy implications
Covid-19 proved not only to be a major health crisis across the globe, but also 
the greatest social, economic, and political challenge the UK has weathered in 
the two decades since the establishment of devolved institutions in Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. The implications of the decisions made to curb the 
spread of the deadly coronavirus are thus likely to reverberate down the years and 
decades to come. In particular, the evolution of the UK’s pandemic response – from 
coordinated strategy executed in lockstep to free-form, sometimes fractious, 
divergence of approach – focused attention among politicians and the public 
alike on the system of UK territorial governance, something which doubtless 
will shape future debates, not least on the constitutional future of the UK.
In analysing the UK’s management of the pandemic, it is clear to see that 
the actions of the various governments underlined the decentralised nature of 
the system. The clear division of competences between the UK and devolved 
governments eschewed controversy vis-à-vis competence jurisdictions and thus 
avoided any (further) unnecessary delays in reacting to the crisis. The collabora-
tive approach seen at the beginning of the pandemic illustrated, on the one hand, 
the respect that exists for the division of responsibilities between different tiers of 
government, and, on the other, the presence of shared recognition of the impor-
tance of working together when faced with a momentous cross-border crisis.
Nevertheless, despite rhetoric on the part of the UK government and 
Whitehall machinery around supporting the autonomy of the devolved 
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governments to make their own decisions within their competence briefs, the 
easing of the lockdown revealed frustration and a lack of understanding amongst 
some Westminster parliamentarians about the permissibility of the devolved 
governments to diverge from UK government policy.
At a wider level, this hints at the precarious nature of the federal spirit in 
the UK and how this precariousness has served to sustain – notwithstanding the 
federal logic of devolution that has taken root over the last two decades – the 
unitary mindset and majoritarian thinking that often characterises UK govern-
ment decision- making processes (Anderson 2021b). This is compounded by the 
absence of an English executive and thus the UK government’s double role as both 
a UK-wide and English-only government. During the crisis, the Prime Minister 
himself at times rejected the notion that his authority extends only to England 
(HC deb 11 May 2020), a stance reinforcing the notion that while devolution has 
entailed much change in the devolved nations, very little has changed at the centre.
A second intriguing finding, linked with the above, concerns the importance 
of local government in England in the absence of a separate English executive 
and legislature. Across the world, governments at all levels have had to respond 
to the pandemic, but it is local governments that have played an essential role in 
taking initiatives both within and outside the scope of their responsibilities to 
curtail and manage the spread of the virus.
In the UK, local governments unequivocally played a leading role in respond-
ing to the pandemic, but this was overshadowed and marginalised in England 
by the over-centralised approach of the UK government in its engagement with 
local authorities. Elected mayors in England made significant interventions in 
the debate on responding to the pandemic, though these often focused on cri-
tique of the government and calls for a more constructive approach on the part 
of the UK government in its interaction with local authorities. There are clear 
lessons to be learnt about taking a more proactive approach to local government 
engagement, specifically in harnessing local knowledge and using this to advan-
tage in times of emergency and crisis. Rescheduled elections for most of the local 
mayoralties will take place in 2021; it may well be that the pandemic is a catalyst 
to further the debate on the devolution and strengthening of more powers for 
England’s metro-mayors.
The experience of IGR during the pandemic reveals the urgency of reform-
ing extant machinery to enhance communication and collaboration between the 
different governments. Amidst crisis, all four governments in the UK showed 
maturity in responding collaboratively to the pandemic, putting aside partisan-
ship and political issues to focus on the good of the country. This, as the evidence 
in this chapter attests, swiftly unravelled as the devolved governments diverged 
from the UK government approach and offers telling proof of the need to over-
haul the Westminster-centric model of IGR.
The history of devolution has been marked by willingness in Westminster 
to cede responsibilities to the devolved legislatures but hesitance to share power 
and thus work together. As much in normal times as in times of emergency, 
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a genuine commitment to work collaboratively, underpinned by mutual trust, 
recognition, and respect, is important, not least in a plurinational democratic 
state. The response to the pandemic in the UK has demonstrated not just that 
a cooperative approach to IGR is possible, but that working together need not 
compromise the decentralised structures and dynamics of the territorial system.
There is no doubt that the coronavirus pandemic itself as well as the way 
it has been managed by the different tiers of government in the UK will have 
short- and long-term implications for contemporary British politics. Opinion 
polls throughout the crisis repeatedly recorded higher support for the devolved 
governments’ handling of the pandemic than the UK government’s, with levels 
of trust in the latter depleted as the pandemic evolved (Ipsos Mori 2020).
In January 2020, the UK left the EU after almost four years of political wran-
gling in both the UK and Brussels, but the constitutional impact of withdrawal 
remains in the balance and is compounded by the pandemic. The passage of the 
UK government’s Internal Market Bill – designed to ensure harmonisation in 
trading rules and regulations across the UK – between September and December 
2020 triggered significant controversy and was interpreted by the devolved gov-
ernments as an assault on devolution. In contrast with the Coronavirus Act, 
which was passed with the consent of all three devolved legislatures, legislative 
consent for the Internal Market Bill was refused by all three devolved legisla-
tures. At the same time, polling on Scottish independence has begun to suggest 
that there may be a sustained majority in favour of independence, with evidence 
pointing to the Scottish government’s handling of the pandemic as a key catalyst 
for growing support.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, there is evidence that nationalist forces 
around the globe have sought to ‘weaponise’ the coronavirus pandemic to fur-
ther their aims (Woods et al. 2020). The UK is no exception. However, while 
there is no doubt that pro-independence supporters in Scotland are likely to point 
to the Scottish government’s handling of the pandemic as proof of Scotland’s 
ability to be an independent country (notwithstanding some complaints about 
its government’s handling of the crisis), unionists have been equally proactive in 
underlining the might of the Union in responding to the pandemic. Covid-19 
has not merely introduced new dynamics in contemporary British politics but 
has already begun to redefine well-entrenched territorial debates.
Notes
 1 Figures on the overall death toll from Covid-19 vary and are counted in three different 
ways: deaths within 28 days of a positive result (this is used for government figures), 
death certificate mentions of Covid-19, and deaths over and above the usual number at 
a particular time of year. As of 31 October 2020, 46,555 deaths occurred within 28 days 
of a positive result, almost 59,000 death certificates stated Covid-19 as the cause of death, 
and more than 67,000 excess deaths had occurred over and above the yearly average.
 2 The Sewel Convention states that the UK Parliament ‘will not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters without the consent’ of the devolved institutions.
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 3 Local governments in Northern Ireland have fewer responsibilities than elsewhere in the 
UK, with no policy responsibility for education or social care.
 4 Barnett consequentials refer to the mechanism whereby any increase in public expend-
iture in England generates increased funding for the devolved administrations.
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RUSSIA’S FIGHT AGAINST 
COVID-19
Dealing with a global threat 
under crisis and stagnation
Viacheslav Seliverstov, Ivan Leksin,  
Nataliya Kravchenko, Vladimir Klistorin  
and Almira Yusupova
9.1 Introduction
The Russian Federation, covering 17.1 million km2, is geographically the largest 
country in the world and, with its 146.7 million inhabitants, the ninth largest in 
population. It is a state with medium levels of urbanisation – in terms of urban 
population (74.4 per cent), it ranks 77th out of 218 countries – and it is sixth 
in a list of states by gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing- power 
parity.
Under the Constitution, the Russian Federation is a federal state made up of 
a complex system of 85 constituent units: republics, krais, oblasts, cities of federal 
significance, autonomous okrugs, and an autonomous oblast. Three federal cities – 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Sevastopol – have the status of a constituent unit, with 
their management systems and budgets consequently independent of the region 
where they are located; for example, the city of Moscow is in Moscow Oblast.
Since Russia’s territory is so vast, it is divided into eight federal districts, each 
combining constituent units in a macro-region, namely the Central, North-
western, Southern, North Caucasian, Volga, Urals, Siberian, and Far Eastern dis-
tricts. They are not official administrative or territorial units but have authorised 
envoys who pursue the President’s policies within the boundaries of their federal 
districts, as well as control and coordinate the work of the existing local bodies 
of federal executive power at the district level.
When Russia’s first Covid-19 cases were reported on 31 January 2020, a num-
ber of economic, political, and social factors combined with one another to create 
a highly adverse background for efforts to combat the pandemic. First, the econ-
omy was in crisis: in the preceding seven years (2013–2019), economic stagna-
tion had set in, with GDP per capita increasing by only 3 per cent (Aganbegyan 
2020). Western sanctions, imposed on Russia in 2014 after the Crimea became 
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part of it, affected a few large Russian companies, among others, as well as the 
economy as a whole. Moreover, world oil prices dropped by half.
Secondly, the poor quality of public administration at the national and 
sub-federal level is compounded by a fairly high prevalence of corruption; within 
this context, constituent entities have been burdened heavily by social and 
economic inequalities (including in regard to their medical services). Thirdly, 
Russia has one of the longest land borders with China, the country where the 
virus originated.
Some favourable factors and conditions were nevertheless present. First, 
Russia has large gold and forex reserves that were accumulated in the past, in 
addition to a massive sovereign wealth fund (called the National Wealth Fund). 
Secondly, its enormous territory, combined with low population mobility, cre-
ated natural barriers to the spread of the coronavirus. Thirdly, though much of it 
has been laid to waste, the system of public health care inherited from the Soviet 
era remains adequately functional.
The situation was further complicated by the political characteristics of con-
temporary Russia. Most notably, the state administration system is overcentral-
ised, with the presidency playing a dominant role in it. The top-down command 
structure (consisting in what is known as ‘the President’s vertical power’) was 
backed by presidential plenipotentiaries and their staff in eight federal districts 
established in 2002.
Furthermore, there is weak political competition. The ruling party, United 
Russia, dominates legislative and executive bodies at the federal and sub-federal 
levels: only 7 out of 85 governors represent opposition parties; two governors 
were elected as independent candidates; and another 20 were formally non- 
partisan but in actuality nominated or supported by the ruling party. Overall, 
United Russia wields power over 90 per cent of Russian governors.
To these considerations, one may add that, viewed geopolitically from the 
perspective of identifying sources of global-threat proliferation, Russia is an 
asymmetric federation with an excessively centralised and low-quality state 
administration system. Such conditions led to apprehensions that the Covid-19 
pandemic would spread rapidly and uncontrollably in Russia, but, fortunately, 
these fears proved unjustified.
The country’s first two Covid-19 cases, involving Chinese citizens visiting 
Russia, were recorded in Siberia on 31 January 2020. The first case in Moscow 
was identified on 2 March, which was a month later than happened in most coun-
tries in Europe and attributable to the quick closure of the border with China (on 
31 January 2020) and then those with other countries. This bought some time in 
which to put in place the minimum necessary conditions for receiving patients 
in Moscow and the regions.
In the first wave of the pandemic, infections peaked on 11 May (11,600 people 
per day), and fatalities on 29 May 2020 (213 people per day). Over the summer 
(until the end of August), the infection rate decreased, then started to grow 
slowly. The second wave emerged in early October, with peak daily infection 
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and mortality rates exceeding those of May. By 31 October, Russia was seeing 
18,140 new cases per day; it had also recorded a total of 1.618 million cases, 
1.215 million recoveries (i.e., 75 per cent of all cases), and 27,990 deaths.
Russia’s constituent entities varied significantly in infection rates. The areas 
most affected by Covid-19 were those with high population density and mobil-
ity, namely the largest cities, North Caucasus, and regions in the north where 
people work primarily on a rotational basis.
This section has outlined some of Russia’s distinctive features as a pandemic 
site and provided an overview of how Covid-19 spread through its territory in 
the course of 2020. The sections that follow examine how it responded to the 
crisis as a federation and what key actions it took in terms of its constitutional and 
legislative framework and within the context of its intergovernmental relations 
(IGR) between the centre and the regions.
9.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
The Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993, as amended in 2020 (RF 
Constitution), contains general provisions that are applicable to a wide vari-
ety of disaster situations. These provisions include ones that set out the federal 
structure, declare the autonomy of local governments, specify the jurisdictions 
of government orders, and define the powers of the federal president and federal 
government.
In terms of articles 71 and 72 of the RF Constitution, governmental powers 
are divided into two categories: those under federal jurisdiction and those under 
the ‘ joint jurisdiction’ of the federal and 85 regional governments. Many of the 
constitutional formulas in the respective lists are equivocal and thus open to var-
ying interpretations, making the distribution of powers quite flexible and leaving 
a small degree of latitude for exclusive regional legislation. As far as pandemics 
are concerned, two jurisdictional areas are relevant, disaster management and 
health care, both of which used to be regarded as matters of ‘ joint jurisdiction’.
The joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its constituent units is 
not ‘ joint’ in the proper sense. Some intergovernmental coordination is provided 
for when it comes to implementing federal statutes on matters within joint juris-
diction, but the RF Constitution does not put federal and regional law-making 
at a par with each other or set any limits on federal law-making within the area 
of joint jurisdiction. In fact, this area is concurrent, with the federal legislator 
enjoying overwhelming predominance (Leksin and Seliverstov 2017). It was by 
means of federal statutes that, within less than two decades after the adoption of 
the 1993 Constitution, Russia evolved from a loose, semi-confederate arrange-
ment into a highly centralised federal state (Leksin 2016).
With regard to local government, article 12 of the RF Constitution asserts 
that local self-government constitutes a separate form of governance; however, 
local governments’ powers do not cover an exclusive sphere of jurisdiction that 
could be separated from the powers mentioned in articles 71, 72, and 73 of the 
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RF Constitution. The constitutional assertion that municipalities enjoy self-gov-
ernment means no more than that they execute federal and regional laws.
Detailed statutory provisions dealing with the allocation of powers are found 
in several federal statutes. According to the statutes regarding a pandemic, the 
federal and regional governments are both responsible for issues that include 
protecting human rights in health care, organising medical care and licensing 
certain types of activities in health care, and facilitating medical treatment by 
medical institutions. The federal government deals mostly with policy-making, 
law-making, administrative regulation, and supervision, while the regional gov-
ernments deal mostly with the practical issues of health protection; local gov-
ernments fulfil auxiliary functions. The single-tier and upper-tier municipalities 
participate in health protection activities in several ways: they are responsible 
for, among other things, creating the conditions for providing medical care 
to the population, preventing diseases, ensuring the provision of medical care 
in municipal health-care institutions, warning the population about epidemic 
threats, raising awareness about healthy lifestyles, and promoting blood donation.
The jurisdiction over disaster management is more decentralised. Every level 
of government is responsible for dealing with emergencies, depending on the 
scale of the latter. As such, federal, regional, and local governments are entitled 
to declare a ‘regime of emergency situation’ or a ‘state of heightened prepared-
ness’ in order to mobilise the necessities for (1) protecting the population; (2) 
evacuations and emergency rescues; (3) keeping stocks of material, including 
food and medical supplies, for purposes of civil defence; and (4) informing the 
population in the emergency zone about the status of the situation and the meas-
ures taken in response to it. However, only federal and regional governments are 
entitled to make laws on population-protection measures and to maintain public 
order during emergencies.
Because disaster management falls within ‘ joint jurisdiction’, federal stat-
utes play the leading role. Federal legislation since the 1990s used to distin-
guish between three legal regimes related to emergencies. The first was called 
the ‘regime of emergency state’. According to the 1993 RF Constitution, the 
President can introduce this regime in the entirety of the Russian Federation or 
in certain parts only. Having introduced it, he immediately has to inform the 
chambers of the Federal Assembly (the State Duma and the Federation Council). 
The Federation Council is entitled to confirm the presidential decree. The RF 
Constitution does not go into detail about the nature of this regime but refers 
instead to a special statute (a federal constitutional law) that should establish the 
rules for it. This special statute was enacted finally in 2001 but has never been 
used. States of emergency were declared several times between 1992 and 1995, 
though not on epidemiological grounds.
Along with the ‘regime of emergency state’, two other legal regimes appli-
cable in the case of a national disaster are provided for in the federal law, On 
the Protection of Population and Territory against Natural and Technogenic 
Emergency Situations (1994). These are the ‘regime of emergency situation’ and 
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a ‘state of heightened preparedness’. While they are little different in content, the 
first refers to the period after the emergency has occurred, whereas the second 
can be introduced when there is the threat of an emergency.
All three regimes can be introduced to address natural or man-made emer-
gencies, including epidemics. However, the primary objectives of the ‘regime of 
emergency state’ are restoring law and order and ensuring safety during armed 
rebellion; attempts of violent overthrow of the regime; terrorist attacks; and 
national, confessional, and regional armed conflicts; the two other regimes are 
focused on disaster management.
9.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
The Russian Federation has a huge network of institutions dealing with disaster 
management. The most relevant of them are as follows:
• The Federation Ministry of Health Care, and, under it, the Federal Health 
Care Surveillance Service with its regional departments.
• The Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and 
Human Wellbeing and its regional subdivisions. This institution played a 
leading role in administering the ‘state of heightened preparedness’ during 
the pandemic in 2020, even though it had been regarded previously as of 
minor importance.
• The Federation Ministry of Emergency Situations and its regional depart-
ments. These used to be the leading problem-solvers during natural and made-
made disasters but played only a supporting role in the response to Covid-19.
• Regional ministries and agencies performing administrative and supervi-
sory functions in the areas of health care and disaster management.
In the past decades, Russia’s system for managing disasters has undergone 
changes in regard to the executive branch. With natural disasters having become 
more common due to climate change, the Federal Ministry of Emergency 
Situations, along with similar departments of the regional governments and local 
administrations, had to be enhanced significantly. The federal executive bodies 
governing health-care issues (and similar departments of the regional govern-
ments), as well the ones tasked with supervision of hospitals and other medical 
institutions, evolved mainly in terms of their functions, which were altered in 
the course of updates to legislation and health-care standards.
Subordination between the federal and regional ministries, agencies, and the 
like does not exist in a formal sense. However, federal ministries issue standards 
and other regulations that are to be followed by regional hospitals and organisa-
tions for which regional governments are responsible. Thus, indirectly, regional 
executives are influenced significantly by the Federal Ministry of Health Care 
and similar bodies when it comes to preparedness for disasters.
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9.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
The unprecedented crisis caused by the pandemic changed the way in which 
state power and governance in Russia are organised, primarily by affecting rela-
tionships and functions among the central, regional, and local levels of the federal 
structure. Three stages may be identified.
In the first ( January to February 2020), federal authorities took preventa-
tive measures to contain outbreaks (for instance, closure of borders) and make 
medical preparations. In the second stage (March to early April 2020), they con-
tinued combating the pandemic, but one region exercised its own judgment, 
Moscow (as Moscow metropolis is a separate constituent unit in the federation). 
In the third (from April 2020 onwards), the foci of decision-making moved 
to the regions. Simultaneously, federal agencies carried out large-scale hospital 
construction and, among other things, secured equipment and specialist supplies.
Notably, from the outset, Russia’s efforts to combat the pandemic did not 
involve interparty conflict. The entire parliamentary opposition – that is, the 
three parties called the ‘systemic opposition’ – supported the President and the 
government in the measures they took. The non-systemic opposition – in other 
words, the parties which are excluded from the political system and absent in 
state government agencies and which are strongly opposed to the ruling party 
and status quo – did not consider it appropriate either to capitalise on the hard-
ship the pandemic brought to the country. As mentioned, the ruling party’s rigid 
discipline, adhered to by most of the governors, reinforced its dominance.
9.4.1 Taking the initiative
Before the first cases of Covid-19 were recorded on 31 January 2020, the federal 
government, in response to events in China, moved into action. On 27 January 
an operational headquarter (‘task force’) was established for the prevention of 
Covid-19, with Deputy Prime Minister Tatiana Golikova appointed as its chief. 
Later, similar ‘task forces’ appeared under the governments in all Russian regions 
and large cities. As measures to prevent the coronavirus from entering Russia, 
borders with China were closed on 31 January and later with other countries, 
while rail traffic was suspended and most flights cancelled.
After Moscow reported its first case of infection on 2 March 2020, the city gov-
ernment imposed lockdown measures on 5 March. In a national televised address 
on the same day, President Vladimir Putin announced a stay-at-home period (called 
‘non-working days’ in Russia) from 30 March to 3 April 2020. Then, in a national 
address on 2 April, the President extended this until 30 April. On 30 March, Prime 
Minister Mikhail Mishustin asked regional authorities to consider the measures 
taken in Moscow and explore whether they could follow the capital’s example. 
As a result, 26 regions had declared a lockdown (the ‘self-isolation regime’) by 31 
March. On 8 April, President Putin instructed regional leaders to take measures 
independently from Moscow in line with the epidemiological situation.
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Although federalism in Russia has tended towards centralisation since the early 
2000s (Leksin 2008; Seliverstov 2015), the pandemic managed to shake the divi-
sion of powers between the centre and the regions to a certain extent. From April 
2020, restrictions and other measures aimed at fighting the pandemic, ensuring 
the health of the population, and supporting local economies were entrusted 
fully and personally to the governors of the regions (Presidential Decree No. 
239 of 2 April 2020). At the same time, President Putin maintained strict control 
over the regional authorities and what they did; presidential plenipotentiary rep-
resentatives in eight federal districts served this purpose. The federal government 
also retained management over the powers transferred to constituent units by, 
for example, issuing standard guidelines for regional governments and setting 
criteria for lifting restrictions and switching to softer measures.
The role and importance of several federal structures changed with the roll-out 
of pandemic response measures. For instance, the Federal Service for Surveillance 
on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor) and its 
regional departments came to the fore. From March 2020, this authority col-
lected and processed all operational information on the spread of the virus, as 
well as drafted decisions and recommendations for other federal executive bodies.
In the complex system of measures to manage the pandemic nationwide 
and locally, we should note the President’s role. Putin was well aware that the 
pre-existing crisis in Russia’s economy would be compounded by negative pub-
lic reaction to the pandemic’s consequences and affect his popularity. Therefore, 
especially in the first stages, he took the initiative, showed himself demon-
strably in control of the situation, and interacted continually with federal and 
regional authorities. As part of this, he delivered numerous televised addresses, 
and between April and May 2020, held almost weekly live-broadcast videocon-
ferences with governors. Clearly, the President’s actions were taken with an eye 
to the anticipated summer constitutional amendment referendum, a matter that 
received his special attention.1
9.4.2 Federal action
The actions taken by federal authorities fall into three main categories: situa-
tional monitoring and raising public awareness, coordinating devolved powers, 
and undertaking planning and economic support.
9.4.2.1 Monitoring and raising public awareness
In the face of extreme uncertainty, a panic epidemic can be as harmful as a 
viral epidemic: a rising flow of spontaneous information about the spread of 
disease increases societal tension and frustration. Accordingly, the State Centre 
for Information of Citizens about the Coronavirus, established in mid-March 
2020, created an official public website covering these issues to advance public 
education.
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9.4.2.2 Coordination and devolving powers
Between 2 April and 30 May 2020, President Putin issued three decrees granting 
extended powers to the top officials in the constituent units. These legal instru-
ments enabled them to take a range of response measures to Covid-19 depending 
on the particular circumstances within their jurisdictions.
The Amendment Law No. 1-FKZ of 14 March 2020 introduced an additional 
matter under exclusive federal jurisdiction, namely, ‘setting the common legal 
basis for the healthcare system’. At the same time, the matter of joint jurisdiction, 
referred to in article 72 of the RF Constitution as ‘coordination of the health-
care issues’, was supplemented by provisions, inter alia, for widely available and 
high-quality medical care and the promotion of healthy living.
Several structures were established at the federal level for developing and 
implementing measures to combat Covid-19 and support the economy: oper-
ational headquarters for cooperation between the relevant executive authori-
ties (which included the heads of federal ministries); a government commission 
(comprising heads of federal ministries and two heads of constituent units) to 
ensure sustainable economic development; a government coordination coun-
cil (comprising heads of federal ministries and two heads of constituent units) 
to control the incidence of coronavirus infection; and a state council working 
group (consisting of federal and regional heads) to counter the spread of the virus.
There was also coordination of procedures for lifting Russia’s nationwide 
restrictions after a first wave of coronavirus infections abated. The date 11 May 
2020 marked the end of the ‘non-working days’ that had been in effect since 28 
March. The federal government announced a three-stage plan for easing restric-
tions, one in which governors were given the right to decide when and how to 
lift them, albeit subject to the mandatory requirement that they comply with fed-
eral health regulations. Phase 1 allowed walks and open-air exercise, and small 
shops and service providers were permitted to reopen. Phase 2 permitted the 
opening of schools, large shops, and service companies, while Phase 3 extended 
this to parks, hotels, restaurants, and all shops. The criteria for easing restrictions 
in certain regions included infection rates, the availability of hospital beds, and 
testing for Covid-19.
9.4.2.3 Planning and economic support
The most important outcomes of the governmental commissions and coordi-
nating bodies mentioned above were the Plan of Priority Measures (Actions), 
approved by the federal government on 17 March 2020, for ensuring sustainable 
economic development in the face of a worsening situation due to the spread of 
infections, followed by a plan, approved on 20 April, to address the pandemic’s 
economic consequences. Within a few weeks in April and May, the government 
announced three packages to combat the pandemic and support the economy 
and population.
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An important task for the federal authorities during the first months was to 
rectify shortages of personal protective gear, medicine, and equipment. Between 
March and April 2020, the number of tests for the virus increased ninefold; by 
mid-October, 200 test systems were being used to diagnose for Covid-19, of 
which more than 80 were of domestic origin. This fact places Russia among the 
world leaders in coronavirus test coverage (as of 31 October 2020, 60.4 million 
tests had been performed). In addition, by that date the number of hospital beds 
available for infected patients had quadrupled to 200,000.
In this regard, the Ministry of Defence made a significant contribution. 
Within a short period, it built 20 inpatient hospitals (on average, two months 
per hospital) in various regions of the country. Field hospitals were also set up in 
particularly disadvantaged constituent units, such as the Republic of Dagestan 
and the Transbaikal Region, while military personnel provided health treatment 
in some of the most affected areas.
The first package of federal economic support included credit holidays for small- 
and medium-sized businesses and certain categories of citizens, financial support for 
affected industries, and a preferential loan programme for paying wages. The most 
significant measure was a reduction – from 30 per cent to 15 per cent – in social 
insurance payment rates for small and medium-sized businesses. The second pack-
age, to the value of about 1 per cent of GDP, sought to assist strategically important 
companies, support regional budgets, and provide increased pay for health workers.
Both of the packages were criticised for being insufficient, focused on busi-
nesses rather than citizens, and lacking in cash transfers to beneficiaries. The third 
package, however, was larger, amounting to about RUB 800–900 billion, and 
provided for direct payments for families with children, for those recently unem-
ployed due to business interruption, and for other socially vulnerable groups. 
Nevertheless, experts (Aganbegyan 2020) deemed these measures as inadequate, 
maintaining that the country’s gold and forex reserves, along with the Russian 
National Wealth Fund, made it possible to (at least) double support for people and 
businesses affected by the pandemic.
On 23 September 2020, the federal government approved the National Action 
Plan to ensure the recovery of employment and income, economic growth, and 
long-term structural reform to the economy. Although morbidity had increased 
notably by then, the document did not mention this second wave of infection but 
spoke rather of restoring employment, supporting entrepreneurship, launching 
a new investment cycle, and improving the business climate. Other topics dealt 
with accelerating technological development, boosting exports, and encouraging 
import substitution.
9.4.3 Regional action
The decentralisation of decision-making during the pandemic highlighted how 
vastly different Russian regions are in terms of socio-economic development 
and the availability of tangible and intangible resources. Experts emphasise that 
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this often happens when, in the face of unmanageable crises like Covid-19, the 
federal centre seeks to shift responsibility for tough or unpopular measures to 
regional authorities (Smyth et al. 2020); as a result, the task, say, of making 
trade-offs between the need to preserve citizens’ health, on the one hand, and 
to sustain economic activity, on the other, is ultimately transferred to regional 
governments. Thus, it was that in the Russian Federation, it was the governors, 
not the President, who closed down business operations and imposed restrictions 
on people’s movement.
During the pandemic, the jurisdiction of the federation’s constituent units was 
increased. In terms of Federal Law No. 98-FZ (1 April 2020), the regional gov-
ernments received one – though highly significant – power, namely, the power 
to determine the rules of conduct during the ‘regime of emergency situation’ 
and the ‘state of heightened preparedness’, rules that were binding on citizens 
and organisations. Regional legislatures and executives made avid use of this 
innovation, imposing limitations on rights that hitherto had been possible only 
under either martial law or a federal state of emergency.
9.4.3.1 Pandemic control measures
The regions actively engaged in the fight against the pandemic. In March 2020 alone, 
the heads of regions issued more than a thousand regulations that imposed restric-
tions of varying degrees of severity. These were based on Federal Law No. 68-FZ 
(21 December 1994) On Protection of Civilians and Territories from Emergencies 
Caused by Natural and Man-made Disasters, on Federal Law No. 52-FZ (30 March 
1999) On Sanitary and Epidemiological Well-being of the Population, and on 
regional laws for protecting civilians and territory during emergencies.
The speed with which regions managed to respond to the coronavirus 
depended more on central government directives than on the epidemiological 
situation in any given region. The Russian Federation itself did not declare a 
national state of emergency. Instead, some of the first restrictions were intro-
duced by the Moscow government on 5 March 2020. While the Republic of 
Buryatia was the only constituent unit to declare a state of emergency – which 
it did on 18 March, a point when no cases of Covid-19 had been recorded there 
yet – the majority of the regions (a total of 45 constituent units) imposed a 
‘state of heightened preparedness’, with the rest operating under variants of the 
‘restriction state’, which is less than ‘a state of heightened preparedness’ to enable 
them to respond promptly to outbreaks (Garant 2020).
Research by the St. Petersburg Policy Foundation divided the constituent units 
into three groups according to the severity of their restrictions (the so-called viral 
sovereignty index) (St. Petersburg Policy Foundation 2020). The toughest ones 
were adopted in 14 regions; 33 units were classified as average; and another 36 
introduced relatively soft restrictions. Kalabikhina and Panin (2020) also identi-
fied three levels of lockdown measures (strict, medium, and low). The tighter the 
restrictions, the greater the possible economic losses and social tensions.
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Moscow adopted the strictest measures, among which was QR (quick 
response) code contact tracing to control citizens’ mobility. Some constituent 
units also introduced so-called digital passes but later abandoned this practice. A 
few regions kept a tight hold on visitors from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other 
major cities. Many tried to introduce strict traffic control (Nizhny Novgorod), 
while the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Crimea first closed entry com-
pletely but then retracted the measure. When Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the 
Chechen Republic, closed the region’s borders entirely, his actions drew harsh 
criticism from Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, who warned the Chechen 
leader not to confuse the regional with the federal scope of authority.
Although Putin announced 12 May 2020 as the end of ‘non-working days’, 
the decision as to when to start lifting the specific Covid-19 restrictions was up 
to the governors who imposed them. Russian regions began easing quarantine 
restrictions starting from May 2020, almost immediately after the number of 
cases had peaked. In Moscow, most restrictions were significantly eased or lifted 
as early as June, but in other regions, they remained in place for longer and fell 
markedly by 1 September.
Regional government measures to combat the pandemic led not only to a 
gradual reduction in the number of people falling ill, but also to sharp drops in 
economic demand and household income, the curtailment of a large part of the 
service sector, and the virtual collapse of several industries, for example, tourism 
and the hotel and restaurant trade. Governmental restrictions were particularly 
devastating for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
9.4.3.2 Support for regions
At the end of April 2020, about a month after the restrictions were introduced, 
the federal government developed the Corona Crisis Action Plan, in terms of 
which all 85 constituent units adopted economic measures to stimulate local 
business: 84 regions had non-tax-support measures (e.g., subsidies and reductions 
in rental rates), while 80 also had tax-support measures (such as tax deferrals and 
abatements). It is estimated that, all in all, the regions deployed 839 economic 
measures, 45 per cent of which were tax-related and 55 per cent, non-tax-related. 
The most common ones were tax incentives, deferred rent for small businesses 
and companies from affected sectors, and subsidies to SMEs (Mavrina 2020).
According to rankings by the National Rating Agency (2020), Moscow, the 
Republics of Buryatia and Crimea, Perm Krai, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
Tula, Irkutsk, and Chelyabinsk Oblasts took the most measures to support 
businesses affected by the pandemic. Support from local authorities may have 
buffered regional economic decline, but in the pandemic situation, it simply 
harmed many regional budgets. Regional economies that were the most affected 
by the restrictions suffered primarily due to regionally specific circumstances 
rather than the pandemic itself. Therefore, the search for a balance between eco-
nomic well-being and health in these regions shifted, quite predictably, towards 
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economic well-being. As survey data show, support measures were not available 
to everyone who needed them (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the 
Russian Federation 2020).
Our analysis suggests that the downturn in economic activity was likely to 
have a negative impact on regional development and increase regional dispari-
ties in terms both of economic indicators and of social well-being. Experts have 
underlined that transferring authority and responsibility for the fight against 
Covid-19 to regions where resources are scarce would, first of all, increase 
regional expenses: indeed, it is estimated that budget expenditure increased by 
30 per cent over six months and that more than half of the regions experi-
enced increased budget deficit (Komin and Poltoratskaya 2020; Trunova and 
Zemlyanski 2020).
The arrangement in turn would have made disadvantaged regions lacking in 
resources of their own even more dependent on the centre and its financial sup-
port. Given that the capacity to support people and businesses depends on regional 
economic and social development (primarily in the health-care system), more 
advanced and wealthier regions would be able to fight the pandemic more effec-
tively than poorer ones, leading to greater inequality. Possible long-term negative 
consequences include deferred problems in the economy (including those result-
ing from reduced private sector investment) and increased social tensions.
9.4.3.3 Federal-regional dynamics
The need for prompt solutions and the high level of diversity in living and work-
ing conditions across the country inevitably led to decision-making on specific 
measures being delegated to the regions. This process, as noted, exacerbated 
existing problems and created new ones.
During the pandemic, the centre exercised supervision over the situation in 
the regions, with the President or the federal government intervening in certain 
cases to enable regions to carry out their devolved functions. Due to the exist-
ence of multiple channels for transmitting information requiring action and dif-
ficulties in coordinating individual agencies, sometimes only the centre’s direct 
intervention could clear the red tape.
After the Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection 
and Human Wellbeing criticised them for the inadequacy of their measures to 
combat Covid-19, several regional heads (those of Kamchatka Krai, Arkhangelsk 
Oblast, and the Komi Republic) handed in resignation letters to the RF President 
(RBK Information Agency News 2020). The Governor of Khabarovsk Krai was 
dismissed by the President for loss of trust and confidence (TASS Information 
Agency News 2020).
In a few cases involving abnormal outbreaks and inadequate health-care sys-
tems in constituent units, the federal government provided improved capacity 
at federal medical centres, ambulance services from neighbouring regions, and 
hospital construction by the defence ministry.
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The Covid-19 crisis again illustrated a fundamental problem with Russian 
federalism: the gap between how much responsibility regional (and municipal) 
authorities have in comparison to the resources and powers available to them and 
their capacity to fulfil their responsibilities.
9.4.4 Self-government in cities and municipalities
One well-known feature of Russian federalism is the relatively weak role that 
cities and municipalities play in the administration (Chikhladze et al. 2020). 
Their subordinate place in intergovernmental and fiscal relations is due largely 
to the limited possibilities for drawing up local budgets. In the fight against the 
coronavirus, this all became clearly apparent when major decisions and concrete 
measures were taken at the national and regional levels, while cities and munici-
palities worked with whatever funds they had. While there is no doubt that city 
authorities did not take a passive stance in combating Covid-19, their actions 
were limited by their powers, on the one hand, and, on the other, their physical 
and financial resources.
For example, the mayor’s office in Novosibirsk (the third-most populous city 
in Russia) monitored the availability of drugs in pharmacies across the city and, 
in case of shortages, negotiated with manufacturers and suppliers. Similarly, a 
shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) was eliminated swiftly with its 
help. Considerable effort was also put into supporting municipal hospitals and 
medical institutions. As a second wave of infection started to emerge, the city 
authorities began well in advance to retool individual hospitals, health centres, 
and social assistance centres in their jurisdiction for treating coronavirus patients.
Moscow City, as a unit of the federation, made the most effective and inno-
vative governance decisions. Among other things, the local administration used 
CCTV and facial recognition to control patient mobility; devised special sched-
ules for Muscovites to go out and get groceries during the first wave of infection; 
used QR code contact tracing; and deployed systems to control travel using 
personal transport. The city authorities also paid great attention to improving 
remote learning for schoolchildren and students. Crucially, the mayor, Sergey 
Sobyanin, was personally and constantly engaged in resolving issues and in direct 
contact with the population.
The effectiveness of Moscow’s management of the pandemic meant that the 
rest of the country could avoid economic collapse and social instability. Moscow 
may yet become a kind of laboratory for testing managerial solutions within the 
digital economy.
9.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
In Russia, intergovernmental relations (IGR) are facilitated via various institu-
tions, officials, and procedures (Leksin 2018). First of all, the President and the 
two chambers of the Federal Assembly, namely, the State Duma and Federation 
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Council, are important instruments of IGR. Under the RF Constitution, the 
President ensures coordinated functioning of the country’s governing bodies. In 
fact, he is the key IGR instrument, albeit influencing regional governors mainly 
through informal meetings and consultations. The State Duma also enables 
informal IGR, but it interacts directly and formally with regional legislatures 
and executives, which are entitled to make submissions on federal bills on mat-
ters of joint jurisdiction. The Federation Council’s relations with regional gov-
ernments are the closest of all, given that every regional legislature and executive 
has a representative in the Federation Council.
Furthermore, specialised institutions exist for enhancing the interaction 
between orders of government. These are advisory bodies, including the RF 
State Council, the Council of Legislators under the Federal Assembly’s cham-
bers, and the councils under plenipotentiary representatives of the President in 
the federal districts. Such institutions were not explicitly designed to deal with 
disasters; they were designed to enable discussion and cooperation, not to make 
orders or execute them. However, all of these structures were involved in disaster 
management during the pandemic. For instance, a specialised working group on 
pandemic issues operated within the RF State Council.
The intergovernmental structures designed to face a wide variety of chal-
lenges, including national disasters, are primarily the above-mentioned 
Federation Council, the State Council, and the councils under the President’s 
plenipotentiary representatives in the federal districts. The State Council of the 
Russian Federation is an advisory body chaired by the President and consisting of 
the leaders of all the constituent units, as well as of a number of federal officials. 
Similar bodies exist under the plenipotentiary representatives of the President in 
the eight federal districts.
The IGR structures of a technical nature are provided for in the federal 
law, On the Protection of Population and Territory against Natural and 
Technogenic Emergency Situations (1994). This statute entrusts coordination 
of emergency prevention and response activities to a system of specialised 
bodies. The system consists of commissions that can comprise officials rep-
resenting two orders of government, the ministries and other governmental 
structures designed to deal with emergencies, as well as the national control 
centre at the federal level and crisis management centres at the interregional 
and regional levels.
In addition, during the pandemic, governments at all levels established bodies 
designated as ‘task forces’. At the federal level, separate ministries and agencies 
created their bodies of this type. According to the regulations establishing these 
bodies, they perform coordinating and advisory functions. However, their rec-
ommendations are generally taken as mandatory guidelines for governmental 
bodies and legal entities. These institutions also provide for intergovernmental 
coordination, given that their informal nature permits them to constitute an 
organic hierarchy. At a minimum, ‘task forces’ at the lower levels convey infor-
mation upwards and follow directions from above.
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Apart from these institutions, other informal means of enhancing inter-
governmental cooperation are relatively common. These include councils and 
meetings of officials responsible for various health-care and disaster management 
issues.
Horizontal cooperation among regional and local governments did not bur-
geon during the pandemic, seeing as every government was responsible for 
taking measures within its own territory. However, coordination and sharing 
best practices were common occurrences. For one thing, because Moscow was 
the first to experience mass contagion, most regional governments followed the 
broad pattern laid out in the policies it adopted; for another, adjacent regions 
occasionally employed coordinated lockdown measures. For instance, during the 
most restrictive period, driving in vehicles without having a digital pass was 
banned in many regions – because each region issued its own passes, it was incon-
venient to travel through several regions using this kind of system. However, the 
e-government platforms of Moscow City and Moscow Oblast (Moscow prov-
ince) issued passes valid in both regions.
The pandemic also led to instances of interregional discord, especially during 
the first months. For instance, various regional governments arbitrarily decided 
to impose a 14-day quarantine on visitors from regions with high infection rates 
(particularly Moscow), with some even closing their borders to entry. The fed-
eral government responded with verbal criticism, but no punitive measures were 
exacted, as the disputes were settled informally.
It should be noted that many problematic issues in IGR during the pandemic 
were resolved through hands-on management (common in Russia). Several gov-
ernors sought a personal meeting with the President, where they asked for special 
federal support due to crisis in their regions. Such informal arrangements, for 
instance, ensured the construction of field hospitals for Covid-19 in Dagestan 
and inpatient hospitals in other territories.
9.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
At present the share of regional and local budget revenues in the consolidated 
budget of the Russian Federation is 34.7 per cent. Moreover, there is a signifi-
cant asymmetry in the distribution of federal support – 16 regions do not receive 
transfers from the federal budget while in some regions the share of transfers in 
their budget revenues is higher than 70 per cent, for example, in the republics of 
the North Caucasus and the Republic of Crimea.
In the first half of 2020, the intergovernmental fiscal transfers provided to the 
regions amounted to RUB 1.4 trillion, which was 1.6 times higher than in the 
first half of 2019. However, a low level of expenditure is observed – on subsidies 
(29 per cent) and other transfers (30.6 per cent) on non-Covid related activities.
As of 1 July 2020, the federal government had adopted about 80 resolutions 
on the allocation of funds to address the following: supporting measures to 
ensure that the worsening situation did not impact on economic sectors and their 
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development; preventing and eliminating the consequences of the pandemic; 
and protecting the population’s health and treating the ill, along with other 
pandemic- related support to citizens. All this amounted to RUB 1.3 trillion. 
The most significant support measures were social spending on benefits to fami-
lies with children under 16 years (RUB 496.5 billion) and grants to the constit-
uent units allowing them to balance their budgets while providing medical care 
to Covid-19 patients (RUB 168.2 billion).
In general, the revenues of the consolidated budgets of constituent units for 
January–June 2020 were 2.1 per cent higher than in the corresponding period in 
2019, amounting to RUB 6.3 trillion. However, the expenditure during the first 
half of the year increased by 18.9 per cent and amounted to RUB 6.5 trillion. 
Such a ratio of income to expenditure growth rates is due to the fact that during 
the first half of 2019, the regions’ total budget resulted in a surplus of RUB 695.7 
billion, while 2020 showed a deficit of RUB 213.7 billion.
The growth in expenditure was mostly covered by uncompensated receipts 
from the federal budget. A decrease in revenue of the consolidated budgets of 
constituent units was observed in 16 regions, with the largest ones in the Yamal-
Nenets Autonomous District (19.2 per cent) and Tyumen region (17.2 per cent). 
However, due to higher transfers, an increase in income was observed in 69 
regions, with the largest ones in the Jewish Autonomous region (39.3 per cent) 
and the Republic of Ingushetia (35.2 per cent).
In most units of the Russian Federation, business support was provided from 
regional budgets regardless of the size of their own-source revenues and deficits 
since a basic source of resources were federal transfers and budget loans provided 
by the federal Ministry of Finance. Commercial loans were generally less signif-
icant for closing gaps in regional and local budgets.
The federal government allocated RUB 300 billion as transfers and grants, 
and it restructured budget loans for RUB 69.5 billion. Moreover, the govern-
ment mitigated measures of responsibility for the fulfilment of obligations under 
the agreement with the regions and eased requirements for the parameters of the 
debt load on commercial loans. Experts estimated that the shortfall in regional 
budget revenues was about three times higher, and believed the support from the 
centre was still insufficient (St. Petersburg Policy Foundation 2020).
With more financial resources allocated to them, constituent units became 
accountable for their response measures to Covid-19 and the socio-economic 
impact of the pandemic. The federal centre also imposed stricter control on 
spending and policy efficiency. Based on these conditions, one can conclude that 
centralisation in public administration has strengthened in Russia.
9.5 Findings and policy implications
Several conclusions can be drawn from this case study of the Russian Federation.
First, Russia’s success in pandemic response was due to the joint efforts of the 
central and regional authorities. These efforts were facilitated to a large extent by 
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strong presidential vertical power and the ruling party’s dominance over regional 
and municipal administrations. As a result, Russia avoided centre-region con-
frontation, interparty competition, tensions between national autonomies and 
the central government, and interreligious conflicts.
Secondly, despite the increasing centralisation of Russian federalism in 
recent decades, a certain balance of interests between the centre and regions was 
achieved during a crisis-ridden 2020. In view of Russia’s vast size, the inequality 
among its constituent units, and the significant regional disparities it saw in the 
spread as well as control of the coronavirus, a decentralised approach to counter-
ing the pandemic was the only viable option.
Delegating powers to the units to combat the pandemic from April 2020 
onwards generally strengthened federative principles in Russia, albeit that 
it did not result in new formalised structures for IGR. In some cases, inter-
state and inter-budgetary relations were nevertheless either inadequate or only 
semi-formal in nature. As such, one of the implications of the crisis the federal 
system faced in 2020 is that Russia should make provision for a more consoli-
dated form of decentralisation, for stronger centre-region bonds, and better insti-
tutional support for IGR processes – all of which improved immensely during 
the fight against the pandemic.
Thirdly, most constituent units and urban settlements in Russia coped 
adequately with the pandemic at its onset, with some, such as Moscow and 
Novosibirsk Oblast, employing particularly innovative models of crisis manage-
ment. However, when the authority to make decisions was given to the regions, 
they were often reluctant or unprepared to leverage their newfound powers due 
to poor regional governance. In several regions, the federal centre was forced to 
intervene in the fight against Covid-19, allocate additional resources, and impose 
strict control measures.
Fourth, in this regard, a lesson for the future is that there is a need to find an 
equilibrium and compromise between Russia’s competitive federalism and the 
cooperative form prevalent in certain European countries. On the one hand, the 
fight against global threats will require, as noted, widespread solidarity based on 
the understanding that these are common rather than private or sectarian issues. 
On the other hand, the inevitable growth of the digital economy and, with 
it, phenomena such as telework and telemedicine, will lead to greater ‘digital 
inequalities’ among Russian regions and thus to even greater asymmetry and 
competition among them for qualified personnel, new technologies, personalised 
medicine, and more.
Special measures will hence be needed in intergovernmental and inter- 
budgetary relations to smooth out such asymmetry in the future. Although one 
of the dominant features of ‘wild’ Russian federalism during the deep economic 
and political crisis of the 1990s – namely, political loyalty by regional elites in 
exchange for federal resources – is a thing of the past, the next goal is finally 
to eliminate elements of this system that make it necessary to rely on hands-on 
management of federative relations by the President alone.
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As 2020 showed us, the current high centralisation of executive power 
in Russia’s federal system is likely to have reached its limit and can hardly 
intensify any further. The joint fight against the Covid-19 pandemic triggered 
decentralisation processes in relations between the Russian federal centre and 
regions. Moreover, we may consolidate this fairly successful experience and 
expand it not only to other crises but also the general development of federalism 
in Russia.
Note
 1 The national constitutional referendum was held in Russia between 25 June and 1 July 
2020. The proposed amendments included various social guarantees and human rights; 
changes to certain powers held by the Federal Assembly; granting the President extended 
authority and reducing that of the government; and judicial reforms establishing the 
supremacy of Russian law over international law. A major amendment concerned nulli-
fying the number of presidential terms served, thereby allowing Vladimir Putin to remain 
in power after his term ends in 2024. In the referendum, 78 per cent of voters supported 
these amendments, with the percentage varying from 44 per cent to 98 per cent across 
the constituent units.
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AMERICAN FEDERALISM  
AND COVID-19
Party Trumps policy
John Kincaid and J. Wesley Leckrone
10.1 Introduction
Although the United States (US) ranked first among 195 countries on the 2019 
Global Health Security Index, it responded poorly to the pandemic, mainly 
because President Donald Trump did not forge a coordinated response with 
the states’ governors and because political party polarisation often thwarted 
cooperative state-federal, inter-state, and state-local relations. Near the end 
of November 2020, among federal countries only Belgium (136.7 deaths per 
100,000 population), Spain (91.2), Argentina (83.2), Brazil (80.8), and Mexico 
(80.6) had worse outcomes than the United States (78.5).
However, because of the dualist structure of US federalism and the states’ 
constitutionally reserved police power, the states were able to respond to the 
pandemic in ways that ranged from strict to lax, thus reducing Covid-19 deaths 
below what is likely to have prevailed if the federal government had controlled 
the pandemic response but higher than would likely have prevailed under a 
cooperative-federalism response. Nevertheless, the federal government per-
formed a crucial role by providing financial support for the development of 
vaccines against Covid-19. Overall, the pandemic has not, to date, wrought 
significant changes in the constitutional or operational features of American 
federalism.
The US has 331 million people, with a median age of 37.9 years and a 79.1-year 
life expectancy. Levels of urbanisation and density vary from Maine (38.7 per cent 
urban) to California (95.0), and from Alaska (1.3 people per square mile) to New 
Jersey (1,210.1). Of persons most susceptible to Covid-19, 16.5 per cent are aged 
65 and over. They experienced 79 per cent of all Covid-19 deaths. People (mostly 
elderly) in long-term care facilities accounted for about 8 per cent of coronavirus 
cases but 45 per cent of all Covid-19 deaths.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003166771-13
182 John Kincaid and J. Wesley Leckrone
Additionally, 13.4 per cent of Americans are black (108.4 deaths per 100,000), 
totalling 20.7 per cent of all US deaths; 2.4 per cent are American Indian (90.0), 
totalling 1 per cent of deaths; 16.7 per cent are Latino (73.5), totalling 21.3 per 
cent of deaths; 60.1 per cent are white (54.4), totalling 51.4 per cent of deaths; 
and 5.6 per cent are Asian (45.4), totalling 4.1 per cent of all deaths.
Public health is mainly a state responsibility, which most states decentralise in 
varying degrees to their county governments (which exist in 48 states). The fed-
eral government’s public health duties apply to foreign and inter-state travel and 
commerce and to providing support to the states, such as research, data collection 
and dissemination, pharmaceutical approvals, expertise, health guidelines, finan-
cial aid, supplies, and emergency field hospitals. Health care and insurance are 
mostly private, but the federal Medicare programme insures citizens aged 65 and 
over; two intergovernmental programmes, Medicaid and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, cover low-income people of all ages (about 18 per cent of the 
US population being enrolled in these programmes); and the intergovernmental 
Affordable Care Act subsidises private health insurance for another 23 million 
citizens. However, about 28 million non-elderly remain uninsured.
The first laboratory-confirmed Covid-19 case occurred on 20 January 2020 
and was reported to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
on 22 January. The first announced Covid-19 death was on 29 February in 
Washington state (although several deaths were later discovered to have occurred 
earlier). The country experienced its first Covid-19 surge in late March to early 
April, with a peak of 34,904 cases on 9 April, a second surge in July with a peak 
of 79,086 cases on 24 July, and a third surge in October and November with a 
peak of 200,447 cases on 20 November.
As of 23 November 2020, the US had recorded 12,778,467 reported infec-
tions, equating to 3,906 cases per 100,000 people. Daily deaths peaked at 2,702 on 
15 April, dropping sharply thereafter. However, deaths began to increase in late 
fall, with an increase from 898 to 1,929 between 31 October and 19 November, 
making for a total of 263,198 deaths since January. Together, the commuter- 
connected states of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, with 9.6 per cent 
of the US population, had 27.2 per cent of US deaths on 18 September (dropping 
to 22.0 per cent by 21 November 2020).1
The initial epicentre was New York City, with a second centre on the West 
coast. Covid-19 entered California, Oregon, and Washington from China but 
entered the New York region from Europe. During the summer, Covid-19 
spread to more urbanised areas in the Midwest and South but spread into all 
states and rural areas during September through November.
The federal government reacted first when President Trump restricted travel 
from China on 31 January and Congress enacted a USD 8.3 billion emergency 
supplemental appropriation signed by Trump on 6 March. State and local gov-
ernments began reacting substantially on 11 March. Yet despite efforts to contain 
the coronavirus, the country was experiencing its third and largest case surge in 
late November 2020.
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10.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
The US federal system was established upon ratification of the US Constitution 
in 1788. It is a congressional-presidential federation with 50 states and seven terri-
tories and a dualist structure in which the states delegated certain limited powers 
to the federal (i.e., national) government and reserved all other powers to them-
selves. The powers delegated to the federal government chiefly involve interna-
tional and interstate commerce, national defence, and foreign affairs, although 
in the 20th century, the federal government assumed substantial responsibility 
for national social welfare and enforcement of civil rights and liberties. Tax pow-
ers to raise revenue are also delegated, as a consequence of which the federal 
government is not dependent on the states for revenue as was the confederal gov-
ernment under the prior Articles of Confederation of 1781. The major federalist 
innovation of the US Constitution, according to Alexander Hamilton, is the 
authority of the federal government to legislate directly for individuals within its 
sphere of authority (i.e., levy taxes and conscript men into the military) (Kincaid 
2014). Each state has its own constitution and complete government, consisting 
of an elected legislature, elected governor and often other elected executives, and 
a supreme court (whose members are elected in many states). The federal sys-
tem operates with two political parties: Democrats, which are left-oriented, and 
Republicans, right-oriented. Other parties exist but have little political impact.
The states have primary responsibility for public health because they possess 
the police power, which is the authority to legislate for the health, safety, welfare, 
and morals of their citizens. The states did not delegate this power to the federal 
government. It is a key reserved power of the states under the US Constitution’s 
Tenth Amendment (1791). Historically, state and local governments have man-
aged epidemics with little or no federal assistance, as was the case in the last major 
epidemic in 1918 (Barry 2004).
Responsibility for managing other matters affected by a pandemic are divided 
and shared between the federal and state governments. The federal government 
commands monetary policy and can enact laws to stimulate the economy by 
altering federal taxes and engaging in deficit spending to aid persons and juris-
dictions. Most social welfare programmes are intergovernmental, with the fed-
eral government paying half or more of the cost. Child care, education, policing, 
emergency medical services, and small businesses, among other matters, come 
under the states’ purview. They have the authority to close and reopen schools 
and businesses. They might also have authority to close their borders, but no state 
has done so. Instead, many states have required out-of-state arrivals to quaran-
tine for 14 days, although it has been difficult to enforce the quarantines. The 
authority of county and municipal governments to take drastic measures var-
ies among the states, but many local governments issued stay-at-home orders 
(SAHOs) before their state government (see below).
The US Constitution contains no explicit provision for any federal branch 
to exercise emergency powers. However, Congress and presidents have found 
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ways to assert some emergency powers. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 
terminated all previous emergencies and authorises the President to exercise 
136 specific emergency powers defined in the law and within procedural lim-
its. A presidential emergency declaration can be ended by a joint resolution of 
Congress. In addition, the Public Health Service Act of 1944 includes some 
emergency powers.
Since the enactment of the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, presidents 
have had authority to declare disasters. The currently significant federal disaster 
statutes are the Stafford Act of 1988 and Homeland Security Act of 2002. The 
leading federal agency is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
created in 1979.
Ordinarily, governors must request disaster declarations from the President; 
however, under exigent circumstances, the President can issue a disaster dec-
laration without a gubernatorial request. This unilateral presidential authority 
is somewhat unusual in the American system because many presidential deci-
sions require consent or consultation with other officials. A disaster declaration 
authorises the dispatch of sometimes substantial personnel, material, and finan-
cial aid to the affected jurisdictions. On 13 March 2020, Trump issued 57 dis-
aster declarations for all states, Washington, D.C., and US territories – the first 
all-state declaration in US history. Past declarations have covered only one state 
or a group of states affected by a disaster such as a hurricane.
To date, the federal courts have placed few constraints on states’ emergency 
powers and on the federal government’s pandemic responses. The principal US 
Supreme Court ruling upholding state emergency responses to public health 
crises is Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197 US 11, 1905), which upheld the authority of 
states to enforce compulsory vaccination laws.
10.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
Compared to other countries, the US was well prepared for a pandemic; how-
ever, the President was initially slow to deploy resources and less than efficient in 
doing so later. He generally prioritised maintenance of the economy over sup-
pression of the virus. In addition, money for federal, state, and local public health 
programmes had been cut for decades.
The leading federal agency for pandemic responses is the US Department 
of Health and Human Services, which houses the CDC, National Institutes 
of Health, Food and Drug Administration, and National Vaccine Advisory 
Committee. The US Department of Homeland Security plays a role because 
FEMA and some other relevant agencies are located there. The US Department 
of Defense performs such response functions as accelerating delivery of medical 
supplies to states and localities. The US Department of the Interior is responsible 
for public health on 500 million acres of federal land and Indian reservations. All 
these agencies mobilised at varying speeds, and Dr Anthony Fauci, director of 
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the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases since 1984, soon became 
the most televised and trusted voice on the pandemic. Trump and Dr Fauci had 
a tense relationship because Fauci sometimes contradicted the President’s mes-
saging (Cathey 2020).
Avian flu outbreaks and a lack of national strategy to deal with a pandemic led 
President George W. Bush to push for new federal policies (Homeland Security 
Council 2005). The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 
authorised more than USD 3 billion for pandemic preparedness. A Pandemic and 
All-Hazards Preparedness Act was enacted in 2006, providing for development 
of a National Health Security Strategy and a Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority. However, funding for most of the Act’s programmes 
expired in 2018. A reauthorisation of the Act was signed by President Trump in 
June 2019.
In 2016, President Barack Obama’s administration developed a Playbook for 
Early Response to High-Consequence Emerging Infectious Disease Threats and 
Biological Incidents (Diamond and Toosi 2020). The Trump administration 
apparently did not use it, relying instead on its own plans: a National Biodefense 
Strategy (2018), which is mostly goals rather than plans, and two plans generally 
viewed as flawed, a Biological Incident Annex (2017) and Pandemic Crisis Action 
Plan (2018) ( Johnson 2020). In an effort to coordinate federal-agency responses, 
Trump organised a White House Task Force on the Coronavirus headed by Vice 
President Mike Pence.
None of the federal agencies or the taskforce are formally intergovernmental, 
although most have advisory committees that include state and local officials. 
Agencies such as the CDC in particular have regularised channels of communi-
cation with state and local public health officials. The CDC also relies on those 
governments to report data regularly, such as Covid-19 cases, deaths, hospitalisa-
tion rates, and testing rates. All of the states and many counties have public health 
agencies, although they vary in their capacities and levels of expertise.
10.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
Most of the major federal, state, and local government responses occurred from 
mid-March to late April 2020 after the gravity of Covid-19 had become apparent 
to public officials and citizens. Details of these responses are discussed below.
Most notable was sharp political party polarisation over Covid-19 among pol-
iticians and citizens. Generally, Democrats supported stern measures to suppress 
Covid-19 and encouraged such personal behaviours as mask-wearing; generally, 
Republicans supported living with the coronavirus so as to maintain jobs and the 
economy and resisted state governments’ mask-wearing mandates as violations of 
individual freedoms. This party polarisation affected all aspects of intergovern-
mental relations and weakened pandemic responses. The roles of the parties con-
firm long-standing theories about the importance of parties in federal systems 
(e.g. Grodzins 1960; Riker 1964; Detterbeck et al. 2015).
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Otherwise, the US is not marked by deep multicultural or multinational 
diversity; however, as noted above, blacks, Latinos, and indigenous peoples were 
affected more severely by Covid-19 than whites and Asians. This difference led 
to controversy, though conflict was channelled through the party system given 
that blacks, Latinos, and indigenous peoples are key voting blocs within the 
Democratic Party.
10.4.1 Taking the initiative
Early in the pandemic, there was little conflict over which order of govern-
ment should go first because governments acted largely independently within 
their spheres of authority. The Trump administration declared a Public Health 
Emergency on 31 January 2020 that allowed for travel restrictions from China (2 
February), Iran (28 February), and Europe (12 March), as well as other mitigation 
efforts to prevent people infected with Covid-19 from entering the US. Trump 
declared a National Emergency on 13 March, which authorised USD 50 billion 
to address the pandemic.
State and local governments were simultaneously acting to prevent Covid’s 
spread within their jurisdictions. San Francisco was the first locality to declare a 
local emergency on 15 February and joined with surrounding local governments 
to enact the first order closing businesses and schools. California was the first 
state to declare an emergency and on 19 March became the first to issue a state-
wide SAHO. By 1 April, 33 other states had followed suit. However, conflict 
between the federal and state governments emerged in March and early April, as 
the Trump administration proved unwilling to coordinate distribution of med-
ical supplies and testing equipment, while at the same time pushing states to 
open their economies while Covid cases were increasing. Despite the histrionics 
between Trump and some governors, intergovernmental coordination began to 
develop, particularly among federal, state, and local bureaucrats.
10.4.2 Federal action
Following the President’s restrictions on international travel, his emergency, 
and disaster declarations, and his signing of Congress’s emergency supplemental 
appropriation on 6 March, and following the World Health Organization’s dec-
laration of a global pandemic on 11 March, Congress passed four relief bills by 
huge bipartisan margins:
• Families First Coronavirus Response Act, signed by Trump on 18 March, 
providing USD 95 billion;
• Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (27 March), 
providing USD 2.2 trillion;
• Pay Check Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act (23 
April), providing USD 484 billion; and
• Pay Check Protection Program Flexibility Act (5 June).
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Altogether, Congress provided about USD 360 billion in aid to state and 
local governments to fight the pandemic. Further, the Federal Reserve (the US 
central bank equivalent) initiated many stimulus programmes, including USD 
2.3 trillion in lending to support households, employers, financial markets, and 
state and local governments as well as a Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) for 
the state-local bond market. Although USD 500 billion was pledged to the MLF, 
few states and localities participated in the programme, in part because they 
obtained better or equivalent borrowing terms in the regular markets.
The President conferred frequently with governors (although Vice President 
Mike Pence became the preferred contact for many governors) and invoked the 
Defense Production Act (1950) on 2 April, which enabled the federal govern-
ment to expedite purchase contracts and loans for private companies to produce 
medical equipment and supplies needed for the pandemic. The President also 
expedited supply deliveries to states and localities and fast-tracked production of 
a Covid-19 vaccine. The CDC issued voluntary SAHOs and other preventive 
guidelines for state and local officials. In taking these actions, the President did 
not substantially enhance executive powers or marginalise Congress, although 
he did issue a few executive orders that raised concerns about power enhance-
ment and circumvention of Congress. One controversial measure was signed 
by Trump in early August when he unilaterally suspended payroll taxes and 
announced USD 400 weekly payments for the unemployed when talks on larger 
Covid relief legislation broke down with Congress (Haberman et al. 2020).
By April, moreover, the President was at loggerheads with many governors, 
especially Democrats, because he wanted them to end their SAHOs and reo-
pen their economies. He called resistant governors ‘mutineers’ and tweeted such 
messages as ‘LIBERATE MICHIGAN.’ By late June, gridlock settled in between 
the Democratic House and Republican Senate and between the President and 
congressional Democrats and some congressional Republicans.
Even so, President Trump’s most consequential action was his 15 May 2020 
announcement of Operation Warp Speed, a public-private partnership funded 
with USD 10 billion in federal money, to develop an anti-Covid-19 vaccine by 
the end of 2020. By late November, three corporations – Pfizer, Moderna, and 
AstraZeneca-Oxford University – announced successful vaccine trials. Pfizer 
and AstraZeneca each received more than USD 1 billion from Operation Warp 
Speed; Pfizer received a USD 1.95 billion advance-purchase agreement from the 
initiative. Distribution of the vaccine was expected to start in late December and 
be carried out mostly through the states.
The federal government did not use the pandemic to augment intrusions into 
state and local domains. The federal government lacks constitutional authority to 
command a national response, and the President largely left response responsibili-
ties to the states. On 13 April 2020, Trump claimed ‘total’ power to reopen states’ 
economies, but he retreated the next day under heavy criticism. The state-local 
aid packages enacted by Congress contained the usual conditions and structures of 
accountability attached to federal aid but no unusual regulatory leaps.
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The federal courts largely deferred to the pandemic responses undertaken 
by the federal, state, and local governments. There was considerable litiga-
tion by religious groups against state SAHOs, but the US Supreme Court 
was initially unsympathetic. For example, in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. 
Sisolak (No. 19A1070) in July 2020, the Court upheld Nevada’s restrictions on 
worship services that were stricter than rules governing casinos and restau-
rants, leading one dissenting justice to quip, ‘There is no world in which the 
Constitution permits Nevada to favour Caesars Palace [a casino] over Calvary 
Chapel.’ In a series of decisions, the Court also held that in litigation over 
the 3 November presidential election, federal courts should uphold changes 
in voting procedures, such as mailed ballots and deadline extensions, enacted 
by state legislatures or decided by state agencies and courts. The Supreme 
Court also rejected intervention by lower federal courts attempting to loosen 
state voting restrictions due to Covid-19 in a number of cases. However, on 
14 September, a US district court judge ruled that the Pennsylvania governor’s 
March SAHO violated various rights, including property rights, guaranteed by 
the US Constitution (County of Butler v. Wolf, 2:20-cv-677, 2020). The ruling 
is on appeal.
There was no supranational governance dimension to pandemic policy-making, 
except that, at the time of this writing, the US borders with Canada and Mexico 
had been closed since 23 March. Many states along the Canadian border wanted 
to reopen the border, but Canada was refusing to do so until the US had Covid-19 
under greater control (Wamsley 2020).
10.4.3 State action
Many governors, county officials, and mayors reacted to Covid-19 by mid-March 
2020, usually without legislative approval. In 38 states, the governor can suspend 
certain laws during a disaster, but in 25 states, the legislature can terminate a 
governor’s emergency declaration, and in six states, an emergency declaration 
ends within 2–60 days. Nonetheless, as of October, 24 legislatures were consid-
ering bills to limit their governor’s emergency powers.
Few legislatures constrained their governor’s pandemic policies, and in some 
cases, governors vetoed legislative constraints. For example, Pennsylvania’s 
Democratic governor vetoed seven bills passed by the Republican-majority leg-
islature to reverse some of his policies (Scolforo 2020) and announced his inten-
tion to veto two more bills at the time of this writing (Levy 2020).
From 19 March, when California issued the first SAHO, to 7 April, 43 gov-
ernors issued SAHOs of varying scope and stringency. Of the first ten gover-
nors issuing SAHOs, nine were Democrats. The seven states having no SAHO 
had Republican governors. SAHOs required most residents to stay at home, 
except for essential travel, and closed businesses deemed non-essential as well as 
some public functions, such as mass transit. Had governors and local officials not 
issued SAHOs in March, Covid-19 cases and deaths would have been higher. 
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Most SAHO-issuing governors enjoyed high public approval, although support 
ebbed as SAHOs endured (Solender 2020).
Most state courts did not intervene in gubernatorial policy-making, although 
the supreme courts of Michigan and Wisconsin, which had Republican majori-
ties, overturned most of their Democratic governor’s SAHO, while Pennsylvania’s 
Democratic Supreme Court upheld the Democratic governor’s SAHO. Thirty-
eight states elect their supreme courts in partisan or non-partisan elections, with 
the rest being appointed. The party affiliation of judges is generally known, even 
among those chosen by non-partisan election (Ballotpedia n.d.).
Table 10.1 arrays the states by party control. A trifecta means the governorship 
and both legislative houses were controlled by one party. In the other two cat-
egories, different parties controlled the governorship and one or two legislative 
houses. Given partisan differences among the states, the table’s purpose is to sum-
marise key state policy and outcome differences and illustrate how differently the 
groups of states experienced Covid-19, not to assert causal relationships.
All the states with a Republican governor and Democratic legislature had a 
SAHO by March 30. They were followed by states with a Democratic gover-
nor and Republican legislature on April 1 and Democratic trifectas on April 2. 







Dem Leg GOP trifecta
Date of last SAHOa April 2 (100%) April 1 (100%) March 30 (100%) July 31 (67%)
Date of last reopeningb June 9 (100%) June 1 (100%) May 18 (100%) May 12 (100%)
Date of last mask 
mandatec
July 17 (100%) August 1 (100%) August 1 (60%) August 4 (43%)
Death rate per  
100k population 
(through 1 Sep)d
55.4 39.3 47.6 34.2
Death rate per  
100k population 
(through 21 Nov)d
75.3 64.6 56.2 66.2
Unemployment rate, 
March 2020e
4.4% 4.4% 3.5% 4.0%
Unemployment rate, 
April 2020e
15.0% 13.8% 14.0% 12.2%
Unemployment rate, 
May–July 2020e
12.7% 10.0% 11.9% 8.8%
Unemployment rate, 
August–October 2020e
8.9% 6.8% 6.6% 6.0%
Public sector job loss 
(February–October)f
−7.3% −5.8% −7.6% −4.2%
a Mervosh et al. (2020).
b Lee et al. (2020).
c Compiled from Fernandez (2020); Kim et al. (2020); Markowitz (2020); Roberts and Mitroff (2020).
d Centers for Disease Control (n.d.). Rates are for deaths since 21 January 2020.
e Herman (2020); US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2).
f Compiled from US Bureau of Labor Statistics (1).
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Only 67 per cent of Republican trifectas had SAHOs, and only by July 31. 
Republican trifectas began reopening the earliest; Democratic trifectas reopened 
last. However, a few states reasserted SAHO measures in response to case surges in 
October. Democratic trifectas issued a mask mandate much earlier than the other 
state groups, although only 60 per cent of states with a Republican governor and 
Democratic legislature and 43 per cent of Republican trifectas mandated masks.
As the pandemic progressed, the difference in death rates for Democratic and 
Republican trifectas narrowed, though Democratic trifectas still had the highest 
death rates. The most common explanations for this is that Democratic states are 
more urbanised, have higher numbers of people of colour with underlying health 
conditions, and are more likely to have metropolitan areas that serve as major 
travel hubs conducive to spreading Covid (Brown 2020; Medina and Gebeloff 
2020). Unemployment and public sector job losses were consistently highest in 
the Democratic trifectas since the pandemic’s outbreak. This is probably due to 
SAHOs being stricter and more prevalent in Democratic states.
This difference contributed to gridlock in Congress over more relief. On 
15 May 2020, the House passed a USD 3 trillion bill, which included about 
USD 950 billion for state, local, and tribal governments. The Republican 
Senate refused to consider the bill, arguing in part that it would bail out mostly 
Democratic states whose economic and fiscal straits are due to their own policy 
choices (Cole 2020).
States used their own funds and federal funds to ameliorate some of the eco-
nomic and social consequences of their SAHOs, such as providing more unem-
ployment benefits, subsidising small businesses, and postponing evictions for 
rent or mortgage non-payments. States also worked to mobilise private-sector 
resources for food banks and other welfare services.
States were laboratories for some innovative policies, and some innovations 
diffused among some states, albeit party polarisation limited diffusion. For exam-
ple, the Republican governors of North and South Dakota refused to institute a 
SAHO and other anti-Covid-19 policies employed by most other states, in part 
because the two states had few cases during the first half of 2020. However, cases 
soared in both states during October, such that by 31 October, North Dakota had 
813.2 weekly new cases per 100,000 people and South Dakota had 767.4 – both 
being far higher than the peaks of any other state since the pandemic’s start. Yet a 
senior advisor to South Dakota’s governor said, ‘We feel pretty good about where 
we’re at. The governor is not going to change any of her approach’ (Findell 2020).
Otherwise, many states cooperated with each other to coordinate poli-
cies, share medical equipment, engage in collective purchasing, and the like. 
Cooperative agreements among the states were primarily regional, although 
Democratic governors were more likely than Republicans to participate. The 
three most formal cooperative ventures included three states in the west, seven in 
the northeast, and seven in the Midwest (Strauss 2020). Many states also loosened 
medical licensing standards to allow out-of-state medical personnel to practise in 
the state during case surges.
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10.4.4 Local action
Most local governments did not undertake policies substantially different from 
their state’s policies, though many large urban counties and municipalities acted 
somewhat independently. San Francisco was the first US jurisdiction to act by 
banning large gatherings on 11 March 2020. It joined five neighbouring counties 
to issue the first US SAHO on 16 March. Between then and 1 April, 136 counties 
(out of 3,031 counties) nationwide, accounting for 66.9 million people, imposed 
SAHOs before their states (Brandtner et al. 2020).
County officials and mayors did not stray far from their legal powers or sus-
pend customary accountability measures. Counties and big cities had primary 
responsibility for implementing state policies and providing direct services such 
as testing and contact tracing. Many local governments helped mobilise resources 
for food banks and other services and provided grants and loans to small busi-
nesses. Many municipalities permitted restaurants to offer outdoor dining 
and closed streets to vehicular traffic for restaurants to do so. Most states also 
allowed municipalities to decide whether or how children could trick-or-treat 
on Halloween (31 October).
In some states, schools were closed and reopened by the governor; in others, 
decisions were left to local school districts. During the initial outbreak of Covid 
in March and April, 48 states mandated or recommended school closures, while 
the western states of Montana and Wyoming deferred to individual school dis-
tricts (Education Week 2020a). As the new school year started in the fall, most 
schools were closed during case surges, and many schools were operating entirely 
online or with a mixture of online and in-person instruction. However, the 
‘digital divide’ between children with and without access to technology impelled 
most school districts to provide technology to minority and low-income chil-
dren needing equipment.
The majority of states provided guidance or allowed counties or school dis-
tricts to determine when in-person instruction had to cease due to Covid infec-
tion levels. Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, and Texas, all with Republican governors, 
mandated that schools be open five days a week for in-person instruction unless 
cases spike (Education Week 2020b). Most states also allowed universities and col-
leges to decide whether to welcome students on campus for the fall and spring 
semesters.
Conflict occurred between governors and local officials, especially those of 
different parties. Most big cities are governed by Democrats, including those in 
states having a Republican governor and/or legislature. County and municipal 
Democrats resisted efforts by Republican state officials to end SAHOs, reopen 
the state economy, and overturn local mask mandates. Georgia was particularly 
contentious, as Republican Governor Brian Kemp moved to reopen the economy 
in late April. Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottom and other Democratic mayors 
were not consulted by the governor and opposed reopening high-risk businesses 
(Forgey 2020). In turn, local Republican officials, such as county sheriffs, refused 
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to enforce mask mandates and other measures emanating from Democratic state 
officials. Governors retaliated by threatening fund cut-offs and other punitive 
measures against local governments and license revocations for non-compliant 
businesses. For example, when faced with county sheriffs and local law enforce-
ment officials who refused to enforce state mask orders, California governor 
Gavin Newsom (D) threatened to withhold federal and state Covid relief fund-
ing from non-compliant local governments (Koseff 2020).
One state-local conflict, however, had catastrophic consequences for US 
Covid-19 cases and deaths. In New York, Governor Andrew Cuomo and New 
York City Mayor de Blasio, both Democrats, had clashed frequently before the 
pandemic. On 17 March, de Blasio advised city residents to prepare to shelter 
in place, but Cuomo’s office accused the mayor of ‘scaring people’ (Vielkind 
et al. 2020). Cuomo pre-empted the mayor and delayed a state SAHO until 22 
March. He also ordered elderly Covid-19 hospital patients relocated to nursing 
homes. On 11 June, New York, with 5.9 per cent of the US population, had 6.0 
per cent of the world’s Covid-19 deaths and 22.8 per cent of US deaths. As of 23 
November 2020, New York City still had 288 Covid deaths per 100,000 popu-
lation, one of the world’s highest rates.
The property tax is the main own-source revenue for counties, municipali-
ties, townships, and school districts. These entities have not been eager to defer 
payments or reduce tax rates in mid-year because tax payments on due dates are 
crucial to their ability to provide services. A few states authorised some deferrals, 
and a few more states extended deadlines for people to apply for existing prop-
erty tax relief benefits. Eighteen states already had a property-tax circuit breaker 
that limits the tax to a certain percentage of household income, and 13 states 
offer property-tax credits based on income.
Since the pandemic’s start, 45 states and 56 per cent of big cities implemented 
moratoriums on housing evictions; 40 per cent of big cities and 54 per cent 
of states provided rent relief; 66 per cent of states and 19 per cent of large cit-
ies enacted a foreclosure moratorium; 33 per cent of big cities and 58 per cent 
of states offered mortgage relief; and 30 per cent of states and 37 per cent of 
large cities provided some property-tax relief (Einstein et al. 2020). Michigan 
enacted a ‘Pay to Stay’ law that allows local governments to lower delinquent-tax 
amounts, making it easier for owners to stay in their homes. Connecticut enacted 
a law allowing local governments to reduce interest rates on delinquent taxes; a 
few states allow localities to delay or waive late payment penalties (Collins 2020). 
Economists expect property-tax declines to be smaller than sales and income tax 
declines (McClelland 2020).
Counties, municipalities, townships, and school districts each have their own 
organisations (e.g., state municipal leagues) for fostering cooperation, communi-
cations, innovation sharing, and collective pressure on their state government and 
the federal government. These continued to function as usual, in part because 
most local governments shifted fairly quickly to working online. In some cases, 
online council and school-board meetings increased citizen attendance.
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10.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
State-federal relations were contentious in the political arena given that President 
Trump jousted with the country’s 24 Democratic governors and a few Republican 
governors. Democratic state and local officials, along with some Republican 
officials, believe Congress and the President were uncooperative in refusing to 
enact a second relief stimulus, although, as of late October, many states had not 
spent all their federal aid from the March stimulus. On 21 December, however, 
Congress enacted a USD 920 billion relief stimulus, which included money for 
various state and local functions, such as education, health, and transportation.
In the bureaucratic arena, cooperation largely continued as usual, such as close 
cooperation between the CDC and state and local public health officials. Also, 
for example, the US Army Corps of Engineers was praised for quickly construct-
ing field hospitals to handle case overloads in Covid-stressed localities (Williams 
2020). Since the demise of the US Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations in 1996, there has been no overarching intergovernmental institution, 
but intergovernmental mechanisms of varying types and robustness among fed-
eral, state, and local administrators as well as relevant private-sector stakeholders 
exist in virtually every policy field. It is unlikely that Covid-19 adversely affected 
these mechanisms. These mechanisms are also important for communicating and 
sharing ideas and are likely to have helped officials across policy fields respond 
and adapt to Covid-19, such as in developing new protocols for ambulance per-
sonnel, firefighters, and the police.
States cooperated with each other in many ways, especially on regional bases, 
although there was a period of intense competition for medical equipment and 
supplies during March–May 2020 when the President told the states to fend 
for themselves (Nicholas and Gilsinan 2020). The office of Michigan’s governor 
dubbed the competition ‘the hunger games’ (Mahler 2020). Some states sought 
to alleviate the competition by forming joint purchasing arrangements. State 
officials also relied on their national associations, such as the National Governors 
Association, to share ideas, formulate policies, and lobby the federal government.
However, the rise of remote working generated tax conflict and competi-
tion between a few states where workers employed by an entity in one state 
were working remotely from their homes in other states. In October, New 
Hampshire, which does not tax earned income, filed suit in the US Supreme 
Court against Massachusetts, arguing that Massachusetts’ tax on the incomes of 
New Hampshire residents working remotely in New Hampshire is unconstitu-
tional. Many commuter-connected states already had reciprocal tax agreements 
that resolve this issue, but a victory for New Hampshire would encourage many 
workers employed in or living in high income-tax states to work remotely from 
states with no income tax or a lower tax.
To date, there is little information on how Covid-19 affected inter-local rela-
tions; however, many central cities were losing revenue because state SAHOs 
reduced the number of daily commuters and visitors. In late October, conflict 
194 John Kincaid and J. Wesley Leckrone
arose between the mayor of San Francisco and the independent San Francisco 
Unified School District, which was ignoring the mayor’s pleas to reopen schools.
10.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
The principal federal aid response to Covid-19, the USD 2.2 trillion CARES 
Act, is extremely complex and allocated funds to governments, for-profit and 
non-profit entities, and citizens. CARES provided USD 150 billion directly 
to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. This aid was distributed on 
the basis of population, though direct aid to local governments was limited to 
jurisdictions having more than 500,000 residents. States could use some of their 
CARES funds to help smaller local governments. No direct aid was in the form 
of a block grant, although USD 5 billion of local aid was funnelled through the 
47-year-old Community Development Block Grant programme.
CARES also infused neglected public health institutions with new money. 
For instance, the CDC’s annual budget for emergency public-health prepared-
ness had declined from USD 1.4 billion in fiscal 2002 to USD 675 million in 
the 2020 fiscal year (adjusted for inflation). Funds for hospital preparedness had 
dropped by 62 per cent from USD 723 million in fiscal 2004 to USD 275.5 mil-
lion in 2020. It is also estimated that the 2007–2009 recession, associated with 
the global financial crisis, resulted in the loss of 50,000 state and local public 
health jobs that were not recovered after the recession ( Johnson 2020).
Most of the CARES funds were distributed through existing intergovern-
mental mechanisms and formulas, such as the federal-state unemployment insur-
ance programme. Little of the money was allocated according to Covid-19 case 
levels. New mechanisms were managed by extant institutions, such as new aid 
for hospitals that was distributed by the US Department of Health and Human 
Services based on each hospital’s total net patient revenue. CARES provided 
USD 1,200 to each adult citizen (USD 500 for children) earning less than USD 
75,000 per year. The money was distributed by the 86-year-old Social Security 
Administration. Some of the CARES money was in the form of loans, mostly for 
private-sector businesses, and some loans were forgivable under certain condi-
tions. Otherwise, all the CARES money was accompanied by the usual spending 
and accountability rules and regulations attached to federal aid. A downside of 
such rules is that they can delay the actual expenditures by recipients; conse-
quently, Congress delivered most of the money through established channels 
having established rules.
The CARES Act and other spending resulted in a federal budget deficit of 
USD 3.1 trillion in fiscal year 2020 – 15.2 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) – out of USD 6.6 trillion in total spending, and total debt reached 102 
per cent of the nation’s GDP (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget 
2020).
Policy responses to the pandemic, especially SAHOs, reduced state and local 
revenues. States might experience a USD 555 billion revenue shortfall through 
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to fiscal year 2022 (Center for Budget and Policy Priorities 2020). However, 
fiscal 2021 losses will vary from about 1 per cent in Idaho to perhaps 30 per cent 
in New Mexico (National Conference of State Legislatures 2020). At the close 
of fiscal 2019, states had only USD 74.9 billion of reserve funds (called rainy-day 
funds) to compensate for revenue losses. An analysis of 150 cities predicted reve-
nue loses between 5.5 and 9.0 per cent (Chernik et al. 2020). A National League 
of Cities survey of mayors estimated a 13 per cent revenue drop (McFarland and 
Pagano 2020). Revenue declines will likely be largest in Democratic jurisdic-
tions, partly because of stricter SAHOs.
A few states might increase aid to local governments, but most will not do 
so due to their own budget shortfalls. State and local governments are typically 
required to balance their annual budgets. In the absence of an influx of federal 
funding, they resort to spending cuts or tax increases, both of which can exac-
erbate the effects of an economic downturn. Draw-downs on reserve funds, 
government employee layoffs, benefit reductions, postponed spending on capital 
projects, underfunding public pensions, and cuts to programmes such as educa-
tion are all tools used to adapt state and local budgets to market conditions. The 
level of austerity will depend on how hard individual states and localities are 
hit by Covid and the level of economic disruption caused by closures. By mid- 
November 2020, however, revenues in many states were rebounding at higher 
levels than projected several months earlier (Editorial Board 2020).
10.5 Findings and policy implications
The US response to Covid-19 has been highly non-centralised, largely because 
President Donald Trump, despite his alleged autocratic proclivities, left most of 
the response duties to the states and because party polarisation generated sharply 
different pandemic policy preferences across states and localities. This response 
pattern departed, therefore, from the tradition of cooperative federalism whereby 
federal and state officials work more closely to forge common guidelines and pol-
icy actions. There was an initial burst of cooperative federalism from about early 
March to late April 2020 when the President and Congress acted vigorously to 
support the states in a largely bipartisan fashion through established intergovern-
mental channels, but this cooperative spirit was undercut by partisan polarisation 
that induced gridlock, delayed enactment of a second major federal fiscal relief 
measure and negotiation of a more coordinated and cooperative state-federal 
response, and prevented full and more effective mobilisation of the system’s fed-
eral, state, and local institutional capacities.
The model of dual federalism thus seems to fit the US response best: that is, 
pandemic-relevant federal agencies performed most of their customary public 
health functions, but each state acted independently to formulate and imple-
ment its own Covid-19 policies. The states’ possession of the police power is a 
key feature of the federal system’s dualist structure. State governors in particu-
lar used this power in unprecedented ways. There is no precedent in US history 
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for the SAHOs instituted by the states to combat Covid-19. This expression of 
dual federalism also highlighted the continuing limits of federal power despite 
the centralisation that has occurred in the federal system since its founding 
(Kincaid 2019).
The major liability of this response pattern is that the US has had one of the 
world’s highest levels of cases and deaths. A cardinal rule for responding to a 
disaster is issuing clear, consistent, and trustworthy messaging. Such messaging 
proved impossible due to the fact that partisan polarisation generated often dia-
metrically opposed Covid-19 messages and that the diversity of state and local 
policy responses conveyed mixed messages to citizens. Furthermore, the high 
levels of mistrust Americans evinced towards governments and each other before 
the pandemic were exacerbated by mixed and combative messaging during 
the pandemic. President Trump set the tone for Republicans by downplaying 
Covid-19’s severity and focusing on opening the economy; Democratic gover-
nors in states hit hard early in the pandemic framed the response for their own 
party. Federal, state, and local officials, and citizens, fell in line behind their par-
ty’s narrative, and the fight against Covid-19 became a partisan battle throughout 
the federal system.
The US response illustrates the potent role of political parties in a federal 
system. There has been no profound change in the federal system, either con-
stitutionally or bureaucratically, but party combat has thwarted the effective 
operation of the system. Perhaps aggravating the conflict was Covid-19’s arrival 
during President Trump’s first impeachment trial and during a year when he was 
running for re-election against a Democratic Party eager to unseat him.
As 2020 drew to a close, President-elect Joe Biden was signalling a more bipar-
tisan approach to fighting Covid-19 and pledging greater cooperation with gov-
ernors and between federal, state, and local health officials. The blueprint is for a 
centralised, coordinated plan coming from the CDC to determine when and how 
Covid-related economic and health restrictions should be put in place, including 
school and business closures, limits on the size of gatherings, and when SAHOs 
should be issued. Biden was championing a national mask-wearing mandate while 
acknowledging that the federal government lacks the constitutional authority to 
impose a mandate directly. A national mandate would apply to federal property and 
inter-state transportation. Biden was proposing to convince governors to impose 
mask mandates, but partisanship may thwart that goal. His intent was to increase 
federal planning to help states acquire and distribute rapid Covid testing, vaccines, 
and personal protective equipment. In sum, the incoming Biden administration 
signalled more reliance on cooperative federalism and less on dual federalism.
Note
 1 Real-time data on Covid-19 cases and deaths are available on the CDC’s website at 
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker.
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11
FACING THE CORONAVIRUS 
PANDEMIC IN THE CANADIAN 
FEDERATION
Reinforced dualism and muted  
cooperation?1
Johanne Poirier and Jessica Michelin
11.1 Introduction
To begin with the obvious, size matters – and Canada is a large country. Second 
only in size to the Russian Federation, its area of 9,984,670 km2 is bordered by 
three oceans and the longest land frontier in the world to the south. With a pop-
ulation of 38 million, it is one of the world’s least densely populated countries, 
although its largest city, Toronto, hosts 5 million people. There are 5.5 time 
zones in Canada. Although viruses, like pollution and people, do travel, what 
happens out west does not immediately affect what happens in the centre, the 
east, or the north. Geography matters and the coronavirus pandemic has under-
scored the huge regional diversity of the Canadian federation. Infection rates and 
deaths differed radically across the country, with the Atlantic provinces having 
fared better than New Zealand, and Québec having been similar to France, 
Belgium, or Spain. This reinforces the importance of looking beyond aggregate 
national statistics in comparative analysis.
Beyond geography lies another obvious element: federalism impacts on the 
fight against the microscopic enemy; conversely, fighting the virus impacts on 
the dynamics of federalism. In other words, when it comes to combating a 
pandemic, federalism – like size, population density, and regional diversity – 
matters.
The Canadian federation is composed of ten provinces and three northern 
territories of widely different sizes. Canada, a country of immigration, is deeply 
multicultural and known for its ‘complex diversity’. A federation founded by 
two groups of European descent, it is officially bilingual, and for a long-time 
was considered, at least in Québec, as ‘bi-national’. With the – very belated – 
recognition of the place of indigenous peoples in the complex polity, few today 
would challenge the idea that Canada is multinational. Throughout its history, 
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Canadian federalism has had a differential impact on key actors (Gagnon and 
Poirier 2020). Unsurprisingly, the same is true in the context of the pandemic.
To use somewhat simplistic labels, Canadian federalism is officially ‘dualist’, 
pragmatically ‘cooperative’, multipolar, multicultural, multinational, symmetric 
in some ways, and asymmetric in others. The official division of powers is still 
outlined in a Constitution Act adopted by the Parliament of Westminster in 
the middle of the 19th century. Consequently, courts have played a major role 
in determining ‘who can do what’ in the Canadian federal system. Periods of 
decentralisation and centralisation have succeeded one another, with the last few 
decades heralding overlapping jurisdictions that challenge the dualist nature of 
the formal institutions. The Covid-19 pandemic underscored several of these 
paradoxes and grey zones.
This chapter examines the initial outbreak and first wave of infection 
(March–June 2020), the partial lull that occurred during the summer, and the 
beginning of the second wave, up to October 2020. In all three phases, the 
federal and provincial/territorial (P/T) governments acted largely in parallel, 
in keeping with the dualist nature of the federation; however, a fair degree of 
congruence in provincial action at the start gave way to differentiation in the 
later stages. Meanwhile, the federal order sought to keep the economy afloat by 
setting up financial aid packages and income replacement strategies. Although 
welcomed across the country, these costly initiatives were likely to generate 
the country’s highest federal deficit in decades, and there were concerns that 
P/T (and future generations) would eventually pay the price in the search for 
balanced budgets.
By the end of October 2020, about 235,000 cases and over 10,000 deaths had 
been reported. The vast majority of cases (77.2 per cent) and deaths (92.6 per cent) 
occurred in Ontario and Québec, which make up slightly more than 60 per cent 
of Canada’s population. More remarkable – and rather hard to explain – was 
Québec’s initial inordinate proportion both of cases and deaths. With only 
23 per cent of the Canadian population, it accounted in the early stages for slightly 
less than half of all cases and slightly more than half of all deaths (Table 11.1).
By October 2020, Ontario and Québec faced a massive rise in infections. The 
Atlantic provinces were generally spared, and there were increases in the west. 
The situation was asymmetrical from the outset and remained so. The same is 
true of the country’s responses to the pandemic. These facts and figures reflect 
the first six months of the pandemic and had to be taken with caution, as federal 
and provincial responses were in constant evolution.
Overall, the story of the federation’s initial ‘pandemic era’ is one of parallel 
action by various orders of government, with cooperation taking place quietly 
and largely behind the scenes. There were hardly any jurisdictional turf battles. 
Provinces came out as ‘real actors’ alongside Ottawa. Unlike the situation in 
some federations that saw either centralisation or the creation of formal multi-
lateral bodies under federal leadership, in Canada intergovernmental relations 
(IGR) did occur, particularly at the operational level, but were muted.
202 Johanne Poirier and Jessica Michelin
11.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
Despite the ‘pragmatically’ cooperative nature of Canadian federalism on a day-
to-day basis, the fundamental structure of the federation remains dualist (Poirier 
2020). Each order of government has its own legislative and executive – and to 
a certain extent, judicial – branch. The delegation of administrative and regula-
tory functions is possible between orders of government, but generally P/T are 
not seen as implementers of federal law or programmes. The management of the 
Covid-19 crisis was no exception.
Innumerable policy areas were implicated in the fight against the pandemic. 
They ranged from public health and health-care delivery, elderly care and 
schools, and medical research to policing, prisons, fiscal and financial arrange-
ments, relations with indigenous nations, emergency measures, border closures, 
and more. The following discussion focuses though on health and disaster 
management.
The relevant constitutional provisions are vague and have been interpreted 
broadly. Particularly in the recent past, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
invoked ‘cooperative federalism’, not in order to impose cooperation (or any 
form of loyalty) on members of the federation, but to facilitate jurisdictional 
overlap (Gaudreault-DesBiens and Poirier 2017). This allows all orders of gov-
ernment to intervene in matters of health and disaster management, increasing 
the possibility of public action. It also leaves the responsibility for sorting out 
‘who should do what’ to the political branches, which coordinate – or not – the 
various interventions.







Rate of cases 
(per 100,00 
population)
Rate deaths  
(per 100,00 
population)
British Columbia 14,733 263 290.52 5.19
Alberta 28,245 323 646.14 7.39
Saskatchewan 3,144 25 267.7 2.13
Manitoba 5,723 67 417.9 4.89
Ontario 75,730 3,136 519.89 21.53
Québec 106,016 6,246 1,249.46 73.61
Newfoundland and Labrador 291 4 55.8 0.77
New Brunswick 343 6 44.15 0.77
Nova Scotia 1,109 65 114.17 6.69
Prince Edward Island 64 0 40.78 0
Yukon 23 1 56.3 2.45
Northwest Territories 10 0 22.31 0
Nunavut 0 0 0 0
Total 235,431 10,136 617.19 26.9
Source: Public Health Agency of Canada (2020a)
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Coordination takes place through a plethora of means that have no 
constitutional – and hardly any legislative – grounding. There is little official 
input by constitutive units into federal law- or decision-making, particularly 
since the Canadian Senate is inadequate as a body of provincial or regional 
representation – Canada’s model is the archetype of ‘inter-state’ federalism 
(Broschek 2020). Consequently, in the context of Covid-19, a significant degree 
of informal consultation regularly occurred through pre-existing as well as ad 
hoc intergovernmental channels.
11.2.1  Public health, health-care delivery,  
and elderly care facilities
As the Supreme Court noted, health ‘is an amorphous topic which can be 
addressed by valid federal or provincial legislation, depending [on] the circum-
stances’ (Carter v. Canada (AG) 2015 SCC 5: paragraph 53). While in theory each 
order’s action finds its constitutional grounding in an exclusive power, there is, 
in practice, a substantial degree of de facto concurrency (Steytler 2017: 7). This 
generates both interdependence between orders of government and confusion 
about who can do what.
11.2.1.1 Federal constitutional authority and legislation
Ottawa’s explicit powers over health are limited to ‘quarantine’, ‘marine hos-
pitals’, and ‘patents’, including those for pharmaceuticals (Constitution Act of 
1867 [CA, 1867], section 91(11) and 91(22)). Of increasing relevance is reliance 
on the federal ‘criminal law’ power to intervene in matters of public health (CA, 
1867, section 91(27); Klein 2017). Explicit federal authority over certain classes 
of people, such as indigenous peoples and immigrants, extends to their health 
care and is exercised in conjunction with provinces. Ottawa has an important 
department of health and an arm’s-length public health agency.
Numerous federal statutes address health matters. The Quarantine Act of 
2002, for example, enables the federal administration to prohibit entry into 
Canada or subject it to strict conditions. It foresees some intergovernmental col-
laboration, including mandatory notification to provinces of suspected infected 
persons. It also authorises delegating the administration and enforcement of 
quarantine measures to provinces.
11.2.1.2 Provincial constitutional authority and legislation
Provinces bear the brunt of the burden of health-care delivery. Provincial power 
over health is rooted in one explicit section regarding hospitals and the very 
broad powers over ‘property and civil rights’ and ‘matters of a merely local or pri-
vate nature’ (CA, 1867, section 92(7), 92(13) and 92(16)). In practice, provinces 
are responsible for hospitals, and structuring public health care, among other 
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things. They are also responsible for long-term care for the elderly – the popula-
tion segment in which, in the first wave, most of the cases and deaths occurred.
Each province and territory has its own legislative and regulatory health 
scheme. Moreover, certain indigenous communities exercise a degree of self- 
government, including in regard to health matters. The overall public character 
of the health-care system depends largely on targeted federal financial transfers to 
provinces, with a loose conditionality set out in the Canada Health Act of 1985. 
These transfers have decreased significantly over the last several decades, a trend 
which provincial leaders have decried for years and which became acute during 
the Covid-19 pandemic.
11.2.2 Disaster and emergency management
As with health care, jurisdiction over disaster and emergency prevention and 
management is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution. In practice, it is 
a shared responsibility, with each order acting pursuant to some of its – officially – 
exclusive powers. In the Covid-19 context, it is mostly provincial emergency 
powers that have been mobilised.
11.2.2.1 Federal constitutional authority and legislation
Courts have grounded the federal emergency power in the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ clause (CA, 1867, section 91, preamble). The effect of invoking the 
federal emergency power is a temporary federal take-over of provincial jurisdic-
tion. The potential political fallout of such drastic action is a key limiting factor 
in the federal government’s decision to invoke this power (Deschenes 1992). A 
number of federal statutes provide legislative grounding for federal action in 
dealing with health emergencies. In the context of Covid-19, the Emergencies 
Act of 1988 and Emergency Management Act of 2007 stand out.
The former identifies four types of emergencies: public welfare, public order, 
international, and war. The classification affects permissible actions and the dura-
tion of the emergency declaration. Noteworthy, the Act subjects these meas-
ures to the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and provides 
for detailed parliamentary oversight mechanisms. It also explicitly recognises 
provincial jurisdiction over emergencies, imposes consultations, and invites con-
certed intergovernmental action. Parliament has thus strongly limited the condi-
tions under which a ‘federal take-over’ could occur.
For its part, the companion Emergency Management Act addresses emergency 
preparedness. It outlines the responsibilities of the federal minister of public safety. 
These include supporting – not overseeing – provincial or local emergency initiatives, 
establishing intergovernmental arrangements for consulting cabinet with respect 
to declarations of emergencies, and providing assistance – including financial – 
to provinces on request. As with the Emergencies Act, a federal institution may 
not respond to a provincial emergency unless the province requests assistance.
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Read in this way, both Acts seem like models of federalism of the type based 
on respect for provincial autonomy. The Emergencies Act was not activated in 
response to Covid-19, but the Emergency Management Act gave rise to some 
degree of intergovernmental preparation prior to the outbreak, steps which were 
initiated in March 2020.
11.2.2.2 Provincial constitutional authority and legislation
In parallel with the federal order’s powers in the context of emergencies, prov-
inces also have jurisdiction over disaster management and emergencies in areas 
that fall within their own sphere of competence (Deschenes 1992). This is not 
pursuant to any explicit constitutional provision but rather to provinces’ author-
ity over ‘local matters’ and the administration of justice (which includes the 
police) (CA, 1867, sections 92(13)–(14)). In some P/Ts, governmental depart-
ments have emergency response plans similar to federal ones.
The ‘real’ federal emergency power needs to be activated through a formal 
declaration by the governor-general, which did not occur. In a way, provin-
cial emergency powers are the baselines, with the federal one understood as the 
exception. Later, in Section 11.4.2, we address the question of why a federal 
emergency was not declared.
11.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
A number of intergovernmental committees and agreements were already in 
place at the beginning of the pandemic. Many of these structures were developed 
in the wake of Canada’s poor response to the outbreak in 2003 of SARS (severe 
acute respiratory syndrome), a response characterised by a lack of coordination 
between Ontario’s provincial authorities and the federal order (Fierlbeck and 
Hardcastle 2020).
The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) is a federal institution, not a 
multilateral one, yet its mandate includes promoting intergovernmental collab-
oration on public health policy and planning. Meanwhile, the Pan-Canadian 
Public Health Network is the primary intergovernmental body dealing with 
public health. It is governed by a council composed of federal and P/T govern-
ment officials and is accountable to another group of civil servants, the federal 
and P/T deputy ministers of health. The network has developed a number of 
intergovernmental agreements establishing frameworks for information-sharing 
and assistance with health resources during health emergencies.
The key intergovernmental agreement is the Federal/Provincial/Territorial 
Response Plan for Biological Events (Pan-Canadian Public Health Network 
2018a). It sets out a governance structure and articulates a complex response-pathway 
from notification of potential threats to post-incident review. It also outlines pos-
sible responsibilities for each order of government, including areas of overlap. 
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When a coordinated response is deemed necessary, a special advisory committee 
is established to advise the deputy ministers of health. The Plan also anticipates a 
plethora of working groups to address technical issues, logistics, and communi-
cations (McNeill and Topping 2018).
In addition to this general response plan, the network developed a specific 
pandemic flu guidance framework, articulated in the document, Canadian 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Planning Guidance for the Health Sector 
(Pan-Canadian Public Health Network 2018b). Intended to guide the develop-
ment of a consistent and coordinated F/P/T pandemic response, it – again – seeks 
to clarify responsibilities for each order of government regarding laboratory ser-
vices, public health measures, vaccines, and so on.
Four other intergovernmental agreements are worth noting. The Multilateral 
Information Sharing Agreement (Pan-Canadian Public Health Network 2014) sets 
out the terms for sharing information relevant for routine surveillance, case man-
agement, and responses to infectious diseases. The Memorandum of Understanding 
on the Provision of Mutual Aid in Relation to Health Resources during an 
Emergency Affecting the Health of the Public (Pan-Canadian Public Health 
Network 2009) establishes a framework for interjurisdictional sharing of health 
resources during public health crises. This led to the development of the Operational 
Framework for Mutual Aid Requests (OFMAR), a non-binding mechanism to 
operationalise the general framework and allow P/Ts to identify and share health-
care professionals and assets across jurisdictional boundaries during public health 
events (Framework for Mutual Aid Requests (OFMAR) n.d.). Even more specifi-
cally, in August 2020, PHAC released the collaboratively developed F/P/T Public 
Health Response Plan for Ongoing Management of Covid-19 (Public Health 
Agency of Canada 2020b). It uses epidemiological modelling to predict different 
scenarios and anticipate various responses until vaccines or treatments are in place.
In short, while the Response Plan for Biological Events sets out the govern-
ance structure, at least four intergovernmental agreements anticipate operational 
responses to a pandemic; the Covid-19 Plan detailing respective responsibilities 
for the current crisis. None of these agreements have statutory force, however. 
They are intergovernmental executive instruments, often written in rather hor-
tatory language, and probably even lacking in contractual force between the 
executive branches party to it (Poirier 2004).
11.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
A federal election in the autumn of 2019 saw the incumbent Liberal Party retain 
power, though as a minority government. Partisan politics are never hugely rele-
vant in IGR in Canada (Adam et al. 2015). They barely played a role in the initial 
response to Covid-19, either in the intergovernmental context or within orders of 
government. In fact, political leaders who did not get along particularly well, or 
had distinct political agendas, showed remarkable respect for one another during 
the first six months of the pandemic.
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While there was some later fracturing of this united front, criticism was 
directed less at the health crisis management and more at deficit-creating spend-
ing (federally) and at needs for greater funding (from provinces). Regardless 
of political affiliation, Canadians expressed high levels of satisfaction with 
the initial government responses (Harell 2020). With time, greater opposi-
tion was voiced through party politics, but it remained moderate and cordial 
(Noël 2020).
11.4.1 Taking the initiative
The measures set out in the Response Plan for Biological Events were activated 
by the federal PHAC in early January 2020 and a special advisory committee 
was established. By early March, the virus was spreading exponentially in cer-
tain regions. This asymmetrical impact saw some provinces mobilising more 
quickly than others. That being said, in contrast to the more disjointed reo-
pening schemes that were implemented as the pandemic progressed, these first 
initiatives took place in relatively close concert with each other.
On 13 March 2020, Québec became the first of Canada’s governments to 
declare a public health emergency, in the process shutting down schools, uni-
versities, and day-care centres and forbidding indoor gatherings of more than 
250 people. Subsequent provincial orders prohibited all indoor and outdoor 
gatherings and proscribed visits to hospitals and seniors’ residences. Inter-
regional travel was also banned and enforced by road blockades. An executive 
order gave Québec’s Minister of Health and Social Services enhanced powers, 
including the authority to contract without public tender. Legal prescription 
periods were suspended, as courts were closed for all but urgent matters. In 
short, the declaration of a public health emergency thrust Québec into a full-on 
pandemic response.
Four other provinces (Prince Edward Island, Ontario, British Columbia, 
and Alberta) all declared public health emergencies prior to significant fed-
eral response, which occurred on 18 March. Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, 
Labrador, and the three territories declared an emergency on the day the federal 
government closed the border with the United States, while New Brunswick, 
Manitoba, and Nova Scotia declared public health emergencies in the days there-
after (Breton and Tabbara 2020).
A federal response group was convened at the end of January 2020 to monitor 
the virus. Initial actions had an international focus, first with travel warnings 
and then repatriation of Canadians stranded abroad. In March, a special cabinet 
committee was established to ensure a whole-of-government response. From 
mid-March, all foreign nationals were banned from entering Canada (with lim-
ited exceptions) and anyone entering the country, including Canadians, had to 
quarantine. While public authorities take note of World Health Organization 
decisions, their actions do not seem to have been directly influenced by any 
supranational considerations.
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11.4.2 Federal action
Federal actions can be broadly classified into five categories. The first were 
measures taken pursuant to various areas of federal jurisdiction. Regulations and 
orders were issued addressing quarantine, air, rail and marine travel, drug safety, 
financial administration, federal prisons, indigenous services, and immigration 
and justice matters. In tandem with the provinces, Ottawa scaled up its procure-
ment of medical supplies and personal protective equipment (PPE) and negoti-
ated with pharmaceutical companies to procure an eventual vaccine.2
Secondly, responding to provincial requests, the Canadian armed forces sent 
personnel to 54 long-term care homes (47 in Québec and 7 in Ontario). In the 
first wave, 80 per cent of deaths occurred in these institutions, which were woe-
fully ill-prepared compared to hospitals. Soldiers were also deployed to remote 
areas, notably to support indigenous communities (National Defence 2020).
A third set of initiatives provided direct financial support to citizens, organi-
sations, and interest groups. Two ‘omnibus’ bills (Covid-19 Emergency Response 
Act Nos. 1 and 2, 2020) dealt with tax deferrals, insurance, the housing mortgage 
industry, student loans, farm credit, and the like. A wage subsidy programme 
for businesses, along with temporary income benefits for workers and students 
unable to work, were rapidly introduced. Funding was also mobilised to support 
scientific industry research, including vaccine development.
Fourth, Ottawa supported provincial initiatives, much in the way it does in 
non-pandemic times. Pursuant to the multilateral Safe Restart Agreement, con-
cluded in September 2020, Ottawa would transfer CAD 19 billion to provinces 
and territories for a range of measures, with P/Ts specifying their respective needs 
(Intergovernmental Affairs 2020). These included testing, tracing, health care, 
long-term care support, PPE procurement, child care, and support for munici-
palities. Additional funding targeted, inter alia, homelessness, gender-based vio-
lence, indigenous communities, and schools.
The fifth category of federal action includes the issuance – often in an inter-
governmental setting – of guidance frameworks in a flurry of domains, often 
within provincial jurisdiction, such as virtual health-care delivery, schools, long-
term care, and funeral homes. Ottawa also developed a smartphone tracing app 
into which provinces could co-opt.
Perhaps strikingly from a comparative perspective is what the federal order 
did not do: declare a full-on pan-Canadian state of emergency. While there is no 
doubt that the Emergencies Act could have been invoked, it was not, for at least 
five reasons. To begin with, it was not truly necessary. The federal government 
could close borders, impose quarantine, and assist provinces – including deploy-
ing the army – under existing legislation. Secondly, every P/T rapidly declared 
‘health emergencies’. Given that the pandemic affected regions differently – as 
noted, geography matters – a wholesale, one-size-fits-all solution was not war-
ranted, particularly in that the P/T generally all adopted restrictive measures, at 
any rate in the early stages.
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Thirdly, the Emergencies Act requires provincial buy-in, mostly in the form 
of consultation and, where it is the case that an emergency is localised, actual 
provincial consent. Ottawa chose to heed the provinces’ express reluctance to 
see the Act invoked. Fourth, the Emergencies Act places the executive branch 
under strict parliamentary scrutiny. Parliamentary sittings were reduced as of 
mid-March and used mostly to adopt specific legislation (introducing financial 
aid packages, for instance). The executive was even authorised to circumvent the 
need for appropriations bills (An Act to amend the Financial Administration Act 
(special warrant), 2020; MacDonnell 2020). Parliament was in fact suspended 
between mid-August and 23 September 2020. Meanwhile, the Senate, including 
its committees, resumed sitting in any regular manner only in October. Overall, 
Parliament was less mobilised than it would have been under the Emergencies 
Act. Hence, paradoxically, not invoking it probably increased the federal execu-
tive’s room for manoeuvre (Leuprecht 2020).
Finally, for reasons unrelated to the pandemic, there was political reluctance 
in Ottawa, at least under Liberal leadership, to invoke federal emergency powers. 
The last time these were put into action was in the 1970 October Crisis when a 
foreign diplomat was kidnapped and a provincial minister killed, in the context 
of claims for Québec’s independence. At the request of the Québec government, 
Ottawa had sent the army to Montreal, civil liberties were suspended, and nearly 
500 people imprisoned, most of them without being charged. The federal prime 
minister at the time, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, was the father of the current Prime 
Minister, Justin Trudeau. It is likely that the latter sought to avoid rekindling that 
saga 50 years later, even if in very different circumstances.
In brief, emergency powers were in place as of March 2020, but only within 
provincial and territorial legal orders. Federal action was grounded instead in 
other – less politically sensitive and constraining – legislation. As the third wave 
of infection began to spread, it remains to be seen whether the federal govern-
ment might change its strategy in favour of a more centrally driven response. But 
this, in our view, is unlikely.
11.4.3 Provincial and territorial action
It will be apparent by now that there were (at least) 13 different pandemic regimes 
in Canada, each corresponding to the circumstances of a P/T (and in some cases, 
those of indigenous communities). Nonetheless, there was initially a degree of 
convergence. The following is a partial survey of the measures taken.
Between March and September 2020, all 10 provinces declared a state of 
emergency. At different points, they all closed schools, restaurants (except for 
take-out), and bars, radically restricted visits to long-term care centres, pro-
hibited residential evictions, and limited gatherings indoors and outdoors. 
Moreover, most constitutive units closed day-care centres, sport facilities, and 
cultural centres (Breton and Tabbara 2020). All P/T legislative assembly meet-
ings were temporarily suspended (Sahota 2020).
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Extraordinary measures affecting labour and employment law were taken. Just 
within Québec, executive orders suspended the terms of some collective agree-
ments, allowing forced overtime for health-care staff, preventing them from tak-
ing vacation, and permitting compulsory reassignment. The latter measure led 
to health-adjacent personnel such as speech therapists being sent to fill staffing 
shortages in long-term care homes. While many drastic measures were lifted 
during summer, some were re-implemented in autumn.
In addition to federal initiatives, some provinces introduced financial support 
measures, such as grants and loan-forgiveness for small businesses, investment 
programmes for hard-hit industries (e.g., restaurants and the arts), and bonuses 
for essential workers (Lee and Hamidian 2020). However, certain provinces were 
criticised for clawing back federal assistance payments (Béland et al. 2020a).
Given the significantly divergent impact of the pandemic in the first wave, 
there was noticeably greater variation in reopening protocols than observed 
in the initial shutdown. In some provinces, students returned to classes in the 
spring, while others waited until autumn. Ontario offered a choice between vir-
tual classrooms or in-class teaching, while Québec favoured in-person schooling 
until it opted for limited ‘alternate days’ for some students when the second wave 
expanded. There was a patchwork of mandatory mask mandates, with some 
provinces leading the charge and others leaving the decision to local authori-
ties. At least four provinces (Manitoba, New Brunswick, Québec, and Ontario) 
created a colour-coded system to introduce measures of variable intensity in 
different intra-provincial regions. The strict approach taken by the territories 
may be explained in part by their particular geographic situation as remote 
Northern communities, where accessing health resources is a challenge. This is 
compounded by demographics, as territories have significant indigenous com-
munities, often marginalised in the Canadian health-care system.
Particularly fascinating was the asymmetrical closure of interprovincial bor-
ders. The Atlantic provinces created an ‘Atlantic travel bubble’ whereby anyone 
entering from the rest of the country had to self-isolate for 14 days upon arrival, 
with some exceptions made for the eastern parts of Québec. This paid divi-
dends – the region was spared the high death rates and resurgent infection rates 
observed elsewhere. Nunavut and the Northwest Territories created a two-unit 
travel bubble. Manitoba required self-isolation for anyone entering the province 
from the east, but not the north or west (where infection rates were lower). 
Saskatchewan, Québec, and Manitoba limited intra-provincial travel to protect 
certain regions or indigenous communities regarded as vulnerable.
Canadians enjoy a constitutional right to move across the country, subject to 
limitations deemed justifiable in a ‘free and democratic society’ (CA, 1982, sec-
tions 1, 6(2)). While Ottawa could limit or prohibit inter- and intra-provincial 
travel under the Emergencies Act, whether provinces have constitutional jurisdic-
tion to take similar actions is unclear. A court in Newfoundland ruled that the 
province’s severe travel restrictions (before the creation of the Atlantic bubble) 
were valid exercises of provincial power and constituted reasonable limitations 
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on mobility rights, given the nature of the pandemic (Taylor v. Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 2020 NLSC 125). This decision was being appealed, and other chal-
lenges targeting travel restrictions were also making their way through the courts.
By and large, few courts have issued decisions assessing the legality of gov-
ernment decisions in response to Covid-19 in general. In addition to challenges 
to interprovincial travel bans, legal action has targeted occupational safety reg-
ulations regarding the use (or not) of PPE, confinement and social distancing, 
mandatory masks, and return to school protocols. In any event, it is doubtful that 
judicial review can compensate for shortcomings in political accountability, given 
the courts’ deferential attitudes to valid delegations of authority (Daly 2020a).
Parliamentary scrutiny of executive action also varied across provinces. As 
with the federal parliament, several provincial legislatures adapted their schedules, 
often with virtual options (Sahota 2020). Much of the regulatory activity related 
to the Covid-19 response occurred through subordinate legislation, in the form of 
ministerial orders, which are not subject to legislative debate (Daly 2020b).
11.4.4 Local government actions
Under Canadian law, municipalities do not constitute a third order of govern-
ment. Local authorities only enjoy powers delegated through provincial legisla-
tion. That said, while their autonomy is formally limited, they have a wide range 
of responsibilities, all of which the health crisis put to the test (Flynn 2020). 
For example, many cities reimagined urban spaces to facilitate social distanc-
ing and distributed free masks to citizens even in the absence of province-wide 
mask mandates. The limitations of municipal authority were also evident. For 
instance, Toronto’s health director lacked power to implement enhanced pub-
lic health measures at the beginning of the second wave and issued a call for 
Ontario’s top health officer to take action.
Municipalities raised concerns about the strain the crisis was putting on their 
budgets. The misalignment of revenue and expenditure responsibilities was the 
greatest for municipalities, with the Federation of Canadian Municipalities call-
ing for CAD 10 billion in emergency federal funding (Béland et al. 2020c). 
This pan-Canadian organisation created a Covid-19 website highlighting avail-
able municipal resources and local innovation. That apart, there did not seem to 
be any ground-breaking sharing of best practices to maximise the ‘laboratory’ 
potential of decentralisation, albeit information-sharing certainly took place, nor 
was there systematic coordination between regional and municipal authorities.
11.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
There is a general consensus that federal and P/T intergovernmental commu-
nication during the first wave of the pandemic response was fairly effective 
(Schertzer and Paquet 2020a). Governments avoided undermining each other’s 
public health directives, in stark contrast with the situation south of the border. 
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Federal and P/T leaders publicly committed to ongoing collaboration when 
restarting the economy and de-escalating public health measures.
The fact that Ottawa did not invoke federal emergency powers probably set 
a positive tone of respect between orders of government. Nonetheless, certain 
measures that were announced at the opening of Parliament in September 2020 
potentially altered that sentiment. For instance, Ottawa suggested that it might 
impose ‘national standards’ on long-term care homes. As it does not have consti-
tutional authority in this area, it could act only through its spending power. This 
announcement annoyed some provinces, which reaffirmed their jurisdictions 
and called for increased – and unconditional – federal funding.
By contrast to Belgium’s National Security Council, or Australia’s ‘National 
Cabinet’, there was very little structured or visible interaction between govern-
ments. Federal press conferences were held in parallel with those of the prov-
inces. The public was simply told that regular phones calls were being made 
among the top leadership. Informal discussions with senior civil servants reveal 
that a lot of intergovernmental communication and consultation took place in a 
wide range of contexts. These were grounded in existing emergency preparation 
plans but also emerged spontaneously as the need arose.
The pandemic generated creative forms of horizontal cooperation, particu-
larly between provinces with regional and economic ties. The eastern provinces 
have a history of regional cooperation, including in the health sector, which may 
explain the fact that they managed to forge the ‘Atlantic bubble’. Québec and 
Ontario premiers and several members of their cabinets held joint meetings. That 
being said, provinces generally acted with a great deal of autonomy, with calls 
made for greater interprovincial action and pooling of best practices.
The degree to which pre-existing intergovernmental arrangements were 
effected in practice is also unclear. The detailed three-layered coordination 
frameworks set out in the Response Plan for Biological Events, the Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness Plan, and the specific Covid-19 plan seem to have been 
mobilised, although the extent to which they were followed, or were effec-
tive, remains difficult to ascertain. Similarly, while the federal government made 
billions of dollars in funding available to the provinces, little information was 
publicly available about the details of the funding agreements. Formal sources 
of horizontal cooperative arrangements, such as the Atlantic bubble, are also 
difficult to access. What one saw were the results, but not the processes or legal 
mechanisms on which they were built.
In short, IGR remain executive-led. They are apparently widespread, rela-
tively effective, and quietly innovative – and as opaque as ever.
11.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Canadian fiscal federalism faced major criticism prior to the pandemic – the 
economic challenges created by Covid-19 only exacerbated some of these ten-
sions. While provinces enjoy substantial taxing powers, the federal order has 
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much greater fiscal capacity; meanwhile, the cost for provinces of meeting their 
responsibilities continues to rise. This imbalance was reinforced by the fact that 
key areas impacted on by the pandemic – such as health care, long-term care, 
education, housing, and most social assistance programmes – are provincial 
responsibilities. Although Ottawa announced major financial transfers to P/Ts in 
response to the pandemic, securing the funding was likely to prove challenging, 
given the politics of negotiating bilateral transfer agreements. Québec in particu-
lar has been a vocal opponent of conditional federal funding.
Scholars have suggested that Covid-19 might provide the momentum for sig-
nificant structural changes in Canadian fiscal federalism or certain federal redis-
tribution programmes such as (un)employment insurance (Béland et al. 2020b; 
Noël 2020). Political actors were certainly trying to seize the opportunity, with 
Québec and Ontario advocating for increased health-related transfers. Alberta, 
which has been a net contributor to fiscal equalisation for decades but has been 
facing a major economic crisis since the prices of fossil fuel crashed, also pushed 
for reforms to fiscal federalism, even calling for a referendum to launch a consti-
tutional reform of fiscal equalisation across the federation.
11.5 Findings and policy implications
11.5.1 Effectiveness of the federal system
Mixed conclusions are drawn from the Canadian response to the first wave of 
Covid-19. At one end of the spectrum, some maintain that Covid-19 under-
scores the strength of a decentralised system in that it allows for effective asym-
metrical responses (Mathieu and Guénette 2020). Diversity in epidemiological 
and geographical realities calls for localised solutions. High infection rates in 
some provinces did not lead to widespread outbreaks in neighbouring ones. This 
might be explained in part by the high degree of convergence in initial pro-
vincial responses and the unprecedented closure of domestic borders. Indeed, 
some provinces were modelling solutions based on other provinces’ experiences. 
Migone notes that compared to the SARS outbreak, there was greater coopera-
tion, a trend she attributes to Canada’s tradition of executive federalism, includ-
ing the interjurisdictional bodies and agreements specifically designed to palliate 
policy fragmentation and jurisdictional turf wars (Migone 2020). We see subsidi-
arity as well as ‘cooperative’ and ‘laboratory federalism’ at play.
At the other end of the spectrum, critics argue that Canada’s Covid-19 
response was bungled due to a weak federal presence. Notably, they criticise the 
Multilateral Information Sharing Agreement, which allows provinces to limit 
the publication of data otherwise needed to craft effective responses (Attaran and 
Houston 2020). The extent to which Ottawa could impose health-data-sharing 
on provinces is, however, uncertain from a constitutional perspective. Others 
also called for greater federal action, not through the Emergencies Act – which 
only justifies federal temporary intervention – but through the initiation of 
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pan-Canadian policy responses to address social problems arising from (or exac-
erbated by) the pandemic (Lee and Hamidian 2020). This would likely generate 
jurisdictional battles.
Somewhere in the middle, others reject greater centralisation but also deplore 
ad hoc mechanisms activated only during a crisis and the lack of sustained, coor-
dinated actions. This contributes to thin intergovernmental trust (Schertzer and 
Paquet 2020b). In response to this intergovernmental weakness, Da Silva and 
Saint-Hilaire call for a new multilateral intergovernmental agreement to clarify 
roles and responsibilities and increase vertical and horizontal coordination (Da 
Silva and Saint-Hilaire 2020). They suggest that an intergovernmental agree-
ment would ease provincial concerns about federal intrusion, as intervention 
conditions would be outlined and agreed upon. Unfortunately, they do not iden-
tify precise failings of the current intergovernmental bodies and agreements – a 
failure which only serves to underline the opacity of IGR alluded to previously.
11.5.2 Impact on the federation’s multinational character
It is generally admitted that systemic issues make indigenous populations more 
vulnerable to Covid-19, with such issues including overcrowded housing, home-
lessness, high incarceration rates, inadequate health services, food insecurity, lack 
of clean water, and the remoteness of northern, fly-in communities (Carling 
and Mankani 2020). In addition to the differential impacts of urban/rural and 
on-reserve/off-reserve divides, the tug-of-war between Ottawa and provinces 
regarding services to indigenous peoples is bound to have an impact in crisis 
situations (Poirier and Hedaraly 2020). Some indigenous communities adopted 
self-isolation measures, such as putting up road blocks to prevent visitors from 
entry. For outside observers, what is striking is that indigenous peoples seemed 
to be largely absent from public media as interlocutors or decision-makers; the 
narrative instead was mainly about ‘protecting’ these communities. This seems 
to contrast with the place which reconciliation and the call for indigenous self- 
government occupied in public discourse just prior to the pandemic.
Unsurprisingly, a new chapter in the Québec-Canada story was also unfold-
ing. At least since the 1960s, Québec has considered itself a distinct nation within 
Canada. Yet appeals by the premier to the special solidarity that Québécois are 
supposed to share with each other did not appear to resonate strongly with the 
population. Health care and old-age housing – under provincial jurisdiction – 
proved to be dramatically inadequate. Initially at least, infection and death rates 
were initially – inexplicably – higher in Québec than in the rest of the country. 
Sociologists will have much to reflect upon in considering the impact of the 
pandemic on Québec’s sense of ‘distinctiveness’ and how this played out in its 
commitment to, or rejection of, the federal system.
The Québec government’s decision to request military assistance in staffing 
long-term care homes was undoubtedly difficult for what is not an officially 
independentist but nationalist government. When Québec requested that the 
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military remain until autumn, the federal government refused. Québec replied 
that its tax contributions help fund the military (National Assembly 2020). As a 
compromise, the Canadian Red Cross stepped in to fill personnel shortages … 
with federal funding!
French-speaking minorities in other provinces saw their linguistic rights 
abridged during the pandemic. Since the outbreak, respect for linguistic obli-
gations in certain public institutions and governments gradually diminished 
(Chouinard and Normand 2020). For example, Ottawa exempted certain prod-
ucts from bilingual labelling. In New Brunswick, the only officially bilingual 
province, the premier refused simultaneous interpretation services during brief-
ings and even ignored questions from French-speaking journalists. In contrast, 
Québec authorities conduct a (limited) part of all briefings in English, and key 
communications were available in both languages on government websites (as it 
is for the federal order).
The extent to which public messaging reached immigrant communities was 
also of concern, particularly given that some of these communities were hard-hit 
by the virus. Several provinces, notably British Columbia, disseminated infor-
mation in a number of languages other than French and English.
11.5.3 Looking to the future: Quo vadis, the federal spirit?
The impact of federalism on pandemic management is a trade-off (Migone 
2020). The Canadian model’s strength is its ability to tailor responses to different 
needs; the cost is a lesser degree of coordination, even when it would be benefi-
cial. This, of course, is a textbook instance of the advantages and disadvantages 
of federalism.
A main thread in the story is that both provinces and the centre remained 
strong actors during the pandemic in 2020. Despite the absence of constitution-
alised and structural inputs into federal law-making, several key federal acts do 
call for consultation and coordination with provinces. Ottawa’s decision not to 
invoke the Emergencies Act – particularly in the face of provincial resistance – 
suggests that it did not seek to play a dominant role. Federal action, especially of 
such a pronounced kind, would have required serious provincial buy-in.
Also noteworthy during the Covid-19 crisis: orders of government did not raise 
jurisdictional obstacles to each other. When Québec sent officials to the Montreal 
airport prior to federal action on Ottawa’s part, the latter did not flinch, nor did 
it object to provinces closing internal borders. Despite the absence of any recog-
nised principle of subsidiarity in Canadian constitutional law, the federal order was 
probably only too relieved to leave these difficult decisions to provinces. In turn, 
the Québec government called upon the army and allowed Ottawa to set up new – 
emergency – income replacement programmes. In a federation where governments 
use courts fairly regularly to clarify federal issues, it is striking that basically no chal-
lenges to actions taken by any order of government seem to have been considered. 
Whether this constitutional truce will last was, of course, an open question.
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In the landscape of Canadian federalism, the real test moving forward will 
be managing the aftermath of Covid-19. Numerous economic response meas-
ures have generated the highest federal deficit since the 1960s. This is bound to 
have a major impact on equalisation and transfer payments. The resultant social 
problems are likely to fall in the provinces’ backyards, as they did in the 1990s 
during a period of federal fiscal austerity, apart from the issues of who will pay 
for the required measures, and how, the situation risks increasing fiscal inequal-
ity between provinces (Noël 2020). These concerns are exacerbated by serious 
budgetary problems in British Columbia and Alberta, which are historically net 
contributors to equalisation.
Interprovincial solidarity is thus both reinforced and tested. Regional blocs 
have emerged to improve public health measures but so too for maximising 
bargaining power and political pressure on the federal government. Meanwhile, 
solidarity has also been strained for non-pandemic reasons, such as environ-
mental policy and fiscal redistribution. Vertical and horizontal friction will be 
heightened in the course of events as orders of government attempt to recover 
from the economic impact of Covid-19. In their reading of Canada’s experience 
in 2020, Schertzer and Paquet see complex intergovernmental problems being 
met initially in a collaborative manner, only to give way to subsequent conflict 
(Schertzer and Paquet 2020b). This suggests that we should anticipate that ris-
ing intergovernmental tensions will partly displace the current cooperation and 
interjurisdictional respect as the pandemic and its aftermath unfold.
Notes
 1 We thank Atagün Kejanlioglu, Félix Mathieu, Dave Guénette, André Lecours, and Chris-
tian Leuprecht for their helpful comments, as well as Melisande Charbonneau-Gravel 
for superb research assistance on intergovernmental agreements. We are also grateful for 
the financial support of the Research Support Programme of the Québec Secretariat for 
Canadian Relations and of the Centre de recherche interdisciplinaire sur la diversité et la 
démocratie (CRIDAQ).
 2 The Canadian Armed Forces coordinated PPE stocks and flew them across the country 
to ensure that all P/Ts had adequate supplies.
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MANAGING THE CORONAVIRUS 
PANDEMIC IN A CENTRALISED 
FEDERAL SYSTEM
The case of Mexico
José María Serna de la Garza
12.1 Introduction
According to its most recent census, taken in 2010 (the 2020 census was sus-
pended due to the pandemic), Mexico has a population of 120 million people. 
Of this count, 25.694 million (21.5 per cent of the total) consider themselves 
members of the indigenous population, with 7.3 million people over the age of 
3 years speaking a Native-American language – of them, 12 out of every 100 do 
not speak Spanish. Around 77.8 per cent of Mexicans live in urban areas, and the 
balance of 22.2 per cent in rural areas (INEGI 2010), yet in spite of this high rate 
of urbanisation, the population is dispersed across a territory almost 2 million 
km2 in size and characterised by great geographical diversity, as a result of which 
there are important regional differences in cultural and political identity. These 
differences, however, have not led any subnational community to claim recog-
nition as a ‘nation within the nation’ (as happened, for example, with Catalonia 
in its relationship with Spain), nor does any component of the Mexican union 
demand secession.
Mexico’s rather centralised federation consists of 31 states, Mexico City 
(which has a different status), and 2,457 municipalities. The origins of its cen-
tralisation lie in the hegemonic party system that prevailed between 1929 and 
2000. In this system, an all-powerful president led a party that controlled most 
of the political positions at national and subnational level, subordinated state and 
municipal authorities to his will, and centralised the federal arrangement by way 
of formulas for allocating powers and sharing fiscal revenue (Cabrero Mendoza 
2013). To this day, the logic of centralisation persists in the institutional and 
normative design of what is otherwise a competitively multiparty federal system.
Mexico’s first case of Covid-19 – a 35-year-old man who had travelled from 
Italy to Mexico – was reported on 28 February 2020 in Mexico City, and its first 
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fatality, on 18 March. During 2020, there were more than 90,000 deaths from 
Covid-19. States and municipalities were the first to take steps to combat the 
pandemic; as for the federal government, it espoused a policy of denialism until 
it became evident that Mexico (and the rest of the world) was facing a global 
health crisis. After numerous social and economic activities were placed under 
lockdown, a gradual reopening began in June of the year, though the pace and 
rhythm of the lockdown and reopening were a matter of dispute between the 
federal and state governments.
This chapter examines the actions and decisions that federal, state, and munic-
ipal actors took during the 2020 pandemic within the applicable constitutional 
and legislative framework. The general goal is to identify what can be learnt 
about Mexico’s federal system by analysing their behaviour; the argument made 
is that, in spite of a centralised federal system, states and municipalities played a 
significant role in combating Covid-19, thus reinvigorating that system.
The study covers the period from 18 March to 31 October 2020. During this 
period, in which the initial shock of the pandemic occurred, it was possible to 
observe key federal issues play out in regard to the distribution of powers and 
responsibilities and intergovernmental relations in the context of fighting the 
pandemic; in addition, demands and proposals were made for aspects of the fed-
eral system to be changed, chiefly ones relating to fiscal federalism.
12.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
12.2.1 Division of powers and functions
The principle by which powers and competences are allocated in Mexico’s federal 
system is found in the residual clause of article 124 of the Mexican Constitution of 
1917, according to which the powers not expressly attributed by the Constitution 
to the federal authorities are reserved to the states or Mexico City. There is a 
long list of such federal powers (Serna de la Garza 2013: 134–161). However, 
a number of policy areas are subject to a regime of concurrent powers, which 
entails that the Federal Congress can pass a statute distributing competences 
and responsibilities between the two (or among the three) levels of government 
– municipalities are recognised under article 115 of the Constitution as a third 
order of government.
Matters of ‘general health’ are subject to a regime of concurrent powers. The 
General Law on Health of 7 February 1984, passed by the federal Congress, 
distributes competences between the federal and state authorities in connection 
with different aspects of public health care. The federal government, through the 
Ministry of Health, has the power to issue general guidelines for the provision of 
public health services, powers of coordination of the National Health System,1 
and inspection powers to verify compliance with those guidelines. Moreover, 
the General Law on Health provides powers to the states in regard to the oper-
ation of public health services within their territories (González Block 2020).
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The federal government provides health services and social security to two 
categories of insured people: private sector employees, through a federal entity 
called the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS), and federal govern-
ment employees, through the Institute for Social Security and Services for State 
Workers (ISSSTE). Some federal ministries or agencies have health services and 
social security schemes of their own for their employees. For their part, state gov-
ernments likewise provide health services and social security for state employees. 
In addition, they have operative powers to provide public health services to the 
‘open’ population, that is to say, to uninsured people.
Municipal governments do not have direct competence in the provision of 
health-care services, but do have constitutional powers that have an impact on 
public health, given that they are in charge of a variety of public functions and 
services. These include drinking water, drainage, and sanitation; street lighting; 
refuse removal; municipal markets and wholesale markets; cemeteries; slaugh-
terhouses; streets, parks, and gardens; and public security, including preventative 
policing and traffic police (Graizbord 2009).
Public education is a subject matter that likewise falls under a regime of con-
current powers. In this regard, the General Law on Education of 30 September 
2019 distributes competences and powers in this field among the different orders 
of government. Broadly speaking, the federal government, through the Ministry 
of Public Education, has the power to carry out global planning and programme 
direction of the national education system for the provision of public education, 
further to which it has powers of inspection over federal and state public schools 
as well as private education institutions; as for states, they are in charge of man-
aging public state schools of the different levels of government.
12.2.2  Declaration of national disasters or states  
of emergency
Article 29 of Mexico’s Constitution establishes a procedure for suspending or 
restricting rights by means of a declaration of a national disaster or state of emer-
gency. In terms of this procedure, the President must obtain the approval of the 
Congress of the Union for such a declaration. The mechanism in article 29 has 
been activated only once, in the context of the Second World War, and was 
not to put to work during the Covid-19 crisis. Neither the states nor municipal 
governments have constitutional powers like these. States do not have the oppor-
tunity to participate in the procedure foreseen in article 29. This procedure is 
exclusively in the hands of federal entities, namely, the President of the Republic 
and the Congress of the Union.
In regard to disaster management, civil protection is a matter that falls under 
a normative regime of ‘coordination’, which is different from the regime of ‘con-
currency’. Under the latter, the federal Congress can pass a statute that distributes 
powers and competences among the different orders of government in a specific 
subject matter. Under ‘coordination’, the federal Congress does not distribute 
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powers but creates mechanisms of coordination and collaboration among orders 
of government in a specific policy area (Serna de la Garza 2009). Accordingly, the 
General Law on Civil Protection of 6 June 2012, passed by the federal Congress, 
creates a system of coordination and collaboration between federal, state, and 
municipal authorities to react in cases of natural or man-made disasters. This 
system was, however, not put to use during the 2020 pandemic.
Article 73(XVI) of the Constitution defines two authorities that have the 
power to make decisions in a health crisis: the Ministry of Health and the Board 
of General Health. Both have the power to issue orders and provisions of manda-
tory compliance by the authorities of the three orders of government in the event 
‘of a serious epidemic or risk of invasion of exotic diseases’.
12.2.3 Health in the constitution and statute law
According to article 4(4), of the Constitution,
[e]very person has the right to health protection. The law shall determine 
the bases and terms to access health services and shall establish the concur-
rence of the Federation and the States in regard to general health according 
to the item XVI in Article 73 of this Constitution.
In its development of this constitutional regime of concurrence, the normative 
scheme established by the General Law on Health in connection with fighting a 
pandemic can be summarised as follows: If a communicable disease threatens to 
become a serious danger in the territory of a state, the state authorities, in exer-
cise of the reserved powers they enjoy in accordance with the logic of article 124 
of the Constitution, can take such health measures as they are entitled to under 
the local legal order. Furthermore, this is particularly the case if, for some reason, 
the Federal Ministry of Health and the Board of General Health decide not to 
exercise their powers in the matter (e.g. if they regard the disease not as a threat 
to the general health of the republic, but as a problem limited to the territorial 
scope of a state). However, if the Ministry of Health and/or the Board of General 
Health decide/s to exercise their powers in this matter, then the state authorities 
must be subject to the general provisions, measures, and actions that these federal 
bodies dictate in addressing the health emergency.
12.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
Normatively speaking, the Board of General Health has an intergovernmental 
dimension inasmuch as some state ministers of health form part of its structure 
and participate in its sessions, with voice though without vote. In theory, then, 
the Board should function as a forum for intergovernmental relations. However, 
in practice it does not function in a collegiate way, given that its decisions are 
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taken by the Federal Ministry of Health. Prior to the 2020 pandemic, the last 
time the Board of General Health and the Ministry of Health issued general 
norms to control a pandemic was in 2009, in the context of the H1N1 influenza.
There is also a Federal Aid Plan for the Civilian Population in Disaster Cases 
known as the DN-III Plan, which is a military operational instrument that estab-
lishes general guidelines for the Mexican army and navy to carry out relief activ-
ities if the population is affected by disasters of natural or human origin. Its legal 
basis is in articles 21 and 73 of the General Law on Civil Protection and article 1 
of the Organic Law of the Mexican Army and Air Force.
12.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
When the pandemic struck, party-political contestation was already much in 
the foreground, so governors and legislators duly responded to the crisis along 
party lines.2 Supporters of the President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and his 
party, the Movement for National Regeneration, or Movimiento de Regeneración 
Nacional (MORENA), followed federal directives and guidelines with little criti-
cism, although there were a few exceptions.3 For their part, governors within the 
opposition established different groups (four in total) to form a common front in 
resisting particular federal directives.
These groups were organised along party and regional lines, with the most 
visible of them being the so-called Federalist Alliance. Made up of 10 governors, 
it drew together opposition parties on the left, centre, and right of Mexico’s 
political spectrum. Its members were the governors of Aguascalientes (PAN), 
Coahuila (PRI), Guanajuato (PAN), Jalisco (MC), Colima (PRI), Michoacán 
(PRD), Nuevo León (no party affiliation), Tamaulipas (PAN), Chihuahua 
(PAN), and Durango (PRI). In September 2020, they decided to withdraw from 
the National Conference of Governors – which has represented all state gover-
nors since the early 2000s – on the grounds that it did not defend the sovereignty 
of the states, operate effectively, or serve as a forum for dialogue with the federal 
executive.4
The pandemic not only deepened political divisions but also further mar-
ginalised Mexico’s indigenous peoples. Many such communities lack clinics, as 
a result of which some of them closed access to their towns or locales as the 
only way to avoid infection. Many of them had also not received information 
in their own languages on how to take care of themselves during the pandemic. 
For example, the leader of the Council of Community Government of Chilón, 
which represents about 600 communities of the Tzeltal ethnic group, accused 
health authorities of having done nothing to help them. Under circumstances 
like these, indigenous peoples resort to traditional medical practices but still 
claim for more assistance from health authorities. The Nich Ixim Midwife 
Movement of Chiapas, which advocates on behalf of indigenous midwives in 
the state of Chiapas, sought to guide community members on how to implement 
prevention measures in the absence of resources such as sanitisers and masks.
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Such communities generally lack clinics, health services, and regular access 
to water and are challenged by linguistic barriers, inequality, exclusion, and his-
torical neglect. During the pandemic, many were demanding that authorities at 
least provide mobile clinics, along with appropriate personnel and equipment 
(Reforma, 19 April 2020: 10). In the face of inaction by health authorities, some 
local authorities, such as the municipality of Ometepec (in the state of Guerrero), 
denied access to non-residents and imposed evening curfews, with sanctions of 
arrest of up to 36 hours for transgressors.
12.4.1 Taking the initiative
Some states, and even municipal authorities, were the first to take measures to 
combat the pandemic. On 13 March 2020, while the federal government was 
still denying the dangers of Covid-19, the governor of Jalisco, Enrique Alfaro, a 
member of the centrist opposition party Movimiento Ciudadano (MC), announced a 
number of response measures (Reforma, 18 March 2020: 1). First, he set up a panel 
of experts with advisory functions and, secondly, a coordination mechanism for 
engaging with municipal governments and academic institutions to reach con-
sensus on what to do. On the same day, Alfaro announced the postponement of 
mass events including a film festival and pre-Olympic football tournament. On 15 
March, he suspended in-person classes in state public schools and ordered the use 
of Covid-19 screening and sanitisation stations at state airports and bus stations.
Similarly, on 17 March 2020 both Alfaro and the governor of Nuevo Leon 
ordered the closure of public places such as bars, casinos, cinemas, and restaurants. 
At the local level, the municipal government of San Pedro Garza García (in the 
state of Nuevo León) also reacted rapidly. On 17 March 2020 it declared a ‘state of 
emergency’, ordering measures that included the temporary closure of bars, clubs, 
discos, breweries, gyms, and places of worship, as well as the cancellation of per-
mits for all public and private events in public spaces (Reforma, 18 March 2020: 1).
Alfaro’s precautionary measures drew criticism from the Federal Ministry 
of Health, which at that early, uncertain point in the pandemic deemed the 
state of Jalisco’s actions as unnecessary. Federal-state tensions continued to rise, 
though, when the governor of Jalisco announced a programme of rapid tests for 
the coronavirus, thereby contradicting a federal policy stance that, then as later, 
gave little to no credence or importance to testing. Finally, on 16 April 2020, the 
Ministry of Health accused the government of Guadalajara (the capital city of 
Jalisco) of not complying with suspension of non-essential commercial activities 
as ordered by federal authorities (Reforma, 18 April 2020: 7).
In spite of the fact that the first infection in Mexico was reported on 
27 February 2020, during the next 30 days the federal government continued 
allowing mass events and football games of the national league. Likewise, the 
President continued attending public meetings, shaking hands, and kissing peo-
ple without him or other participants wearing face masks. On 22 March he 
was still inviting Mexicans to go out in the streets and dine at restaurants to 
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strengthen the economy (Reforma, 13 May 2020: 12). The first action by the 
federal government came only on 30 March 2020, when the Board of General 
Health issued a decree by which a health emergency of force majeure was declared. 
One day later, the Ministry of Health issued a decree enumerating extraordinary 
actions to address this emergency. Among other things, the public, social, and 
private sectors had to implement measures that included the ‘immediate suspen-
sion of non-essential activities’.
12.4.2 Federal action
12.4.2.1 Initial federal action
The Board of General Health’s Declaration of Emergency was published on 30 
March 2020. The main purpose of this Declaration was to open the door to the 
Extraordinary Measures taken by the Ministry of Health, which were published 
on 31 March. The latter ordered the immediate suspension of ‘non-essential’ 
activities for one month (the decree provided a list of activities considered ‘essen-
tial’); set out rules on how to organise work in places where essential activities 
were allowed (concerning the number of people allowed in the workplace and 
the sanitary and control measures to be taken); and instructed people to stay at 
home. The decree also stated that the Ministry of Health, in conjunction with 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, 
would issue guidelines for the country’s orderly, phased, and regionalised return 
to work and social and economic activity (Ministry of Health 2020).
On 21 April 2020, another decree by the Ministry of Health extended the 
extraordinary measures for two months (until 31 May) and imposed a number 
of duties on state governments. Among other things, state governments were to 
keep a registry of patients in hospital with acute respiratory infections; implement 
prevention and control measures in line with the criteria issued by the Ministry 
of Health; establish mechanisms for restricting the municipal-level mobility of 
persons infected by or exposed to Covid-19; report to the Federal Ministry of 
Health on the implementation of these measures; and supervise changes to hos-
pitals to guarantee the availability of beds for treating infected patients.
In addition, Aid Plan DN-III, mentioned earlier, was activated so as to make 
military hospitals available for patients with Covid-19; to make military per-
sonnel available to operate and protect hospitals; and to provide support in food 
distribution, transportation of supplies, repatriation of compatriots, and manu-
facture of medical supplies.
12.4.2.2 Federal-state conflict about reopening
In the same way as there were conflicts about the imposition of the lockdown, 
so there was conflict when it came to reopening schools and the economy. On 
13 May 2020, the federal government announced its strategy for enabling the 
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country to resume social and economic activity. This was to extend across three 
stages, each entailing a ‘traffic-light’ system of four phases (red, orange, yellow, 
and green), and to begin on 1 June.
GOAN, the association of nine governors from the opposition party PAN, 
reacted to the strategy on Twitter, saying in effect that its member states would 
heed their own counsel and decide for themselves when to reopen their states, 
taking into account local conditions and the advice of experts. The President 
replied that there would be no fight with the states in the event that their gover-
nors did not comply with the federal reopening plan:
If there is a municipal or state authority that according to the characteris-
tics of their own region or of each state, decides that they will not comply 
with the plan, there will be no controversy…. Though the plan was agreed 
in general, it also allows discrepancies, the right to think differently.
(Reforma, 14 May 2020: 5)
Likewise, the Ministry of Health conceded that decisions on reopening 
according to the ‘traffic-light’ system would depend on the conditions in each 
state. States would be able to increase restrictive measures but not make them less 
restrictive or more flexible. Consensus, the Ministry said, had been reached on 
the issue (Reforma, 3 June 2020: 1).
The federal government and state governors also differed on the date on 
which to resume in-person classes in private and public schools. Initially, the 
Federal Minister of Education set 1 June 2020 as the date on which this would 
come to pass throughout Mexico. Numerous governors disagreed, arguing that 
in view of the differing conditions in the states, the decision to reopen schools 
should be taken by the authorities of each state. Ultimately, the Minister had to 
accede to this position (Reforma, 14 May 2020: 3).
12.4.2.3 Legal challenge by indigenous peoples
Flaws in the inclusivity and efficacy of Mexico’s federal system, specifically when 
placed under the strain of pandemic crisis management, were highlighted in a num-
ber of legal challenges that communities of indigenous peoples mounted in reaction 
to alleged acts or omissions by the federal government in responding to Covid-19.
In one case, for example, the indigenous peoples of the Tsotsil, Tzeltal, Zoque, 
and Chol ethnic groups successfully filed a writ of amparo5 demanding a guaran-
tee of access to information about Covid-19 and its prevention in their respective 
home languages (Reforma, 8 April 2020: 1). In another, the Pueblo Maya Ch’ol 
(who reside in the municipalities of Palenque, Ocosingo, and Salto del Agua 
in the state of Chiapas) filed a writ of amparo against the continuation of a fed-
eral mega-project involving the construction of a railway line in the Southeast 
states. Here, the district judge ruled that the federal government had to desist 
from the project in the affected municipalities while the pandemic lasts, since 
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continuation of work endangered the lives and health of the local population 
(Reforma, 23 June 2020: 1).
12.4.2.4 Accountability and the separation of powers
Mexico’s pandemic response served to centralise power even further in the fed-
eral executive in the context of a system that, even before the health crisis, was 
focused on the President.
The two chambers of Congress stopped meeting from the end of March 2020, 
returning to work, albeit in a limited way, by mid-June. As a result, health meas-
ures and those related to mitigating the economic effects of the pandemic were 
adopted by the President and Ministry of Health with little deliberation. Especially 
controversial was the President’s proposal, sent to Congress on 23 April 2020, 
which sought to empower him, in case of ‘economic emergencies in the country’, 
to ‘redirect resources of the federal Budget, to allocate them to maintain the exe-
cution of the projects and priority actions of the Federal Public Administration 
and promote the country’s economic activity, to face health emergencies and 
finance programs for the benefit of society’ (Parliamentary Gazette 2020).
This proposal was not discussed in Congress – not only because of the diffi-
culties of having meetings, but because the proposal was presented seven days 
before the end of the regular session of the Federal Congress, which each year 
begins on February 1 and ends on April 30. The proposal represented an attempt 
to take advantage of the crisis and absorb powers which are exclusive to the 
Federal Chamber of Deputies, such as the power to approve the federal budget. 
Furthermore, in the proposal, the power to declare when there is an ‘economic 
emergency’ was entirely at the discretion of the federal executive.
Apart from the case of the governor of Michoacán (mentioned below), there 
were cases in which federal courts were asked to clarify whether municipal gov-
ernments have powers to establish harsh restrictions on the freedom of move-
ment. The Courts determined that, according to the Constitution, municipal 
authorities are not allowed to suspend or restrict human rights.
12.4.3 State action
Some states asserted their autonomy with regard to their responsibilities and 
resisted being directed by the federal government. This is generally true for gov-
ernors from opposition parties, as the examples below suggest.
12.4.3.1 Health measures
On 17 April 2020, the government of the state of Mexico, via its Ministry of 
Security, paroled 1,894 prisoners to avoid infections in state prisons. The releases 
were approved by the state Superior Court of Justice, which examined the pro-
posal and allowed prisoners sentenced for ‘non-serious’ crimes (i.e., ones entailing 
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a prison sentence of less than 5 years) to be paroled subject to their wearing elec-
tronic bracelets. On the same day, the federal government announced that it was 
considering paroling inmates in federal prisons and, to this end, utilising the 
President’s power of pardon.
On 25 June 2020 the government of Hidalgo established, in the state’s cap-
ital city of Pachuca, the first of 30 health units to apply quick and free tests for 
Covid-19 (this, contrary to federal policy that denied the usefulness of tests) 
(Reforma, 26 June 2020: 6). Three days later, the same initiative was implemented 
in the rest of the state. A similar policy was implemented in an important tourist 
centre, namely Acapulco in the state of Guerrero.
12.4.3.2 Lockdown and mobility measures
The governor of Jalisco rejected the possibility of returning to in-person classes 
on 1 June 2020, as ordered by the federal government. This contradicted what 
the Federal Ministry of Education had declared regarding a possible return to 
classes on 1 June or 17 July. Jalisco suspended classes on 17 March and resumed 
them online on 17 April.
While the federal government was working out its plans and timelines for the 
resumption of schooling, opposition governors announced unilateral decisions to 
finish the then-current cycle and begin the next one. The governor of Jalisco said 
that in spite of a decrease in infections in the state, there would not be a return 
to in-person classes, as his government did not want to run any risks. Classes, 
he said, would continue online or on television by way of programmes such as 
Recrea Digital and Learn at Home (Reforma, 12 May 2020: 2).
Although federal policies entailed voluntary rather than mandatory confine-
ment, some governors adopted more restrictive measures that indeed required 
mandatory confinement, giving rise to lawsuits that claimed these measures were 
unconstitutional. For example, on 20 April 2020, the governor of Michoacán 
issued a decree declaring mandatory isolation and imposing strong restrictions on 
people’s mobility, along with sanctions for those who violated them. The decree 
was challenged by a group of academics at the Faculty of Law of the Nicolaíta 
University of Michoacán, who filed a writ of amparo against it. However, in the 
end the collegiate circuit court that heard the case decided in favour of the gover-
nor, on the ground that the contested decree aimed to protect social well-being.6
Only a few states imposed border controls. For example, the government of 
Tamaulipas did so on the state’s border with Nuevo León to prevent the entry of 
vehicles and persons deemed ‘non-essential’ (Reforma, 17 April 2020: 2).
12.4.3.3 Economic measures and reopening
In May 2020, Jalisco announced a plan for its economic recovery. Entitled Plan de 
Reactivación Económica, its main thrust was to revise the state budget by taking aus-
terity measures. The governor requested that the state executive, legislature, and 
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judiciary draft a plan to save money given that the pandemic had led to a major 
shortfall in a state budget of more than MXN 3 billion (Reforma, 2 May 2020: 3).
In the same month, the governors of Coahuila, Colima, Michoacán, Nuevo 
León, Tamaulipas, and Jalisco collectively determined their reopening plans. At 
a meeting on 15 May 2020, they agreed to work to a common agenda prioritising 
health, economic recovery, and assistance for the poor. An underlying premise of 
their collaboration was – as opposition governors argued on another occasion in 
a virtual meeting with federal authorities – that it is state governments, not the 
federal government, that have full knowledge of the conditions in their respec-
tive territories (Reforma, 16 May 2020: 1).
Even the governor of Puebla, a member of the same party as President López 
Obrador, announced that his state would have its own ‘traffic-light’ system for 
reopening. Although it would be similar to the federation’s, he asserted that the 
‘new normality’ in Puebla had to be defined by this state’s own criteria. The 
governor said he did not want to be left waiting to take the lead from the federal 
government on the basis of assessments that were unrelated to circumstances in 
places where the real fight against the virus was being waged (Reforma, 23 May 
2020: 3).
12.4.3.4 Cooperation among states
As has been suggested already, various states engaged in horizontal cooperation 
with each other along regional and political lines. For instance, in May 2020, 
the governors of Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Querétaro, and San Luis Potosí decided 
on a series of measures for addressing the pandemic in a coordinated manner, 
with such measures including reinforcing Covid-19 screening and sanitisation 
stations and devising ways to support the automobile and electrical industries. 
These states formed a regional alliance, the Alianza Centro-Bajío-Occidente, and 
agreed to assist one another with medical resources for their hospitals (Reforma, 
1 May 2020: 8).
In addition, after initiating their own reopening plans, eight governors met 
in the state of Nuevo León to share their experiences on the matter and agree 
on simplified requirements for allowing businesses to reopen. According to the 
governor of Nuevo León, this involved using a system of ‘economic intelligence’ 
to monitor the impact of economic reactivation. He said the governors at the 
meeting agreed to support small enterprises through credit from public and pri-
vate financial institutions and thus enable them to integrate themselves into the 
value chains of larger companies.
The governors present in the meeting were those of Tamaulipas, Coahuila, 
Jalisco, Michoacán, Durango, and Guanajuato. This bloc, located in the Northeast 
of the country and cutting across political parties, said it would seek a meeting 
with another regional alliance of governors, the Alianza Bajío-Centro-Occidente, 
to exchange information about what they had learnt from their experiences.
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For their part, the nine opposition governors of GOAN proposed common 
areas of action in regard to economic reactivation. For example, they put for-
ward a national strategy to address the economic crisis caused by the pandemic. 
It included creating an unemployment insurance scheme, implementing a pro-
gramme of temporary employment, introducing tax incentives for new busi-
nesses, and providing soft loans for companies.
12.4.4 Local government action
The role of local authorities during the 2020 pandemic was mostly confined 
to implementing measures decided upon by the federal and state govern-
ments. There were exceptions to this, however. For example, in early March 
a number of municipalities took the initiative to shut down activities in pub-
lic places; others yet, as mentioned, illegally closed their borders with other 
municipalities.
In this respect, the mayors of various municipalities disregarded the direc-
tives of the Federal Minister of the Interior, who told them not to limit freedom 
of movement in their goal of curbing infections. She explained to them that 
the federal government had authorised neither a curfew nor a suspension of 
rights; what it decreed was instead a health emergency in which Mexicans were 
requested to stay at home voluntarily. As such, municipalities could not close 
their ‘borders’, that is, their territorial limits, albeit that this is what happened 
in the states of Veracruz, Tamaulipas, Coahuila, and Nuevo León (Reforma, 
25 April 2020: 7).
Another trend during the period was that mayors of the same party affiliation 
endeavoured to work together to leverage greater financial resources from the 
federation. For example, due to the fact that the income municipalities derived 
from municipal taxes decreased by 50 per cent as a result of the pandemic, may-
ors of the Federación Nacional de Municipios de México (FENAMM), linked to 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party, and of the Asociación Nacional de Alcaldes 
(ANAC), linked to the Party of National Action, asked the Federal Ministry of 
Finance to flexibilise the use of federal transfers and to authorise extraordinary 
transfers. The same was proposed by the Asociación de Autoridades Locales de México 
(AALMAC), which represents mayors from the ruling MORENA party at fed-
eral level (Reforma, 9 June 2020: 5).
Generally, the impression gained from media coverage of the pandemic is that 
there was a suspension of the usual modes by which executive mayors are held 
accountable, given that various municipal councils temporarily ceased opera-
tions. By the same token, many others decided to conduct their sessions online, 
while others yet resumed in-person sessions, with strict sanitary measures being 
observed. Nonetheless, the scope for public accountability diminished, particu-
larly in those municipalities where there is the option of having public and open 
sessions of the municipal council.
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12.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
Coordination among the different levels of government was patchy, if not dys-
functional. It is worth noting generally that Mexico lacks an institutional forum 
in which the federal executive can meet regularly with governors to reach con-
sensus on public policies in matters related to health and education, among other 
things (see Hopkins 1990; Rodríguez 1998; Ward and Rodríguez 1999). Some 
governors had been requesting a meeting with the President since December 
2019, without success. That meeting finally took place on 19 August 2020, by 
which point the country was nearing a total of 60,000 deaths from Covid-19.
In particular, there was a notable lack of communication between the Federal 
Health Ministry and state governments about ‘general health’, which is a concur-
rent responsibility of the federal and state governments. In the case of pandemics 
like Covid-19, the Ministry of Health may adopt ‘extraordinary measures’ in 
regard to health, with state governments then obliged to follow federal guide-
lines. However, what was witnessed throughout the crisis was a series of con-
flicts, disagreements, and failed encounters between federal and state authorities 
with regard to, inter alia, the point at which to declare a health emergency; the 
kinds of health-protection measures to adopt; and the timing and pace of reo-
pening the national economy.
This was due in large part to the non-existence of an institutional mechanism 
to facilitate communication between the President and state governors and har-
monise the development and implementation of public policy in the federation. 
Consequently, the lack of effective coordination and cooperation between the 
federal and state governments was evident from the outset of the 2020 pandemic – 
by mid-March 2020, state governments had taken the first measures to curb the 
spread of the virus, whereas the Federal Board on General Health did not meet 
until 19 March (and then only so as to make an evaluation of the situation).
An example of the disagreements between federal and state authorities 
occurred in mid-April when, after receiving federal aid in the form of materials 
to use in combating the pandemic, the governors of Michoacán, Aguascalientes, 
and Quintana Roo complained that the materials were of bad quality and 
returned them to the federal government as useless.
In another example, on 21 April 2020, the President threatened to expose 
those governors who did not comply with the measures stipulated by the fed-
eral government. He also said his government would not authorise the use of 
curfews, the police force, or monetary fines in the enforcement of those meas-
ures. On the next day, the spokesperson of the presidential office made public 
a list of municipalities that were not complying with the federal government’s 
instructions to reduce the mobility of persons and have them stay at home. He 
said, however, that the vast majority – 97 per cent – were compliant. Some of 
the ‘accused’ municipalities responded to this by denying the charge and others, 
by adopting more effective measures for reducing mobility (Reforma, 23 April 
2020: 3).
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If the Covid-19 pandemic has taught us any lesson, it is the need to design 
better coordination and cooperation mechanisms between the three orders gov-
ernment of Mexico’s federal system.
12.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
In economic affairs, the federal government has broad powers since it controls 
both monetary and fiscal policy, with the latter especially centralised given that 
90 per cent of fiscal income comes from federal taxes, 8 per cent from state 
taxes, and 2 per cent from municipal taxes. States and municipalities are highly 
dependent on federal transfers to fund their activities in that they have only lim-
ited taxation powers. The transfers are the so-called ‘participaciones’ (for discre-
tionary use by state and municipal governments) and the ‘aportaciones’ (restricted 
to the specific purpose defined by federal law). These federal transfers represent 
about 80 per cent of states’ fiscal income.7 Of the total federal transfers to the 
states, 42.9 per cent correspond to ‘participaciones’ and 37.3 per cent to ‘aportaciones’ 
(Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas 2019: 6)
By the end of April 2020, a group of opposition governors had begun to 
call into question the existing federal fiscal arrangement. The governors of 
Chihuahua (PAN), Nuevo León (no party affiliation), Tamaulipas (PAN), Jalisco 
(MC), and Coahuila (PRI) alleged that although their states contribute the most 
to the federal treasury, they receive the least in federal transfers. After proposing 
a national debate on this matter, they agreed to postpone it and instead work 
together in the next general election (2021) to win a majority in the Chamber 
of Deputies and use that majority to propose a change to the fiscal pact (Reforma, 
20 April 2020: 1).
Opposition governors also started to demand more federal resources to fight 
the pandemic, arguing that ‘extraordinary’ federal resources were needed to 
address an extraordinary situation. However, the President’s response was that 
they should reduce their spending and save money in order to procure those 
resources.
Finally, the governors of Nuevo León (no party affiliation), Tamaulipas 
(PAN), Coahuila (PRI), Durango (PRI), and Michoacán (PRD) – all with dif-
ferent political affiliations but sharing a regional interest – agreed to do a count 
of the expenses incurred to face the pandemic and claim reimbursement from 
the federation. They said that they had faced the crisis with their own ordinary 
resources and that these resources had to be reimbursed. In their view, it was not 
possible to face an extraordinary situation with ordinary resources.
The rather centralised arrangement of Mexico’s fiscal federalism dates back to 
three national fiscal conventions that took place in 1925, 1933, and 1947. Today, 
and as a consequence of tensions derived from the pandemic, some opposition 
governors have proposed calling a new national fiscal convention, in order to 
review the rules and principles of the existing fiscal arrangement.
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12.5 Findings and policy implications
Mexico has long had a highly centralised federal system, but it was during the 
2020 pandemic that the shortcomings of centralisation in such a large and diverse 
country came fully to light. The federal government has broad legal powers 
in the fields of health and education, as well as in matters to do with reopen-
ing the economy. However, in spite of those powers, a good number of gov-
ernors took the initiative to decide when to shut down their states’ economies 
and schools, adopted public health measures contrary to federal guidelines (e.g., 
quick and large-scale testing for Covid-19), or decided for themselves when and 
how quickly economies should be reopened to suit the circumstances of their 
respective states.
The pandemic also revealed the displeasure numerous governors feel in con-
nection with the fiscal arrangement in the country’s federal system. This arrange-
ment, which dates from the 1980s, is based on the premise that states have waived 
their powers to create state taxes by ceding them to the federal government in 
exchange for federal transfers. However, the arrangement has contributed to 
the subordination of the states to the federation, since the latter has an impor-
tant margin of discretion in the distribution of federal transfers to the states. 
Moreover, states that contribute the most to the federal treasury contend that 
they are not adequately recompensed by what they get back in federal transfers.
Opposition governors of 12 states maintained that, due to a lack of a rational 
response to the pandemic and the lack of a plan for the economic reactivation of 
the federation, Mexico needs to move to a new federalism based on a new fiscal 
pact. This was declared by the governors who comprise the Alianza Centro Bajío 
Occidente and the Alianza Federalista. In a joint statement, they ‘expressed the 
importance of advancing to a new cooperative and responsible federalism, that 
is, to a new model of decentralization articulated around powers, responsibilities 
and duties clearly defined that allow the strengthening of local capacities’. The 
statement continued:
This new federalism will … take the maximum advantage [of ] the 
USMCA,8 [and] accelerate the country’s economic recovery, the strength-
ening of public finances and the promotion of public and private invest-
ment in infrastructure and in public services.
(Reforma, 4 July 2020: 11)
Whether this will happen or not will depend largely on the balance of power 
that emerges from the electoral processes of 2021, in which the 500 seats of 
the Chamber of Deputies and 15 governorships will be at stake. At the time of 
this writing, 14 of those governorships were controlled by opposition parties. 
If López Obrador’s party wins these elections, the Alianza Federalista in favour 




 1 The national health system is made up of public administration agencies and entities at 
the federal, state, and local levels; individuals and organisations in the private sector and 
civil society that provide health services; and mechanisms for coordinating action. The 
system aims to fulfil the right to health protection (General Law on Health, article 5) and 
seeks to harmonise the programmes of the different public (federal and state) and private 
entities that provide health services in Mexico.
 2 In March 2020, the political affiliations of Mexico’s 31 governorships were as follows: Par-
tido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI), 12; Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), 9; MORENA, 
7; Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), 1; Movimiento Ciudadano (MC), 1; and one 
governor with no party affiliation. The percentage of seats in the Chamber of Deputies 
was MORENA, 50.4 per cent; PAN, 15.4 per cent; PRI, 9.6 per cent; Partido del Trabajo 
(PT), 9.2 per cent; MC, 5.4 per cent; Partido Encuentro Social (PES), 4.8 per cent; PRD, 
2.4 per cent; and Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM), 2.2 per cent; three deputies 
had no party affiliation. The split in the Senate was MORENA, 42.6 per cent; PAN, 19.5 
per cent; PRI, 10.1 per cent; PT, 4.6 per cent; MC, 6.2 per cent; PES, 3.1 per cent; PRD, 
2.3 per cent; and PVEM, 5.4 per cent; one senator had no party affiliation.
 3 At the outset of the pandemic, the governing party MORENA and its allies (PT, PES, 
and PVEM) had a comfortable majority in both chambers of Congress, controlling 66.6 
per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 55.7 per cent of the seats in the 
Senate. The legislators of these parties have been always ready to cooperate with Presi-
dent López Obrador, and this support did not wither away as the pandemic continued.
 4 The other three groups were the Alianza Noreste-Pacífico, comprising seven opposition 
governors (from Nuevo León (no party affiliation), Coahuila (PRI), Durango (PRI), 
Tamaulipas (PAN), Jalisco (MC), Colima (PRI) and Michoacán (PRD)); the Alianza 
Centro-Bajío-Occidente, comprising five opposition governors (from Aguascalientes 
(PAN), Guanajuato (PAN), Jalisco (MC), Querétaro (PAN) y San Luis Potosí (PRI)); and 
the Asociación de Gobernadores de Acción Nacional (GOAN), comprising the nine governors 
of the PAN.
 5 A petition for a writ of amparo, or an amparo action, is, according to the Supreme Court 
of the Philippines (n.d.), ‘a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty 
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a 
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity’.
 6 See Amparo 403/2020, filed by Jorge Alvarez Banderas against the decree of 20 April 
2020 by the governor of Michoacán, which declared mandatory confinement as a meas-
ure to combat the pandemic.
 7 See generally Cabrero Mendoza (2013) and Gershberg (1995); for a constitutional and 
comparative perspective, see Serna de la Garza (2000).
 8 The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is a free-trade agreement in 
force since March 2020; it replaces the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
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BRAZIL AND THE FIGHT 
AGAINST COVID-19
Strengthening state and municipal powers
Gilberto M. A. Rodrigues, Vanessa Elias de Oliveira, 
Marcelo Labanca Corrêa de Araújo and Sérgio Ferrari
13.1 Introduction
From the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic, a central feature of federalism in 
Brazil was the strong role played by state governors and the fact that this stood in 
contrast to the denialism of the President Jair Bolsonaro, who neglected his fed-
eral responsibilities. Whereas the President refused to support isolation measures 
and import medicines and supplies for curbing the pandemic, governors quickly 
performed these tasks. Subnational responsibility was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court, giving governors and mayors important political visibility and shaking up 
the entrenched structures of Brazil’s centralised federalism.
This chapter discusses the dual nature of Brazilian federalism, as evidenced by 
the Covid-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the crisis highlighted the importance 
of the federal government in the institutional arrangement of Brazilian federal-
ism, which is highly centralised; on the other hand, it has provided greater scope 
for action by state governments, whose political power has gradually diminished 
over the 30 years since the 1988 Constitution came into being.
The Federative Republic of Brazil is the largest country in South America 
and the fifth largest in the world. Its Constitution of 1988 makes it a signifi-
cantly decentralised federation in terms of the distribution of political power 
and fiscal resources between the three levels of government – federal, state, and 
municipal – each of which consists of ‘federative entities’ (Souza 1997). Brazil is 
also highly socio-economically heterogeneous, a fact that presented considerable 
challenges in its efforts to confront the Covid-19 pandemic.
Politically, too, the country is fragmented, with 24 political parties repre-
sented in Congress, the federal parliament. The 10 with the largest congres-
sional representation are the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), Workers’ 
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Party (PT), Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), Progressive Party (PP), 
Democratic Workers’ Party (PDT), Brazilian Workers’ Party (PTB), Democrats 
Party (DEM), Liberal Party (PL), Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), and Republicans. 
However, governability in Congress depends as well on small parties without an 
ideological affiliation; in addition, a strong conservative multiparty caucus – the 
so-called beef, bullets, and bible lobby – supports the government in pursuit of 
specific interests, with the focus falling variously on agrarian matters (‘beef ’), 
law and order (‘bullets’), and religion (‘bible’).
President Bolsonaro was elected by a small party, the Liberal Social Party 
(PSL), which espouses anti-political-system rhetoric. He left it in November 
2019 but was unable to create a new one and thus remained without party affili-
ation during the 2020 pandemic. In the absence of a formal coalition, Bolsonaro 
relied on unstable support from conservative parties in Congress. In regard to 
state-level opposition politics, opposition governors are from a broad ideological 
spectrum ranging from the political left to the right.
The Brazilian population is relatively young: in 2019, 42.3 per cent of people 
in a population of about 210 million were less than 30 years of age (IBGE 2019a). 
Approximately 85 per cent of the population live in cities, but regional disparities 
are large: city dwellers make up 93 per cent of the population in the Southeast 
region of the country, but the proportion drops to 73 per cent in the Northeast. 
Although cities have a higher population density than peri-urban and rural areas 
and were disproportionately affected by the pandemic, health services are also 
concentrated in these areas, thanks to which treatment was readily accessible 
there.
Brazil has a mixed public and private health-care system, with the vast 
majority (75 per cent) of the population using the public National Health 
System (SUS) and only 25 per cent having private health insurance (Scheffer 
et al. 2015). Spending per capita is USD 1,282 when the public and private 
sectors are combined; however, it is much lower than this if one considers the 
public health service alone, which covers most of the population. Public health 
spending in this respect is USD 551 per capita per year (43 per cent of total 
spending in 2017, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD 2019)). According to the World Bank, public spend-
ing on health in 2018 accounted for 3.9 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) – this is lower than the average for Latin America and the Caribbean as 
a whole (4.1 per cent), and the average of 6.5 per cent presented by the OECD 
countries (OECD 2019).
It was in the big cities, especially São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, that 
Brazil recorded its initial cases of Covid-19; the first to come to light was on 
25 February 2020 and concerned a traveller returning from Italy (Department of 
Health 2020). Several days after a pandemic was declared by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) on 11 March, the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 
were the first in Brazil to introduce quarantine measures. On 20 March, the 
country’s Ministry of Health confirmed the domestic spread of the virus.
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Given that the federal government opposed isolation and quarantine, a policy 
of social distancing was not introduced uniformly across the country; even so, 15 
of Brazil’s 26 states, along with the Federal District, adopted these measures. The 
latter were important in reducing the initial transmissibility rate (i.e. the number 
of persons infected by one infected person), which was estimated at three – much 
higher than the average at the height of the pandemic in Europe, where the mean 
rate was 1.6. By 31 October 2020, Brazil had the third highest number of cases 
(about 5 million) and second highest number of deaths (more than 160,000) 
in the world, in this regard trailing behind only the United States. More than 
a third of the cases were concentrated in the Southeast region (Candido et al. 
2020). On 14 November, the transmissibility rate had decreased to 0.94 (Imperial 
College 2020).
However, a series of problems indicated that the situation was more serious 
than the data suggested. Firstly, Brazil’s rate of Covid-19 testing was very low; 
secondly, there would be a delay between the occurrence of a case and/or death 
and the official report of it; and, thirdly, in the middle of 2020, the Brazilian 
Ministry of Health changed the system for counting cases.
13.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
Brazil has a federal constitution that establishes three levels of government: the 
federation, the states, and the municipalities, each of which has its own adminis-
trative and legislative powers. States and municipalities enjoy political and con-
stitutional autonomy (Ferrari 2015; Rodrigues 2018) whereby governments are 
chosen without the interference of the federal authorities, and legislative and 
administrative powers are held without the need to submit to any consultation, 
approval, or referendum at the federal level. Law-makers in the three spheres are 
elected in their respective constituencies, and, likewise, there is no interference 
on the part of any federal organ.
The division of powers adopted by the 1988 Constitution combines dual and 
cooperative models of federalism. Specific powers are reserved for the union 
(the federal government), with a residual clause pertaining to state governments 
(Constitution, article 25). This model is based on the United States’ division of 
powers into those enumerated for the federal government and those reserved to 
the states, as provided for in the 10th Amendment. However, powers in a coop-
erative federation may also be shared or concurrent. In reference to the concur-
rent powers of cooperative federalism, the 1988 Constitution uses the expression 
‘in common’ in article 23 to assign the administrative powers of entities, and 
the term ‘concurrently’ in article 24 to refer to legislative powers. The terms 
‘common’ and ‘concurrent’ thus refer, in the system of shared powers of the 1988 
Constitution, to the fields within which federal, state and municipal govern-
ments operate jointly in administrative or legislative matters (Rodrigues 2017).
Two features of Brazilian federalism tend to confer heightened status to cit-
ies. In the first, the political autonomy of municipalities is guaranteed in the 
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Constitution; in the second, municipalities are given extensive responsibility for 
social and urban policies. In regard to health care, they are responsible for the 
provision and management of primary health care (‘basic care units’) through 
municipal structures co-funded by the federal government. Municipalities are 
also responsible for urban transport, except for metropolitan bus services, while 
subways and urban railways are managed by the states. They (municipalities) 
are responsible too for establishing and running municipal schools for children 
between the ages of 6 and 15 years. In all such activities, mayors and city councils 
enjoy full jurisdiction.
One recurrent criticism of Brazilian federalism concerns the concentration of 
powers vested in the central government. Article 21 lays out 25 administrative 
matters over which the union has exclusive power, while article 22 lays out 29 
further issues covered solely by laws of the union. The field of health is shared 
and, according to article 23, the promotion and protection of health is a concur-
rent power. The union has the power to draw up general legal frameworks in 
this field, leaving states and municipalities free to draft specific legislation. The 
actual provision of health services is the responsibility of all levels and should be 
accomplished in a decentralised manner (Constitution, articles 196 and 198(I)). 
Health legislation relating to Covid-19 passed by the National Congress thus fits 
into the category of a framework law, forming a kind of legislative condominium 
with state and municipal legislation.
With regard to disaster management-related legislation, four concepts in 
Brazilian law are to be distinguished from each other: a state of emergency, a 
state of disaster, a state of national defence, and a state of siege. The last two are 
provided for in the Constitution but have never been invoked (being for use 
when public order and the peace are threatened by extreme institutional insta-
bility, or in the case of war). Thus, in the Covid-19 crisis, Brazil declared, first, 
only a state of emergency and, then, a state of disaster. These two institutions are 
provided for by infra-constitutional frameworks without a specific constitutional 
foundation.
A state of emergency occurs when there are grounds to fear that the opera-
tion of the health system by public authorities may be overwhelmed and public 
safety jeopardised. It is declared to prevent harm. At the federal level, this issue 
is governed by Decree No. 7616 of 2011, which establishes the procedures to 
be followed when declaring a state of ‘national health emergency’ (ESPIN) in 
the case of epidemics, disasters, or lack of assistance to the population. Once an 
ESPIN has been declared, it is possible to adopt exceptional measures, such as 
the requisition of goods and services and the contracting of temporary staff. The 
federal government is required to act in conjunction with affected states and 
municipalities.
By contrast, a state of disaster occurs when the actions of public authorities 
and the health of the population have been compromised already in actuality 
(as opposed to when – as in a state of emergency – it is feared that this could 
happen). In case of disaster management, the federal government should play a 
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coordinating role in which it works in concert with state and municipal plans to 
counter the effects of the disaster.
The Federal government has a National System of Security and Civil Defence 
(SINPEC) in which federal, state, and municipal authorities participate. Law 
10954 of 2004 provides for emergency assistance to be given to the affected 
population, while Law 12340 of 2010 governs the transfer of funds from the 
union to state and municipal governments to support the emergency response 
and recovery of affected areas.
States and municipalities are not involved in the drafting of federal legis-
lation other than, in the case of states, indirectly through the Federal Senate 
(which, in terms of article 48 of the Constitution, represents their interests); 
instead they implement and enforce national legislation, within the concurrent 
powers arrangement. Through their legislation, states and municipalities may 
also declare states of emergency or disaster (but not of defence or siege).
In principle, the federal government does not have the prevalence to declare a state 
of emergency and a state of disaster, since states and municipalities have equal powers 
to declare states of emergency or disaster within their respective remits. However, 
for states and municipalities to acquire funds from the federal government, they must 
submit to the legal criteria established by the federal legal framework.
Accordingly, Law 12608 of 2012 outlines national security and civil defence 
policy and stipulates the powers reserved to the union, in particular that of 
‘establishing the criteria and conditions for the declaration and recognition of 
situations of emergency and a state of public disaster’ (article 6(10)). Thus, despite 
the autonomy of the states and municipalities in authorising the declaration of 
a state of emergency or disaster, its recognition by the federal government may 
operate as a form of control. Law 12608 contains a section that defines the pow-
ers of each unit of the federation – the union (article 6), the states (article 7), the 
municipalities (article 8) – and, finally, all three (article 9).
The situation in Brazil during the 2020 pandemic was unparalleled in recent 
history. States of emergency and disaster had been declared before, especially 
in the event of natural disasters, but not on the same scale as in the response 
to Covid-19. In such events, the federal government produces central records 
recognising states of emergency and disaster (many of which relate to droughts, 
floods, and landslides) and monitors the situation by means of an integrated dis-
aster information management system indicating the locations on the map where 
the crisis is in force.
13.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
Despite the existence of the SINPEDC national security and civil defence sys-
tem, Brazil has no agency specifically responsible for responding to disasters. 
Disaster management is provided as the situation demands and organised in a 
decentralised way. Civil defence is coordinated at the state and municipal levels.
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The organisation best equipped to deal with disasters is the Fire Service, 
which is a state-level entity organised as a military fire service. In cases of acci-
dents or environmental disasters, such as the bursting of dams built by mining 
companies, the civil defence force and the Fire Service (both of which are state 
organisations) work together with the civil defence forces of the municipali-
ties concerned. In such cases, federal agencies conduct investigations, initiate 
administrative procedures, and impose administrative fines and punishments. 
In extreme cases, the (federal) armed forces may be used, but this must be at the 
request of the governors.
In regard to public health, the prevention and management of disasters depend 
on agencies and organisational systems specific to this field. Under normal politi-
cal circumstances, public health crises of national proportions are addressed pri-
marily by the Ministry of Health and the National Health Council.
The federal government has at its disposal an autonomous agency – the 
Brazilian National Health Regulator (ANVISA) – which has administrative 
policing power to intervene in the national territory in cases of epidemics and 
pandemics. Its scope of action is broad and affects various aspects of public health. 
Under normal circumstances, it provides health surveillance in border regions, 
ports, and airports; approves medication for use; and oversees health conditions 
at industrial, commercial, and service establishments in cities and rural areas. 
ANVISA is an agency that enjoys widespread public confidence. At the federal 
level, it has a well-trained professional technical staff that follows the recommen-
dations of the WHO and the Pan-American Health Organisation.
The Brazilian National Health System (SUS) has a federated structure and 
depends on cooperation between the three levels of government. It has some 
institutional instruments for coordination, such as the Two-Party Inter-
Administration Commission (which brings together municipal and state manag-
ers) and the Three-Party Inter-Administration Commission (involving all three 
levels of government). These management structures promote dialogue between 
governments within each state and in the federation as a whole.
A number of previous health crises, such as the Zika and H1N1 virus epidem-
ics, have posed a significant challenge to the Brazilian public health system, but 
nothing has been comparable to the challenges posed by Covid-19. For exam-
ple, the low rate of testing by the three levels of government adversely affected 
Brazil’s efforts in dealing with the pandemic (Magno et al. 2020). Eight months 
after the first case in Brazil, the federal and state governments were still unable 
to solve the problem of insufficient testing, as a result of which the number of 
infected individuals continued to be underestimated. In April 2020, the number 
of tests per thousand inhabitants in Brazil was 0.63, which was far lower than the 
rate in other Latin American countries (Our World in Data 2020). The only per-
sons who were tested were frontline health workers, those who had been hospi-
talised, and, in some states, those suspected of having died as a result of Covid-19. 
Consequently, as França et al. (2020: 1) noted, ‘the two major challenges are that 
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of estimating the scale of underreporting Covid-19 deaths and that of determin-
ing what the exact figure should be’.
In addition, richer states conducted more testing than poorer ones, both 
because these states could afford to do so and because of the huge presence within 
them of the private health system. Richer states also paid for patients’ tests.
13.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
Since President Bolsonaro took office, the political situation in Brazil has been 
anomalous due to his ideologically polarising rhetoric and adoption of an agenda 
that denies science. Under the circumstances, the federal executive did not, as 
it should have, respond effectively to the outbreak of the pandemic by heeding 
practical administrative and technical expertise in this field. There was, from the 
outset, thus no coherent political approach to the pandemic, which worsened 
as time went on. The fact that opposition parties governed the major states and 
cities exacerbated the lack of unity of purpose.
One of the tragic aspects of federal mismanagement of the pandemic was 
the negligence shown towards indigenous populations. Brazil has a diversity 
of indigenous ethnic groups, who inhabit territories that are scattered across 
the country and which comprise 13 per cent of the national territory (Castro 
and Rodrigues 2010). The indigenous population is estimated to number 
1 million people (IBGE 2019b). Although their immunological status puts 
them at a high risk of infection and fatality, the federal government refused 
to adopt protective measures suited to their needs. The Covid-19 pandemic 
worsened the plight of indigenous peoples, who were already burdened by 
the Bolsonaro government’s regressive environmental and human rights pol-
icies. They have been threatened with forced assimilation, the suspension 
and revision of their land rights, and the re-demarcation of their territories. 
Allegations of genocide against indigenous peoples by President Bolsonaro 
were referred not only to the United Nations Human Rights Council but the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), whose Rome Statute Brazil has ratified 
and whose decisions it is thus legally bound to accept (Connectas Human 
Rights 2020).
In reaction to the President’s Covid-19 denialism, the Federal Supreme 
Court supported states and municipalities, thereby strengthening their role 
in the federation during the pandemic. It held in particular that the federal 
government was neglecting its coordinating role and, worse yet, flouting the 
recommendations of the WHO. The Court maintained that this jeopardised 
the security of the Brazilian population and necessitated decentralised gov-
ernment action in line with the recommendations. The ruling would appear 
to reflect a political position on the value of health and human life rather than 
a change in the Court’s interpretation of the Brazilian federal system (Araújo 
and Liziero 2020).
246 Gilberto M. A. Rodrigues et al. 
13.4.1 Taking the initiative
The first political reactions, both from the President and the governors, revealed 
the leaders’ differences in viewpoint on the pandemic. While President Bolsonaro 
minimised it, describing Covid-19 as a ‘small flu’, governors quickly sought to 
tackle it by setting up teams of political leaders and medical experts. Despite the 
President’s stance, the federal health minister acted promptly; their divergent 
perspectives on viral transmission led to conflict, however, and culminated in the 
health minister’s resignation a month after the health crisis began.
On 3 February 2020, the Brazilian Ministry of Health published Ordinance 
No. 188, marking the start of the state of emergency relating to Covid-19. Law 
No. 13979 of 6 February 2020 likewise established the basis for adopting a series 
of measures for confronting the Covid-19 emergency, such as isolation and quar-
antine, compulsory medical examinations, and restriction of movement within 
and into the country. Moreover, a state of disaster was declared in Brazil by 
Legislative Decree No. 6 of 20 March 2020.
Directly after the first federal initiatives, state governors began to react. The 
Federal District of Brasilia was the first subnational entity to adopt restrictive 
measures, doing so on 11 March when it suspended classes in all educational 
institutions. In the most populous state in the country, São Paulo, restrictive 
measures were taken on 13 March with the suspension of commemorative events. 
Then, still in March, all shops, restaurants, and schools were closed. Other states 
followed suit and took similar measures, such as Rio de Janeiro on 19 March. 
The states adopted measures based on their monitoring of infection rates and the 
occupancy rates of hospital beds (Agência Brasil 2020).
A key feature of Brazil’s management of the pandemic was the conflict 
between the federal and subnational governments regarding social isolation. 
As noted, President Bolsonaro reacted to the first cases of Covid-19 by deny-
ing the gravity of the situation and the need for social isolation. Despite clear 
scientific proof of the importance of isolation in containing transmission, the 
President continued to argue that the policy of social isolation adopted by state 
and municipal governments was damaging to the economy and should therefore 
be discontinued.
Under such circumstances of inaction and misrepresentation by the federal 
government, various state governors used the power they share with the union in 
managing public health crises to introduce measures, rejected by the President, 
regarding social isolation and the obligatory use of masks in public places. The 
suspension of operations at schools, businesses, services, and locations open to the 
public was decreed by state governments as an emergency measure to contain 
the pandemic.
The President made several verbal attacks on isolation measures and gover-
nors and mayors who adopted them – through social media, he continued all the 
while to incite his supporters to flout these measures. For their part, states began 
to implement various public health measures. State opposition to the federal 
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government on these issues had no direct relationship to party politics; indeed, 
at the time, the President had no party. The opposition by states was instead due 
to his denialist attitude towards science.
13.4.2 Federal action
Numerous federal laws were enacted in response to Covid-19. Among others, 
Provisional Measure 927 of 22 March 2020 concerns labour law during the pan-
demic; Law No. 14010 of 10 June 2020 established an emergency legal frame-
work for legal relations in private law; and Law No. 14021 of 7 July 2020 set out 
measures to protect indigenous and quilombola (African-Brazilian) communities 
from the pandemic. The measures were intended to protect jobs and also to 
adapt contracts signed between private actors in a way to fit them into the new 
panorama of the pandemic. In relation to indigenous peoples and quilombolas, 
the measures were intended to protect them and their cultural heritage through 
the provision of an emergency plan that included quick tests and construction of 
field hospitals near their villages. Various laws were also passed to mitigate the 
economic consequences of the pandemic and assist the most vulnerable sectors 
of the population. The congressional legislature was not suspended during the 
pandemic but continued operations by way of virtual sessions.
This legislative industriousness gives little indication, though, of the tensions 
that underlay the federal government’s pandemic response, in particular the con-
troversies surrounding its Ministry of Health. Brazil had three health ministers 
during the 2020 pandemic. After clashing with the initial Minister of Health, 
Luiz Henrique Mandetta – events that culminated in the latter’s resignation on 
16 April 2020 – the President appointed the renowned doctor, Nelson Teich, 
in Mandetta’s stead; he, however, did not accept the President’s anti-scientific 
stance, either, and spent only a month in office. Thereafter the President decided 
to militarise the Ministry. Eduardo Pazzuelo, a general specialising in logistics 
and with no prior experience in public health, was made Minister of Health in 
September 2020 after having held the position on an interim basis for around 
four months.
Arguably, President Bolsonaro impaired a crucial office and misused resources 
of specialist expertise that could have helped the executive branch manage the 
pandemic at federal level. As mentioned, he underplayed the risk of contagion 
and its grave consequences for the health of the population, and questioned the 
WHO’s recommendations regarding the use of masks and social isolation. He 
also urged the population to remain at work and lead normal lives, thereby giv-
ing priority to the economy to the detriment of public health. The resignation 
of two health ministers sent a clear message that the President had decided not 
to accept WHO protocols; instead he elected to adopt obscure, non-transparent 
criteria to manage the pandemic, to publish incomplete accounts of case numbers 
and fatalities, and to support Covid-19 treatments not endorsed by the WHO, 
such as hydroxychloroquine.
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Given the President’s stance, Brazil was soon to face a conflict over juris-
diction in emergency measures. Law No. 13979 of 6 February 2020 drew up a 
list of drastic measures that could be adopted, including isolation, quarantining, 
restriction of activities, compulsory medical examinations, restrictions on enter-
ing and leaving the country, and requisitioning goods and services. Although 
subnational administrations are empowered to take measures to counter pan-
demics, Provisional Measure 926 of 20 March amended the federal legal frame-
work to determine that the President would have the competence to list the 
essential services that could not stop, as well as to establish the need for previous 
authorisation from the regulatory agencies so that the restriction measures could 
be adopted by governors and mayors.
This requirement was challenged before the Supreme Court, which in 
two decisions came down firmly in favour of the states. In the first case 
(Unconstitutionality Direct Action 6341/DF), the Democratic Workers’ Party sought 
to ensure that the measures provided for in the federal law would not exclude the 
possibility of state action and would not depend on authorisation from the federal 
government. The Court decided on 15 April, confirming an earlier injunction of 
24 March, that the possible measures adopted by the federal government did not 
exclude the possibility of normative and administrative measures by the states, 
the federal district, and municipalities.
In the second case (Non-compliance of Basic Principles 672/DF), the Brazilian Bar 
Association asked the Court, on April 1st, to order the President to abstain from 
committing acts contrary to the social isolation policies adopted by the states and 
municipalities. The Court responded quickly, on April 9th, reinforcing subna-
tional governments for issuing decrees, free of federal government supervision, 
legally provisioned restrictive measures, such as social distancing and isolation, 
suspension of activities at schools and universities, and restrictions on commer-
cial and cultural activities and the free movement of people.
The Court thus adopted a position affirming decentralisation and recognis-
ing the action of states and municipalities in introducing measures to control 
the pandemic. Justice Ricardo Lewandowski expressly said in a conference 
at an academic congress (organised by the Brazilian Bar Association) that the 
Federal Supreme Court had reassessed federalism during the pandemic and that 
the ruling did not reflect the Court’s traditional position (Notícias STF, 2020). 
Indeed, the literature shows that Brazilian federalism is usually centralised and 
that the Supreme Federal Court has tended either to reinforce this (Lorencini 
et al. 2017) or to ignore the debate on federal powers, with the Court in various 
cases having sided with the federal government and overruled state governments 
(Araújo 2009).
Apart from the dispute between federal entities about social isolation, another 
controversial measure by the federal government was its promotion of hydrox-
ychloroquine as an effective treatment for Covid-19. The day after Eduardo 
Pazuello took office as interim Minister of Health, he signed an ordinance 
authorising the use of this medication in the public and private health-care 
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system, doing so without prior authorisation by the country’s health regulator, 
ANVISA, which is responsible for approving medications for clinical use. As an 
emergency measure, the Brazilian Army Pharmaceutical Laboratory (LQFEx) 
then started to produce hydroxychloroquine, for which it had acquired BRL 
1.5 million worth of hydroxychloroquine powder without putting the acqui-
sition out to competitive tender. In June 2020, the Federal Court of Accounts 
(TCU 2020) launched an investigation into the purchase, which was suspected 
to have involved overbilling.
The medication thus produced, amounting to three million pills, did not 
go unused, though. The President’s vocal support of it led to a frenzied rush to 
acquire it, especially by the mayors of rural towns, who, as part of their cam-
paigns for re-election in November 2020, distributed it as a way of associating 
themselves with the President and demonstrating they were in control of the 
disease. By mid-August, Minister Pazzuelo announced that there was a shortage 
of hydroxychloroquine; however, the army had not resumed production (CNN 
Brasil 2020).
Despite the federal government’s disastrous performance, autonomous fed-
eral institutions made significant contributions to the effective management of 
the pandemic. Public federal universities (of which there are 68 in the coun-
try) undertook important studies on diagnostic tests, vaccines, and improved 
treatment of Covid-19. Another key federal institution is the Oswaldo Cruz 
Foundation, which conducted diagnostic tests and research (Fiocruz 2020).
13.4.3 State action
State governments played an outstanding role in curbing the pandemic. They did 
so primarily by responding promptly to the first cases of Covid-19 and adopting 
quarantine and other social isolation measures, such as the closure of schools and 
public parks and suspension of non-essential commerce and services. Moreover, 
the failure of the federal government to provide technical and financial assis-
tance to the states, which are responsible for a large number of public hospi-
tals, prompted some governors to pursue alternative routes, such as importing 
medical equipment (masks, tests, ventilators, and the like) directly from foreign 
countries without the intervention of the federal government. São Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro, and Maranhão (all governed by President Bolsonaro’s opponents) were 
among the states to take steps of this kind.
In particular, the need to purchase large numbers of ventilators and expand 
intensive care units (ICUs) posed a significant challenge to the health-care 
system in Brazil. The federal response in this regard was slow, resulting in 
shortages of beds and equipment. Several states hired private facilities to ena-
ble the public health system to meet demand, with some seeking alternatives 
on the international market, such as the purchase of breathing ventilators and 
PPE. The fact that they often did so without logistical assistance from the 
Ministry of Health meant that they encountered great difficulty in managing 
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these imports, making the latter a further point of tension between the federal 
and state governments.
The commendable performance that states delivered at the start of the pan-
demic was, however, not always sustained. For example, economic and political 
pressures from the private sector, mainly from service associations wishing to 
reopen, led to various state governors relaxing restrictions sooner than recom-
mended, with the result that the numbers of new cases and fatalities remained 
unchanged or even increased. Opinion polls suggest that governors hence saw a 
decline in their popularity ratings (Uol 2020a).
One crucial measure that states undertook was to set up field hospitals to 
increase the availability of ICUs. Prior to this, the number of ICU beds available 
differed substantially from state to state. It thus became necessary to provide beds 
urgently, especially in states with lower capacity. Ministry of Health data pro-
vided a clear picture of the inequality between states, showing that, on average, 
the SUS was meeting the WHO recommendations of one public bed per 1,000 
inhabitants. However, 17 of the 26 states and the Federal District had not met 
this quota, while others (mostly in the Sand Southeast regions) greatly exceeded 
it (Albuquerque et al. 2017).
The urgent need to provide ICU beds gave rise to questionable administrative 
practices, with corruption scandals emerging in connection with the acquisition 
of materials and equipment as well as the contracting of service providers to 
establish and run Covid-19 field hospitals, in the process raising doubts about the 
probity of government officials. For instance, the governor of the state of Rio de 
Janeiro was temporarily removed from office by the courts due to suspicion of 
involvement in pandemic-related fraud (Superior Court of Justice, 2020).
What also became apparent was that inequalities in facilities translated into 
huge disparities between states in case numbers and fatalities. São Paulo, Bahia, 
Rio de Janeiro, and Ceará saw the largest numbers of cases and, by the same 
token, placed greater restrictions on people’s movement than elsewhere; never-
theless, the federal government did nothing to address the situation, leaving states 
to their own devices and consequently aggravating the inequalities between the 
richest and the poorest. As an illustration, a judge from the state of Maranhão in 
the Northeast region ordered a full lockdown in its capital, São Luis, and three 
cities of the metropolitan region due to the lack of beds and high level of infec-
tions and deaths – the decision led to a 10-day lockdown and arose from a lawsuit 
filed by the office of the state public attorney (Carta Capital 2020). The governor, 
Flavio Dino, of Brazil’s Communist Party and strongly opposed to Bolsonaro, 
received insufficient support from the union to combat Covid-19.
13.4.4 Local government action
Municipalities are recognised in the Constitution as federative entities with the 
autonomy to legislate and manage action on the basis of their local interests 
(Ribeiro and Pinto 2009). State capitals and large cities are the main actors in 
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the local government scene. During the 2020 pandemic, many city councils 
stayed in operation by virtual means. For example, the city councils of Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo passed laws concerning the pandemic during virtual ses-
sions. Some mayors, especially those of state capitals and large cities, introduced 
stricter measures than those adopted by state governments. These included mak-
ing it mandatory to wear face masks and suspending or curtailing the provision 
of goods and services.
Municipalities too were subject to economic pressure from the sectors of the 
population that wished to reopen activities and see the adoption of more flexible 
modes of social isolation. Reopening has thus not always been in response to 
a reduced number of cases. State capitals such as Porto Alegre and São Paulo, 
which adopted responsible measures at the beginning of the pandemic, gave in 
to pressure and reopened, causing a drastic increase in the numbers of new cases 
and deaths. The pressure was not only economic but also political, given that, 
by virtue of a decision of the Superior Electoral Court, municipal elections took 
place throughout the country in November 2020; moreover, local politicians 
were reluctant to impose drastic social isolation measures for fear of paying the 
political cost in lost votes.
Another issue that merits attention is the capacity of local authorities to deal 
with the pandemic, including their technical capacity to provide adequate health 
care for patients with Covid-19. As noted, there were enormous disparities in 
the number of beds available from state to state and even within the same state. 
Many municipalities did not have ICUs and had to send patients to larger nearby 
municipalities; given that some states had very low capacity, citizens in towns 
often had to travel long distances to receive adequate care, losing precious treat-
ment time as a result. In the state of Amazonas, for example, some localities were 
12 hours’ drive away from the nearest ICU, which they could sometimes access 
only by riverboat.
The pandemic has revealed Brazil’s shortage of primary health-care resources 
and the failure on the part of the authorities to provide support for frontline 
health workers. Lotta et al. (2020) found that community health workers 
(CHWs) had not received enough training and safety equipment to be able 
to attend to patients or identify cases requiring hospitalisation. In July 2020, 
only 9 per cent of CHWs reported having received proper instruction in how 
to deal with patients (Lotta et al. 2020). In some cities, CHWs with chronic 
health issues were asked to confine themselves to administrative duties and 
work remotely, while in others, such workers were obliged to continue pro-
viding direct care. This fact highlights that the wide-ranging autonomy the 
Constitution grants municipalities can lead to inequalities in the provision of 
public services to citizens.
Another situation that illustrates the extensiveness of local autonomy and the 
problems arising from it is the absence of regional coordination in metropolitan 
areas. A bizarre but representative case was that of a shopping mall in the state 
of São Paulo that straddles the boundary between the municipalities of Sorocaba 
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and Votorantim. As no more ICU beds were available in the public sector in 
Sorocaba, the municipal authorities decided to reintroduce the policy of sus-
pending commercial activities. Votorantim, however, kept the mall open for four 
hours a day, as mandated by the state government for municipalities in Phase 2 
of the state’s lockdown plan. As a result, the section of the mall located in the 
municipality of Votorantim reopened stores, while, in the section falling under 
the municipality of Sorocaba, stores remained closed. The mall thus remained 
partially open, and partially closed, as a result of a lack of regional coordination 
(Uol 2020b).
Although this is an extreme example, it shows the negative effects of the 
extensive local autonomy that is permitted in Brazil’s federal system notwith-
standing the absence of institutional mechanisms for horizontal intergovern-
mental coordination in cases of disaster management. This affects not only the 
opening of stores but also strategies to counter the pandemic itself, as the virus 
makes no distinction between the commerce of one municipality and that of a 
neighbouring one within an urban conurbation.
It was only in a few locations, such as the ABC region in the metropolitan area 
of São Paulo (with 20 million inhabitants), that municipalities engaged in hori-
zontal intergovernmental cooperation with a view to addressing the pandemic in 
a coordinated way (Rodrigues and Oliveira 2020). This was especially important 
due to the large flow of people between these cities, mainly for work reasons.
13.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
Although its elements are envisaged as functioning cooperatively, the federal sys-
tem in Brazil has not – except for single issues such as fiscal policy – developed or 
constitutionalised structures and mechanisms to enable vertical intergovernmen-
tal relations between the union and the states, despite the country’s long history 
of shortcomings in the area of policy coordination (Arretche 2015; Souza 1997).
Intergovernmental coordination in Brazil varies not only in function of the 
institutional framework (polity), but also in regard to the specific design of the 
public policies. As such, because it stems from policies rather than being sys-
temically embedded, the problem is that it is an unstable practice, one easily 
modified by changes in ordinary laws by the government of the day. A dramatic 
case in point is that the Bolsonaro government has been dismantling impor-
tant structures for coordinating public policies, both in health and other socio- 
economic such as social assistance. This was the case, for instance, with federal 
programmes, such as the Bolsa Familia, that could be used to render emergency 
assistance for the low-income population. It was discarded by the federal govern-
ment in preference for providing federal resources to citizens through the Caixa 
Econômica Federal, a bank run by the federal government. With more than 60 
million beneficiaries entitled to emergency benefits in Brazil, the bank was find-
ing it difficult to distribute these benefits due to its capacity constraints (Stuchi 
et al. 2020).
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In a crisis such as the Covid-19 pandemic, people tend to look for guidance to 
the President because of his or her ability to bring the nation together around a 
consensus or majority position regarding the implementation of policy, a power 
which in most cases is accompanied by the transfer of federal resources to states 
for emergency action. This did not happen during the Covid-19 crisis.
To turn from vertical to horizontal intergovernmental relations, some states 
cooperated horizontally with each other during the 2020 pandemic. The states of 
the Northeast mobilised a regional consortium, one created in March 2019, and 
established the Scientific Committee to Control Coronavirus to advise gover-
nors on the political and administrative decision-making process regarding pre-
vention and control of the pandemic (IREE 2020). As mentioned, instances of 
horizontal intergovernmental relations between municipalities were few and far 
between, even in situations where – as in the case of the bi-municipal shopping 
mall in São Paulo – their absence resulted in measures glaringly at cross-purposes 
with each other.
13.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
The pandemic had a major impact on the economic welfare of Brazil. Its gross 
domestic product (GDP) declined by 7.05 per cent from March to June 2020 
(compared to June 2019), making this arguably the worst recession the country 
has witnessed in the past 120 years. The impact was especially detrimental for the 
states since their main revenue derives from their collection of value-added tax, 
or imposto sobre valor acrescentado (IVA), the amount of which was seriously affected 
by social isolation measures.
Although they have fiscal autonomy, states also receive federal transfers. In 
view of the pandemic, they were consequently more dependent on these trans-
fers, as well as on public and private debts. By constitutional provision (article 
158, IV Federal Constitution), local governments must receive 25 per cent of 
the IVA revenue collected by the states, in proportion to the economic activ-
ity in each one. Therefore, local government finances were also in peril, also 
because, especially in urban municipalities, the service tax (ISS) is one of the 
main sources of revenue, strongly impacted by the suppression or reduction of 
activities.
Public spending is also regulated by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2000, 
which establishes several limits and permanent procedures to avoid financial 
imbalance. Some of its main provisions are the limitation of spending on public 
employees and the prohibition on borrowing in the last year of the term. The 
declaration of a state of disaster via the Legislative Decree of 6 March 2020 
enabled governments to dispense with some of the fiscal obligations imposed by 
the law. However, Constitutional Amendment 95 of 2016 established a ‘ceiling’ 
on federal government spending for 20 years, starting in 2017, to contain the 
growth in public debt. This ceiling was neither suspended nor relaxed during 
the pandemic.
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Furthermore, Complementary Law 173 of 27 May 2020 established the 
Federal Covid-19 Control Programme, with measures such as suspension of pay-
ment of state debts to the union, restructuring of financial credit operations, and 
the transfer of financial assistance from the union to the states. It also stipulated 
that the federal government has to provide financial aid to the states, the federal 
districts, and the municipalities to the sum of BRL 60 billion. The funds were to 
be distributed according to a number of criteria, including on the basis of demo-
graphic data and the incidence rate of Covid-19.
One of the great debates in Congress and among the financial sector was 
about the extent to which Brazil would be able to respect its debt ceiling or, 
failing that, the extent to which it was at risk of having to increase its domestic 
and international debt to unsustainable levels.
13.5 Findings and policy implications
Eight months after the first Covid-19 case in Brazil, the federal government was 
still berating subnational governments with the claim that governors and may-
ors were responsible for more than 160,000 deaths nationwide. Although the 
federal system has traditionally been centralised, management of the pandemic 
revealed the potential for decentralisation and for strengthening the scope of 
action of states and municipalities, which received support from the Supreme 
Court in their appeal for legitimisation of their measures to combat the virus.
Brazil saw a shift in the play of federative forces, with states and municipalities 
taking the lead in fighting the pandemic; conversely, the federal government, 
which usually has a coordinating role, saw two ministers of health leave the post 
amid a pandemic and wound up playing a secondary role in which it followed 
the actions of subnational entities – that is, when it was not intent on sabotaging 
them without proposing viable alternatives.
It may be argued therefore that the intergovernmental relations generated by 
the very nature of federalism were indispensable in enabling Brazil to address the 
pandemic and so prevent worse outcomes in terms of public health. Relations 
between states and municipal governments were fundamental in the struggle 
to contain the 2020 pandemic – although on occasion the country functioned 
as a unitary entity with a single central command structure directing public 
health measures, the present government alone would certainly not have been 
capable of providing effective responses to protect the health of the population, 
given that the President’s denialist policy led him to act in opposition to WHO 
recommendations.
It is thus fair to say that federalism in Brazil fulfilled its core purpose of decen-
tralising power and thereby protecting fundamental rights by instituting checks 
and balances on a wayward president. Ultimately, the role of the states was 
strengthened by the pandemic and their governments conducted themselves in a 
manner that warrants public trust. Local governments at city level nevertheless 
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showed wide variation in their responses, which suggests that coordination with 
states was insufficient and should be improved.
Yet it is uncertain if the expanded autonomy of states and municipalities dur-
ing the pandemic, due the Supreme Court decision, will lead to a more decen-
tralised federation in the middle and long terms. Nevertheless, this precedent 
may produce an impact on the perception that decentralisation is not only good, 
but sometimes necessary, to protect lives against a centralist, non-rational rule.
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FEDERALISM AND COVID-19 
IN ARGENTINA
Centralisation and hyper-presidentialism
Antonio María Hernández and Cristian Altavilla
14.1 Introduction
Argentina has a federal system comprising 23 states, known as provinces, and the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, or Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (CABA), 
which is the seat of the national capital.1 There is substantial asymmetry between 
the CABA and the provinces2 in terms of wealth, territory and population size. 
Within this federal arrangement, the country has a republican and presidential 
form of government, with powers separated between the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches and direct election of the federal president and provincial 
governors. The bicameral legislature, called the National Congress, consists of 
the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. It is elected independently of the executive 
branch for fixed terms – four years in the case of deputies, and six in the case of 
senators.
In the elections of October 2019, the Frente de Todos (‘Everybody’s Front’) 
coalition won 48.1 per cent of the presidential vote, with Alberto Fernández 
and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner becoming president and vice president, 
respectively. Frente de Todos is a centre-left coalition of political parties largely 
Justicialist-Peronist in orientation. It defeated Juntos por el Cambio (‘Together for 
Change’), a centre-right coalition composed mainly of the Republican Proposal 
and Radical Civic Union parties. The latter coalition had been in power since 
2015 under then President Mauricio Macri, who sought re-election.
To turn to the results in the federal legislature, the governing coalition won 
43 of the 72 seats in the Senate (59.7 per cent of the total) and Juntos por el Cambio, 
29 (40.3 per cent). The outcome in the Chamber of Deputies was far more evenly 
matched: of the 257 deputies, 119 (46.3 per cent) were of Frente de Todos and 
116 (45.1 per cent) were of Juntos por el Cambio. At the provincial level, Frente 
de Todos governed in 20 provinces at the time of the Covid-19 outbreak, while 
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the opposition Juntos por el Cambio was confined to the provinces of Mendoza, 
Corrientes and Jujuy and, at city level, the CABA.
As for health care in Argentina, the Pan American Health Organization 
describes the country’s health system as ‘one of the most fragmented and seg-
mented’ in Latin America (PAHO 2017). Likewise, Isuani (2020) asserts that it is 
characterised, inter alia, by fragmentation, variation in quality, and irrationality. 
Inequality of access to health benefits and services is compounded by geograph-
ical disparities, given the extreme socio-economic differences that are evident 
from region to region. Such fragmentation is due to the country’s federal organ-
isation, which enables each of the 24 jurisdictions to run its own health system, 
as well as to a historically uneven pattern of development and a lack of national 
coordination.
Health matters are a concurrent competence among the four orders of gov-
ernment, namely the federal, provincial, municipal, and federal district (i.e. 
governance pertaining to the CABA).3 Health care is provided by a varying 
combination of employer- and labour-union-sponsored plans, government 
insurance plans, public hospitals and clinics, and private health insurance. More 
than 300 health-care cooperatives (200 of which are related to labour unions) 
provide care for half the population. The Federal Health Council, presided over 
by the national Minister of Health, is responsible for intergovernmental coordi-
nation in health matters and is composed of the highest health authorities of the 
nation, provinces, and CABA.
It is in this overall context that Argentina’s first case of Covid-19 was recorded 
on 3 March 2020 and its first death on 7 March. Early cases were concentrated in 
the CABA and its metropolitan area. On 11 March, the government announced 
a mandatory 14-day-quarantine of returnees to Argentina from highly affected 
countries such as China, South Korea, Japan, Iran, and the United States. The 
first domestic restrictions were imposed on 19 March when the federal gov-
ernment ordered a lockdown of the whole country by way of the Decree of 
Necessity and Urgency (DNU) No. 297.
Adopted at a point when there were still fewer than a dozen cases in the coun-
try, the measure had the support of federal legislators, the leaders of all politi-
cal parties, and the governors of all provinces. It was generally considered the 
correct step to take in order to buy time in which to strengthen a health system 
unprepared for the pandemic. Borders were duly closed, all air and land transport 
was halted, only essential work and movement were allowed, and the population 
was confined to its homes; on 14 April, a further restriction was introduced that 
made it obligatory for everyone using public transport or otherwise out in public 
to wear face masks. Although the initial lockdown was for two weeks, it was 
extended incrementally until 10 May, at which time certain restrictions were 
lifted in areas beyond Greater Buenos Aires.
On 23 March, Ministry of Health officials reported that the coronavirus was 
spreading via community transmission in the CABA and its surroundings, as 
well as in cities in the provinces of Chaco, Córdoba, and Tierra del Fuego; by 
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the end of March, there were 1,054 confirmed cases of Covid-19 and 27 deaths. 
Then, as later, the major location of infections and fatalities was the province 
of Buenos Aires, in particular the 40 municipalities that make up the Buenos 
Aires Metropolitan Area – with a population of more than 12 million people, 
this is the part of the country where its greatest problems of poverty and social 
exclusion are found; a related area of concern was the CABA and its 3 mil-
lion inhabitants, which also forms part of the metropolitan area. Other high- 
infection locations were the provinces of Santa Fe, Córdoba, Jujuy, Río Negro, 
Neuquén, and Chaco.
By 3 July, cases of Covid-19 had been found in every province of the country, 
but it was thought that the pandemic was abating: July concluded with 191,289 
confirmed cases, 3,543 deaths, and 83,767 recoveries. However, on 31 July, 
President Fernández announced that the lockdown restrictions would continue 
until 16 August, as there had been a record number of cases and deaths in the 
previous days.
On 9 August, the Ministry of Health confirmed a total of 61,867 new recov-
eries on that day. This big jump was due to a change in the definition of recov-
ery, which now included (along with discharges from hospitals) mild cases that 
the Covid-19 monitoring system would discharge automatically 10 days after 
the onset of symptoms. The recovery rate thus rose to 70 per cent of confirmed 
cases until that date. President Fernández on 28 August authorised meetings 
throughout the country of up to 10 people in the open air, providing they used 
face masks and practised social distancing, and announced that the eased lock-
down would be extended again until 20 September. Shortly before then, on 
10 August some 10,000 students in San Juan became the first to return to face-
to-face classes. Most other provinces either did not attempt this or faced strong 
resistance from teachers’ unions.
The lockdown was extended for three more weeks on 18 September. After 
reaching a maximum level of infection of 7.591 cases per day in late August, 
the infection rate started to decrease in Greater Buenos Aires at the beginning 
of September and was officially said to be ‘stabilising’. At the same time, how-
ever, the virus increased in spread in the country at large. In the first 15 days of 
September, the provinces of Córdoba, Jujuy, La Rioja, Mendoza, Neuquén, Río 
Negro, Salta, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, Tierra del Fuego, and Tucumán registered 
exponential increases in case numbers, with most of their health-care systems 
facing high levels of strain. The lockdown was again extended, now by another 
two weeks until 25 October.
On 20 October, Argentina, with a population of 45 million, confirmed 
more than 1 million positive cases, becoming the fifth country in the world 
and the second in South America to pass this landmark. Three days later, it 
was announced that the lockdown would continue for another two weeks in 
provinces with a high daily number of confirmed cases. By 29 October, official 
figures set the accumulated national total at 30,071 deaths, 1.1 million cases, and 
nearly 3 million tests (or 64,257 per million inhabitants).
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At the time of writing, the pandemic was ongoing and Argentina’s anticipated 
phase of social and economic recovery had not begun – one consequence of the 
country’s protracted lockdown. Poverty increased from 35.5 per cent at the end 
of 2019 to 40.9 per cent in the first half of 2020, while inflation had risen over the 
past 12 months to 35 per cent in November 2020. Similarly, the unemployment 
rate rose to 13.1 per cent in the second quarter of 2020, compared to 10.6 per 
cent in the same period in 2019 and 10.4 per cent in 2018, making the increase a 
15-year record (Infobae 2020). Economic activity rose by 1.1 per cent in August 
2020, but this was still 11.6 per cent lower than in August 2019.
These economic stressors came in addition to the huge fiscal deficit, tax pres-
sures, and enormous external debt with which Argentina was encumbered even 
before the pandemic broke out.
14.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
14.2.1 Division of powers and functions
Article 1 of the Constitution of 1853 declares Argentina a federal country. The 
provinces and CABA have their own constitutions and are empowered to create 
institutions and be governed by them. Although they have to comply with the 
Constitution, provinces enjoy significant autonomy in the legislative, adminis-
trative, and juridical domains. Their governments have three branches (execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial). The executive branch is led by a governor, while 
the legislative branch may be unicameral (as is true of 15 provinces and the 
CABA) or bicameral (as is the case with eight provinces).
The Constitution divides power and functions between the federal and pro-
vincial levels. In this regard, there are three main types of competence: exclusive, 
shared, and concurrent.
The federal government’s exclusive competences pertain to, inter alia, inter-
national relations, the armed forces, citizenship, currency, air and aerospace nav-
igation, telecommunications services, and federal intervention, while those of 
the provinces relate to, for instance, primary education, electoral systems, creat-
ing own institutions and establishing local government structures. By contrast, 
shared competences apply in matters requiring joint decisions, such as the cre-
ation of new provinces, the establishment of the capital city, and the enactment 
of the so-called co-participation regimen – a special tax-sharing arrangement 
between federal and provincial levels.
As for concurrent competences, they can be decided and implemented inde-
pendently by any level (Bidart Campos 1998). Both the federal and provincial 
levels are endowed with powers and functions related to social policies and 
general welfare: health care, education, science and culture, employment and 
labour, environmental affairs, and housing are all concurrent competences. The 
main principle informing the distribution of power is contained in article 121, 
which states that provinces reserve to themselves all the powers not delegated 
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to the federal government. As such, federal powers are limited and enumerated, 
whereas provincial powers are numerous and indeterminate.
In practice, though, the federal level plays the role of developing and coor-
dinating policies and establishing general guidelines, while the provinces are 
in charge of implementing and administering these policies. This arrangement 
is especially apparent in the areas of health care, education, and housing. The 
federal government plays a key – almost exclusive – role in the areas of social 
assistance and social security, two competences which have been re-centralised 
in recent decades.
14.2.2 Declaration of states of emergency
In terms of the Constitution, a state of emergency may be declared if there are 
exceptional social, political, economic, or natural situations that could affect the 
constitutional order. The power to declare an emergency lies with the National 
Congress, which can create various emergency powers that are subject to the 
Constitution. The Congress has to decide whether there is a true state of need, 
formally declare the emergency, establish its duration, and set out the main 
measures to be taken. In general, while those measures increase the powers of 
the state – particularly of the executive – and correlatively limit the rights of 
individuals, they may not in any way suspend or limit the republican and federal 
system.
The Emergency powers foreseen by the 1853 constitutional text are federal 
intervention (article 6) and a state of siege (article 23); those contemplated by 
amendments to the Constitution in 1994 are decrees of necessity and urgency 
(DNUs) (article 99(3)) and legislative delegation to the executive (article 76) 
(Hernández 2012a; Midón 2001).
A state of siege (‘estado de sitio’ in Spanish), or what is more commonly 
known as a state of emergency, is provided for in the 1853 Constitution in 
the event of the emergencies of war (‘external attack’) and domestic disor-
der (‘internal commotion’). These situations have to meet the requirements, 
first, of endangering both the Constitution and the authorities created by it, 
and, secondly, presenting a disturbance of order. Since 1853 there have been 
53 states of siege, and in 60 per cent of them the executive acted by decree; 
exorbitant powers were given to the President; congressional functions saw 
evident decline; and notable harm was done to individual rights and guarantees 
(Hernández 2020a, 2012b).
With regard to DNUs, the President is not allowed under any circumstances 
to issue provisions of a legislative nature, which would be entirely null and 
void; however, in exceptional circumstances where the ordinary constitutional 
procedures for the enactment of laws are impossible to follow, he or she may 
issue decrees on the grounds of necessity and urgency. Even then, the President 
cannot issue decrees on criminal matters or issues of taxation and electoral or 
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political-party systems. As regards formal requirements, the Constitution stipu-
lates that this kind of decree has to be decided together with all the ministers and 
the Chief of Cabinet and be submitted to the consideration of a joint standing 
committee of Congress composed of representatives of both houses.
Finally, legislative delegation is a mechanism whereby Congress can delegate 
the power to regulate certain issues concerning administration and public emer-
gency to the executive arm of government. The legislature empowers the exec-
utive to create norms (which, from a purely material point of view, are laws) that 
determine the content and timing of the decision previously taken and owned, 
so to speak, by the legislature (Quiroga Lavié 2009: 1172).
14.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
As noted, the national constitution does not specifically provide for institutions 
to respond to a disaster such as Covid-19. In the case of a health crisis, the Federal 
Health Council, comprising the federal and provincial ministries of health, could 
be used, but at the time of this writing it had not convened during the pandemic.
Argentina recorded its first case of Covid-19 on 3 March 2020. At that point, 
it was in the midst of a severe economic, social, and health crisis that had been 
formally declared as a public emergency by the National Congress in December 
2019. This declaration put in place most of the legal framework within which 
national and local authorities acted during the 2020 pandemic.
The background to it is that in late December 2019, the National Congress, 
at the request of the new government, enacted Law No. 27541 which declared a 
public emergency in nine areas, including economic, financial, fiscal, adminis-
trative, pension, tariff, energy, health and social matters, and, under article 76 of 
the Constitution, expressly authorised the delegation of powers to the President, 
although in broad terms.
Consequently, when the pandemic reached Argentina in March 2020, a pub-
lic emergency had already been declared, with the President enjoying legisla-
tive delegations and in no need of a further declaration by Congress. The latter 
commenced its ordinary session on 1 March, but adjourned in the course of the 
month and did not meet again until mid-May.
14.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
With the coronavirus spreading across the world and its arrival in Argentina 
imminent, the country’s three levels of government began to take measures. 
Provincial governors were the first to do so, followed rapidly by the federal 
government; numerous municipalities were also quick to respond to the loom-
ing health crisis. Once the federal government had taken the lead, however, the 
other levels acted within its framework.
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14.4.1 Taking the initiative
As stated above, the three levels of governments reacted automatically to the 
first cases of Covid-19. Indeed, the three levels acted first independently and 
within their own respective constitutional competencies – although, many 
local and provincial decisions where considered unconstitutional by local lit-
erature. The federal government announced a lockdown throughout the coun-
try on 19 March 2020, following which provincial and municipal governments 
accepted the decision and acted accordingly. Making use of a certain margin of 
discretion within the federal legal framework, subnational governments added 
restrictions of their own, with provinces closing borders between each other and 
many municipalities doing the same with their neighbours.
These actions reflected a lack or failure of coordination in multilevel govern-
ance. From the outset, questions emerged about which level of government has 
constitutional competence to deal with emergencies and which has emergency 
police powers. The country’s literature is unanimous in recognising that health 
care is a concurrent competence both in times of normality as well as emergency; 
what was in question was the extent to which each level could limit fundamental 
rights in exercising its emergency powers.
14.4.2 Federal action
In the face of an imminent viral outbreak, President Fernandez on 12 March 
2020 issued Decree No. 260, in terms of which the health emergency declared 
by Congress previously in December was extended for one year ‘in accord-
ance with the pandemic declared by the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
in relation to the coronavirus Covid-19’. The measure was criticised as uncon-
stitutional, on the grounds that no emergency can be established by means of 
DNUs and that the President is not authorised to extend an emergency already 
declared by a law of Congress, especially when Congress is still in session – as 
the Supreme Court of Justice found in San Luis Province v. Estado Nacional [ J.A.] 
(2003-I-188).
One week later, on 19 March, a compulsory lockdown was imposed on the 
entire country by way of DNU No. 297. This was initially successful, since it 
had the support of all political parties as well as provincial, CABA, and municipal 
governments (Porto and Di Gresia 2020; Tortolero Cervantes 2020). There was 
widespread agreement that mandatory social distancing was the primary way to 
curb the pandemic, regardless of the constitutional rights it affected.
The first renewals of the lockdown were announced jointly on 26 April by the 
President, and the governor of the province of Buenos Aires, who belonged to 
the governing party, and the head of government of the CABA, who was of the 
opposition party. Later, though, when the President continued issuing decrees in 
violation of the republican and federal form of state, resistance, accompanied by 
public protests, grew throughout the country.
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The justification consistently offered for the lockdown was that the health 
of the population was more important than the economy. Accordingly, the 
Ministry of Health established an Emergency Operations Centre, or Centro de 
Operaciones de Emergencia (COE), comprised of epidemiologists and public health 
experts whose function was to advise the government. Before each renewal 
of the lockdown, the COE met with the President and national Minister of 
Health – arguably, the President was seeking thereby to be absolved of responsi-
bility for the social and economic consequences of his actions, as he could claim 
that, in the name of rationality, he had to follow scientific advice for the good of 
population health.
From the outset of the pandemic, the federal government implemented a series 
of socio-economic measures to mitigate the impacts of quarantining. In the first 
place, it formed an ‘economic cabinet’ or cabinet committee, albeit without pro-
vincial representatives.4 This cabinet sought to speed up assistance to small and 
medium enterprises, vulnerable sectors, and taxpayers financially affected by the 
lockdown.
As part of these initiatives, the federal government introduced two special 
financial support packages: the Emergency Family Income package, which pro-
vided AMD 10,000 (less than USD 100) to each of more than 8 million people, 
and the Emergency Assistance Program for Work and Production, aimed at pro-
viding economic support to affected businesses and workers for the duration of 
the pandemic.
It also regulated aspects of business activity that have key socio-economic 
impacts. Among other things, it froze the price of housing rentals, fixed the 
maximum prices of basic products, introduced tax exemptions, and prohibited 
layoffs in the private sector. The President adopted these measures unilaterally 
by executive decree – although Congress validated most of them, they ought to 
have come about by means of laws of Congress.
The federal government continued to govern by means of decrees and res-
olutions as the year wore on. By the end of October 2020, the President had 
issued 38 DNUs and 12 Delegated Decrees (Cavallini Viale and Ferreyra 2020), 
facing increasing resistance from the opposition due to Congress’s irregular 
functioning.
Indeed, Congress was bypassed by the DNUs issued by the President, in part 
because it was closed from the beginning of the lockdown until it began to meet 
virtually on 13 May. The situation was not helped by the fact that the Senate was 
presided over by the Vice President, Cristina Kirchner, who steadfastly resisted 
calls to debate the pandemic response; her son, meanwhile, was the head of the 
governing-party legislative bloc in the Chamber of Deputies. The opposition 
was also hindered from taking recourse to judicial measures because both the 
federal and provincial judiciaries decreed an extraordinary recess for the first 
months of the pandemic (from March until July), as a result of which – barring a 
few isolated cases – they all but ceased to operate.
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Moreover, when Congress began to meet virtually on May 13 and thereaf-
ter, it gave only brief attention to presidential DNUs – some 20 of these were 
approved in the Senate meeting of that day. Before the online sessions became 
operative, both houses had spent considerable time deliberating such a possibil-
ity informally and in the media before deciding to proceed with remote ses-
sions paired with the physical presence of a minimum of legislators (restricted to 
parliamentary office-holders and leaders of legislative blocs). In the Senate, this 
mixed mode of operation was extended by decree of the Senate leader, yet with-
out the two-thirds votes required to amend the relevant laws pursuant to article 
227 of the Senate’s Rules of Procedure;5 the same occurred in the Chamber 
of Deputies, where the government extended the remote sessions without the 
required consensus.6
It is evident that the federal government’s only strategy in response to the 
2020 pandemic was the nationwide lockdown. The national lockdown was the 
longest in the world and caused a multitude of social and economic, as well 
as educational and psychological, problems in all sectors of the population, 
including notably the poor, children and youth, and the elderly. The lockdown 
was mandatory and sanctions were imposed for non-compliance, all of which 
resulted in violations of fundamental rights that were not sufficiently reviewed 
by the judiciary.
The situation was well illustrated by the Single Certificate for Circulation, 
issuable only by the Ministry of Interior. In terms of Resolution 48/2020 of 
the Ministry of Interior dated 28 March 2020, permission for any individ-
ual to travel outside his or her place of residence depended on the national 
authority. Thus, all authorisation of movement, and hence of circulation of 
the population and the resumption of social, economic, and educational activ-
ity, rested with the federal government, irrespective of the prevalence – or, 
in some provinces, or in many areas within different provinces, the virtual 
non-existence – of the pandemic. By the logic of the Resolution, no one any-
where in the Argentine federation could at any time make a move without the 
say-so of the centre.
14.4.3 Provincial action
All 23 provinces and the CABA formally declared public health emergencies 
in their respective jurisdictions and according to their own constitutions and 
laws, thereby enabling their authorities to exercise emergency powers. In many 
cases, these declarations were effected by executive decrees rather than laws, 
as required by provincial constitutions. The provinces adopted, and complied 
with, federal decrees and resolutions, in addition to which they added their own 
restrictions. In fact, Tierra del Fuego was put under lockdown on 16 March 
2020, three days before the rest of the country, while the provinces of Chaco, 
Misiones, Salta, Jujuy, and Mendoza closed their borders to other countries on 
18 March.
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The federation as a system of federal and provincial governments was impor-
tant in health-care provision. As noted, public health services are under the 
administration of provinces, the CABA, and municipalities, with more com-
plex institutions falling under provincial governments or the private sector via 
private health insurance. Provinces thus had to respond to the emergency as 
well, which many did by repurposing facilities as Covid-19 treatment centres, 
building new hospitals, or setting up tent and mobile hospitals. Accordingly, 
provincial COEs were established, with these composed of provincial health 
ministers and specialists in different fields (e.g. physicians, epidemiologists, and 
lawyers). COEs decided on measures to combat the pandemic, which in effect 
subordinated municipal governments to provincial ones, since the former had no 
say in decisions made by the latter.
Operating within a thin margin of autonomy, provinces were allowed to 
reduce or expand the activities permitted during the lockdown. In some cases, 
provinces took measures that went beyond the restrictions of the federal govern-
ment, such as preventing interprovincial transit and imposing curfews, thus affect-
ing the fundamental rights and federal principles contained in the Constitution. 
For example, numerous provinces closed the roads leading into them, often by 
digging up road to make them impassable or leaving trucks parked across them; 
such actions led to legal challenges.
In general, though, the provinces’ role in the quarantine was merely to imple-
ment federal decisions, especially regarding DNU 297 and its successive exten-
sions. This is so because any measures implemented by a province were carried 
out within the national legal framework. The DNU 297 measures were highly 
restrictive and imposed a rigid framework within which local authorities were 
also required to act.
Like their federal counterpart, the provinces were prone to a state-level ver-
sion of hyper-presidentialism. Provincial legislatures and municipal councils 
were not fully operational, though there were exceptions. Some provincial leg-
islatures held meetings that were attended in person, in which they adhered to 
hygiene and safety protocols (as is the case in Neuquén, San Juan, Catamarca, 
Tucumán, and Jujuy, among others) while in other provinces, legislatures pro-
ceeded with remote sessions (as in Córdoba, Santa Cruz, Misiones, or La Rioja, 
for example) or a mixture of online participation and a minimum physical pres-
ence of legislators (as in San Luis and Formosa). Although provincial legislatures 
were operational in one way or another, the general trend was for government 
by gubernatorial decree, or even by resolutions or administrative decisions issued 
by lower-level officials such as provincial COEs, which are not legislative bodies 
(Hernández 2020a).
The role of provincial government was far from insignificant. Provinces are 
in charge of police forces, which were drawn on extensively to enforce pandemic 
control measures. Crucially, too, provinces are responsible for the administration 
of the health-care system and all it entails, ranging from hospitals and health 
centres to personnel, resources, and infrastructure.
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14.4.4 Local government action
Municipal governments also had an important role to play in the 2020 pandemic, 
primarily because their broad competences in health matters are concurrent 
with those of the provincial and federal levels. Of the 25,751 facilities that make 
up Argentina’s health system, a total of 4,056 (15.75 per cent) depend directly 
on municipal governments, which all developed prevention, containment, and 
support activities in the fight against Covid-19. Their role – specifically the role 
played by primary health-care centres – was especially critical given their close, 
direct relationship with the most vulnerable sectors of the population, which 
are present in small towns as well as intermediate cities and large metropoli-
tan areas.
This immediacy led some local governments to take preventive measures 
ahead of the federal or respective provincial government. For example, Bahía 
Blanca in the province of Buenos Aires issued Decree 317/2020 on 12 March 
2020 prohibiting large-scale public events and activities; a few days later, other 
municipalities followed suit, among them La Plata, Tandil, Olavarría, Pilar, 
Avellaneda, Mar del Plata, and Brandsen (Malavolta and Pulvirenti 2020).
Some local government orders were controversial, such as blockades of inter-
provincial or municipal boundaries or the imposition of curfews. A notable case 
was the local government of Puerto Iguazú, which announced the closure of the 
Tancredo Neves Bridge linking Brazil and Argentina but which was prevented 
by a warning from the Federal Judge of El Dorado (Azarkevich 2020).
14.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
Cooperative and coordinated federalism are fundamental to the constitutional 
reform of 1994 (Hernández 2009), but the intergovernmental relations (IGR) 
they entail were not given full effect to during the pandemic or, for that matter, 
before it. The federal government’s hyper-presidentialism and attendant central-
ised approach meant that Congress, provinces, the CABA and local governments 
were marginalised (Hernández 2020a, 2020c) – arguably, a serious error to make 
in the management of Covid-19 in what is, after all, the eighth-largest country 
in the world.
This occurred notwithstanding that certain DNUs refer explicitly to mul-
tilevel coordination in implementing control measures. Article 3 of DNU No. 
355/2020 stipulates that federal authorities, ‘in coordination with their peers 
from the provincial jurisdictions, from the CABA and from the municipal 
authorities, each one in the scope of their competences, will arrange the meas-
ures …’. However, article 2 of the same decree in effect subordinates subna-
tional governments and curbs their leeway for movement, since only the Chief 
of Cabinet of the federal government is authorised to make exceptions to the 
orderly exit from lockdown, exceptions which have to be requested by provincial 
governments. Similarly, DNU No. 408/2020 permits provinces to determine 
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their respective activities and protocols, only to constrict them tightly again by 
reaffirming that it is the Federal Ministry of Health and Chief of Cabinet that 
have the final say on these matters.
At an institutional level, a variety of spaces exist for deliberating on and imple-
menting joint, consensual intergovernmental decisions, in particular federal 
councils such as the previously mentioned Federal Health Council, along with 
the Federal Education Council and Investment Education Council. However, 
the latter were inactive and unutilised in the 2020 pandemic response, an act of 
omission that amounted to a missed opportunity for fostering IGR generally and 
so, among other things, averting or mitigating the conflicts that would inevitably 
arise in a nationwide effort of this kind. For instance, the decision of the federal 
government to centralise the purchase of respirators prevented the provinces of 
Mendoza, Jujuy, Chubut, and Corrientes from buying their own even though 
they had already placed orders with the company concerned (Mozetic 2020) 
and as a consequence of that decision, these provinces were unable to buy those 
respirators.
To turn from vertical to horizontal IGR, inter-state cooperation was rare. In 
Patagonia, for instance, an enormous region encompassing the provinces of La 
Pampa, Neuquén, Río Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego, all but 
two interprovincial initiatives were carried out: the creation of the Interprovincial 
Commission for Monitoring the Epidemiological Situation (Covid-19), set up by 
the governors of Neuquén and Río Negro on 19 April 2020; and a meeting 
of the Patagonian Forum of the Superior Courts of Justice to prevent and mini-
mise the pandemic’s effects on the administration of justice.
Far more common was inter-state conflict. A case in point was that between 
the neighbouring provinces of Corrientes and Chaco. Separated by a river and 
joined by a bridge, the one province, Chaco, had a high level of Covid-19 infec-
tion, while the other, Corrientes, had none; their dispute turned around two 
contradictory court rulings to do with medical personnel living in the province 
of Corrientes but working in Resistencia, the capital of Chaco.
When the government of Corrientes prohibited them from crossing the 
bridge between the two provinces, the federal judge of Resistencia ordered the 
opposite; in turn, the province of Corrientes resorted to the federal judge of 
Corrientes (the city of the same name), who ruled that this resolution was unen-
forceable in the province of Corrientes’s jurisdiction. Once again, the federal 
judge of Resistencia ordered Corrientes not to prevent the medical personnel 
from performing their duties in accordance with the federal government’s emer-
gency decree. This precautionary measure was ratified by the federal judicial 
chamber of Resistencia in a resolution, dated 20 April 2020, that allowed medi-
cal personnel from Corrientes entry to Chaco (Pulvirenti 2020).
A similar issue arose between the federal court of Rio Cuarto (province of 
Córdoba) and the province of San Luis. In response to a precautionary meas-
ure issued by the former, which ordered the lifting of the blockade imposed 
by the province of San Luis on national and provincial routes connecting both 
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jurisdictions, the federal judge of San Luis issued a counter-measure requested 
by the provincial government itself. In the meantime, an amparo action was filed 
before the federal judge of Río Cuarto by four entities – representing thousands 
of citizens of the south of the province of Córdoba – in regard to the funda-
mental rights violated by the blockade ordered by the provincial government of 
San Luis.
In view of the conflict of jurisdiction, the federal judge of Río Cuarto referred 
the case to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, which has competence 
in such matters under article 117 of the Constitution. Its ruling was awaited 
at the time of writing, and it was anticipated that it would clarify the position 
not only as regards Córdoba and San Luis but also the several other provinces 
and municipalities which had declared similar prohibitions of interprovincial or 
inter-municipal transit. The Supreme Court had requested that the provinces 
of San Luis, Córdoba, Corrientes, Salta, and Formosa submit reports detailing 
citizens’ complaints about the prohibitions. In one such instance, it ordered the 
province of Corrientes to allow a person to enter the provincial jurisdiction so 
as to assist his mother, who was ill with cancer (Maggi, Mariano v. Provincia de 
Corrientes, 10 September 2020).
14.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
The pandemic had a highly adverse impact on the economy, all the more so 
given that Argentina was already in the midst of a major economic crisis when 
Covid-19 broke out. Unemployment rose to 13.1 per cent in the second quar-
ter of 2020, while between March and November, poverty rates increased and 
inflation climbed to 35 per cent. Due to the slump in economic activity, tax 
collection decreased, thus hampering federal transfers to provinces. Fiscal feder-
alism is highly centralised in Argentina, where it is the federal government that 
collects the lion’s share – nearly 82 per cent – of tax revenue generated by the 
country. Federal taxes represent 32 per cent of the tax burden as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP), while provincial taxes represent only 5.6 per cent 
(Altavilla 2019).
Under normal circumstances, the federal government provides provinces with 
resources by way of various transfers. Chief among these is the co- participation 
regime, or Régimen de Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos (RCFI), which accounts 
for a little more than 50 per cent of all federal transfers. Provincial finances are 
heavily dependent on these transfers. Most provinces rely on them for more 
than 50 per cent of their revenue, and in some extreme cases, for nearly all of 
it: in Formosa, federal transfers cover as much as 94.5 per cent of its budget, in 
La Rioja, 92.5 per cent, in Catamarca, 90.2 per cent, in Santiago del Estero, 
89 per cent, and in Chaco, 88.1 per cent (Altavilla 2019).
As mentioned, from the outset, the federal government adopted measures to 
mitigate the lockdown’s socio-economic impacts. Between March and October 
2020, it transferred AMD 1.55 trillion to the provinces by means of discretionary 
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federal funds, such as food programme funds or the fund, Contributions from the 
National Treasury, or Aportes del Tesoro National (ATN). As these are discretion-
ary funds, the federal government was free to distribute them to any province 
according to its own criteria.
Furthermore, in April 2020, it created the Provincial Financial Emergency 
Programme, or Programa para la Emergencia Financiera Provincial (PEFP), capitalised 
to a total amount of AMD 170 billion (made up of AMD 60 billion from the 
ATN fund and ADM 110 billion from the Provincial Development Trust Fund 
(FFDP)). Predetermined federal transfers continued to be assigned to provinces. 
However, since transfers are composed of federal taxes, their amount depends on 
tax collection; during the pandemic, tax collection declined, as did the amounts 
directed to provinces. As such, transfers via the FFDP compensated for the 
decrease in RCFI amounts.
Critical problems in intergovernmental fiscal relations surfaced, nonetheless. 
For one, at the time of writing, the federal government had not yet distributed all 
the FFDP’s budgeted amounts (to date, only AMD 46 billion of AMD 60 billion 
had been transferred from the ATN fund). For another, some reports show that 
the distribution of resources to provinces has been linked less to their degree of 
Covid-19 infection than to whether they are governed by the national ruling 
party (Aerarium 2020). Looking at federal transfers as a whole, only five prov-
inces received more resources in 2020 than in the previous year (Buenos Aires, 
La Rioja, Neuquén, Santa Cruz, and the CABA); the other 19 provinces received 
less than before.
Certain decisions by the President caused major intergovernmental conflict. 
In a sudden, unilateral decision, he issued decree No. 735 on 9 September on 
tax relations which provided for a 1.18 per cent reduction of the co- participation 
regime of the CABA (in opposition hands) to be granted to Buenos Aires prov-
ince, ostensibly to help tackle the pandemic, and immediately sent a bill to 
Congress to reduce the tax share due to the CABA. The bill, approved by the 
Senate, was in relation to the 2016 Security Transfer Agreement. In that year, 
federal and city governments agreed to transfer more than 20,000 federal police 
to the CABA since the latter were providing services in the city but were funded 
by the national budget. For this reason, the CABA’s tax share was set at 3.50 per 
cent. Decree 735 reduced this to 2.32 per cent, while the bill passed in the Senate 
reduced the percentage further to 1.4 per cent. The CABA rejected the federal 
government’s policy as unconstitutional and approached the Supreme Court, 
whose decision was pending at the time of this writing.
Other serious infringements of federalism also occurred, such as the fact that 
the process of transferring companies providing water and electric power ser-
vices under the federal jurisdiction to the province of Buenos Aires and to the 
CABA were stopped. Also, in the proposed federal budget most of the transport 
subsidies are targeted at the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area at the expense of 
other jurisdictions, which has led to claims by the mayors of the metropolitan 
areas of Córdoba, Rosario, Salta, and Bariloche, among others.7
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In short, the main economic measures were taken at the centre, while the 
intergovernmental fiscal structure was not adapted in response to the pandemic. 
The pandemic and lockdown worsened the country’s economic situation, both 
generally and specifically in the provinces. Federal transfers depend on tax col-
lection, and because tax collection declined, federal amounts paid to the prov-
inces were reduced – at the same time, there were no compensatory measures to 
mitigate the provincial financial crisis.
14.5 Findings and policy implications
Emergency powers should conform to the principles and rules of Argentina’s 
constitutional, democratic, liberal, and republican order. The standards set by 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice and of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights should be applied, based on reasonable and proportional 
limitations to fundamental rights. In contrast, what occurred in practice is that 
most of the decisions made and measures taken in response to the pandemic were 
adopted through presidential decrees with a centralist bias and in violation of 
the concurrent powers of subnational entities and the formal division of power. 
There was a de facto subordination of provinces, the CABA and local govern-
ments to the federal government, rather than coordinated federalism based on 
adequate IGR.
Although the country’s executive authorities are endowed with the highest of 
powers for dealing with exceptional situations, this does not mean that Congress 
and other legislative bodies should cease to play their oversight role with regard 
to emergency measures – the same is true as well at the subnational level. In 
responding to emergencies, the country’s measures need to balance effectiveness, 
on the one hand, with democratic legitimacy and constitutionality, on the other. 
This is not easy to do, but if the mistakes of the past are to be avoided, it is a 
challenge that has to be taken up (Hernández 2020d).
Argentina has returned to hyper-presidentialism in which power is concen-
trated in the hands of the President beyond what is prescribed in the Constitution, 
a situation that stands to the detriment of the division of powers in multilevel 
government and the principles of constitutional democracy (Hernández 2012b; 
Hernández et al. 2016; Nino 1992a, 1992b). The country has often suffered from 
circumstances such as these, which point to low institutional capacity, a weak 
culture of legality, and a strong culture of corporatism and centralism (O’Donnell 
1992). The executive branch also reverted to its old habit of using emergency 
powers for personal or political advantage.
In view of the complexity of the pandemic, deliberation by legislative bodies 
should not have been dispensed with. The national union (mentioned in the 
preamble of the Constitution as one of the objectives of the nation) that needs to 
be defended in times of threat should be imagined as a plural, open society and 
sustained by democratic consensus rather than centralist thinking. The pandemic 
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and the consequences of its governance have now been added to Argentina’s 
many other national problems.
In conclusion, the pandemic has brought out new issues and has revitalised 
some old problems that have affected the Argentine Federation for a long time. 
Centralised decision-making without consulting the provinces and municipal-
ities has damaged the already weakened intergovernmental relation network. 
While at the beginning of the pandemic, the process of decision-making seemed 
to follow some intergovernmental logic (previous reunion between the president 
and governors), however, soon thereafter the practice of decision-making turned 
to be centralist (Hernández 2020b). No institutional channel was used (such as 
the existing federal councils) not even a new one was established (for instance, 
some federal emergency committee).
Undoubtedly, federal institutions were helpful and useful in addressing the 
pandemic because of the effectiveness of the preventive measures that were imple-
mented, and the swiftness with which they were implemented. However, a great 
opportunity to improve intergovernmental relations was lost, and Argentine fed-
eralism failed, in some way, to address this emergency situation from a federal 
perspective, using all the institutional resources provided by the Constitution. 
Yet, the pandemic is still ongoing – and while it is not yet feasible to reach a 
definitive conclusion – it can be said that a window of opportunities for improv-
ing intergovernmental relations is still open.
Notes
 1 Greater Buenos Aires, also known as the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, is an agglom-
eration consisting of the CABA and 40 adjacent districts within the province of Buenos 
Aires.
 2 The 23 provinces are Buenos Aires, Catamarca, Chaco, Chubut, Córdoba, Corrientes, 
Entre Ríos, Formosa, Jujuy, La Pampa, La Rioja, Mendoza, Misiones, Neuquén, Río 
Negro, Salta, San Juan, San Luis, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, Santiago del Estero, Tierra del 
Fuego, and Tucumán.
 3 See Hernández (2003, 2009); on concurrent municipal powers, see Marchiaro (2020a, 
2020b).
 4 This cabinet was composed of, among others, the Chief of Cabinet; the federal Econ-
omy Minister, Minister of Productive Development, and Minister of Labor, Employment 
and Social Security; the president of the Central Bank; the president of the AFIP (Fed-
eral Administration of Public Revenues); and the Secretary of the Treasury. All of these 
office-holders were federal public servants.
 5 For this reason, an amparo action (special proceedings for urgent protection of constitu-
tional rights) was filed before the Supreme Court on 22 September by the Interbloque de 
Juntos por el Cambio of the National Senate, which brings together the opposition parties 
Republican Proposal and Radical Civic Union parties, with Antonio María Hernández 
and Ricardo Gil Lavedra as lawyers for the plaintiff.
 6 An amparo action was also filed on 8 September by the Interbloque de Juntos por el Cambio 
of the Chamber of Deputies, with Antonio María Hernández and Juan Vicente Sola as 
lawyers for the plaintiff.
 7 Practically 90 per cent of the subsidies are provided to the Buenos Aires Metropolitan 
Area, with the balance going to the main cities of the country.
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The ongoing shift to ‘national federalism’
Ajay Kumar Singh
15.1 Introduction
Covid-19 broke out in India in January 2020, soon placing a federation already 
embattled by authoritarian centralism under strain, yet without successfully con-
taining the spread of the pandemic in what, after China, is the second-most 
populous country in the world. The pandemic further pushed the polity towards 
national federalism, emphasising national executive governance of public poli-
cies and state subjects.
With a population density of 382 per km2, India’s population, according to 
the 2011 census, stood at 1.21 billion in 2011 (Union Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting 2020: 7), while estimates by the United Nations in 2019 put 
the figure as high as 1.37 billion (United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division 2019: 12). Roughly 29.5 per cent of people 
are in the age group 0–14 years, 62.5 per cent in the age group 14–59 years, 
and 8 per cent 60 years and older (Office of the Registrar General and Census 
Commissioner of India 2011). About 31.2 per cent of the population reside in 
urban areas that range from towns to cities and metropolises. Hindus comprise 
approximately 79.8 per cent of the population, followed by Muslims (14.2 per 
cent), Christians (2.3 per cent), Sikhs (1.7 per cent), Buddhists (0.7 per cent), and 
Jain (0.3 per cent).
Politically and administratively, India is a federation consisting of 28 states and 
nine union (or federal) territories, 734 districts, 4,470 urban bodies, and 255,544 
village panchayats (grass-roots councils). Over the past decade, especially since 
2014, parliamentary democracy has been overshadowed by what many regard 
as an authoritarian regime in the form of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a 
right-wing Hindu formation which rules at the centre and in most of the states 
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demonstrates little respect for constitutional principles. Secularism and multi-
culturalism have been under attack in the face of the BJP’s efforts to establish a 
Hindu-ised socio-political order, with anti-minority sentiment and exclusionary 
politics becoming the norm (Diamond 2020: 1–7; Gandhi 2020: 1–4; Mukherji 
2020: 91–105; Patnaik 2019: 6–9; Picketty 2020: 944–948).
Notably, in August 2019, the special autonomy status of Jammu and Kashmir 
regions was revoked (Basu 2020: 287–294), while in December, amendments 
under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 47 of 2019 granted citizenship to mem-
bers of non-Muslim religious communities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or 
Pakistan who had entered India by 31 December 2014 (Tharoor 2020: 258–277; 
Union Ministry of Law and Justice 2019). This led to violent protests, with fears 
being voiced that the Act is discriminatory to Muslims and intended to make 
indigenous peoples minorities in their homelands.
Other aspects of India’s democracy are also in danger. Freedom of expression 
is suppressed by state organs such as police, investigative agencies, surveillance 
systems, and tax authorities (Yadav 2020: 351). Parliamentary processes are 
subverted in the making and amendment of laws; parliamentary accountabil-
ity is at its lowest ebb; and the autonomy of independent institutions, includ-
ing the judiciary, Election Commission, Central Information Commission, 
and other regulatory bodies, is under constant threat (Ramakrishnan 2020). 
The pandemic has further incentivised illiberal repressive measures by Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi’s government (Diamond 2020: 1–7; Mukherji 
2020: 91).
Economically, at the beginning of 2020 India found itself in the midst of 
a growth crisis, one that worsened as the pandemic unfolded. Gross domes-
tic product (GDP) has been in decline since 2016, when it recorded growth of 
8.2 per cent. By 2019, GDP decreased by 3 per cent (World Bank 2020), after 
which it saw negative growth of 23.9 per cent in the first quarter (April–June) 
and 8.6 per cent in the second quarter ( July–September) of the 2020–2021 fiscal 
year (Reserve Bank of India 2020). Unemployment, always a cause of concern, 
was aggravated by the pandemic, with salaried jobs decreasing from 86 million 
in 2019–2020 to 65 million in August 2020 (Vyas 2020).
On the medical front, India has a three-tier system consisting of primary health 
care (provided at sub-district level), secondary health care (provided at district 
level), and specialised services at the tertiary level. Public health expenditure has, 
however, never exceeded 1.6 per cent of GDP (PRS Legislative Research 2020a: 
1), resulting in a significant misalignment in India between population size and 
health infrastructure; likewise, the doctor-population ratio is low at 1:1,343. The 
country has about a thousand district hospitals, 5,335 community health centres, 
24,855 primary health centres, and 157,411 sub-centres in outlying areas. More 
tellingly, Jaffrelot and Shah (2020), referring to a study by the Centre for Disease 
Dynamics, Economics and Policy (India) and Princeton University, noted that 
‘public hospitals have only 713,986 beds, including 35,699 in intensive care units 
and 17,850 ventilators’.
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It was in this context that India reported its first case of Covid-19 on 30 January 
2020, with the infection coming to light in the state of Kerala; the first Covid-19 
death occurred on 12 March. The authorities continued with their wait-and-
see policy until 14 March, at which point the pandemic was declared a national 
health emergency. Prior to this, the official response was virtually non-existent. 
Health screening at airports and international borders was not up to the standards 
set in World Health Organization (WHO) advisories, and almost no cases were 
reported in the intervening month of February.
When the first national lockdown was announced on 24 March 2020, India 
had only 519 recorded cases. Between then and 31 October, it conducted 108.8 
million tests, with the total number of cases amounting to 8.1 million; during 
this period, 121,000 people died of Covid-19. In terms of territorial distribu-
tion, nearly all states and union territories were affected. However, about 75 per 
cent of cases were reported in ten states, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, 
Delhi, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, 
and West Bengal (Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2020a). About 
130 districts were hotspots, while the worst affected cities included Mumbai, 
Chennai, Delhi, and Ahmadabad. In a cumulative analysis, 97.72 per cent of 
the cases were reported during the period of phased reopening from 1 June to 
31 October, which supports the thesis that India imposed a national lockdown 
too early and hastily.
This chapter argues that, under the helm of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, 
India’s response to the pandemic resulted in the suspension of federalism in 
favour of highly centralised, unitary executive governance, and, concomitantly, 
severe curtailment of state autonomy. Elsewhere, I have argued that Indian fed-
eralism since 2014 (the year the BJP rose to power) is best described as undergo-
ing a phase of national federalism marked by a shift of sovereignty from states to 
the centre and from the centre to the Office of the Prime Minister (Singh 2019). 
Pandemic governance is no exception to this trend. It is also argued that cen-
tralisation has not yielded the desired result of containing and managing Covid-
19, which instead has placed further strain on centre-state relations, particularly 
when it comes to fiscal issues.
15.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
India’s union model of federalism is a curious blend of the characteristics of dual, 
cooperative-collaborative, and organic-interdependent federalism (Singh 2009). 
Under the Constitution of India of 1950, the distribution of powers between the 
different levels of government tilts the balance in favour of a strong centre, with 
centralisation rationalised as a measure to secure national unity and interests, 
promote general public welfare, and advance national economic integration ( Jain 
2019: 739).
Schedule 7 of the Constitution grants the centre residual powers and exclusive 
authority over 97 subjects including the deployment of the central armed forces; 
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major industrial operations; national highways and transport (including inter-
state movements of goods, services, and people); regulation of higher education; 
inter-state migration and quarantine; and offences against union laws.
In comparison, important competences of states pertaining to Covid-19 are 
public order and safety; policing; public health and sanitation; hospitals and dis-
pensaries; local and intra-state transport and communications; agriculture and 
allied activities; local industry and manufacturing; market operations; theatres, 
amusement parks, and the like; civil works and construction; and school and 
university education. In many of these subjects, states have only qualified and 
conditional competence. For example, in public health matters, the central gov-
ernment regulates clinical trials, treatment protocols, drug use, and medical 
standards, in addition to disease-specific measures (Singh 2015: 139–142).
States and the centre have shared competencies in matters such as civil and 
criminal law and procedure, social and economic planning, labour, education, 
social security, and employment. Nevertheless, central laws and regulations 
override state laws.
The Constitution provides for only two kinds of national emergency – the 
first due to war, external aggression or armed rebellion, and the second a finan-
cial emergency in which India’s fiscal stability is under threat. In the event 
of a breakdown of governance in a state, presidential rule from the centre is 
imposed on the state. The declaration of an emergency is subject to parliamen-
tary approval within a specified period (Basu 2019: 15061–233). In the absence 
of constitutional provisions specifically dealing with a pandemic emergency, the 
central government invoked three legislative enactments to declare a national 
pandemic emergency on 15 March 2020: the Epidemic Diseases Act (EDA) of 
1897, the Disaster Management Act (DMA) of 2005 and Criminal Procedure 
Code (CPC) 1973 (Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha 2020a). The EDA was used 
to declare Covid-19 a national pandemic and the DMA to declare it as a ‘notified 
disaster’ and a ‘national health emergency’. The CPC 1973 enabled police and 
other authorities engaged in pandemic management to take preventive and puni-
tive action on any breach of the government’s order on Covid-19 and to impose 
punishment for offences.
The EDA has four significant features: it allows the centre to declare a dan-
gerous epidemic a national pandemic; it empowers state authorities to initiate 
corrective, preventative and regulatory control measures which are otherwise 
not feasible under the ordinary laws; it allows the government to inspect passen-
ger traffic on air, land, or water and detain any person; and it protects health-care 
providers from any act of violence committed by any individual or group (PRS 
Legislative Research 2020b). The EDA was invoked previously during outbreaks 
of malaria, cholera, dengue, and swine flu (Nomani and Parveen 2020: 156).
The DMA 2005 was invoked, for the first time, to declare Covid-19 a national 
health emergency. The central government assumed all powers from the local to 
the national level related to pandemic care, control, and management. The DMA 
also empowers the central government to issue directives and orders on pandemic 
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management and related matters. The orders made by the centre are binding 
(although barely accountable to Parliament); conversely, states and local authori-
ties cannot take any measures contrary to central directives. For instance, during 
the phased reopening after India’s lockdown, states wished to regulate inter- and 
intra-state movement of people but could not contradict an order of the central 
authority forbidding this.
15.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
After enacting the DMA in 2005, India established a three-layered hierarchy 
for managing disasters, with the National Disaster Management Authority 
(NDMA; hereafter ‘National Authority’) at the central or national level, the 
State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) at the state level, and the District 
Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) at the local level.
The National Authority is led by the Prime Minister: in the event of emer-
gency, he or she can ‘exercise all or any of the powers of the National Authority’ 
(DMA 2005, section 3), which are ratified ex post facto by the NDMA. The 
latter comprises not more than nine members, each of whom is nominated 
by the Prime Minister; currently, it has five expert members. The NDMA is 
vested with the authority of planning and policy formulation. It approves the 
disaster management plans prepared by ministries, as well as coordinating and 
enforcing the policies and guidelines it prepares or approves; accordingly, it 
also has the authority to direct central ministries, departments, and state and 
district authorities in compliance with its orders and guidelines. It ensures 
funding and other measures of support necessary for disaster management. The 
National Authority can sanction concessional loans to persons and establish-
ments affected by disaster of a severe magnitude, in addition to providing for 
basic necessities such as food, shelter, and health care. In other words, ensur-
ing social and economic welfare is a principal responsibility of the National 
Authority.
The National Authority is assisted by the National Executive Committee 
(NEC). Headed by the union home secretary, it is a committee of secretaries 
in charge of ministries or departments involved in disaster-management work. 
As a ‘coordinating and monitoring body for disaster management’, the NEC is 
responsible for the preparation of a national plan to be approved by the National 
Authority, which lays down guidelines and their administration by departments 
of the central government as well as state authorities and ministries. It monitors 
and evaluates progress in disaster mitigation and management.
The SDMA in turn is headed by the chief minister of the state concerned. 
In case of a localised state disaster, the state authority has powers and functions 
similar to those of the National Authority. However, in the event of a dec-
laration of a national disaster, its authority has no autonomous domain. Like 
the National Authority, the state authority is assisted by the State Executive 
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Committee (SEC), which is chaired by the state chief secretary – the latter is 
the executive officer responsible for implementing disaster mitigation plans and 
guidelines issued by the state authority.
The district authority is in charge of district-level planning and led by the 
district magistrate, collector or deputy commissioner, who appoints executive 
magistrates as ‘incident commanders’ responsible for the implementation of dis-
aster mitigation measures in their respective local jurisdictions. All other line 
department officials work under the instruction of the chair of the DDMA, 
which means in practice that panchayats and municipal authorities serve under 
his or her authority.
In declaring Covid-19 an epidemic, the National Authority (read: the Prime 
Minister) on 24 March 2020 invoked its power under the DMA 2005 to ‘direct 
ministries/departments of government of India, state governments and state 
authorities’ to take nationally consistent and uniform measures for the preven-
tion of the spread of disease (section 6(2)(i)). It further authorised the NEC to 
issue necessary guidelines.
In this context, three sections of the DMA 2005 must be highlighted. Section 
35 allows the central government unilaterally to control, command, and coor-
dinate disaster measures across India, while section 62 endows it with extraordi-
nary authority to issue directives to statutory authorities, officers, and employees 
at any level of government. In other words, the pandemic is to be governed 
through a unified system of command and compliance. Furthermore, section 65 
grants the leviathan of the state the ‘power of requisition of resources, provisions, 
vehicles, etc.’ from any public authority or person.
In summary, in the event of disasters of a national scale, the DMA 2005 pro-
vides for a pyramidal structure of governance with the Prime Minister at the 
top and incident commanders at the bottom. Authority begins and ends with 
the Prime Minister. It is from here that the overall national power structure, its 
political composition, ideologies, and leadership have a determining impact on 
disaster management.
15.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
When the pandemic struck, the BJP – either on its own or as part of the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) – was firmly in control at the centre and in 21 states, 
which approximates to about 70 per cent of India’s population. The Indian 
National Congress (INC) party is in power in but five states, the Communist 
Party of India in one, and other regional or local parties preside over three states 
(Maps of India 2020). Of the 545 seats in the Lok Sabha (‘House of the People’), 
the lower chamber of India’s bicameral parliament, the BJP has 302 and the 
INC only 51; of the 250 seats in the upper house of parliament, the BJP has 92 
and the INC, 37. The picture which emerges is that India has a nationally weak 
opposition, and hence one that cannot ensure the accountability of a nationally 
dominant ruling party.
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Against the backdrop of this imbalance, India in recent years witnessed an 
escalation in communal polarisation directed at Muslims, a trend that continued 
into the Covid-19 period. When infections began rising in the national capital 
and other cities, members of the Tablighi Jamaat sect were targeted by Hindu 
fundamentalists as ‘super-spreaders’ of the coronavirus (Salam 2020: 59–60). 
The Bombay High Court, in clearing Muslims of this pejorative label, was 
moved to remark that ‘a political government tries to find the scapegoat when 
there is [a] pandemic or calamity’ (Aurangabad Bench, Criminal Writ Petition 
No. 548 of 2020, 21 August 2020: para 27). Despite incidents like these, people 
in India generally responded supportively to government health measures, with 
community- driven food-relief initiatives for the needy coming into operation 
almost everywhere during the national lockdown.
15.4.1 Taking the initiative
In early January 2020, the government issued advisories to states to improve pre-
paredness and health infrastructure in the event of a pandemic. On 18 January, 
thermal screening of passengers from China and Hong Kong was introduced at 
entry-points. A committee of five union ministers – those of health, aviation, 
shipping, home affairs, and foreign affairs – was formed to monitor the pan-
demic. On 11 March, the NEC, acting in terms of the DMA 2005, delegated 
powers to the union health secretary to boost preparedness and containment. 
Once a national disaster is in force, union ministries do not enjoy equal status 
but exercise their authority only with the consent and approval of the NDMA 
and NEC.
Point-of-entry surveillance was introduced by the end of January, and on 4 
March, thermal screening was made mandatory for all international passengers. 
Travel bans, visa cancellation, and quarantining were effected from 13 March, 
and on 14 March, Covid-19 was (as noted) declared a national health emergency, 
which enabled states to withdraw monies from the State Disaster Response Fund 
(SDRF) (Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha 2020b: 6). States were instructed to 
ensure strict implementation of union advisories and guidelines. In terms of 
advisories issued by the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, edu-
cation facilities, cinemas, malls, and gyms were closed, and social and cultural 
gatherings were restricted. On 22 March, all international flights to India were 
suspended, as were mass transport services such as railways and buses. Domestic 
flights were suspended on 24 March.
On that same day, Prime Minister Modi, in a televised address at 20:00, 
announced a 21-day national lockdown, effective from midnight. The public 
had barely four hours’ notice to gather essential items, nor for that matter had 
states or political parties been given much or any forewarning of the announce-
ment (Mukherji 2020: 93); indeed, it was only later that night that chief secre-
taries of states were briefed about the lockdown (PIB 2020). Once the lockdown 
had been announced, states and political parties extended their support to the 
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central government. For instance, the INC president, Sonia Gandhi, welcomed 
the decision in a public letter to the Prime Minister on 26 March, although 
also raising concerns among the medical fraternity about their safety and among 
workers about financial aid (The Print 2020a).
On 29 March 2020, the Union Home Secretary, as chair of the NEC, set 
up 11 specially empowered groups of officials to plan and manage the imple-
mentation of various aspects of pandemic response such as medical-emergency 
planning, disease surveillance, critical-care infrastructure, the supply of food 
and essential goods, and economic and welfare measures. Furthermore, work-
ing under the direction of the NEC, the Union Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare coordinated health-care preparedness across states, issuing SOPs (stand-
ard operating procedures) and guidelines in this regard. The union agency, the 
Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), appointed technical experts to 
attend to the clinical aspects of health management, which included identifying 
laboratories in the states to conduct testing, and approve modes of treatment, 
drug prescriptions, and medical interventions.
Looking briefly at the initial state-level response, Kerala, led by the Communist 
Party, was the first to respond substantively to Covid-19. Even before the 
national lockdown, a stringent local lockdown was in effect, with schools having 
been closed and social gatherings banned; in fact, Kerala had issued coronavi-
rus guidelines setting out case definitions and procedures for screening, quaran-
tine, isolation, and treatment four days before India’s first case of Covid-19 was 
reported on 30 January (NDMA 2020a). Rajasthan was also quick to respond 
to a possible emergency by taking measures in regard to quarantining and con-
tainment, with a state-wide curfew imposed on 18 March some days before the 
national lockdown. Likewise, Punjab adopted similar measures between January 
and early March. Prior to the lockdown, every state had a protocol of its own for 
contact tracing, isolation, and treatment.
Once Covid-19 had been declared a national pandemic on 14 March, states 
no longer had autonomy in their response measures and were obligated to follow 
national directives – if they wished to depart from them, they had to obtain per-
mission in advance from the central government. Moreover, what was missing 
from the outset was the dimension of inter-state coordination – hardly any for-
mal or informal inter-governmental mechanism was utilised.
15.4.2 Federal government action
In India, central government action in response to Covid-19 had four aspects 
to it. A first set of interventions were non-pharmaceutical and non-clinical 
and involved containing viral spread through closures, including lockdown 
and other modes of suspension and regulation of activity. A key outcome was 
that nationwide lockdown gave the central government time to ramp up health 
infrastructure. In the second place, there were pharmaceutical-clinical inter-
ventions carried out in terms of the regulatory guidelines of the ICMR and 
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other central-level medical agencies. This involved centrally monitored hospital 
management and treatment of Covid-19 cases on a uniform national basis – to 
which one should hasten to add that it intruded significantly on state autonomy 
and jurisdictional authority over public health, given that states could not initiate 
medical measures contrary to central guidelines.
A third kind of action entailed providing information to the public about 
dietary and other means for building immunity, including through the use of 
Ayurvedic (alternative) medicine, while a fourth involved welfarist interventions 
geared towards the socio-economically vulnerable groups. This included supply-
ing food relief over six months to two-thirds of the population (in the form of 
free rations consisting of 5 kg of rice and wheat and 1 kg of pulse foodstuffs such 
as beans and lentils) and paying INR 500 per month for an initial three months 
to about 200 million women holding accounts under the Pradhan Mantri Jan 
Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) financial inclusion programme; in addition, free gas cyl-
inders were provided for three months to some 83 million families living below 
the poverty line (NDMA 2020b: 33).
The lockdown was effected through a series of orders issued by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs. The first 21-day national lockdown started on 25 March 
(Order No. 40-3/2020-DM-I/(A)). Except for the partial relaxation of the 
opening of states’ administrative offices, and agricultural operations, the second 
lockdown order (MHA Order No. 40-3/2020-DM-I/(A), 15 April 2020) kept 
the stringency of the first and did not return states’ powers. The third lock-
down order (MHA Order No. 40-3/2020-DM-I/(A), 1 May 2020) brought 
some easing of trade restrictions allowing standalone shops in urban residential 
localities, and all shops in rural areas to operate. During the fourth lockdown 
(MHA Order No. 40-3/2020-DM-I/(A), 17 May 2020), states were allowed to 
start market operations with staggered opening times and Covid-19 preventive 
measures. States by mutual agreement were allowed to start interstate move-
ment of vehicles. For better focused pandemic measures at the local level, the 
centre conceded the request of states to delineate red, green, and buffer zones 
in accordance with parameters laid down by the Union Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare.
With the economic slump in sight, India started to unlock on a monthly 
basis from 1 June when hospitality services, markets, shopping malls, and limited 
religious worship in temples were allowed. During August the night curfew was 
removed and inter- and intra-state travel and transportation were permitted. In 
September, socio-religious, political, and academic gatherings could be held, 
while states were allowed to open schools and colleges and other educational 
institutions from 15 October.
Overall, pandemic governance under the institution of the NDMA con-
sisted principally in executive governance little impeded by accountability to 
Parliament. As one contributor to the magazine Frontline observed, the pan-
demic seemed to have given the central government the opportunity to engage 
in ‘muting parliament’ (Ramakrishnan 2020: 21–23).
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Despite resistance from opposition parties, major instruments of parliamentary 
accountability were suspended during the legislature’s 2020 monsoon session, 
namely, private members’ bills, question hour (except for questions requiring 
written answers), and ‘zero hour’ (a procedural innovation allowing members to 
raise issues on matters of national concern without prior notice). Notably, too, 
the government did not accede to a demand for a debate on Covid-19, as this 
would have put it in the embarrassing position of explaining its handling of the 
pandemic and the effect it had on the economy.
The well-known parliamentarian Shashi Tharoor said the Modi govern-
ment was attempting to reduce Parliament to ‘a notice-board’ and was ‘[using] 
its crushing majority as a rubber stamp for whatever it wants to pass’ (cited in 
Ramakrishnan 2020: 21–22). This was especially true of labour laws passed dur-
ing the monsoon session, and three controversial farm bills that were introduced 
and passed on the same day, thereby short-circuiting amendment procedures and 
truncating opportunity for debate in spite of stiff resistance from farmers, non-
BJP-ruled states, and several regional political parties.
Together, the three bills – the Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce 
(Promotion and Facilitation) Bill, the Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) 
Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services Bill, and the Essential 
Commodities (Amendment) Bill – leave India’s farmers without security of pric-
ing and the minimum guarantee of assured income and assistance they enjoyed 
hitherto. The effect of the three new legislative enactments is to privatise farm-
ing and bring agriculture within the ambit of inter-state trade, with the centre 
having exclusive jurisdiction – a move in keeping with the Modi government’s 
wider efforts to use the pandemic as an occasion to promote privatisation and 
policy centralisation under the much-vaunted doctrine of Aatma Nirbhar Bharat 
(‘self-reliant India’).
This extends beyond agriculture. Although education is a concurrent sub-
ject, a new education policy (Union Ministry of Human Resource Development 
2020) adopted in 2020 shifts the constitutional scales in favour of the centre 
rather than seeking to secure a fine federal balance between states and centre. 
Apart from promoting privatisation, the policy introduces structural changes in 
education governance by creating a single regulator for higher education as well 
as regulating the school curriculum, a matter that otherwise falls within the 
competence of states. In a similar vein, the Banking Regulation (Amendment) 
Bill of 2020 removes cooperative banking from the regulatory control of states 
and assigns it to the Reserve Bank of India.
15.4.3 State government action
As noted, prior to the declaration of a national disaster, states introduced meas-
ures of their own, given that they could issue orders under their state disaster 
management acts or state legislation on epidemics and public health. However, 
once central directions were issued, states had to comply with them.
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Kerala, for instance, allowed short-distance city bus travel and the reopening 
of local barber shops and restaurants. The centre considered it a violation of 
national lockdown measures, and the union home secretary instructed Kerala 
to adhere to them ‘without any dilution and to ensure strict compliance [with] 
lockdown measures’ (D.O. 40-3/2020-DM-I(A), 19 April 2020). The state was 
left with no choice but to rescind its order.
Nevertheless, states were allowed to introduce stricter containment measures 
if necessary. In addition, in later phases of the lockdown (1 June–31 October), 
they were permitted a partial degree of autonomy, but again only in accordance 
with central guidelines and SOPs.
The leeway available for individuality and locally responsive agency and inno-
vation in state-level responses to the pandemic was thus highly constrained, a 
situation compounded by wide variation in resource capacities from one state to 
the next and hence in what each would be capable of doing anyway even if given 
a free hand. States largely performed similar functions such as border screening 
and control and enforcement of quarantining and isolation, although some states 
were innovative, as illustrated below:
• Kerala, with a highly decentralised and well-equipped public health system, 
followed a community-based approach in successfully containing two waves 
of Covid-19. It developed a network of neighbourhood surveillance systems 
for contact tracing. Its response further included effective provision of med-
icines, community kitchens, food relief, and social assistance worth INR 
1,000 to families not receiving welfare grants (Kerala Chief Minister 2020).
• Karnataka optimised information technology and conducted a health-risk 
survey of about 15 million households that enhanced its management of 
Covid-19. It was also the first state to invoke provisions of the Epidemic 
Diseases Act, in addition to which it capped the cost of testing and hospital-
isation in private hospitals (NDMA 2020c).
• Andhra Pradesh introduced innovations in ward surveillance and in managing 
multiple lockdowns, which were accompanied by highly regulated reopening.
• Tamil Nadu, apart from rigorously implementing lockdown measures, pro-
vided social assistance of INR 1,000 to all ration-card holders and INR 1,500 
per month to persons with disabilities. (Most states provided free rations and 
cash transfers to the needy in the initial few months of lockdown.)
• Apart from implementing a community-based surveillance system, Madhya 
Pradesh introduced ‘fever clinics’ serving as ‘[first] points of contact for sus-
pected Covid patients’ (NDMA 2020d).
• Rajasthan’s success story lies in decentralised public health and rigorous 
containment measures, while Punjab and Delhi were the first few states to 
introduce plasma therapy for Covid-19 treatment.
State high courts – notably in Delhi and Maharashtra, among others – 
intervened, either on their own initiative or on the basis of public appeals, in 
290 Ajay Kumar Singh
matters relating to migrant workers, disease testing, the disposal of dead bodies, 
the condition of facilities in quarantine centres, and capping fees charged by 
private laboratories. During the August and September 2020 phased re-opening, 
state legislative assemblies began to convene; however, there are no inspiring 
tales of legislatures securing executive accountability in Covid-19 management.
The commanding authority of the central government was further upheld in 
two rulings by the Supreme Court of India. In Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of 
India, it pronounced that ‘state governments, public authorities and citizens of 
this country will faithfully comply with the directives, advisories, and orders 
issued by the union of India in letter and spirit in the interests of public safety’ 
(Supreme Court 2020, WP(C) No. 469). Then, in Praneeth K and Ors v. University 
Grants Commission (UGC) and Ors, it quashed the decisions of the SDMAs of 
Maharashtra and West Bengal to promote students to the following semester or 
year without holding year-end or term-end exams.
Stating that this was contrary to the guidelines of the University Grant 
Commission of India (UGC), the Court ruled that an SDMA was not authorised 
to take such a decision while the NDMA is in force. It also upheld the federal 
authority of the central government to regulate the examination and promo-
tion of students in colleges and universities; conversely, SDMAs and other state 
authorities have no such jurisdiction (Supreme Court 2020, WP (C) No. 724).
15.4.4 Local government action
Although the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution in 1992 put 
panchayati raj institutions and municipal bodies on a sound constitutional footing, 
the devolution of functions, funds, and functionaries to them was left to the 
discretion of states (Basu 2020: 304). Some states, such as Kerala, Karnataka, 
and Rajasthan, have devolved considerable powers and authority to local bod-
ies, while others, such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, are yet to do so. From the 
perspective of pandemic control, then, local government has been implemented 
unevenly and, in constitutional terms, is asymmetrically positioned in relation 
to state government.
Moreover, in terms of the DMA 2005, local bodies have to work under the 
control and direction of SDMAs. Their role ranges from raising public awareness 
about health issues and disposing of dead bodies to distributing welfare goods, pro-
viding sanitation and conducting community surveillance. In Kerala, for instance, 
panchayats were engaged, inter alia, in quarantine-centre work, door-to-door sur-
veys, and keeping lists of migrants (Dutta and Fischer 2020). In Karnataka, they 
played a proactive role in delivering goods under government schemes in rural 
areas. In urban areas, municipal bodies were mainly responsible for the surveillance 
of hotspots and containment zones, over and above providing sanitation services.
In India, local bodies do not have the fiscal authority to defer or waive service 
charges, defer housing-loan payments, or grant concessions in property taxes, 
all of which are done either by states or the centre. For example, soon after the 
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imposition of the first national lockdown, the central government announced 
that housing-loan repayments would be deferred for three months, later extend-
ing this by yet another three months; this measure did not affect local authority 
income, however.
15.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
Intergovernmental relations (IGR) are conducted both formally and infor-
mally (see Singh and Saxena 2015). The Constitution establishes the Inter-State 
Council to promote cooperation and coordination between the centre and states 
and among states on crucial issues of IGR and on matters of national importance. 
Its composition – consisting of all chief ministers, heads of union territories, the 
Prime Minister and six cabinet ministers of the union government – makes it a 
truly federal forum. However, in the three decades since it was constituted in 
1990, it has met only 11 times, with the last meeting to date having been held in 
July 2016; on the matter of the global pandemic, it had not met once.
As for the DMA 2005, it does not provide any structured mechanism for IGR 
to facilitate policy consensus and coordination of measures among different levels 
of government. Instead, as noted, it institutes an executive, unilateral model of 
pandemic governance in which orders and commands flow top-down and per-
mit only one-way traffic.
Informal mechanisms of intergovernmental relations include chief ministers’ 
conferences and governors’ conferences. Although not required to do so under 
the DMA 2005, Prime Minister Modi convened eight virtual meetings with 
state chief ministers and addressed the heads of local bodies once, and at the 
bureaucratic level, union home and health secretaries held several briefings and 
preparedness meetings with their state counterparts.
An overall assessment is that IGR has been at a low ebb in recent years and 
notably so in the Covid-19 period, with Prime Minister Modi showing scant 
regard for federal IGR institutions. At state level, instances of inter-state cooper-
ation in pandemic management have been few and far between and, where they 
arose, limited to sharing cadres of health professionals, as happened between 
Kerala and Maharashtra.
In the grand scheme of pandemic governance, cooperative or competitive 
inter-state relations have little substantive role to play. For example, states have 
acted on their own rather than in concert in capping the prices of Covid-19 
testing kits and treatment; at the same time, given that the centre monitors the 
prices of essentials, the resultant ceiling has prevented price wars or resource 
competition among the states.
15.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
The states raise about 52.5 per cent of their revenue, of which state GST con-
stitutes about half of that (Reserve Bank of India 2019: 28–36), with central 
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transfers constituting the remaining 47.5 per cent, following the recommenda-
tions of the Finance Commission of India. The decline in tax collection by the 
centre during the pandemic also caused a drop in the states’ share of central taxes 
(Union Ministry of Finance 2020a).
The pandemic had a colossal impact on goods and service taxes (GST), which 
usually make up about 42 per cent of states’ own tax revenue. Overall state 
GST collection in April–May 2020, India’s two months of complete lockdown, 
declined by more than 44 per cent year-on-year, and in April–August, by more 
than 30 per cent; states’ revenue deficit was estimated to be over INR 3,000,000 
million (The Indian Express 2020a). Except Nagaland, which recorded a growth 
of 12 per cent, almost all states recorded a decline in the collection of state GST 
during April–August 2020 (Union Ministry of Finance 2020b).
Any shortfall in GST has an adverse impact on capital expenditure by states. 
Given that states ceded tax sovereignty in favour of a one-nation-one-tax model, 
a key issue is whether or to what extent the central government is under an 
obligation to compensate them for their GST shortfalls. It presented options for 
borrowing money from the Reserve Bank of India or from the open market, but 
non-BJP ruled states, such as Kerala, West Bengal, Punjab, and Delhi, demanded 
compensation to avoid the debt trap (The Indian Express 2020b).
As far as disaster funding is concerned, Bhaskar and Kelkar point out that, 
unlike the Government of India, ‘state governments do not levy taxes/cesses to 
directly fund disaster relief ’ (Bhaskar and Kelkar 2019: 41). Annual expenditure 
in this regard is generally managed in four ways: by spending funds earmarked 
for relief expenditure such as ‘gratuitous relief ’, food supplies, and the like; by 
tapping into funds allocated for capital works; by taking out loans for restoration 
work, such as ‘repair of damaged houses and loans for purchase of agricultural 
inputs’; and by using money released from the SDRF (ibid). With a few excep-
tions, health infrastructure in India’s states is poor; faced with the critical need to 
improve it yet also lacking adequate fiscal resources to meet expenditure on hos-
pital facilities, quarantine centres, testing kits and similar necessities, states had to 
rely on the SDRF, other central assistance towards Covid-19 preparedness, and 
borrowing from the market.
Within the existing fiscal arrangements, disaster financing is shared between 
the centre and states in the ratio of 75:25 for general-category states and in the 
ratio of 90:10 for north-eastern and Himalayan states such as Uttarakhand and 
Himachal Pradesh. The Fifteenth Finance Commission, by way of grant-in-aid, 
allocates funds to the SDRF: for 2020–2021, the allocation was INR 289,830 
million. SDRF funds are shared among states on the basis of criteria such as the 
state’s size, population, disaster risk profile, and expenditure responsibility in 
regard to disaster management (Fifteenth Finance Commission 2019: 55–60). 
Unless permitted by the central government, states on their own may not with-
draw from the SDRF (Union Ministry of Home Affairs 2020a).
As at 20 September 2020, releases from the SDRF totalled INR 115,659.25 
million. The central government also released INR 16,246.3 million from 
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the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) to give Manipur, Meghalaya, 
Odisha, Rajasthan, Tripura, and West Bengal additional support in their fight 
against Covid-19 (Union Ministry of Home Affairs 2020b). Assistance under the 
SDRF and NDRF was geared mainly towards meeting expenditure on quaran-
tine measures and the procurement of essential equipment.
Moreover, states were provided with once-off central assistance of INR 
42,567.9 million from the India Covid-19 Emergency Response and Health 
System Preparedness Package to set up dedicated hospitals and procure diag-
nostic and protection kits as well as other essentials for managing Covid-19. 
With a corpus fund of INR 150,000 million, the Package was created in April 
2020 for strengthening national and state health systems and promoting pan-
demic research. Allocations to states were generally made on a combination of 
criteria such as case numbers and health infrastructure indexes (Union Ministry 
of Health and Family Welfare 2020a). To meet growing expenditure on health, 
states were also granted an additional borrowing limit of up to 2 per cent of gross 
state domestic product (GSDP) and permitted borrowing of 0.50 per cent of 
their respective GSDP from the market in the 2020–2021 financial year (Union 
Ministry of Finance 2020a).
In spite of these various measures by the central government, states have faced 
a severe cash-flow crisis. During April–June 2020, their fiscal deficit swelled to 
36.5 per cent (The Print 2020b), adversely affecting expenditure on salaries and 
pensions as well as infrastructure, while their market borrowing in 2020–2021 
soared to INR 3 trillion rupees – a figure estimated to be 52 per cent higher than 
borrowing in the previous year.
15.5 Findings and policy options
As this analysis shows, federalism in India was for all practical intents and pur-
poses suspended during the Covid-19 pandemic in favour of highly centralised 
and personalised executive governance. The Indian polity accordingly tilted 
strongly towards unitary government: the power structure came to resemble a 
pyramid, with the Prime Minister placed at its apex and wielding extraordinary 
authority in commanding his subordinates at the state and local levels.
One explanation for this may be that the Constitution does not lay down a 
federal framework of pandemic governance. It is, indeed, a constitutional para-
dox that public health is a state matter, yet states are not allowed to govern it dur-
ing a declared national disaster. The DMA 2005 entails a deeply unitary system 
of governance with little conformity to federal principles – as was evident in the 
practice it enabled, shaped, and sanctioned.
States were not part of central decision-making on the pandemic: a federal 
political culture of negotiated cooperation was missing, and neither states nor 
opposition parties were taken on board in any decision of the centre. Powers 
were concentrated in the centre; the normal functioning of centre-state relations 
was suspended. The centre exploited the pandemic to encroach upon important 
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state-level fields such as agriculture, school and tertiary education, local eco-
nomic, industrial and market operations, local transport, and intra-state move-
ment of people and goods. The pandemic, in sum, did not retard or interrupt the 
general trend towards centralisation: it accelerated it.
Despite all the centre’s measures, the pandemic continued to spread and 
intensify in its multiplying impacts. The lockdown failed to achieve its stated 
objective of breaking the chain of viral transmission; instead, the sudden dec-
laration of a national lockdown caused the virus to spread from urban to rural 
areas due to massive labour migration. In the midst of all this, the federal gov-
ernment continued to control reporting on Covid-19 data, with the media and 
other independent agencies prevented from reporting any alternative informa-
tion. The public had little option but to trust, or accept, central data on the 
pandemic.
By way of policy suggestions, there is, first, a need to review the DMA 2005, 
which was originally intended to respond to disasters on an emergency basis: it 
allows for short-duration centralisation and executive governance, but was never 
architected with a long-duration national pandemic emergency in mind. Thus, 
to cater for biological emergencies of an extended duration, it is necessary either 
to create a separate law or institution conforming to the principles of federalism 
and parliamentary accountability, or to amend the DMA 2005.
Secondly, the pandemic exposed the cracks in the system in India’s primary 
and secondary levels of health care: even district hospitals, never mind grass-
roots facilities, lacked facilities adequate to the task of responding to a biological 
emergency. Given that the problem is due mainly to poor investment in health 
care, it needs to be re-emphasised, as has been done time and again, that the 
country should invest 2.5 per cent of its GDP in the health sector. The current 
budgetary allocation is insufficient to respond to biological emergencies such as 
Covid-19, while states are unable to meet rising health expenditure from their 
own pockets. There is hence a manifest need to revisit centre-state financial 
allocations.
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THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL 
RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 
CRISIS
Momentary success or enduring reform?
Nicholas Aroney and Michael Boyce
16.1 Introduction
The Commonwealth of Australia is a federation of six constituent states and 
two self-governing territories. With an area of almost 7.7 million km2, it is 
the world’s sixth largest country and the only nation-state occupying an entire 
continent. With a total population of just over 25 million, Australia is one 
of the most sparsely populated countries in the world; however, it is also one 
of the most urbanised, with more than half of its population living in five 
urban centres of more than 1 million persons. The Australian states and ter-
ritories differ vastly in land area and population. The largest state, Western 
Australia, is more than 2.2 million km2, while the smallest, Tasmania, is less 
than 70,000 km2; the most populous state, New South Wales (NSW), has more 
than 7.7 million people, while the least populous, Tasmania, has a little over 
520,000. Australia has a highly developed economy, with one of the largest 
gross domestic products (GDPs) per person in the world and with Australians 
enjoying an average life expectancy of more than 83 years – also among the 
highest in the world.
In 2020, Australia experienced two waves of Covid-19 cases, the first in 
March–April and the second in July–August. At the time of writing (November 
2020), a total of more than 9 million Covid-19 tests had been administered, 
27,668 cases confirmed, and 907 deaths recorded, 819 of which were in the State 
of Victoria. More than 93 per cent of Covid-19-related deaths were among per-
sons older than 70, with 685 of these associated with aged-care facilities and 655 
occurring in Victoria (Department of Health 2020c; Pagone and Briggs 2020: 
2, 15). Cases and deaths were concentrated in densely populated urban centres; 
by contrast, there were many regional and remote communities that experienced 
very few or no cases.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003166771-21
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The Australian policy response was coordinated between the Commonwealth, 
states, territories, and local government through a newly formed ‘National 
Cabinet’ consisting of the Prime Minister, the Premiers of the states and the First 
Ministers of the territories, supported by an array of health officers and expert 
advisers. This response was built on legislative frameworks and policy plans that 
were already in place to deal with national emergencies, including pandemics. 
Collectively, the implemented measures were remarkably successful in contain-
ing the virus despite occasional but serious administrative failures.
The main tension points concerned differences in policy goals (containment 
versus eradication) and the appropriate policy settings to achieve these goals (e.g., 
strict lockdowns and state border closures), with differences in political ideology 
as well as variations in local conditions driving disagreements between right-of-
centre Liberal-National Party coalition governments at a Commonwealth level 
and in NSW, South Australia and Tasmania, and left-of-centre Labour Party 
governments in Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, and the two territo-
ries. Despite these tensions, the federal system has worked relatively well overall, 
enabling a nationally coordinated approach with localised variations in govern-
mental response, at least at a state and territory level, though not always in a man-
ner well adjusted to the needs and circumstances of smaller local communities, 
especially in remote regions.
16.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
Under the Australian Constitution, the states continue to exercise the general 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers they possessed prior to federation, 
while the Commonwealth is vested with overriding legislative powers over a 
range of specific topics. These powers enable the Commonwealth to control 
Australia’s national borders, such as by restricting entry of persons into the coun-
try and imposing quarantine requirements. In most other respects, governmental 
responses to the Covid-19 pandemic were implemented by the states and territo-
ries, including management of hospitals and intensive care facilities, restrictions 
on personal movement and interaction, and imposition of social distancing and 
lockdown requirements. The powers of both the Commonwealth and the states 
are subject, however, to a constitutional requirement that ‘trade, commerce and 
intercourse’ among the states be ‘absolutely free’, potentially restricting their 
ability to control personal movement across state borders.
The Commonwealth, states, and territories each have their own democrat-
ically elected legislatures and executive governments responsible to those leg-
islatures. They also have independent taxing and spending powers, except that 
the Commonwealth has a constitutional monopoly over taxes on goods and has 
in effect monopolised taxes on individual and corporate income. Consequently, 
the states are dependent on the Commonwealth for approximately half of their 
revenues and the Commonwealth has the capacity to make conditional grants to 
the states that require them to pursue particular policies and meet operational 
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benchmarks. The Commonwealth also has much greater capacity to provide 
general financial support and welfare benefits by way of income supplementation 
and economic stimulus.
Local governments, on the other hand, are creatures of the states and have 
had relatively limited capacity to develop policies responsive to the pandemic. 
Nonetheless, they initiated measures to support local communities and businesses, 
such as through relief from council rates, fees and other taxes, and engaged with 
state and territory governments in developing and implementing coordinated 
government responses.
The constitutional settings of the Australian federal system enable three prin-
cipal modes of governmental response: (1) independent policy-making by the 
Commonwealth, states, and territories, each exercising autonomous powers of 
governance within its particular jurisdiction; (2) coordinated policy-making based 
on agreement among the Commonwealth, state, and territory governments, each 
exercising its constitutional powers as mutually agreed; and (3) coercive policy- 
making by the Commonwealth using its overriding legislative powers and 
financial capacities to determine or shape the policies to be implemented by the 
states and territories. The extent to which each of these approaches is adopted in 
response to any emergent issue or problem has significant implications for the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the policy response. As Alan Fenna (2020: 1) has put it:
Federalism might have hindered an effective response to the crisis by cre-
ating obstacles to action or discoordination. On the other hand, it might 
have encouraged a proportional and appropriate response by opening the 
way to regionally varied measures and by mustering the greater wisdom of 
a more collective decision-making process.
16.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
Prior to the emergence of the pandemic, the Commonwealth, states, and territo-
ries had enacted legislation authorising the use of emergency powers to respond 
to bio-security threats, such as by imposing quarantine requirements, restricting 
movement, controlling commerce, and prohibiting gatherings. These included 
the National Health Security Act of 2007, which establishes a national system 
of public health surveillance, and the Biosecurity Act of 2015, which facilitates 
management of biosecurity risks and emergencies. The Biosecurity Act gives the 
federal Health Minister expansive powers to issue directions and impose require-
ments to combat human biosecurity emergencies. Each state and territory also 
has its own disaster response and public health laws which authorise officials to 
declare a state of emergency and issue orders and directions to deal with natural 
disasters and public health emergencies.
The Commonwealth had also developed the Australian Health Management 
Plan for Pandemic Influenza (AHMPPI), which was used to guide Australia’s 
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response to the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 and was revised in 2014 and again 
in late 2019 (Department of Health 2019). More broadly, in 2011 the Council 
of Australian Governments (COAG) adopted a National Strategy for Disaster 
Resilience to support the development of coordinated policies at all levels of gov-
ernment for preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disas-
ters of all kinds (Council of Australian Governments, 2011). Following Australia’s 
adoption of the United Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015–2030, the country’s policies also focused on preventing the emergence of 
new disaster risks and reducing existing ones. This is reflected in the National 
Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (2018), which was co-designed by all three 
levels of government with input from the private sector.
16.3.1 Commonwealth
The Biosecurity Act was enacted to manage biosecurity risks caused by dis-
eases and pests entering, establishing or spreading in any part of Australian 
territory and thereby causing harm to human, animal or plant health, to the 
environment or, as a consequence, to the economy. To enact the statute, the 
Commonwealth relied on an array of legislative powers. Recognising that 
the Act presses these powers to their outer constitutional limits, and quite 
possibly beyond them, a ‘severance’ clause was included which provides that 
the Act is to have the effect it would have if its operation were limited to its 
constitutionally valid operation under any one of these alternative heads of 
power. To date there have been no court cases testing the constitutionality 
of the Act, even though its constitutionality is in some respects questionable 
(Aroney 2020: 14).
The Act empowers the Commonwealth Chief Medical Officer (CMO) to 
issue ‘biosecurity control orders’ in respect of persons exposed to ‘listed’ dis-
eases. Recognising the federal context, the CMO must first consult with the state 
and territory chief health officers (CHOs) before doing so. Biosecurity control 
orders can require a person to provide contact information, report signs or symp-
toms, remain confined to his or her place of residence, wear particular clothing 
or equipment, undergo decontamination, undergo examination, provide body 
samples, or receive vaccination, treatment or medication.
The Biosecurity Act has been described as ‘shift[ing] the constitutional 
boundaries between the Commonwealth and States with respect to civil emer-
gencies’ (Lee 2018: 170) and as ‘an unprecedented expansion of power by the 
federal executive’ (Brenker 2020), particularly because it encroaches on areas 
of regulation which would usually be within the states’ domain and because 
Parliament has delegated to the executive branch the power to legislate and 
override pre-existing legislation. Possibly for these reasons, the powers available 
under the Biosecurity Act have been exercised sparingly and only in relation to 
matters generally outside of the states’ areas of primary responsibility or control 
(see Section 4.2).
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16.3.2 States and territories
The states and territories have passed general emergency management laws that 
confer an array of extraordinary powers on public officials following the decla-
ration of a state of emergency. Of special relevance to the Covid-19 crisis is that 
Public Health Acts in each jurisdiction allow for the declaration of a state of 
public health emergency, triggering specific emergency powers that can be exer-
cised following such a declaration. In some jurisdictions (Queensland, Victoria 
prior to August 2020, and the two territories), these powers have been exercised 
exclusively by their respective CHOs. In the largest jurisdiction, NSW, it is the 
responsible minister who issues public health orders directly, while in three other 
states (Western Australia, Tasmania, and South Australia), the responsibility to 
exercise emergency powers is shared between the public health authorities and 
the general emergency authorities, giving rise to risks of administrative overlap.
The powers exercisable by the CHOs are extensive. They include powers to 
detain or restrict the movement of persons; restrict contact between persons; pre-
vent entry into the jurisdiction; close any premises; enter any premises without 
a warrant; search for and seize anything; subject persons and places to decon-
tamination procedures; direct persons to undergo medical observations, exami-
nations or treatments; direct the destruction of any substance or thing; and issue 
any other directions considered reasonably necessary to protect public health.
16.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
Having conferred most of the necessary powers by legislation, the Australian par-
liaments played a largely passive role during the Covid-19 crisis. The bulk of the 
decision-making was undertaken by the executive and administrative branches 
of government, particularly by public health officials. Most intergovernmental 
coordination was executive-led, principally through the conversion of the pre- 
existing COAG into the newly minted National Cabinet, which met frequently 
throughout the crisis. The National Cabinet generally exhibited a notable degree 
of unity when compared with the often fractious intergovernmental relationships 
that tended to characterise COAG. The Prime Minister exercised leadership but 
appeared most often to have sought to develop policy responses by consensus on 
the basis of shared expert advice. This allowed each jurisdiction to tailor its par-
ticular measures to its specific conditions, including in addressing some residual 
disagreement over policy goals and means. Through these mechanisms, the Prime 
Minister brokered what may prove to be an enduring change to the system of 
intergovernmental relations in Australia, even if the underlying political and fiscal 
tensions will remain and could become more apparent as time goes by.
16.4.1 Taking the initiative
On 21 January 2020, after undertaking the required consultations with his state 
and territory counterparts, the then CMO, Dr Brendan Murphy, determined 
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that the ‘human coronavirus with pandemic potential’ was a listed human dis-
ease due to its communicable nature and its potential to cause significant harm 
to human health. This determination activated an array of powers under the 
Biosecurity Act. Two days later, Australian federal biosecurity officials began 
screening arrivals on flights from Wuhan, China, seven days before Covid-19 
was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation. Another two days 
later, Australia recorded its first case.
On 1 February 2020, the Commonwealth government required returning 
citizens who had been in mainland China to self-quarantine for 14 days, and 
closed the border to all foreign nationals arriving from that country. The same 
rules were soon applied to persons who had been in Iran, South Korea, and 
Italy. During this time, the Australian states and territories initiated testing and 
contact-tracing regimes, while hospital, intensive care, and ventilator capacities 
were ramped up across the country. From 16 March, all travellers arriving in 
Australia from any destination were required to self-isolate for 14 days, and on 
20 March the national border was entirely closed to non-residents and non- 
citizens. These measures were supplemented by a declaration by the Governor-
General on 18 March that a human biosecurity emergency existed with respect 
to Covid-19, triggering additional powers under the Biosecurity Act. On the 
same day, the federal Minister for Health used these additional powers to pre-
vent international cruise ships from entering Australian ports except in specific 
circumstances.
These and other measures limited the initial spread of the disease, such that 
of the 300 cases identified by mid-March 2020, most were returning travellers. 
However, towards the end of that month, as instances of community transmis-
sion increased and national case numbers doubled every three to four days, the 
Commonwealth, states, and territories agreed to a nationally coordinated lock-
down in which indoor and outdoor gatherings were restricted to two persons, 
with only limited exceptions. Several states and territories also introduced hard 
border closures and restrictions on travel. These latter policies resulted in a sig-
nificant ‘flattening of the curve’ that was evident by early April. This trend con-
tinued into early June, with daily cases declining to less than 10 new cases per 
day, compared to a high of 460 daily cases on 28 March. The states and territories 
thereafter eased internal restrictions, but several maintained their respective state 
border closures.
Australia’s relative success in controlling the spread of the virus occurred 
despite notable administrative failures, including the disembarkation of some 
2,700 passengers from the Ruby Princess cruise liner in Sydney on 19 March 
2020 without undergoing quarantine (Walker 2020). From early June, a second 
wave of infections became apparent, peaking in late July and early August at a 
high of 721 cases on 30 July. The vast bulk of these new cases were concentrated 
in the city of Melbourne due to another policy failure, this time involving the 
use of poorly trained private security guards to monitor the state’s hotel quaran-
tine system.
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The Victorian Government initially responded to the second wave through 
localised lockdowns focused on particular infection clusters in Melbourne and 
elsewhere, but these measures were not effective and in early August 2020 
movement restrictions were implemented throughout the state, with even more 
severe restrictions imposed in Melbourne, including a controversial nightly cur-
few. These measures reduced the number of daily cases substantially, such that 
by mid-November no new cases had been reported for the previous 10 days 
(Department of Health and Human Services (Vic) 2020). During this period the 
Victorian Government had relaxed restrictions only very cautiously, giving rise 
to considerable controversy within the state as well as disagreements with both 
the Prime Minister and the Lord Mayor of the City of Melbourne.
The Australian Government initially framed its policy response around the 
goal of flattening the curve (Department of Health 2020b), based on models 
aimed at suppressing the virus in order to maintain health-care capacity (Moss 
et al. 2020). Some argued, however, that Australia should aim to eliminate the 
virus altogether, calling for an 8- to 12-week shutdown. Others responded that 
a sustained lockdown would have detrimental effects not only on the economy 
but on mental health as well as the diagnosis and treatment of other serious dis-
eases, many of them more lethal than Covid-19. There was also debate about 
the effectiveness of particular measures, such as lockdowns, border closures and 
masking (Chaudhry et al. 2020; Hopman and Mehtar 2020), which gave rise to 
competing petitions by medical experts about what should be done.
Although the Australian response was relatively well coordinated between 
jurisdictions, differing assessments of the relative importance of these factors in 
the light of differing understandings of appropriate policy responses were at the 
heart of policy disagreements between the Commonwealth and the states and 
among the states themselves. The argument advanced by the Commonwealth’s 
Deputy CMO that eradication was, in any case, an unrealistic goal (Coatsworth 
2020) seemed to be vindicated as the second wave enveloped the State of Victoria 
through the winter months.
On 18 February 2020, the Commonwealth issued an emergency response 
plan for the Covid-19 pandemic, setting out a national approach designed to 
guide the Australian health sector’s response to the pandemic (Department of 
Health 2020a). The plan, among other things, was meant to enable the state and 
Territory health systems to provide the highest quality medical care and to guide 
the efficient allocation and use of resources. Among its stated aims was to develop 
a whole-of-government framework at Commonwealth, state, territory, and local 
levels that protects Australia’s social functioning and economy and minimises the 
outbreak’s impact on the health of Australians. The plan was specific as to the 
particular responsibilities of the Commonwealth and the states and territories, 
and indicated several responsibilities to be undertaken jointly.
As noted, at a meeting of COAG on 13 March 2020, the Commonwealth, 
state, and territory governments agreed to establish a new National Cabinet, 
consisting of the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers, which would 
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meet at least weekly to coordinate the country’s response to Covid-19. The 
Prime Minister sought to constitute the new body as a Cabinet Office Policy 
Committee operating in accordance with the conventions of the Commonwealth 
cabinet, among them the guiding principles of collective responsibility, solidar-
ity, and confidentiality. The body is not a ‘cabinet’ in the ordinary sense of the 
word, however, because its members are not collectively responsible to the one 
parliament but individually responsible to their respective parliaments, and it 
is not clear how the usual conventions of cabinet responsibility, solidarity, and 
confidentiality could apply to it. Its success has depended on the commitment 
of the Prime Minister, Premiers, and Chief Ministers and their willingness to 
implement the National Cabinet’s collective decisions within their respective 
jurisdictions. Despite its general effectiveness, considerable debate attended its 
unique and novel features and the likelihood of its continued operation once the 
crisis has passed (see Section 16.4.5).
16.4.2 Commonwealth action
The Commonwealth’s actions fall into three categories: firstly, the leading role 
it took in coordinating government responses to the crisis; secondly, its primary 
fiscal role in implementing economic stimulus packages and providing addi-
tional funding to the states and territories to meet the needs of the emergency; 
and, thirdly, its attention to matters falling specifically within its responsibil-
ities under the Constitution. As noted, although the powers available to the 
Commonwealth under the Biosecurity Act are vast, they were used only in rela-
tion to matters broadly of national interest or concern, including overseas travel, 
retail outlets at international airports, remote indigenous communities, cruise 
ships, the ‘Covid Safe’ app, and the distribution of ‘essential goods’ such as face 
masks and hand sanitiser. The Commonwealth parliament had a mostly passive 
role during the crisis. During a one-day sitting on 23 March 2020, however, 
it passed an Omnibus Bill approving, among other things, a stimulus package 
of AUD 66 billion and an amendment to the Biosecurity Act enabling bios-
ecurity control orders to be issued by public service employees in the Health 
Department.
The Commonwealth’s financial assistance measures included an additional 
fixed ‘Coronavirus Supplement’ payment added onto existing welfare scheme 
payments, more relaxed income and assets test standards for the existing 
JobSeeker scheme (welfare payments for unemployed job hunters), introduction 
of a new JobKeeper wage subsidy to keep at-risk employees from losing their 
jobs and a JobMaker Hiring Credit scheme to incentivise businesses in employ-
ing additional young employees, as well as certain measures aimed at preventing 
termination of commercial leases and relieving company directors from personal 
liability for insolvent trading by their companies.
Many of the deaths from Covid-19 in Australia were associated with aged-
care facilities. Under the Constitution, responsibility for such matters ordinarily 
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falls to the states and territories, but over time the Commonwealth has become 
increasingly responsible for their funding and regulation (Tracey and Briggs 
2019: 42–46). The Commonwealth provided guidance and additional funding 
to aged-care facilities throughout the Covid-19 crisis (Pagone and Briggs 2020: 
4–6). However, a recent Royal Commission report identified significant short-
falls in the system, including conflicting advice provided by Commonwealth and 
NSW officials in relation to the movement into hospital of infected aged-care 
residents and failures to properly manage the outbreak of infections in Victorian 
aged-care facilities. The Royal Commission recommended the establishment of 
a national aged-care advisory body, promulgation of clear protocols regarding 
Commonwealth and state responsibilities, and appointment of trained infection- 
control officers in elderly care facilities (Pagone and Briggs 2020). These recom-
mendations were accepted by the Commonwealth (Colbeck 2020).
The Commonwealth also provided support to the states and territories 
through the provision of large numbers of Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
personnel to help with quarantine compliance, contact tracing, border con-
trols, and similar tasks. This became a point of political controversy following 
Victoria’s bungling of its hotel quarantine program when it emerged that the 
Prime Minister’s offers of ADF assistance had been ignored or refused by the 
Victorian Government. It was alleged that the poorly trained security guards 
employed to monitor hotel quarantine had engaged in sexual relations with 
persons under quarantine, contributing to the second wave of infections that 
required a second shutdown of the state. The scandal led to the resignation 
of the Minister for Health. The Victorian Government established a board of 
inquiry to investigate the actions of government agencies, hotel operators, and 
private contractors (Coate 2020).
16.4.3 State and territory action
The state and territory emergency management and public health laws allow 
declarations of emergency to be made and enable emergency powers to be exer-
cised. These powers have been described as ‘both extensive and highly elastic’: 
they include the power to compel individuals in a broad range of ways and con-
fer wide discretion on the relevant decision-maker (Carter 2020: 117, 127). In 
2020, all jurisdictions except NSW declared a public health emergency, while 
Tasmania, Western Australia, South Australia, and Victoria also declared a state of 
emergency under their emergency management laws. In Victoria, a state of disas-
ter declaration was not made until 2 August 2020, at which point it was deemed 
necessary as a response to a uniquely aggressive second wave of infections.
The particular measures taken by each state and territory were formulated 
within the National Cabinet framework. The latter enabled each jurisdiction to 
implement agreed policies in ways considered suitable to local conditions and to 
adopt specific measures to respond to particular challenges. These measures were 
ramped up when Covid-19 infections increased in March 2020, relaxed after 
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they declined in April and May, ramped up again as infections increased, espe-
cially in Victoria, in July and August, and gradually relaxed in September and 
October. At the height of the second wave of infections, restrictions in Victoria 
were much more extensive than those in other states. By mid- November, in 
Queensland there were only relatively minor restrictions on gatherings, busi-
nesses and other activities and travel within the state, whereas in Victoria masks 
still had to be worn in public and gatherings in homes remained restricted 
(Victorian Government 2020).
All states except Victoria imposed strict border controls. The extent of these 
restrictions varied over time, ranging from 14-day quarantine requirements and 
targeted restrictions on travel by infected persons from particular hotspots to 
blanket bans with only minor exemptions. In response to prolonged border clo-
sures in states such as Western Australia, Commonwealth government ministers 
emphasised the importance of inter-state trade for the national economy, with 
the NSW Premier criticising the Queensland Government for imposing unreal-
istic conditions on the reopening of its borders. Apex business bodies criticised 
the ‘patchwork of inconsistent state and territory-based rules that ignore the real-
ity of the way small and large businesses operate across borders and Australians 
live their lives’ (Ferguson et al. 2020). Similar tensions emerged about the main-
tenance of strict lockdown requirements in Victoria for indefinitely long periods 
without a sufficiently transparent set of criteria and timetable for their relaxa-
tion (Wells et al. 2020). In response to criticism by the Commonwealth Health 
Minister, the Victorian Premier argued that Victorian health officers and pol-
iticians have a better understanding of conditions within the state. However, 
similar complaints were made by local government leaders in regional Victoria, 
who expressed concerns about the state government’s failure to understand or 
take into consideration conditions in regional areas.
The organisational structure of the state and territory health departments was 
also significant. In NSW, a decentralised system of local area health districts ena-
bled the state to implement a relatively effective system of contact tracing from 
the outset, whereas in Victoria a highly centralised health department had to 
build contact-tracing capacity from a very limited local base, with much less suc-
cess. The devolved public health units in NSW already had well-established links 
with local health providers and community leaders and were in a better position 
to understand the local social and cultural factors that determine the spread of the 
disease and the human response to government requirements (Bennett 2020).
The border restrictions gave rise to legal challenges on the basis that they 
contravene the constitutional requirement that inter-state ‘trade, commerce and 
intercourse’ must be ‘absolutely free’ (Constitution, section 92). This protection 
was seen by the framers of the Constitution as an essential element of the fed-
eral compact between the states (Aroney et al. 2015: 310–13). The expression of 
this protection in such sweeping and unqualified terms – ‘absolutely free’ – is 
extraordinary, especially given the otherwise precise and often technical lan-
guage used in the Constitution. However, the High Court has found ways to 
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restrict the apparently unlimited scope of section 92 (Cole v. Whitfield (1988) 
165 CLR 360). The Court has accepted that laws can validly impose burdens on 
both trade and commerce and personal movement across state borders provided 
that such laws pursue a legitimate objective in a proportionate manner (Cunliffe 
v. Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272).
The critical question is how to determine whether a law is proportionate, for 
such questions require the Court to weigh the competing public interests. Part 
of the reason why it has been difficult to predict the result of the constitutional 
challenges to the state border closures is that the exact test to be applied to deter-
mine their validity is not entirely settled. This uncertainty is then compounded 
by the complexity of the issues raised by government attempts to limit or prevent 
the spread of Covid-19 in the community.
The one sustained challenge to the border closures was brought by mining 
billionaire Clive Palmer against the border regime implemented by the State 
of Western Australia. Although Palmer wished to travel from Queensland to 
Western Australia to manage his Perth-based business, he did not classify as 
an exempt traveller under the Western Australia Directions and therefore was 
prohibited from entry into the state. His case depended on expert evidence con-
cerning the reasonable need for and efficacy of the closure of the state border. 
On 25 August 2020, a Federal Court judge found that border controls are an 
accepted and effective component of the public health response to the control of 
infectious disease outbreaks. Notably, this finding was based on evidence pro-
vided by epidemiological and public health experts and did not take into con-
sideration the economic, social, and individual impacts of the border closures, 
even though these factors could be relevant to a determination of whether the 
measures were reasonably proportionate.
However, on 6 November the High Court resolved the case on what may 
be called technical grounds (Palmer & Anor v. The State of Western Australia & 
Anor [2020] HCATrans 180). It determined that the relevant sections of the 
statute under which the Directions had been made complied with the require-
ments of section 92 of the Constitution and that the question of whether the 
Directions were validly authorised by those sections did not raise a constitu-
tional question.
16.4.4 Local government action
As noted, local government is a creature of the states and its responsibilities are 
relatively limited. However, a role for local government was envisaged by the 
Commonwealth’s emergency response plan (Department of Health 2020a: 2.4, 
4.2.1). According to this plan, local government responsibilities are mostly sup-
portive rather than regulative, although they do include representing the inter-
ests of local communities in broader planning processes and providing feedback 
on the effectiveness of government activities. Some local government researchers 
observed that these functions go beyond anything that local government has 
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recently been expected to perform (Zierke 2020: 3). However, it can also be 
noted that several of them are already recognised functions of local government 
in the various state local government Acts.
The governments of Australia’s three most populous states (NSW, Victoria, 
and Queensland) established dedicated websites with information and guid-
ance for local governments. A survey of initiatives taken by the local councils of 
Australia’s three most populous cities (Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane) located 
in these three states suggests they sought to communicate health-related infor-
mation from their respective health departments; assist state authorities in con-
tact tracing and encouraging testing and wearing of masks; implement measures 
to support businesses and facilitate economic recovery; and support physical and 
mental health and maintain community connection (City of Melbourne 2020; 
City of Sydney 2020; Queensland Government 2020).
However, this is to focus attention on the largest and most urbanised popula-
tion centres in the three largest states. In the local government field, questions are 
being asked about whether government handling of the crisis illustrates problems 
associated with excessive centralisation of decision-making at state and federal 
levels vis-à-vis local government, especially in remote regions. A persistent criti-
cism of state government lockdowns and border closures has been that they have 
tended to adopt state-wide policies focused on containment of the virus within 
large cities without sufficient adaptability or flexibility for regional and remote 
areas where the incidence of the virus is minimal or non-existent. This is partly a 
consequence of the perceived need for urgent and extreme action, but it is also an 
artefact of a centralised decision-making process driven by urban-based experts. 
It is an open question whether local governments in regional and remote areas 
would have made the same policy decisions for their particular communities 
based on the same information about the incidence, spread, and impact of the 
virus available to decision-makers at a state level.
Other issues that particularly affected local governments were pressures 
placed on local recreational areas and parks and local-government-managed 
caravan parks, which were under increased pressure during lockdowns and as 
a result of border closures (Zierke 2020: 8–11). In the October 2020 budget, 
the Commonwealth expanded the existing Local Roads and Community 
Infrastructure program with an additional AUD 1 billion for councils to imme-
diately upgrade local roads, footpaths, and street lighting, complemented by the 
availability of an AUD 1.2 billion wage subsidy programme for trainees and 
apprentices and several other funding initiatives.
16.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
Most of Australia’s responses to the Covid-19 crisis took place in the context 
of a coordinated all-of-government approach led by the Commonwealth but 
cooperatively agreed to by the states and territories within the newly developed 
National Cabinet process. While each jurisdiction exercised its constitutional 
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powers independently and with important dimensions of diversity, this occurred 
within an agreed framework.
In making its risk assessments and policy decisions, the National Cabinet 
was informed primarily by an array of expert bodies that developed guidelines 
intended to provide nationally consistent advice to public health units concern-
ing case management and contact tracing (Communicable Diseases Network 
Australia 2020). Other bodies were responsible for identifying issues to be 
addressed, assessing the resources and capabilities required to mitigate impacts, 
and coordinating activities with stakeholders in sectors such as education, public 
safety and policing, banking, transport, food, and agriculture in the development 
of public–private partnerships for anticipating and mitigating the social and eco-
nomic effects of the pandemic (Department of Home Affairs (Cth) 2020).
On 29 May 2020, the National Cabinet took the further step of agreeing 
to the formation of the National Federation Reform Council (NFRC) and 
the cessation of COAG as the primary forum of intergovernmental relations 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2020). The Prime Minister 
claimed that the NFRC would change the way in which the Commonwealth, 
states, and territories address emergent issues requiring reform, with the inten-
tion that the new model would streamline processes and thus enable improved 
collaboration, communication, and effectiveness. A degree of continuity would 
be preserved, however, with particular COAG taskforces continuing to address 
their assigned matters.
By the end of 2020, the National Cabinet continued to function as the apex 
intergovernmental body coordinating the Commonwealth, state, and Territory 
responses to the crisis. The outcomes of its meeting of 23 October 2020 illustrate 
its capacity to facilitate cooperative federalism while also reflecting underly-
ing tensions. On the one hand, the Commonwealth and seven of the states and 
territories agreed to a new framework for ‘national reopening’ (i.e., relaxation 
of restrictions), but with the notable disagreement of Western Australia, which 
was unwilling to ‘cede control’ over its border (McNeill 2020). On the other 
hand, all nine jurisdictions accepted the recommendations of a review of the 
old COAG councils and ministerial forums which was highly critical of ineffi-
cient and often ineffective, convoluted, and over-bureaucratised arrangements 
(Conran 2020: 2).
Noting the way in which the National Cabinet processes had enabled min-
isters and chief executive officers to cut through issues to agree on nationally 
coordinated responses, the report recommended disbanding numerous minis-
terial forums and rationalising others, greater ministerial control over agendas, 
and substantial reductions in administrative staffing (Conran 2020: 5–8). The 
implications of these and other changes may prove significant. To what extent do 
they signal a lasting change in Australian intergovernmental relations?
While described as a ‘council’, COAG was more in the nature of an occasional 
summit meeting of Australia’s heads of government. It never ‘existed’ as a standing 
body established constitutionally or by legislation. Instead, it was an intermittent 
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forum in which Australian political leaders met to discuss and adopt coordinated 
policies on issues of public importance. Its meetings were infrequent, fleeting, 
bureaucratised, and often politicised. In its early days, COAG was a collabora-
tive body that achieved significant reforms, but its agenda and processes became 
increasingly dominated by the Commonwealth. At times it enabled significant 
intergovernmental cooperation, but it was also the site of acrimonious disagree-
ment and contributed to ‘executive federalism’ in which democratic accountabil-
ity and parliamentary responsibility are side-lined (Aroney 2017: 199).
Several structural features of the National Cabinet distinguish it from COAG. 
Firstly, while the National Cabinet plans to continue meeting monthly after 
Covid-19, COAG generally met only biannually. Secondly, the membership 
of COAG and the National Cabinet are not identical. While the National 
Cabinet is composed solely of the executive heads of each state, territory, and 
the Commonwealth, COAG’s final membership also included representation of 
local government through the President of the Australian Local Government 
Association (ALGA). Under the new arrangements it appears the ALGA will be 
represented only at the annual meeting of the NFRC.
Thirdly, while COAG facilitated coordination of a wide range of matters, 
the old intergovernmental councils and ministerial forums will be drastically 
reduced under the National Cabinet scheme to several of the most important, 
such as education, energy, environment, health and infrastructure (Conran 
2020: 5). Fourthly, whereas COAG processes were highly bureaucratised, it is 
intended that councils and ministerial meetings will be radically streamlined 
(Conran 2020: 7). Fifthly, in accordance with its establishment as a Cabinet 
Office Policy Committee, it is proposed that National Cabinet processes will be 
subject to cabinet secrecy and its decisions released only if the Prime Minister 
decides to do so. By contrast, COAG decisions were expected to be made public 
within the week of their being made.
The future of the National Cabinet is unknown and difficult to predict. The 
underlying political conditions for cabinet solidarity are not present because its 
members are drawn from and responsible to different parliaments and repre-
sent competing political party platforms and interests. The potential for divi-
sion and disagreement was illustrated early on when, following the National 
Cabinet meeting of 22 March 2020, the NSW and Victorian Premiers and the 
Chief Minister of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) appeared to break 
ranks by recommending that parents keep their school-aged children home 
from school, whereas the Federal Government maintained that schools should 
remain open.
This need not be seen as a weakness but rather a strength of the system, for 
the National Cabinet deliberately identified areas of coordinated action, leaving 
each jurisdiction free to make its own determinations about how best to imple-
ment those decisions and what other policies might be appropriate or necessary 
to meet the specific conditions and needs of each locality. As Cheryl Saunders 
(2020: 4) has observed, disagreements among the jurisdictions ‘did not detract 
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from the National Cabinet as an effective, genuinely intergovernmental process, 
responding to an urgent public need in ways the public could trust’.
Nonetheless, as Saunders also points out, a key ongoing question is whether 
the National Cabinet will continue to embody a form of executive federalism, or 
whether ways will be found to accommodate the important roles of the state and 
territory parliaments and cabinets in the system of intergovernmental relations 
in Australia (Saunders 2020: 4). Too many reform efforts in the past have served 
only to underscore the ‘governmentality’ of the Australian system, with changes 
that were supposed to improve accountability to the people resulting actually in 
increased accountability of the states and territories to Commonwealth bureau-
crats (Aroney 2010: 75, 81).
16.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
The Commonwealth took a lead role in providing the very substantial funding 
required for emergency medical supplies and economic stimulus during the crisis. 
Early on, on 12 March 2020, it announced an AUD 17.6 billion stimulus package 
to protect jobs, which was soon followed on 22 March with a second stimulus 
package of AUD 66 billion. In addition, at the COAG meeting of 13 March 
2020 a new 50–50 shared-funding deal between the Commonwealth, states, 
and territories was announced to support more effective assessment, diagnosis, 
and treatment of people with the coronavirus. By the time of the federal budget 
in early October 2020, the Commonwealth had spent or committed a total of 
AUD 198 billion to economic stimulus and health measures. These measures are 
significant because, while the states and territories own and run their own public 
hospital systems, they are dependent upon the Commonwealth for about 50 per 
cent of their funding.
Despite the radical nature of the reforms associated with the newly evolv-
ing National Cabinet system, it appears that the Council on Federal Financial 
Relations (CFFR), which consists of the treasurers of the Commonwealth, states, 
and territories, will continue to play a central role. This role includes reviewing 
all funding agreements between the Commonwealth and the states with a view 
to rationalising and consolidating them, as well as acting as the ‘gatekeeper’ for 
new agreements (Conran 2020: 18, 28). The long-term implications for feder-
al-state financial relationship remain to be seen.
16.5 Findings and policy implications
Governmental responses to policy crises are shaped by institutional structures 
and decision-making processes. In unitary states, decision-making power 
is constitutionally concentrated in a single locus of governmental authority, 
whereas in federations it is constitutionally distributed. Federations thus enable 
democratically accountable governance to be conducted at the relatively smaller 
scale as well as on a whole-of-federation basis. This allows state governments 
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to be more responsive to the needs and expectations of their respective pop-
ulations. However, local governments in Australia are subordinate institu-
tions: their powers and responsibilities are dependent and derivative; they lack 
constitutional self-determination and their jurisdiction is determined by state 
legislation.
A disease like Covid-19 does not respect national, state, or local boundaries. 
The spread of the disease in Australia has depended on patterns of human inter-
action, spreading most rapidly among mobile and concentrated populations in 
the major cities and large towns, while having less impact in regional centres and 
very little in rural areas. Governmental responses were obviously needed, but the 
pattern of the disease required different measures at national, state, and local lev-
els. Very restrictive measures were instituted among concentrated populations, 
but the application of such measures in places where the impact of the disease 
was minimal or non-existent may have been excessively restrictive and could 
have resulted in an inefficient allocation of resources. Given the need for both 
general coordination and localised flexibility, how well has the particular federal 
configuration of governmental power in Australia facilitated a policy response 
that achieves both of these objectives?
Australia was relatively well prepared for the Covid-19 crisis. Legislation was 
in place at Commonwealth, state, and territory levels, and several policy doc-
uments detailed system-wide coordinated response plans for an array of emer-
gency situations, including an influenza pandemic. While the powers available 
to the Commonwealth under the Biosecurity Act are extensive, they were used 
sparingly and only in relation to matters generally outside of the states’ areas of 
primary responsibility. As might have been expected, the Commonwealth was 
the major financier of the coordinated response, whereas most of the regula-
tory measures were implemented by the states and territories pursuant to their 
respective laws, with important administrative and policy differences in each 
jurisdiction.
This did not mean that the jurisdictions acted independently. Rather, their 
actions were coordinated by the newly minted National Cabinet. This enabled 
a coordinated government response, based on shared expert advice, with each 
government implementing particularised policies within this framework based 
on the specific conditions and needs of its jurisdiction. Much of it was remarka-
bly cooperative, but there were also political disagreements and disputes between 
the Commonwealth and the states and territories, as well as among the states 
themselves.
The relative success of the National Cabinet has depended on the political 
goodwill of the Prime Minister, Premiers, and Chief Ministers. However, con-
siderable debate has attended its novel features and the likelihood of its continued 
effective operation once the crisis has passed. The jury is still out as to whether it 
will facilitate genuinely improved collaboration, effectiveness, and accountabil-
ity in the long term. While substantial reforms have been implemented, there are 
also signs that cooperation is waning and ‘politics-as-usual’ may be returning.
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Furthermore, while a whole-of-government approach was adopted, there are 
questions whether centralised decision-making at state level allowed sufficient 
adaptability or flexibility for regional and remote local government areas where 
the incidence of the virus was minimal or non-existent. Moreover, NSW’s 
devolved public health system enabled it to implement a more effective con-
tact-tracing regime than Victoria’s more centralised system, and the exclusion 
of local government representation from the regular meetings of the National 
Cabinet was a point of contention. Nonetheless, in spite of occasional significant 
policy failures and administrative errors, the Australian response was remarkably 
effective in controlling the spread of the virus, suggesting the capacity of the 
Australian federal system to respond to a global crisis in a manner which is both 
centrally coordinated and regionally differentiated.
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CONTROLLING PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCIES IN FEDERAL 
SYSTEMS
The case of Ethiopia
Zemelak Ayitenew Ayele and Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha
17.1 Introduction
It was merely a day after the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the 
coronavirus disease (Covid-19) a global pandemic that Ethiopia recorded its first 
case of infection. On 12 March 2020, a week after entering the country from 
Burkina Faso, a 48-year-old Japanese national presented himself at a public health 
centre in the capital city, Addis Ababa, and was diagnosed as having Covid-19. 
The number of cases in Ethiopia’s estimated population of 110 million climbed 
steadily in the following months, and by the end of October some 96,000 people 
were infected in what is one of the most populous countries in Africa.
According to official statistics, the infection rate reached its peak when 2,000 
new cases were reported in August 2020, after which it began to decline. This 
was, however, not necessarily because the prevalence of Covid-19 decreased; 
it was because the government cut back on its daily testing for the disease. In 
August, it had been conducting more than 20,000 such tests a day; from the 
beginning of September, it reduced them by three-quarters to 5,000 (FDRE 
Ministry of Health 2020). It was little wonder that infection rates seemed to have 
dropped – here, as elsewhere in a country as vast and diverse as this, matters were 
not as straightforward as they appeared on the surface.
Located on the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s territory of 1,104,300 km2 is host, 
if not always home (increasingly a point of contention), to more than 80 ethnic 
groups, which gives the country a multifaceted character amply reflected in the 
complexity of its history. In the modern era, Ethiopia became a republic in 1974 
when a popular revolt against the monarchy culminated in a coup that ousted 
Haile Selassie I and led to a period of military government and unitary state-
hood. A 17-year-long civil war ensued, in which the ruling junta, the Derg, were 
defeated by the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 
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a coalition of ethnic-based rebel groups. After this victory, Ethiopia became a fed-
eration in 1995 and would be ruled by the EPRDF for most of the next 30 years.
However, a three-year public protest that started in 2015 against what many 
described as the EPRDF’s authoritarianism saw Dr Abiy Ahmed Ali emerge as 
Prime Minister in April 2018. He oversaw various reforms with the declared aim 
of transforming Ethiopia into a democratic state, among which was the amal-
gamation of the EPRDF coalition into a single party, the Ethiopian Prosperity 
Party (EPP). The sixth national elections, scheduled for August 2020, were 
meant to be a litmus test of whether the country was moving towards democra-
tisation and a peaceful transition, but they were postponed due to the Covid-19 
pandemic – events which, at the time of this writing, culminated in federal mil-
itary intervention in one of the states.
Clearly, then, Covid-19’s arrival in Ethiopia was especially inopportune, 
coming as it did when the country was at a political crossroads and the feder-
ation under heavy strain. This chapter argues that the 2020 pandemic further 
complicated the political entanglements that beset the federal system, in the pro-
cess deepening the communal divisions that already threaten the country with 
disintegration.
17.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
17.2.1 Federal structure
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is composed of a federal gov-
ernment and 10 states, demarcated along ethnic lines, and two self-governing 
cities, Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa; the tenth state, Sidama Regional State, was 
created in June 2020.1 As Ethiopia has a parliamentary system of government, the 
executive is headed by a Prime Minister who governs the country together with 
the Council of Ministers. The federal parliament is a bicameral one in which 
only the lower house, the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), exercises 
legislative powers; the upper house, the House of Federation (HoF), exercises 
non-legislative functions that include resolving constitutional disputes.
At the state level, elected legislatures exercise powers over state matters. The 
highest executive authority in the state lies with the chief administrator (some-
times referred to as president), who presides over the state cabinet. In terms of the 
Constitution’s dual court system, each state has a judiciary of its own to admin-
ister justice based on state law.
Local government is not explicitly recognised as an autonomous level of gov-
ernment; as such, its establishment is left within the exclusive competence of 
the state (Constitution, article 50(4)). In practice, states have formed ethnic local 
government (composed of special zones and special woredas) and regular local gov-
ernment (composed of woredas and city administrations) (Ayele and Fessha 2012). 
Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, both of which are answerable directly to the federal 
government, are included in the category of local government (Ayele 2014).
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17.2.2 Division of powers: Federal competences
Ethiopia has a dual federal system in which competences are divided between the 
federal and state governments. Local government is not part of the power division. 
Article 51 of the Constitution contains a list of 20 functional areas that usually fall 
under the exclusive competences of the federal government, including foreign affairs; 
defence; printing money; borrowing; immigration; and air, rail, waterway, and sea 
transport, as well as major roads linking two or more states. The powers of the federal 
government also extend to functional areas that are mentioned directly or indirectly 
in other parts of the Constitution (Fiseha 2007). The Constitution contains a short 
list of state competences (article 52(1)). Residual powers are left to state governments.
The federal government has broad powers in the area of public health. It has 
the power to ‘establish and implement national standards and basic policy criteria 
for public health’ (Constitution, article 51(3)). This implies that the federal gov-
ernment has the competence to develop policies and framework legislation for 
containing pandemics. However, a global pandemic like Covid-19 is not solely 
a public health issue, but also involves issues linked to, inter alia, the national 
economy, social services, international relations, and national security.
That makes the long list of powers of the federal government outlined in arti-
cle 51 of the Constitution relevant, in one way or another, in the event of a global 
pandemic. For example, inasmuch as cooperation with other states is necessary to 
contain the spread of viruses, a pandemic has implications for foreign affairs. The 
immigration-related powers of the federal government are also implicated in that 
travel bans are a major way of containing pandemics. What is more, pandemics 
have economic repercussions which may require that the federal government use 
its power of regulating the national economy to minimise them.
The federal government’s emergency powers are relevant too, since combat-
ing a pandemic may require restricting freedoms and liberties and then using 
coercive power to enforce these restrictions. Accordingly, Ethiopia’s federal gov-
ernment not only has the power to declare a state of emergency but the compe-
tence to ‘establish and administer national defence and public security forces as 
well as a federal police force’ (Constitution, article 51(6)).
17.2.3 Division of powers: State competences
The Constitution does not expressly provide the states with competence in 
regard to public health. However, the federal government’s power to ‘establish 
and implement national standards and basic policy criteria’ (Constitution, article 
51(3)) in the area of public health implies that it is expected to restrict itself to 
setting the standards and defining the minimum requirements to which states 
have to adhere; this leaves room for states to come up with their own detailed 
policies based on the national standard (Fiseha and Ayele 2017). By implication, 
public health is a concurrent competence of the federal and state government in 
the mould of ‘framework concurrency’.
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Moreover, article 52(1)(2)(c) provides that the states can ‘formulate and 
execute their own social and development policies, strategies and plans’. 
Arguably, public health is a social matter with respect to which the state could 
formulate its own policies. This, together with the reading above of article 
51(3), would entail that states have competences in the area of containing 
the spread of a global pandemic such as Covid-19. The inference is bolstered 
by the fact that the Constitution expressly authorises the states to declare a 
‘state-wide state of emergency should a natural disaster or an epidemic occur’ 
(article 93(1)(b)).
17.2.4 Local government competences
The role and power of local government in public health are not evident from 
the federal constitution, as it is silent on the functional competences of local 
government (article 50(4)). The state constitutions also tell us little about the 
role local government could play in public emergencies in general and the 
Covid-19 pandemic in particular. A brief survey of them finds that woredas 
and cities are authorised simply to implement their own plan on local social 
and economic matters; none of the state constitutions define the specific social 
and economic matters that are within the competences of local government 
(Ayele 2014).
In practice, local governments in Ethiopia play a robust role in matters of 
public health. They are responsible for providing basic utilities such as primary 
health care (by establishing health stations and clinics), drinking water, primary 
education, and security maintenance (ibid). The relevance of these competences, 
especially primary health care, in the fight against Covid-19 is self-evident.
17.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
Long before Covid-19 emerged, various federal and state institutions were tasked 
to deal with emergencies, including public health emergencies. Among these 
institutions are the Federal Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ethiopian Public 
Health Institute (PHI), and the Ethiopian Food and Drug Control Authority 
(EFDCA).
The MoH has the primary duty of dealing with public health matters in 
general and public health emergencies in particular. Under article 27(6) of the 
Proclamation to provide for the definition of powers and duties of the executive 
organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1097 (2018), it has the 
duty to ‘devise and follow up the implementation of strategies for the prevention 
of epidemic and communicable diseases’. Additionally, it has the mandate to 
‘take preventive measures against events that threaten the public health; in the 
events of an emergency situation coordinate measures of other stakeholders to 
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expeditiously and effectively tackle the problem’ (article 27(7)). As per Public 
Health Proclamation 200 (2000), the MoH also has the power
to restrict movements to certain countries, or to the areas where there is 
epidemic, or to close schools or recreational areas, or to remove workers 
with communicable diseases from their working places, and to take other 
similar measures whenever an epidemic occurs. 
(article 17(3))
The main responsibility of the PHI is to undertake research to detect and 
prevent public health emergencies. It is expected to create early warning sys-
tems that enable other concerned organs, including the MoH, to take appro-
priate and timely measures. The EFDCA’s main responsibility is to ensure that 
foods, medicines, and medical devices that are imported or produced in the 
country and distributed at national level are of appropriate quality and do not 
pose a risk to public health. The EFDCA had the additional authority of con-
trolling ports of entry, enforcing laws and combating pandemics. This included 
quarantining or denying entry into the country to travellers suspected of being 
infected with communicable diseases. By way of Food, Medicine and Health 
Care Administration and Control Proclamation 661 (2009) and 1112 (2009), this 
power was transferred to the PHI in 2009.
Other federal agencies dealing with health emergencies are the Ethiopian 
Revenue and Custom Authority and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authorities, 
which are mandated to report, through their posts at ports of entries, individuals 
suspected of infection with a communicable disease to the relevant authorities 
so that the country’s quarantine rules can be enforced (Council of Ministers 
Regulation 299 (2013), articles 45 and 46). Another federal institution with 
an important role in combating pandemics is the National Disaster and Risk 
Management Commission (NDRMC), which is charged with storing food and 
non-food items for use in cases of emergency.
States seem to organise their executive and administrative agencies in such 
a way that there is a counterpart to a federal agency at the state level, despite the 
absence of hard and fast rules requiring them to do so. Thus, as a counterpart to 
the MoH, there is a bureau of health at the state level and an office of health at 
the local level. State bureaus of health have the power to deal with public health 
emergencies. There are also state-level public health institutes and disaster and 
risk management commissions.
These state agencies work (or at least are expected to work) in coordination 
with their federal counterparts. In the absence of strong, formalised forums for 
intergovernmental relations (IGR), federal ministries or agencies interact on an 
ad hoc basis with their counterparts at state level. Thus, the MoH interacts with 
state bureaux of health, while the federal PHI interacts with state PHIs.
The blame for the ad hoc nature of these interactions can be laid at the door 
of the EPRDF, which controlled eight of the nine states and operated on the 
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basis of democratic centralism: since IGR issues were addressed within the party 
structure, this practice stifled the emergence of formal IGR forums. When 
Covid-19 broke out, however, the EPRDF was no more and, in the absence of 
established IGR forums, the only mechanism for coordinating efforts to contain 
the pandemic was cooperative engagement among federal and regional sectoral 
offices with complementary mandates.
17.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
The response to Covid-19 was dominated by the federal government. The state 
governments took little or no initiative: with a few exceptions, outlined below, 
they were passive and merely followed federal instructions. This can be explained 
by the fact that the Ethiopian federation operates within a dominant-party state 
that reduced state governments to implementing agents of the federal govern-
ment (Fessha 2019). At the same time, the effort to combat the pandemic took 
place in the context of major political developments that undermined the ability 
of the federal government to dictate to state governments, that prompted unu-
sual defiance among state governments, and that saw the emergence of inter- 
communal conflicts across the country.
17.4.1 Taking the initiative
The spread of the coronavirus was initially slow, and almost all the confirmed 
cases were from Addis Ababa: from March to May 2020, the daily confirmed 
cases were less than 10. The virus nevertheless continued to spread through-
out the country in subsequent months, even though Addis Ababa remained the 
epicentre and accounted for two-thirds of infections. By October 2020, there 
were close to 100,000 confirmed cases, and it was suspected, moreover, that the 
actual number of infected individuals was much higher than what was officially 
reported.
All eyes were on the federal government after the outbreak of the coronavirus 
in Wuhan, China, was reported in January 2020, even so before a global pan-
demic was declared. This was because only the federal government could have 
prevented its entry into Ethiopia, given that it is the level of government charged 
with controlling ports of entry into the country. There were public demands on 
mass and social media for the federal government to close borders and suspend 
flights, especially Ethiopian Airline’s flight to and from China; concerns were 
heightened by the fact that Bole International Airport, located at the heart of 
Addis Ababa, is one of the largest and busiest airports in Africa as well as home 
to Ethiopian Airlines, the largest airline on the continent. The federal govern-
ment initially rejected the demand for the suspension of flights and closure of the 
country’s borders.
However, it did start taking precautionary measures even before the first 
case of Covid-19 was confirmed. On 27 January 2020, prior to the WHO’s 
Ethiopia 325
declaration of a global pandemic, the Council of Ministers ‘activated’ a National 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness Centre and began preparations to deal 
with a potential outbreak of Covid-19, with control mechanisms at ports of entry 
requiring anyone entering the country to undergo a temperature check. In the 
same period, the NDRMC established a National Coordination Centre (NECC) 
in which various sectoral agencies were represented (Public Health Emergency 
Operation Centre (PHEOC), Ethiopia: Weekly Bulletin 2020). The NECC was 
formed on the understanding that Covid-19 was not only an imminent health 
disaster but posed numerous risks, especially humanitarian ones that called for a 
multisectoral response. Accordingly, this body set up quarantine centres and food 
banks in various areas.
A few days after the first case of Covid-19 was confirmed, the Council of 
Ministers banned all public gatherings and sports events. It also ordered schools, 
including universities and colleges, to close and placed restrictions on religious 
gatherings. The decision was to be applicable at the national level. This was fol-
lowed by a decision on 20 March 2020 requiring anyone entering the country 
to stay in quarantine for up to 14 days. One could be quarantined in designated 
hotels if one could cover the cost, or remain in other quarantine facilities at 
the expense of the government. The Council also ordered the closure of bars 
and clubs. Federal and state security organs were charged with enforcing these 
decisions.
Moreover, the Council of Ministers ordered that Ethiopian Airlines cease 
flights to 30 selected cities (surprisingly, cities in China were not on the list). On 
24 March 2020, it decided that, from 25 March, all federal employees were to 
work from home, except those designated by each ministry and federal agency as 
essential workers. Likewise, the president of the Federal Supreme Court declared 
that federal courts would remain partially closed from 19 March to 2 April. The 
restrictions were imposed without a state of emergency having been declared.
The heavy hand of the federal government was evident in the early days of 
Covid-19. There was little initiative by the states to use their competences in the 
fight against the pandemic – their attitude seemed to be to wait and see what 
the federal government would do. However, some of them of their own accord 
took measures with the declared purpose of containing the pandemic, albeit that 
most of these measures were less than comprehensive. For instance, on 31 March 
2020, the states of Oromia, Amhara, and the SNNP for two weeks banned pub-
lic transport from entering or leaving them. The states took even more restric-
tive measures in some of the cities within their jurisdiction. For example, on 31 
March, the Amhara state ordered a total lockdown and banned any movement 
of public transportation for two weeks in four cities, among them the state cap-
ital, Bahr Dar (Fana Broadcasting Corporation 2020). However, Addis Ababa, 
the country’s capital, did not impose a complete lockdown despite its being the 
epicentre of Covid-19.
There was one major exception. Tigray National Regional State declared a 
state of emergency on 25 March 2020, long before similar action was taken by 
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the federal government. As part of the emergency measure, the state govern-
ment introduced several restrictions. It forbade any travel to and from rural areas 
within the state. It also required the closure of cafés, restaurants, bars, and clubs 
and banned all social activities including weddings. Anyone entering the state 
had to stay in quarantine for two weeks. It should be noted, though, that Tigray’s 
declaration of a state of emergency was not simply an exercise of a constitution-
ally allocated power in the interests of the greater good. It is to be seen in the 
light of the prevailing political tension between the federal and state government 
(discussed in the next section).
17.4.2 Federal action
As the spread of the virus increased in terms both of numbers infected and area 
covered, the Council of Ministers resolved on 8 April 2020 to impose a state of 
emergency. As per article 93 of the Constitution, the proclamation by which it 
was declared was adopted by Parliament on 10 April.
The State of Emergency Proclamation (3/2020) was short and composed of a 
preamble and eight articles. The preamble explained that the state of emergency 
was necessary as Covid-19 had become a global pandemic that could not be con-
trolled by regular methods of law enforcement. The adverse political, social, and 
economic impacts of the pandemic and the need to mitigate the ensuing human-
itarian crises, said the preamble, warranted ‘coordinated’ decision-making and 
implementation, which in turn necessitated the state of emergency. The proc-
lamation, which had nationwide application, superseded contrary federal and 
state laws. It also imposed a criminal penalty on those acting or failing to act in 
accordance with its provisions. The penalty was up to three years’ imprisonment, 
or a fine of between ETB 1,000 and 200,000. The state of emergency remained 
in force for five months, starting on 8 April 2020.
On the basis of article 4 of the State of Emergency Proclamation, the Council 
of Ministers issued a regulation (Regulation 466 (2020)) detailing measures to 
contain the virus. The regulation banned some activities entirely and others par-
tially. Among the activities that were banned entirely were gatherings of more 
than four people regardless of the purpose, shaking hands, teaching and learn-
ing in schools, and sports activities; clubs, bars, theatres, cinemas, and the like 
were ordered to close. Public transport, including buses and trains, was allowed 
to operate at half of its usual capacity. Cafeterias, restaurants, and hotels were 
required not to serve more than three people at a single table and to ensure 
sufficient space between tables. International borders were closed, although 
Ethiopian citizens were allowed to enter the country if and when the Council of 
Ministers permitted it.
Various rights and freedoms were thus restricted for the duration of the emer-
gency. Freedom of expression was limited, as the regulation barred the media 
from reporting Covid-19 news in a way that could ‘cause terror and undue dis-
tress among the public’ (article 3(27)); in addition, factual information about 
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Covid-19 could be communicated only in a centralised manner (article 3(16)). 
Freedom of movement was restricted in that travellers from abroad had to be 
quarantined for 14 days. The regulation required everyone to wear masks in 
public.
Furthermore, the rights of property owners were restricted inasmuch as they 
could not evict tenants or increase rental fees. An owner of a vehicle, apartment, 
hotel, or other property could be required by the Ministerial Committee, estab-
lished by the regulation, to submit his or her property to be used in the fight 
against the pandemic. Employers could not dismiss employees except in accord-
ance with a protocol issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The regulation also 
placed obligations on certain service providers by requiring them not to dis-
continue their services during the state of emergency. This included electricity, 
water, and telecom service providers, along with, inter alia, banks, construction 
workers, and cleaners.
The pandemic created major economic challenges. Close to half a million 
jobs were lost due to Covid-19; many businesses closed down, while others suf-
fered a significant loss of earnings as demand for goods and services plummeted. 
This resulted in a 4 per cent drop in growth in gross domestic product (GDP), 
dragging more than 2 million people under the national income poverty line. 
About half of urban and rural households experienced income loss (Dabalen and 
Paci 2020). In addition, the arrival of the virus during the rainy season led to 
poor agricultural productivity, as a result of which the country saw a 30 per cent 
rise in food inflation (World Food Programme 2020).
In response, the federal government sought to mitigate these impacts by, 
among other things, giving tax exemptions to affected companies and can-
celling interest and penalties for unpaid taxes that had been due between 
2015 and 2018. Moreover, it introduced price controls on basic commodities. 
The National Bank injected liquidity to the value of ETB 15 billion (USD 
450 million) into private banks so that they could provide grace periods or 
‘debt relief and additional loans to their customers in need’ (Samuel 2020). 
State and local governments also extended tax exemptions to small traders and 
businesses.
The federal government decided not to renew the state of emergency when 
it expired in September 2020; many of the restrictions were subsequently lifted. 
Although the rate of infection appeared to decrease from September and onwards, 
this was mainly because the MoH substantially reduced testing for the virus as it 
was running out of test kits.
17.4.3 State government action
After the federal government declared a state of emergency, the states adopted 
a more structured approach to Covid-19, given that the federal proclamation 
and its regulation, which had nationwide application, provided the necessary 
framework for state action. The states were responsible mainly for enforcing the 
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state of emergency. They established quarantine centres and transported patients 
to and from these centres. They also mobilised health extension workers, who 
provided various services ‘including immunization, at the community level and 
educated members of the communities on how to prevent the spread of the virus’ 
(Getachew 2020).
As it was responsible for the area most heavily affected by Covid-19, the Addis 
Ababa city government took a number of measures to contain the pandemic. It 
established quarantine centres in various locations, including at the Millennium 
Hall, a venue usually used for music festivals. To curb the spread of the virus 
without hampering food supply to residents, the city government relocated 
Atkilt Tera, the largest fruit and vegetable market, to Jan Meda, an open space 
ordinarily used for sports and religious activities.
There was, however, one exception to the practice of state governments’ lim-
iting their role to enforcing the decisions of the federal government. The state of 
Tigray declared a state of emergency long before the federal government declared 
a nationwide state of emergency. Thereafter, in April 2020, Tigray undertook ‘a 
state-wide door-to-door Covid-19 screening testing campaign’ (Addis Fortune 
2020). After the campaign, the state government eased the measures imposed 
by its state of emergency by lifting restrictions on public transport, cafés, res-
taurants, bars, and the like and allowing them to provide services subject to 
conditions. Tigray eased its restrictions two weeks after the federal government 
imposed its state of emergency – this did not necessarily violate the federal state 
of emergency since the remaining restrictions were as severe as those imposed by 
the federal government.
17.4.4 Local government action
Woredas and cities took measures to prevent the spread of the virus, albeit in an 
unstructured manner. As early as March 2020, some cities in Oromia imposed a 
partial lockdown, while those in the Amhara state, including the capital, imposed 
a complete lockdown (Fana Broadcasting Corporate 2020). Although this was 
done at the behest of the respective state governments, it was undertaken without 
a clear legal framework.
In April 2020, the Addis Ababa city government launched what it called 
‘door-to-door screening’ in which more than a thousand health workers went 
from door to door to take temperature checks and isolate people showing the 
symptoms of Covid-19 (Ethiopian News Agency 2020). In the SNNP, some 
local government units attempted to impose restrictions to contain the spread of 
the virus. For instance, the Gurage zone government barred people from trav-
elling to the zone for the Islamic holiday, Arafa, during which members of the 
Gurage community traditionally travel to the zone to celebrate the holiday and 
get married.
After the federal government declared a state of emergency, local govern-
ments were expected to play a key role in enforcing the emergency regulations, 
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including the requirement that masks be worn in public spaces and that cinemas, 
bars, and so on be closed.
17.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
Although Ethiopia adopted a federal constitution in 1995, IGR has never had 
more than academic relevance in how its federal system operates (Fessha 2020). 
As an aspect of federalism, it was ignored in the past mainly because the EPRDF, 
which acted on the basis of ‘democratic centralism’ and controlled all levels of 
government, dealt with intergovernmental issues through party channels; federal 
agencies and their counterparts at state level interacted with each other, if at all, 
on an ad hoc basis (Fiseha 2009). As noted, the EPRDF has transformed itself 
into a new party, the EPP, which now controls nine of the country’s 10 states. 
The EPP, unlike the EPRDF, is not a coalition of ethnic-based state parties but a 
single national party with state branches legally and politically accountable to the 
centre. Its party structure remains the most important mechanism for coordinat-
ing federal and state relations in Ethiopia – not much has changed in this respect.
There was, nonetheless, an attempt to formalise IGR, and to this effect a pol-
icy document on it was adopted in May 2018 by the HoF, the institution which 
is supposed to play a major role in facilitating federal-state relations, though it 
had not been implemented at the time of writing. A draft proclamation on IGR, 
prepared under the auspices of the HoF, was only recently endorsed by the HPR 
(Anberbir 2020). In the interim, the relevant federal and state agencies interacted 
with each other to coordinate their efforts in the fight against Covid-19. The 
MoH in particular was in regular contact with state bureaus of health, among 
other things making test kits available for them, receiving their reports, and con-
solidating these in nationwide test results that were published daily.
It might not be accurate to say nothing much has changed in federal-state 
relations: for the first time in three decades, a major intergovernmental dispute 
has arisen in Ethiopia. Although Covid-19 was not the main cause of the dispute 
between the federal government and the state government of Tigray, there is no 
doubt that it played a role in escalating the dispute.
The pandemic, as mentioned, broke out when the country was in politi-
cal turmoil thanks to a split in the EPRDF, one precipitated by three years 
of countrywide protests against the party’s authoritarianism and the coun-
try’s ever-rising corruption. Abiy Ahmed, who assumed chairmanship of the 
EPRDF and premiership of the country after Haile Mariam Dessalgn resigned 
as Prime Minister, reconstituted the ethnic-based EPRDF into a single, formally 
non-ethnic party with a new name, EPP, and new ideology, that of ‘medemer’, 
an Amharic word roughly translatable as ‘convergence’ (Ayele 2021). The Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – the founder, nucleus, and most influential 
member of the coalition – did not join the new party.
In April 2018 and thereafter, disgruntled members of the TPLF, including 
former ministers, Members of Parliament, and senior government officials in 
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the federal government, left Addis Ababa and retreated to Mekelle, the capi-
tal of Tigray; the dispute between the Tigray state and the federal government 
soon began to unfold. The altercation worsened when it became clear that, due 
to Covid-19, the sixth general elections would not be held in August 2020 as 
per the schedule prepared by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). 
The NEBE itself declared that it would not be able to administer free and fair 
elections in the context of Covid-19. At the same time, the term of the current 
Parliament was due to expire on 5 October 2020, so it was unclear how and by 
whom the country would be governed after the expiry and until elections could 
be held.
The government then sought the advice of the HoF, which, as noted, has the 
power to interpret the Constitution. The HoF, based on the recommendation 
of the Council of Constitutional Interpretation, the institution that assists it in 
discharging its mandate of constitutional interpretation, decided to extend the 
term of Parliament and all state councils until the next elections are held (FDRE 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry 2020; FDRE House of Federation 2020).
In response, the TPLF declared the HoF’s decision unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, it decided to hold its own state elections by establishing its own 
electoral board and adopting its own electoral law (Addis Standard 2020a). This 
was constitutionally problematic since the power to administer any elections in 
the country exclusively belongs to the NEBE. Nevertheless, on 9 September 
2020, the Tigray state went ahead with the elections, defying repeated warnings 
by the federal government against such actions.
Having conducted the elections and forming a new government, the Tigray 
state declared that, post-5 October 2020, when the terms of Parliament and 
the incumbent administration would have expired were it not for the term 
extension by the HoF, it would not recognise Abiy Ahmed’s government as 
legitimate and have any relationship with it (Addis Standard 2020b). The federal 
government, for its part, declared the elections in Tigray null and void, refused 
to recognise the state government as legitimate, and said it would not have 
relations with it.
Intergovernmental tension was exacerbated when the HoF decided to suspend 
federal revenue transfers to the Tigray state government. Tigray reacted by mak-
ing public its intention to withhold all federal taxes collected in the state. The 
federal government then declared its intention to bypass the state government 
of Tigray and interact directly with local authorities, including in the transfer of 
funds. Those were constitutionally suspect measures (Ayele 2020) and added a 
financial dimension to the already strained relations.
The actions and reactions of the two governments revealed the limits of 
the law’s ability to dampen intergovernmental tensions. The state of Tigray 
labelled the federal government as illegitimate even though the bodies with the 
ultimate power to interpret the Constitution, the Council of Constitutional 
Interpretation and the HoF, allowed the federal government to stay in power 
until the next elections were held. Some aspects of that decision are arguably 
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problematic (especially with regard to the extension of the terms of state gov-
ernments). Nevertheless, those were the final words of the body given the power 
to interpret the Constitution and were expected to be respected as such. While 
a state government probably has the right to hold state and local elections, the 
Constitution envisages a single national body that administers elections.
Eventually, the federal government invoked its constitutional power of fed-
eral intervention and, at the beginning of November 2020, launched a military 
offensive against the government of the state of Tigray.2 At the time of this 
writing, the federal military had removed the state government and the federal 
government had installed a transitional government in its place.
These disturbing developments highlight the absence of traditions and insti-
tutions of intergovernmental dialogue that allow for peaceful resolution of dis-
putes. Indeed, what is striking, tragically so, is that there was not a single report 
of the federal government and government of Tigray having met behind closed 
doors to engage in intergovernmental dialogue. Instead, matters that should have 
been resolved by intergovernmental negotiation conducted away from the public 
arena were allowed to fester in a war of words. That is extremely concerning. 
The developments clearly indicate that Ethiopians are living in an era when they 
have to take the federal experiment seriously, a stance that should include an 
intent commitment to a culture of intergovernmental dialogue and negotiation.
17.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
The duality of the Ethiopian federal system is evident in the way that fiscal pow-
ers are divided between the federal and state government. The principle govern-
ing their fiscal relations is, as provided under article 94(1) of the Constitution, 
that ‘federal government and the states respectively bear all financial expendi-
tures necessary to carry out all responsibilities and functions assigned to them by 
law’; this also explains why ‘the financial expenditures required for the carrying 
out of any delegated function by a state [are] borne [by the federal government]’. 
An exception to the principle is that the federal government could ‘grant to states 
emergency, rehabilitation and development assistance and loans’. This suggests 
that, if it so wishes, the federal government can grant financial assistance to the 
states to deal with public health emergencies, including the Covid-19 pandemic.
In practice, the federal government makes two types of financial transfers to 
the states. The first, commonly known as block grants, are unconditional finan-
cial transfers. These comprise a little more than 36 per cent of the federal budget. 
The Constitution does not specifically mention this type of revenue transfers. 
The second type is specific-purpose grants (SPGs), which are conditional grants.
The outbreak of Covid-19 bore financial consequences both for the federal 
and the state governments. In particular, the federal government saw a mas-
sive drop in the revenue it usually collects. According to Ahmed Shide, the 
Minister of Finance, ‘[a] slowdown of economic activities and exports, because 
of COVID 19, affected the government’s revenue … [for] the budget year’ 
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(Wondwosen 2020). He added that the collection of indirect taxes, including 
value-added tax (VAT) and excise taxes, decreased by close to 15 per cent in 
March 2020 compared to revenue collected in the same period in the previous 
year. Federal government estimates show that, between March and July, more 
than ETB 11 billion (USD 294 million) of revenue that could have been col-
lected in the form of federal taxes had been lost.
On the expenditure side, the federal government incurred additional expenses 
of ETB 15 billion in buying personal protective equipment, medicines, and the 
like. Covid-19 also resulted in humanitarian challenges, including a growing 
need for emergency food assistance. This required the immediate purchase of 
more than 600,000 metric tons of wheat, costing billions of Ethiopian birr. The 
humanitarian situation was worsened by floods during the country’s rainy season 
( June–September) and the invasion of much of north-eastern and south-eastern 
Ethiopia by desert locusts. These together put an estimated 15 million people or 
more in need of food assistance (Fikade 2020). To deal with the emergencies, the 
HPR in May 2020 adopted a supplementary budget of ETB 48.5 billion (USD 
1.2 billion).
As for the states, even under normal circumstances they have never been 
financially self-sufficient and depend on federal transfers to cover in excess of 
70 per cent of their annual budgets; as such, the transfers are used mainly to 
cover the current expenditure of the state and local governments. The pan-
demic aggravated the situation in two respects, however. In the first place, it 
led to a reduction in the revenue they could collect from taxes and service fees. 
Numerous businesses closed down due to Covid-19, while others requested 
tax relief from their respective state governments to avoid going bankrupt and 
keep paying salaries to employees. The states had no choice but to grant these 
requests.
Secondly, states’ expenditure increased since they had to take a variety of 
measures to contain the virus, including opening and operating quarantine cen-
tres. In this regard, they received federal assistance both in cash and in kind. 
In the latter case, the federal government purchased and disbursed personal 
protective equipment and other medical equipment – for instance, it distrib-
uted more than 50 million masks to the states for subsequent distribution to 
returning students. It should be noted that most of the states ceased virtually 
all capital investments and used their full resources to deal with the economic 
and humanitarian consequences of the pandemic; this increased their depend-
ence on federal government handouts in order to carry out their expenditure 
responsibilities.
17.5 Findings and policy implications
Although Ethiopia has a federal constitution, it functions largely as a centralised 
system. This meant it was taken for granted that efforts to manage the threat of 
Covid-19 would be driven by the centre. Conversely, state and local government 
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were not expected to take separate initiatives to control the virus and manage its 
socio-economic impacts: as implementers of the decisions of the national gov-
ernment, they were required to follow directions given by the federal govern-
ment. Indeed, this is exactly what happened.
The federal government dominated efforts to manage Covid-19, with state 
governments acting as implementers and local governments playing a peripheral 
role. There was no report of health ministers across the two levels of government 
engaging in dialogue to ensure coordination and protect citizens from the spread 
of Covid-19 across the country – even the breadth of the pandemic’s impact did 
not prompt governments to engage in regular intergovernmental dialogue. This 
is no doubt linked to the fact that subnational governments acted as implement-
ers of the federal government’s decisions. They are, in other words, yet to be seen 
by the federal government as equal partners that need to be consulted through an 
intergovernmental mechanism.
There was one important exception, however. The state of Tigray took the 
initiative to declare a state of emergency within its territory, doing so long 
before the federal government declared a nationwide state of emergency. We 
cannot think of any other situation where a state in Ethiopia took a decision 
that departed from federal government action, let alone one that preceded it. 
Nevertheless, Tigray was acting within the limits of the Constitution.
Its decision to take actions independently of the federal government was an 
encouraging development as far as the federal experiment is concerned. Yet it 
was unavoidable to conclude that the action of the Tigray state was motivated 
largely by its desire to demonstrate its distinctiveness and autonomy from the 
federal government; put differently, it was hardly based on any specific assess-
ment of Tigray’s epidemiological status. The use of the pandemic to score polit-
ical points against the federal government was clear. After all, this was the same 
state that, on the one hand, seemed to have taken Covid-19 with great serious-
ness, but, on the other, emerged as the fiercest opponent of the decision – made 
in response to Covid-19 – that allowed the federal government to postpone the 
national election.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the pandemic did not alter the way the 
federation operates; it did, however, serve as an opportunity to amplify the ten-
sions that ensued after the election of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minster and the 
reconfiguration of the ruling party that displaced the TPLF as the dominant 
member of the coalition. Indeed, the tensions that Covid-19 exacerbated can be 
read as harbingers of the intergovernmental disputes that are bound to emerge as 
the country transitions from a federation that operated under a dominant-party 
system. Developments during the Covid-19 pandemic exposed the absence of 
traditions and institutions of intergovernmental dialogue that allow for peaceful 
resolution of disputes within the federation. Ethiopians, it was clear, find them-
selves living in an era when they must take the federal experiment seriously and, 
in particular, make a commitment to entrenching a culture of intergovernmental 
dialogue and negotiation.
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Notes
 1 The original nine are Afar, Amhara, Benishanul-Gumuz, Gambella, Hareri, Oromia, 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), Somali, and Tigray. The new 
Sidama state seceded from the SNNP.
 2 The offensive began on the night of 4 November 2020 when the Prime Minister, 
alleging that the TPLF had attacked military bases of the Northern Command of the 
Ethiopian National Defence Force, ordered armed intervention in the state. Many char-
acterised the armed conflict between the two entities as a ‘civil war’; for its part, the 
federal government described it as a surgical operation intended to enforce the rule of 
law in the Tigray state and conducted under the rules of federal intervention. The HoF 
ordered the Prime Minister to abolish the Tigray state government and appoint a transi-
tional administrator once the federal government secured the TPLF’s military defeat and 
gained full control of the state.
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SOUTH AFRICA
Surfing towards centralisation 
on the Covid-19 wave
Nico Steytler, Jaap de Visser and Tinashe Chigwata
18.1 Introduction
When the Covid-19 pandemic reached its shores between February and March 
2020, South Africa was already in a vulnerable situation – socially, economically, 
and politically. Although the country’s population, estimated at 59.6 million 
in 2020, is two-thirds urban, thus facilitating the spread of the virus, its age 
cohorts mitigated against Covid-19’s devastating impact – 28.6 per cent of the 
population is below 15 years old, and only 9.1 per cent is 60 years and older. 
Nevertheless, other factors placed the country at heightened risk.
More than half of the population is poor, and the unemployment rate stands at 
42 per cent (Statistics South Africa 2020); in South Africa, one of the most une-
qual countries in the world, the poor and unemployed are predominantly black. 
In 2018, social grants were, after salaries, the second main source of income for 
45.2 per cent of households, with about 13.1 per cent of households living in 
informal dwellings. Most households with no or limited access to basic services, 
such as water, are found in townships, informal settlements, and rural areas – 
places which are inhabited mainly by black South Africans and where poverty 
tends to be extreme. In 2019, the public health system, which has been neglected 
for years, served more than 71 per cent of households, while only 16.4 per cent 
of the population had medical insurance cover for private health care (Statistics 
South Africa 2019). Moving out of these severe socio-economic conditions has 
been difficult, given that the South African economy had been in a downward 
spiral and was in a technical recession in March 2020.
Facing the tidal wave rolling in from abroad was a multilevel system of 
government comprising a national government, nine provinces and 257 local 
governments, the latter two characterised by great diversity in territorial size, 
population, and, eventually, infection rates. The two provinces with the highest 
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level of urbanisation – Gauteng and the Western Cape – became infection hot-
spots, although two more rural provinces – KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern 
Cape – followed close on their heels. The Northern Cape, the province with the 
largest territory and lowest population, sported the lowest infection rate. As for 
South Africa’s municipalities, these range from large urban conglomerates – such 
as Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (population 5.7 million) in Gauteng 
and the City of Cape Town (3.4 million) in the Western Cape – to sparsely pop-
ulated rural local municipalities.
These state institutions were governed largely by the African National 
Congress (ANC), which experienced deep in-fighting between the country’s 
president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and a faction supportive of former president 
Jacob Zuma. In the 2016 local government elections, the party lost its major-
ity in key metropolitan municipalities such as Johannesburg, Tshwane, and 
Nelson Mandela Bay and shed some electoral support to opposition politi-
cal parties, namely, the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), 
representing mainly white and coloured voters, and the Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF), a split-off from the ANC with a radical Africanist and eco-
nomic agenda. However, after the 2019 national and provincial elections, the 
ANC was firmly back in the saddle, remaining in control of both houses of 
Parliament, eight of the nine provinces and most of the 257 municipalities 
(including seven of the eight metropolitan councils). At the start of 2020, the 
ANC was therefore still the country’s main political actor and facilitated coor-
dination efforts when the pandemic broke out domestically.
South Africa recorded its first confirmed case of Covid-19 on 5 March 2020 
and first Covid-19-related death on 27 March. By the end of May, it was in the 
top five in the world in terms of confirmed infections, with a total of 493,183, 
but in terms of Covid-19-related fatalities, the number was significantly low, 
at 8,005 (Department of Health 2020). After reaching a peak during June and 
July, case numbers dropped substantially, only to rise again in October when 
a second wave of infection gained momentum. By 31 October 2020, 725,452 
infections had been recorded and 19,276 deaths ( John Hopkins University 2020). 
These were much underreported figures: the number of natural deaths between 
5 May and 10 November 2020 in excess of the anticipated number (so-called 
excess deaths) was 51,473, and in all probability linked to Covid-19 (Bradsaw 
et al. 2020).
The response to Covid-19 by South Africa’s system of multilevel government 
entailed a centralisation of power that made the subnational governments’ imple-
menters rather than partners within the constitutional framework of cooperative 
government. The majority of provinces and municipalities were ill suited to 
manage the pandemic adequately due to incapacity, incompetence, and corrup-
tion. The possible benefits of a differentiated approach to decentralisation, in 
terms of which the well-functioning provinces and municipalities could have 
shown more initiative, were provided for but never explored. Unity, and not 
diversity, was the key word.
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18.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
South Africa’s Constitution of 1996 establishes a multilevel system of governance 
that may be described as a hybrid federal system (Steytler 2013). The provinces 
have exclusive powers over a short list of peripheral responsibilities (including 
ambulance services) but concurrent powers over a long list of significant ones, 
among them disaster management, education excluding tertiary education, 
health services, trade, and welfare services (Constitution, schedules 4 and 5). As 
both the national parliament and provincial legislatures have complete legisla-
tive powers over the concurrent responsibilities, conflicts are readily resolved in 
favour of national legislation on the basis of a qualified override clause. Local 
government’s constitutionally protected set of responsibilities includes municipal 
health services, trading regulations, water and sanitation services, cemeteries, 
public places, refuse removal, and solid waste disposal (Constitution, schedules 
4B and 5B). These functions may be regulated, however, by both the national 
and provincial governments. Any functional area not listed – such as interna-
tional travel, policing, and the judiciary – falls under the residual powers of the 
national government.
An emergency such as the Covid-19 pandemic cuts across the listed respon-
sibilities and involves all three levels of government, necessitating coordination 
and cooperation. The Constitution indeed instructs all three levels of gov-
ernment to adhere to the principles of intergovernmental relations and strive 
towards cooperative governance (sections 40 and 41). A formal and rule-bound 
system of intergovernmental relations (IGR) has been developed to support this. 
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 establishes the 
President’s Coordinating Council (PCC), a forum for matters of national inter-
est that comprises the President, deputy president, four national ministers, the 
premiers of the nine provinces, and a representative of organised local govern-
ment (South African Local Government Association (Salga)). A national min-
ister of a line department with a mandate falling within the list of concurrent 
functional areas may establish an IGR forum comprising the minister (Min) 
and members of the provincial executive council (MEC) responsible for that 
functional area – hence the forum’s name of MinMEC. A representative of Salga 
must also be included if a matter affects local government.
The law also provides for two statutory MinMECs that are pivotal in the 
management of pandemics. The first is the Intergovernmental Committee on 
Disaster Management (discussed below). The second, comprising the national 
minister and the MECs for education, is the Council of Education Ministers, 
which is mandated to ‘co-ordinate action on matters of mutual interest to the 
national and provincial governments’ (National Education Policy Act 27 of 
1996, section 9).
Given that states of emergency were used for political repression in the 
apartheid past, restrictions on such declarations were imposed by the 1996 
Constitution. It provides that ‘[a] state of emergency may be declared only in 
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terms of an Act of Parliament and only when … the life of the nation is threat-
ened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other 
public emergency’; furthermore, the declaration has to be ‘necessary to restore 
peace and order’ (section 37(1)). It is subject to strict constitutional guarantees 
and is valid only for 21 days, unless the National Assembly approves its extension 
by a majority and then for not more than three months at a time.
The national executive decided not to use its emergency powers under the 
Constitution to manage the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead, it opted for using the 
framework of the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, which obviates the need 
for parliamentary approval.
18.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
When measured in terms of the availability of law, policy, and plans, South Africa 
ought to have been well-prepared for Covid-19. The Disaster Management Act 
contains an impressive framework of national, provincial, and local institutions 
and mechanisms to manage disasters. Key features are a designated national min-
ister, a National Disaster Management Centre, nine provincial disaster man-
agement centres, and 52 municipal disaster management centres (one for each 
district and metropolitan municipality), a dedicated intergovernmental commit-
tee, and an array of advisory forums, plans, and frameworks. The Act contains 
rules for the declaration of local, provincial, and/or national disasters.
The designated national minister is the Minister of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs, the very same minister who oversees the functioning 
of the IGR system. Nationally, the Minister may declare a disaster if existing 
legislation and contingencies do not adequately equip the national government 
to deal with the disaster or other special circumstances warrant it. This then 
empowers the Minister to issue regulations on a vast array of matters. The over-
all purpose of the regulations must be to assist and protect the republic, provide 
relief, protect property, combat corruption, or deal with the destructive and 
other effects of the disaster.
The Act also provides for an Intergovernmental Committee on Disaster 
Management (mentioned above), which is the primary intergovernmental struc-
ture to oversee disaster management. When it was eventually established in 2016, 
it was a top-heavy forum comprising 20 national ministers, nine MECs and two 
Salga representatives (Presidency 2016).
18.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
When President Ramaphosa announced South Africa’s lockdown regulations in 
March 2020, political parties across the board showed their solidarity with his 
strong stance, a sentiment shared by the broad public and various civil society 
formations. Nevertheless, as the first three weeks of lockdown turned into five 
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weeks and another month of lockdown was announced until the end of May, and 
the impact of the regulations began hitting home in a dramatic rise in unem-
ployment and poverty, the public’s mood rose against the lockdown. The official 
opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), also changed position, chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the Disaster Management Act and the regulations 
made thereunder; however, its approach to the Constitutional Court for direct 
access to that Court was denied (Mailovich 2020).
The crisis painfully revealed the deep schisms that run through South African 
society. In what is one of the most unequal countries in the world, the poor 
(largely synonymous with the black majority) felt the effects of the pandemic 
in two vital areas: access to health services and increased unemployment and 
poverty. Moreover, compliance with severe lockdown regulations highlighted 
the two different worlds in South Africa. Orders to observe social distancing and 
stay at home could be complied with (and was readily done so) in suburbia, but it 
was far less possible to heed them in the cramped living conditions in townships 
and informal settlements.
18.4.1 Taking the initiative
The first and main response to the coronavirus came from the national govern-
ment when it declared a national state of disaster on 15 March 2020. The initial 
measures, promulgated on 18 March, included a travel ban on foreign nationals 
from high-risk countries, the prohibition of non-essential travel by government 
officials outside the country, the closure of all borders, and the screening of trav-
ellers. On 23 March, the President announced further, more drastic, measures 
centred on a national lockdown, which became effective on 27 March. In sup-
port of the national measures, particularly the call for social distancing, the City 
of Cape Town took the initiative to close its beaches from 24 March, three days 
before the lockdown came into effect. South Africa’s lockdown was seen as one 
of the harshest in the world which included a ban on the sale of tobacco and alco-
hol, and the security forces enforced its regulations in a heavy-handed fashion.
From the outset, the national government adopted a centralised approach 
despite the fact that provinces have a concurrent responsibility for disaster man-
agement. The usual IGR structures were sidelined, in one fell swoop, by the 
announcement of a specialised disaster management structure at national level – 
the National Coronavirus Command Council (NCCC), an informal council 
established by the President and comprising, at first, a select number of cabinet 
ministers and, later, the entire cabinet. The NCCC’s functioning was shrouded 
in secrecy.
18.4.2 National government action
The national government managed the pandemic chiefly by issuing regulations 
and directions under the Disaster Management Act after approval by the NCCC. 
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The first set of regulations, those of 18 March 2020, sought to (1) isolate South 
Africa from contagion by closing its international borders, (2) prevent the spread 
of the virus internally, and (3) manage the infected. Measures included the iden-
tification of places of quarantine and isolation by all three spheres of government, 
restriction of gatherings, closure of schools, restrictions on the sale and move-
ment of alcohol and tobacco, and emergency procurement.
The second set of regulations, issued on 23 March 2020, ordered a 21-day 
national lockdown, effective from 27 March, that entailed severe prohibitions 
on freedom of movement and assembly. The regulations corralled, top-down, all 
subnational government structures into becoming facilitators and implementers 
of the national effort:
For the duration of the state of disaster for Covid-19, all Premiers, Members 
of Executive Councils responsible for local government in the provinces, 
the President of the South African Local Government Association, all 
Executive Mayors/Mayors and institutions of Traditional Leadership 
shall take all reasonable measures to facilitate and implement the meas-
ures [against Covid-19]. 
(Direction 6(1) Disaster Management Act, 25 March 2020)
In addition, all spheres of government and their agencies were directed to 
implement precautionary measures to mitigate employee health and safety risks. 
There were also directions aimed specifically at provincial and local govern-
ments. For instance, provinces were directed to work with municipalities in 
identifying quarantine and isolation facilities, to avail resources to disaster coor-
dinative or management structures at the local level, to establish a special disaster 
management structure, to adopt Covid-19 response plans, to monitor the impact 
of the national government’s Covid-19 interventions, and to report regularly to 
the national government.
The economic bite of the lockdown was felt immediately, and so a third set 
of measures focused on ameliorating the lockdown’s economic and social impact 
(National Treasury 2020). On 21 April 2020, President Ramaphosa announced 
a ZAR 500 billion economic package providing for, among other things, the 
extension of lines of credit to small businesses. Food relief programmes, grants 
for the unemployed, funds for the health sector, and financial support for munic-
ipalities were also announced.
Shortly afterwards, on 23 April, came the exit plan from the lockdown – a 
‘risk-adjusted strategy’ for managing the pandemic by means of five levels of 
lockdown, with alert level 5 the most stringent (imposing ‘hard lockdown’) and 
1 the most relaxed. The country moved to alert level 4 on 1 May with a slight 
relaxation of the restrictions on movement. The strategy made provision for the 
possible imposition of different alert levels for different provinces and munici-
palities depending on infection rates. However, this differentiated approach was 
never adopted during the period under review.
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After South Africa’s infection numbers peaked in June and July 2020, the gov-
ernment moved to alert level 2 from 18 August to 30 September, a change that 
saw, inter alia, the lifting of restrictions on interprovincial travel and tourism- 
related activities. On 1 October, the country was on alert level 1, with the econ-
omy having been reopened fully and nearly all restrictions lifted, barring those 
on gatherings, sports events, and international travel, among other things.
Given the immediacy of the threat the pandemic posed, there was a strong 
shift to executive rule during the initial stages of the lockdown. Decisions taken 
by the NCCC and ratified by the cabinet were implemented without oversight 
from the legislature. Indeed, parliamentary proceedings were temporarily sus-
pended, in line with lockdown regulations that prohibited in person sessions, but 
returned partially in May (Waterhouse 2020).
In the absence of a robust parliament holding the executive to account, civil 
society and political parties turned, as they had done before, to the courts to vin-
dicate their rights and demands for good governance. The courts were, on the 
whole, not inclined to upset the apple-cart by invalidating regulations. As noted, 
the Constitutional Court gave the DA the cold shoulder when it contested the 
constitutionality of the Disaster Management Act itself. An attack on the legal-
ity of the regulations because of the ‘unconstitutional’ role of the NCCC was 
also rejected (Esau and Others v. Minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs and Others [2020] ZAWCHC 56 (26 June 2020)). More successful was a 
civil society attack on the constitutionality of the declaration of a National State 
of Disaster and regulations made under it; a High Court found that while the 
declaration was constitutional, a number of regulations (the ban not allowing 
people to visit those dying of Covid-19, the ban on the operation of fisheries, 
hairdressers etc., and the restricted hours in which people could exercise) were 
irrational and thus invalid (De Beer and Others v. Minister of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs [2020] ZAGPPHC 184 (2 June 2020)), a decision that 
became moot when these regulations fell away. The attack on the ban on the 
sale of tobacco also floundered as the High Court found that this regulation was 
rational as there was a link between the measure (tobacco ban) and its purpose 
(saving lives) (Fair-Trade Independent Tobacco Association v. President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another [2020] ZAGPPHC 246 (26 June 2020)).
Unlike the European Union, the Africa Union (AU) in practice has a lim-
ited legal impact on South Africa in general and on combating Covid-19 in 
particular. However, South Africa played a part in formulating a compre-
hensive continent-wide strategy against the pandemic. Soon after the World 
Health Organization (WHO) declared Covid-19 a pandemic, the AU adopted 
its Africa Joint Continental Strategy for Covid-19 Outbreak which provided 
for the coordination of anti-Covid-19 efforts on the continent by AU member 
states, AU agencies, the WHO and other international agencies (AU and Africa 
CDC 2020).
As a member of the AU, South Africa was expected to implement the strategy 
and other measures of the AU, all the more so since President Ramaphosa, the 
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incumbent chairperson of the AU, was leading the coordination of the conti-
nent-wide response to Covid-19, including the establishment of supply chains for 
shared resources, such as personal protective equipment (PPE).
18.4.3 Provincial action
With the response to Covid-19 being driven by the national government, prov-
inces acted as supporting and implementing structures. To begin with, prior to 
the pandemic, no province had adopted provincial legislation on disaster man-
agement, despite it being a concurrent competency. Furthermore, during the 
pandemic, they did not take any legislative measures, with their policies and 
actions falling largely within the broader national Covid-19 strategy.
Within the scope of that strategy, provinces played an important role in three 
concurrent areas – health, education, and social welfare. First, provinces are 
responsible for both primary and secondary health care (i.e. for all hospitals and 
clinics). From the start, given that the objective of the lockdown was to flatten 
the curve of infections, provinces had to upgrade their health systems in prepa-
ration for the surge. This involved equipping existing hospitals and constructing 
field hospitals. They also conducted testing and contact tracing, monitored infec-
tion rates, and ran campaigns raising awareness about Covid-19.
Secondly, provinces implemented the national strategy with respect to the 
closure and opening of schools. For instance, when the national government 
announced the decision to reopen schools under level 3 (from 8 June 2020), 
provinces had to ensure that the schools were Covid-safe and educators and 
learners had the necessary PPE. Thirdly, within the broader strategy of minimis-
ing the harsh impact of the pandemic and the lockdown on livelihoods, provin-
cial governments had to administer food relief programmes.
The provincial response to Covid-19, as prescribed by the national govern-
ment, had to be uniform, but the actual performance was highly uneven. The 
Eastern Cape is the extreme example, but not the only case of incompetence 
mixed with corruption. Even several weeks into the lockdown, the provincial 
administration, in particular its health department, had not put adequate meas-
ures in place to respond to the pandemic. As a result, it failed to treat Covid-
19 patients effectively or undertake testing and contact tracing, a situation that 
contributed to a high rate of viral transmission for a rural province. The national 
government was forced to provide support and oversight of the province in a 
manner that resembled a national-level intervention in a province, with the 
national Minister of Health bringing in a team of managers to assist the province 
in revamping its health system; medical personnel from the defence force were 
also deployed to augment the provincial health personnel. Less prominent but 
equally poor were health services in Mpumalanga and Limpopo.
Another common problem was poor recording of cases and deaths by pro-
vincial authorities. For example, for a period of 19 days an Eastern Cape health 
district that coincides with the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality 
344 Nico Steytler et al.
(Port Elizabeth) reported no mortalities – notwithstanding that the metro man-
aged 76 Covid-related burials in the same period (Legal Brief 2020a).
By contrast, the provincial governments of Gauteng and the Western Cape 
fared well in addressing the country’s two main zones of infection. The Western 
Cape adopted innovative health measures. It put together a team of experts who 
produced large datasets to inform the province’s response to Covid-19 in matters 
such as testing in hotspots and contact tracing. The Western Cape also estab-
lished the country’s first set of field hospitals for treating Covid-19 patients, for 
which it received accolades from the national Minister of Health.
Doing something contrary to national policy met with national disapproval. 
KwaZulu-Natal’s attempt to impose a stricter lockdown regime by making quar-
antining in state institutions compulsory did not get far (Legal Brief 2020a). Being 
less restrictive than the national government was also frowned upon, but the 
Western Cape’s MEC for education persisted in not toeing the line. In the initial 
lockdown, all government schools were closed, as were their school nutrition 
schemes. The Western Cape, however, continued to operate the scheme, though 
without meeting much central opposition.
The second skirmish evoked more reaction. The national Minister of 
Education gave a directive that schools should open on 1 June for Grade 7 and 
12 learners, based on the condition that the schools would be Covid-safe. After 
petitions by most of the provincial departments of education for a delay because 
their schools were not yet ready, the Minister informally announced the post-
ponement of the opening date by a week. The Western Cape MEC for education 
refused to comply, arguing that there was no need for the delay as 98 per cent of 
the schools in her province were Covid-safe; she instructed that schools reopen 
as originally scheduled by the Minister.
Condemnation came from several quarters. The Gauteng MEC for education, 
instead of supporting a provincial colleague, lashed out:
The misbehaviour and the attitude of the Western Cape Government to 
think that they’re a federal state or they’re a government on their own and 
they can defy national government and open schools when we are told not 
to open schools must be rejected. 
(Nicolson 2020, emphasis added)
The MEC berated the Western Cape government further by saying ‘[they] 
don’t support the need to ensure that all children are treated equally’, and claim-
ing the action would benefit the rich and prejudice the poor (Nicolson 2020). The 
same sentiment was shared by the South African Human Rights Commission 
and teachers’ unions, who said that ‘the Western Cape going alone undermined 
the unitary nature of our education system’ (Nicolson 2020).
There was thus no space for a better-performing province to advance edu-
cation: the overriding notion was that of solidarity where the pace is set by the 
slowest provinces. However, this reaction may only be partially concerned with 
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federal politics; underlying it is antagonism towards the DA and the history of 
racial inequality in education. Representing mainly minority groups and, after 
the 2019 national and provincial elections, alienating and shedding most of its 
African leadership, the DA is perceived as promoting largely white interests.
Provinces cooperated in a number of areas, such as the management of inter-
provincial traffic, movement of people between provinces, and the transportation 
of deceased persons across provincial boundaries. For instance, the Western Cape 
and Eastern Cape, which share a provincial boundary, entered into cooperative 
agreements to manage the movement of seasonal farm workers and deceased 
persons between the two provinces during the lockdown period.
Like the national parliament, provincial legislatures were not active in the 
early stages of the lockdown, seeing as their proceedings were temporarily sus-
pended in line with national regulations prohibiting in-person sessions. The 
provincial response to Covid-19 was thus led and driven during this period by 
provincial executives operating without oversight by legislatures.
Overall, given their limited constitutional space, provinces in general did not 
push the boundaries of their autonomy but willingly accepted their role as imple-
menters acting under national direction. They became in effect administrative 
agents of the national government, which funded their response to the pan-
demic. Few of them, however, excelled in their administrative role.
18.4.4 Local government action
The role played by local government was principally reactive. Municipalities 
generally positioned themselves as loyal partners in the national government’s 
response; although they were closely monitored by provincial governments, they 
were ultimately left to their own devices to absorb the cost of the crisis.
The declaration of a national disaster was followed immediately by a range 
of detailed directions for local government. Among other things, municipalities 
were instructed to ban all public meetings, close public amenities and markets, 
sanitise public places, raise awareness, and increase water delivery to informal 
settlements. They were instructed as well to develop response plans, report reg-
ularly to their provincial governments, and set up and participate in the new 
district ‘command councils’ tasked to coordinate the government’s response. The 
national government also ordered municipalities to ban all council and com-
mittee meetings, an instruction later amended to a blanket command to meet 
virtually. Municipalities were directed, furthermore, to abandon their internal 
delegations and allow the mayor, in consultation with the municipal manager 
and chief financial officer, to conduct emergency procurement to respond to the 
crisis (De Visser and Chigwata 2020a).
The impact of pandemic response on municipalities was threefold. First, a 
range of existing local government responsibilities was suddenly intensified and 
redirected. Municipal police and law enforcement were tasked with helping the 
South African Police Service and the army to enforce the lockdown (Beukes 
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2020). Water tanks needed to be delivered to settlements without access to water; 
street traders had to be furnished with special permits, public transport facilities, 
sanitised, and the like. Municipalities were also tasked with identifying infection 
hotspots and assisting in the identification of quarantine sites.
Secondly, a number of new responsibilities emerged, the most controversial 
one being the delivery of food parcels. Food assistance falls within the remit of 
the national and provincial departments of social development and education, 
which manage these two concurrent functions. However, in the chaos of the 
government’s initial response to the hardship of the lockdown, municipalities 
became involved in the identification of recipients and even the funding of food 
parcels. This led to reports of councillors abusing the intervention for political 
ends and municipalities incurring unauthorised expenditure (Payne 2020a).
Thirdly, the lockdown had an immediate and devastating impact on munic-
ipal revenue, with collection of property rates dropping almost instantly. They 
were facing the prospect of fewer paying utility users and a reduction in inter-
governmental funding (Davis 2020). For instance, although the national gov-
ernment promised them assistance to the value of ZAR 20 billion (National 
Treasury 2020: 7), this was woefully inadequate.
The fact that municipalities adopt their own budgets enabled them to pass 
adjustment budgets and redirect funds. Similarly, because they have considerable 
policy discretion to determine, and collect taxes and service fees, some were 
able to ameliorate the impact of the lockdown. For example, Stellenbosch Local 
Municipality introduced relief from property rates for individuals and companies 
that suffered losses as a result of the lockdown (Stellenbosch Local Municipality 
2020). This was not a widespread practice, as most municipalities were too cash-
strapped to follow suit. Other municipalities at least eased off on their debt collec-
tion and reconnected households whose services had been discontinued. There 
was innovation, too. Municipalities were thrust into a practice of holding online 
council meetings and experimenting in forms of public engagement that avoided 
the somewhat tired town-hall approach (De Visser and Chigwata 2020b).
Although the regulations provided for differentiated responses to the pan-
demic, local deviation from the national norms was not tolerated. The request of 
Ethekwini Metropolitan council to remain at level 5 when the rest of the coun-
try moved to level 4 found no national support (OFM 2020). By all accounts, 
the national government, unwavering in its initial response to the pandemic, 
centralised power in respect of local government and in the process also meddled 
in the provinces’ oversight role.
First, it conscripted local government through measures that upended the 
constitutional status of local government. The initial blanket prohibition of all 
municipal council meetings was almost certainly unconstitutional; as for the sub-
sequent instruction to all of them to meet virtually, this may have been overbroad, 
ignoring differences in size and ability to have responsible physical, or hybrid, 
meetings. The instruction to abolish internal checks and balances and central-
ise procurement in the mayor’s office may not only have been constitutionally 
South Africa 347
impermissible but also may have contributed to the corruption in PPE contracts 
that later engulfed the country.
Secondly, further centralised planning emerged through the ‘command 
councils’ that were set up to coordinate at each district and metropolitan level. 
These coincided with the roll-out of a new national government programme 
to improve intergovernmental alignment, the so-called District Development 
Model (DDM). The DDM is predicated on positioning the eight metropolitan 
municipalities and 44 district municipalities as the pivots for all intergovernmen-
tal planning (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
2019). The DDM provides nothing that has not been tried before. However, bol-
stered by the momentum of district-led coordination of the Covid-19 response, it 
may end speculation about abolishing the much-maligned district municipality, 
the ‘upper tier’ of local government.
Thirdly, a similar trend emerged when national politicians assumed the role 
of mentoring local government. The President initiated an informal scheme of 
deploying senior ministers and their deputy ministers (also elected politicians) as 
‘mentors’ to metros and key district municipalities. For example, the Minister 
of Trade and Industry, Pravin Gordhan, was sent to Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality (Pretoria) to assist a highly unstable council (Pijoos 2020). The 
significance of this initiative is that a national minister leapfrogged over the 
province that bears the primary responsibility of monitoring and support.
18.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
Throughout the pandemic, a strong centralised system and ethos prevailed, com-
ing to the fore as well in the sidelining of pre-existing IGR forums and pro-
cesses. The President’s Coordinating Council (PCC) could have played a pivotal 
role in coordinating a whole-of-government approach. Instead, the PCC was 
pushed to the margins, with dictates coming mainly from the informal NCCC, 
on which there was no provincial and local representation.
There was some consultation with the provinces, however. When President 
Ramaphosa announced the first lockdown, he noted, after referring to the deci-
sion of the NCCC to that effect, that the decision was made after consulting the 
provincial premiers. Although the NCCC was the driving force in the coun-
try’s pandemic response, in the initial phase of the lockdown the PCC did meet 
weekly, in contrast to its previous twice-yearly get-togethers. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests, though, that these meetings were a conduit for information and 
instructions rather than a platform for negotiation. Before the move to level 3 
on 1 June 2020, it was reported that the President had a virtual meeting with 
the premiers and mayors following his announcement of the easing of restrictions 
(Daily Maverick 20 May 2020), which suggested that no prior consultation had 
taken place.
Although a top-heavy Intergovernmental Committee on Disaster 
Management had been established in 2016, it faded into obscurity and did not 
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re-emerge during the lockdown. This by-passing of the Committee is in a sense 
a transgression of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Disaster Management Act: 
a dedicated, intergovernmental structure bringing together all three spheres of 
government to advise the cabinet, was replaced by an ad hoc structure consisting 
exclusively of national government ministers.
The Council of Education Ministers (CEM) fared better, emerging as a 
cooperative institution making joint decisions on key issues on schooling dur-
ing the lockdown. In March 2020, prior to the lockdown, it reached agree-
ments on matters such as the timetable for final-year examinations and the 
school calendar for 2021 (Motshekga 2020a). After the lockdown and closure 
of schools, the CEM held frequent meetings in an effort to save the school 
year. The national Minister, Angie Motshekga, also couched major decisions as 
those of the CEM (see Motshekga 2020c). However, such decisions were fun-
nelled to the NCCC, which then affirmed even the school opening calendar 
(Motshekga 2020b).
The role of formal IGR forums also receded, with IGR consultations 
becoming more informal and direct. Ahead of a move to a level 4 lockdown, 
the Minister of Cooperative Government asked for input from the provinces 
(Meyer 2020), yet without using the Intergovernmental Committee on Disaster 
Management for that purpose. As the decision-making process at the national 
level was murky, it is not clear whether such inputs had any impact and whether 
the regulations were ever the product of agreements. Also, it would appear that 
provinces (and municipalities) preferred to direct specific requests directly to the 
President rather than work through IGR forums which did not allow space for 
individual provinces.
For example, after restrictions on liquor sales were eased for the first time 
in three months, the Eastern Cape premier asked for the reinstatement of the 
ban because of an increase in violence-related casualties at hospitals (Dayimani 
2020). With the support of the Minister of Police, the President sprung a sur-
prise on the country by re-imposing the liquor ban after a mere three weeks. By 
contrast, few of the requests from the Western Cape and the City of Cape Town 
seemed to find a receptive ear.
18.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
At the beginning of 2020, the South African economy was already in a tech-
nical recession. Moody’s, the last of the rating agencies to do so, downgraded 
South Africa in March 2020 to junk status, making borrowing costlier. This was 
bad news, as the February 2020 national budget deficit as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) was 8.1. The biggest contributors to the problem were 
the major state-owned enterprises, which, thanks to years of maladministration 
and corruption, were deeply mired in debt. Moreover, due to past maladmin-
istration of the country’s tax authority the revenue collection forecast for the 
2020–2021 financial year fell substantially short of target. Consequently, the 
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Division of Revenue Bill of February 2020 contained cuts in the transfers to both 
the provinces and municipalities.
The lockdown, having closed most economic activities in the second quarter 
of 2020, brought further destruction to this ailing economy, which contracted in 
that period by 51 per cent; the official prediction for the year as a whole was that 
it would contract by 8.1 per cent. By the time the national Special Adjustments 
Budget was tabled at the end of June 2020, the budget deficit had nearly dou-
bled to 15 per cent of GDP. Thus, while the economy was delivering less taxes, 
demands on government services and support escalated dramatically.
The provinces’ increased responsibilities were not covered by transfers 
determined in February 2020 – transfers upon which provinces are almost 
totally dependent, given that only 3 per cent of their revenue is own revenue. 
Municipalities’ own revenue fell by 60 per cent on average, and in the case of 
metros, by 30 per cent. The poor performance prompted Moody’s to push two 
metros deeper into junk status in September 2020. By the end of June, more than 
half of the municipalities owed more to creditors than they had cash in the bank.
The National Treasury responded with a number of measures that provinces 
and local government had to adopt. First, provinces had to reprioritise their 
expenditure to meet pandemic-related needs. In the main, the reprioritised 
funds came from infrastructure spend on public works, roads, and transport. 
Secondly, spending cuts were sought, including breaching a three-year wage 
agreement that in 2020 would have given above-inflation wage increases to the 
civil service (including provincial officials) – a move vehemently opposed by 
labour unions.
Thirdly, equalisation transfers (i.e. each province and municipality’s equitable 
share of the revenue raised nationally) were slightly reduced for provinces, but 
slightly increased for local government. Conditional grants for infrastructure 
development were suspended or reprioritised for Covid-19 spending.
Fourth, the shortfall in revenue drove the national government to take the 
politically contested step of borrowing money from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF); the ANC’s alliance partners – the trade union COSATU and the 
South African Communist Party – saw the spectre of losing national sovereignty 
to IMF structural adjustment programmes.
Despite these measures to save money, the national government did not hes-
itate to shoot itself in the foot by banning the sale of tobacco, thereby forsaking 
billions of rands in excise duties in exchange for a possibly marginal reduction in 
the pressure on hospitals. The ban on alcohol sales also contributed generously 
to the loss of ‘sin taxes’.
The patrimonial state is firmly embedded in the fabric of the ANC and the 
governments they control, notwithstanding Ramaphosa’s ascendency as pres-
ident of the ANC and the country on an anti-corruption ticket and his subse-
quent actions in this regard. Financial accountability to Parliament, provincial 
legislatures and municipal councils is weak overall, a state of affairs not helped by 
the clampdown on oversight by provincial legislatures and municipal councils. 
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Indeed, the pandemic merely provided new feeding opportunities for the patri-
monial state.
The saddest evidence was the looting by officials, politicians and their cronies 
of funds earmarked for Covid-19 relief, including for buying PPE using pro-
curement procedures that had been relaxed given the urgency of the situation. 
In the Eastern Cape, for example, the number of provincial employees doing 
business with the provincial government jumped from 29 prior to the lockdown 
to 565 during it (Legal Brief 2020b). The shamelessness of the feeding frenzy 
was heightened by the fact that the Zondo Commission into State Capture was 
holding hearings at the same time on the financial depravity that characterised 
the Zuma presidency; moreover, in November 2020 the Secretary-General of 
the ANC was arrested on corruption and racketeering charges stemming from 
the Zuma years.
As far as national oversight of local finances was concerned, the Budget 
Forum, an IGR forum comprising the Minister of Finance and the nine MECs 
for finance, resolved that the National Treasury would take the lead in municipal 
financial matters while the Department of Cooperative Governance would keep 
an eye on governance and service delivery (Mkentane 2020). This clarification 
of roles in an area notorious for messy oversight overlaps may be one of the few 
financial positives to have come out of the lockdown.
18.5 Findings and policy implications
The Covid-19 pandemic and response to it touched the constitutional core of 
the multilevel government system – namely, the concurrent functions of dis-
aster management, health services, social welfare and education – and thereby 
also brought the need for cooperative government to the fore. The national 
government, leading the charge against the pandemic, could have declared 
a state of emergency, but chose the unencumbered powers that the Disaster 
Management Act provides. Despite the existence of a system of cooperative 
government erected by the Constitution and legislation, powers were sucked 
up not only to the centre but also within the national government, in the form 
of the NCCC. Even where IGR forums worked cooperatively, such as with 
the CEM, their decisions had to be sanctioned by the NCCC. The end result 
was that the measures taken to combat the Covid-19 pandemic emphasised 
and enhanced the centralised nature of the South African system of multilevel 
government.
Provinces and municipalities were in effect corralled into being implementers 
of nationally determined measures. They did so willingly, but often not compe-
tently. The majority were mired in maladministration and corruption, although 
some provinces, notably Gauteng and the Western Cape, which contended with 
the two largest hotspots of infections, were capable of being efficient and even of 
developing innovative measures. Generally, the inhabitants of the Eastern Cape, 
for instance, fared poorly under their provincial government.
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In the face of this unevenness, the question of whether subnational govern-
ments helped or hindered pandemic management cannot be answered with an 
unequivocal yes or no. To add to this equivocation, it is hard to speculate if the 
national government might have done better in their stead, since it is scarcely a 
paragon of good governance either.
Both provinces and local government lost some of their autonomy during the 
lockdown. Will this surge in centralisation have long-term implications for the 
current system of multilevel government? The great tidal wave of the Covid-19 
pandemic, it is argued, may well send a state already tottering atop an upheaval of 
problems seemingly beyond its capacity to quell, towards centralisation.
First, one of the perennial reasons for centralisation is the poor performance 
of the majority of provinces and municipalities. The poor performance of most 
of the provinces during the pandemic deepened the pre-pandemic trend of inca-
pacity, maladministration, and corruption. Although capacity is not in abun-
dance in the national government, popular faith still rests at that level. The good 
performance of Gauteng and the Western Cape in dealing effectively with the 
highest rates of Covid-19 infections in the country is not likely to steer the 
national ship towards differentiated decentralisation. The same applies to munic-
ipalities: a steady decline in their performance prior to the pandemic was exac-
erbated by the lockdown.
The second reason for the further drift towards centralisation is the absence 
of a ‘federal spirit’ in the body politic. The federal spirit espoused by Michael 
Burgess (2012) refers both to tolerance of diversity among constituent units as 
well as to the celebration of innovative measures for better governance. The 
absence of this spirit within the ruling party and sections within society became 
glaringly conspicuous in the contretemps over a trifling practical but policy-laden 
decision by the Western Cape government to start schooling a week before the 
rest of the country. Doing something different from the rest of the provinces was 
attacked by the other well-performing province, Gauteng, as ‘misbehaviour’, on 
the ground that all provinces had to obey the national direction even though it 
was not couched in binding law.
The third reason for the continuing drift towards centralisation relates to the 
country’s dire financial situation, acutely felt by subnational governments. In a 
context in which there is less public money, where provinces perform poorly and 
municipalities go bankrupt, expenditure controls will intensify in order to ensure 
better use of dwindling resources. Unlike the 2008 financial crisis – which did 
not much affect multilevel government in South Africa, a country that at the 
time had enjoyed a period of economic growth (Steytler and Powell 2010) – the 
Covid-19 crisis was far more severe in impact and afflicted an already-ailing 
economy. The national purse strings are thus likely to reign in autonomy.
Is it all bad news for decentralisation? Perhaps not. As the economic crisis, 
deepened by the lockdown, came to dwarf the fading Covid-19 health challenge, 
the national government’s focus shifted to stimulating economic growth through 
infrastructure spending. Differentiated decentralisation, so argued the Gauteng 
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and Western Cape governments, could be a further measure towards enhancing 
economic growth (Payne 2020b). Gauteng, the economic and financial hub of 
the country, argued that it should be allowed to raise its own revenue and to 
attract investments, while the Western Cape sought a much broader empower-
ment deal to provide a better governance infrastructure necessary for economic 
growth, including powers over policing, rail, and energy supply. The same argu-
ments could be made by the main metropolitan governments.
Out of sheer desperation, the national government may well consider empow-
ering the two provinces and the key metros to facilitate economic growth. A 
careful step in this direction was taken in 2020 when electricity laws were 
amended to enable municipalities to develop their own power generation pro-
jects, thus reducing their dependence on Eskom, the troubled national electricity 
utility. While anti-federal mindsets and political complexities tell against it, the 
prospect of differentiated decentralisation, though slight, is not remote.
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MANAGING COVID-19 
IN A ‘FAÇADE FEDERALISM’
The case of Nigeria
Lukman Abdulrauf
19.1 Introduction
On 27 February 2020, Nigeria, one of Africa’s major federations, recorded its 
first case of Covid-19. The pandemic struck at the peak of its political, economic, 
and social challenges. The country had just emerged from a bitter election fur-
ther polarising it along ethno-religious lines; economically, it was battered by a 
sharp fall in oil prices, a huge infrastructural deficit, and corruption. Indeed, at 
the turn of 2020, it was in its second recession in four years, with unemployment 
and soaring poverty rates a cause for grave concern.
Nigeria’s population is estimated at 208 million, making it the largest country 
in Africa and seventh largest in the world (WPR 2020). Most of its people are 
concentrated in a few cities, with Kano in the lead with about 14 million, fol-
lowed by Lagos with 13 million (NBS 2018). The population is not only large 
but diverse. More than 500 ethnic groups are spread across different regions that 
together span an area of 923,768 km2, a fact pointing to the reasons that the 
country adopted federalism.
Politics in Nigeria – a country divided into a Federal Capital Territory (FCT) 
and 36 states that comprise 774 local governments – is heavily influenced by 
ethnicity and religion. Of its two main parties, the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP) was the dominant party until its defeat in the 2015 elections by the 
All Progressives Congress (APC), which is currently the ruling party at fed-
eral level, albeit not without serious opposition from the PDP. Much of the 
North and South-West are controlled by the APC; the PDP controls the East 
and South-South.
Health care has long been a campaign priority for political parties, yet there 
is little to show for it. Nigeria’s average life expectancy of 54.5 years is one of 
the lowest in West Africa, while rates of HIV-AIDS, poliovirus, and child and 
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maternal mortality remain high, with one out of every five children dying before 
the age of 5 (WPR 2020). The weaknesses this indicates in the public health system 
were further exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic. After the country’s first case was 
recorded, the federal government re-assessed the system and admitted that until 
then it had never realised the extent to which health care in Nigeria is in decay.
The rate at which the coronavirus began to spread in Lagos and FCT was 
alarming. The first 30 days after the first confirmed case showed an elitist disease 
distribution in that most of the infected persons were returnees from abroad 
(NCDC 2020a). When it became obvious that community transmission had 
started, it was the Lagos state government that took the first concrete step of 
imposing a lockdown in the state.
By August 2020, Nigeria reached the peak of its infections and, with cases 
declining, the government began a phased reopening of the country and a roll-
out of economic recovery measures. By the beginning of October, however, a 
second wave of infection and lockdown was anticipated, particularly in the light 
of country-wide protests against police brutality, but this did not come to pass, 
as the total number of confirmed cases by the end of the month remained low at 
62,853, with 1,144 fatalities (NCDC 2020a).
For a country with an ailing health-care system, these statistics may look 
impressive. Yet while some have commended the country’s response, others 
argue that the figures do not bespeak success for reasons such as inadequate 
reporting and low rates of testing. There is hence no clear picture yet of the state 
of the pandemic in Nigeria or how effectively it was addressed.
This chapter contributes to an evolving understanding of the situation by 
examining the multilevel government response to Covid-19 in Nigeria until the 
end of October 2020. Its key findings are that federalism in Nigeria is dysfunc-
tional, that this had an impact on a coordinated response to the pandemic, and 
that states and local government are consigned a diminishing role while other-
wise having to keep up the pretence of ‘façade federalism’.
19.2 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
The Constitution of 1999 delineates the role of each of Nigeria’s three tiers 
of government. The federal government has exclusive powers over issues in 
the Exclusive Legislative List, while matters in the Concurrent List are shared 
between it and state government (sections 4(2), (4), (7)); states have exclusive 
powers over matters in the ‘residual list’. Local government authorities (LGAs), 
or councils, also have powers set out in the Constitution.
While each tier is expected to function independently based on its legisla-
tive competence, the federal government’s powers have preponderance over the 
others. For instance, in terms of section 4(5), federal legislation overrides state 
legislation where there is potential conflict between them. The disequilibrium 
between state governments and LGAs is more pronounced in that the latter 
depend on the former for their existence and structure (section 7).
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As health care is not in the exclusive or concurrent lists, logically it is a resid-
ual matter within the competence of state government (Nwabueze 2014: 380). 
This inference is fortified by the fact that the Constitution stipulates that the 
‘provision and maintenance of health services’ is one of the functions in which 
LGAs participate in state governance (Fourth Schedule, section 2(c)). Other 
health- related LGA services include sanitation and refuse disposal. In the case of 
health care, then, it is the responsibility of the state government, which is sup-
ported in this regard by LGAs.
In the case of disaster management, however, the position is not as straightfor-
ward. While the Constitution vests the power to declare a state of emergency in 
the event of disasters solely in the federal government, the National Emergency 
Management Agency Act 50 of 1999 (NEMA Act) seems to establish a joint 
regime comprising both the federal government and states. It is thus arguable 
that disaster management, unlike health care, is supposed to be their shared 
responsibility, with the federal government playing the leading role.
Moreover, in the event of a pandemic that can be considered a natural disaster, 
the federal government can declare a state of emergency ‘in the federation or 
any part thereof ’ (Constitution, section 305). This is an exclusive power of the 
President; the governor of a state can only ‘request’ that the President declare a 
state of emergency in a state (section 305(4)). The President, though, has over-
riding powers ‘if a State fails within a reasonable time to make a request’ (section 
305(5)).
Importantly, Nigeria’s Constitution, unlike that of many other countries, 
does not distinguish between a state of national disaster and a state of emergency. 
In Nigeria, states of emergency have been declared in states several times, for 
instance in response to terrorism by Boko Haram. States of emergency have not 
been declared before for health emergencies, however, despite calls for this dur-
ing the Ebola crisis. As with Covid-19, the government did not consider Ebola a 
sufficiently ‘imminent danger’ to warrant such a declaration (Abdulrauf 2020a).
Generally, state governments have powers to ‘make laws for the peace, order, 
and good government of the State’ (Constitution, section 4(7)). This means they 
can make emergency laws as well, so long as it is for the peace, order, and good 
government of the state and it is within their legislative competence. In case 
of public health emergencies, state governments can make regulations in the 
course of exercising emergency powers based on their public health laws. Such 
emergency regulations may also be justified by federal legislation, in this case by 
the Quarantine Act of 1926. Although quarantine is a matter within the federal 
Exclusive Legislative List, the Quarantine Act vests state governors with the 
powers to make emergency regulations if the federal government fails to do so 
(Quarantine Act, section 8).
It is on the basis of this legal framework that the Lagos state government 
issued the Infectious Disease (Emergency Prevention) Regulation 2020 which 
gave the governor powers, inter alia, to restrict movement and close internal 
borders. LGAs do not have any equivalent powers.
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19.3  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
The nature of the disaster determines the appropriate institution to respond to 
it. Generally, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is the pri-
mary agency responsible for disaster management. Established by the NEMA 
Act, its responsibilities are, among other things, to formulate policies on dis-
aster management and coordinate the relevant plans and programmes. NEMA 
is an agency under the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster 
Management and Social Development.
NEMA does not appear to be an intergovernmental body because other tiers 
of government are not represented in its membership. Moreover, phrasing in the 
Act suggests its distinctness from equivalent institutions at state level. The Act 
mandates states to establish a State Emergency Management Committee/Agency 
(SEMC/A) to ‘respond to any disaster within the state’ (NEMA Act, section 
9(b)), albeit that, to date, only 25 states have SEMAs (Mashi et al. 2019: 8); at the 
national level, NEMA is only to ‘liaise’ with the state committees ‘to assess and 
monitor’ the distribution of relief material (NEMA Act, section 6).
On this basis, NEMA is, arguably, not established as an intergovernmental 
body, which means in turn that the federal government is solely responsible for 
disaster management at federal, or nation-wide, level.
Since Covid-19 is classifiable as a natural disaster, the role of one other agency 
is noteworthy: the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC). It has the 
responsibility of coordinating the scientific response to epidemics and pandemics, 
with its main function being ‘to lead the preparedness, detection, and response to 
infectious disease outbreaks and public emergencies’ (NCDC 2020b). Formed in 
2011, the NCDC first came to prominence during the West African Ebola virus 
epidemic of 2013–2016.
19.4 Rolling out measures to contain the pandemic
As countries worldwide began taking action to curb the pandemic, Nigeria fol-
lowed suit with similar measures, chiefly the closure of international borders, 
restriction of movement, and development of relief interventions. At the federal 
level, the President introduced them formally in a national address on 30 March 
2020. The ruling APC was in full support of the measures, while the PDP took 
a critical stance, castigating President Buhari’s administration for having allowed 
the virus to get into the country in the first place and blaming this lapse on its 
‘negligence and laidback attitude to the governance and welfare of Nigerians’ 
(Premium Times 2020). However, what drew the most heated criticism, par-
ticularly from opposition parties, was the unilateral way the central government 
imposed the lockdown on the federated states.
More widely, the diverse character of Nigerian society had an impact on the 
response to Covid-19. The degree of seriousness with which different regions 
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took the pandemic varied and largely reflected the North-South divide. In most 
parts of the North, even the political class treated it with some levity. This was 
apparent in the initial response in such states as Kano, as well as among the pop-
ulation at large, where levity sometimes turned into violent resistance against the 
lockdown and social distancing orders. For example, youths in Katsina state (in 
North-Western Nigeria) set a police station ablaze because its officers, in enforc-
ing these orders, prevented them from attending their mosque.
Similarly, the sense of marginalisation commonly felt by people in poor rural 
communities was deepened by the government’s response measures. Many of 
them thought the pandemic was a hoax or a trick the government had pulled off 
to exploit them; others yet believed the pandemic affects only the rich and pow-
erful, given the number of high-profile individuals who contracted the virus or 
went on to die of it (Ihonvbere 2020).
19.4.1 Taking the initiative
Initially, there was uncertainty about who should take the lead in responding 
to the pandemic. A first possible reason for this is that governments at all levels 
appear to have underestimated its potential harmfulness, so it took some time 
before they appreciated the magnitude of what was at stake and gave full focus 
to questions of who should respond and in what way. A second reason related to 
the conflict of legal frameworks regarding the pandemic. If Covid-19 were con-
sidered a natural disaster, it would fall under the NEMA Act and the response be 
driven by the federal government; however, if it were considered a health matter, 
it would be within the constitutional competence of state governments, with the 
support of LGAs.
After Nigeria reported its first confirmed case in February 2020, the federal 
government constituted the Presidential Task Force on Covid-19 (PTF) only 
on 9 March, two days before the World Health Organization (WHO) declared 
Covid-19 a pandemic. The PTF did not take any concrete steps immediately on 
being established. Since most cases then were imported, the federal government 
closed all air and land borders on 18 March. Thereafter, cases started to increase 
exponentially and it became clear that community transmission had set in.
Lagos State, initially the epicentre, witnessed the highest daily increase – 
unsurprisingly so, given that it is the country’s commercial hub and has one of 
the busiest international airports in Africa. On 23 March, it also saw Nigeria’s 
first coronavirus-associated fatality.
Thus, it was that on the following day, 24 March, the government of Lagos 
State took the first decisive steps in Nigeria towards domestic containment by 
imposing restrictions on social gatherings and certain businesses with effect from 
26 March. The restrictions were formalised on 27 March in the Lagos State 
Infectious Diseases (Emergency Prevention) Regulation 2020, the essence of 
which is that it gives the state governor reactive emergency powers to curtail the 
spread of the virus. The Ekiti state government made a similar regulation.
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With these states having got the ball rolling, the federal government awoke 
from its slumber and began taking charge. In a televised address on 29 March, 
President Buhari ordered a two-week lockdown of the FCT and the two states 
with the highest case numbers, responses that were formalised in a regulation of 
30 March (Covid-19 Regulation No. 1); the latter was subsequently extended 
on April 14 (Covid-19 Regulation No. 2). After this intervention by the fed-
eral government, all the other states, excepting Kogi and Cross River, imposed 
restrictions of one form or another between March and May.
In a further address on 27 April 2020, the President announced that from 
2 May there would be a ‘phased and gradual’ easing of lockdown measures in 
the states with federally decreed lockdowns in place. The other states with state- 
imposed restrictions followed suit and started to ease their lockdown measures.
19.4.2 Federal government action
As mentioned, the federal government’s first formal step was to issue Covid-19 
regulations pursuant to the powers of the President under the Quarantine Act of 
1926 (sections 2–4). The first regulation, which was for an initial 14-day period, 
declared Covid-19 ‘a dangerous infectious disease’ and outlined measures for 
curtailing the effects of the coronavirus. They included the suspension of air 
travel and restriction of movement in Lagos, Ogun, and the FCT. At the expi-
ration of the term of the regulation, another regulation was made for a 14-day 
extension (Covid-19 Regulation No. 2 of 2020).
In the course of making these regulations, the President was criticised for 
intruding in state government with the unilateral declaration of lockdowns in 
Lagos and Ogun, and, later, Kano. This was said to be unlawful since no state 
of emergency was in place in terms of the Constitution and the President never 
provided any clear legal justification when the order was made in his national 
address – it was only on the day thereafter that the Quarantine Act was invoked 
to justify his actions. This issue thus touches on the larger conflict between the 
Quarantine Act, which is still an effective law, and the Constitution.
The army was deployed to provide support in enforcing lockdown orders, 
especially at the country’s borders, but it played a broader role than this. 
According to an army memo, the army was to forcibly transfer the sick to hos-
pitals and enforce lockdown orders by the President and state governors (TRT 
World 2020). It also leased equipment to the government for possible mass buri-
als and deployed medical personnel (Punch Healthwise 2020a).
Socio-economic measures were adopted too, especially for the most vulner-
able in society. The Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management, 
and Social Development pledged to distribute food to vulnerable households. 
Furthermore, in terms of a conditional cash payments initiative launched in April 
2020, NGN 20,000 would be paid to families in the National Social Register of 
Poor and Vulnerable Households, established in 2016 to combat extreme poverty. 
As of October, the Social Register contained 4.6 million poor and vulnerable 
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households – arguably insignificant in a country where an estimated 83 mil-
lion people, or 40 per cent of the population, live below the poverty line (NBS 
2018). With regard to micro, small, and medium enterprises, the Central Bank 
of Nigeria announced that NGN 50 billion in credit facilities was being made 
available to support them (CBN 2020).
What is striking about these socio-economic measures is that they were all 
managed by the federal government and its agencies and that none were suffi-
cient for meeting the needs of Nigeria’s teeming population.
Towards the end of April, the pandemic seemed under control and the federal 
government began a phased reopening of the country under the direction of 
the PTF and NCDC. Curfews were relaxed and centres of worship reopened, 
albeit that the latter were still subject to hygiene and social distancing protocols. 
Airspace was opened to domestic travel on 5 July and international travel on 
5 September, with international travellers having to use only two of Nigeria’s 
international airports (Lagos and Abuja). Students in exit classes resumed school 
on 17 August, while those in other levels were to resume in October.
Since the exigencies of the pandemic called for swift action, executive rule 
held sway. The President took unilateral decisions without recourse to the leg-
islature, as emergency powers under the Quarantine Act enable him to make 
regulations and orders without legislative intervention. The National Assembly 
played only three notable roles during this time. First, it ‘advised’ the federal 
government to urgently set aside a special intervention fund to curtail the spread 
of Covid-19. Secondly, the Senate Committee on Health and Private Healthcare 
and Communicable Diseases was to continue to engage with the Federal Ministry 
of Health and the PTF while the legislature was in recess due to the pandemic 
(Nwachukwu 2020). Thirdly, the House of Representatives (the lower legislative 
house) passed the Emergency Economic Stimulus Bill 2020 to provide economic 
relief to businesses and individuals (BKLC 2020).
Neither the legislature nor the judiciary served any substantial accountability 
function during this period. There were no cases before the courts on constitu-
tional challenges relating to the federal system; as for the legislature, paradoxi-
cally, it sought to give the executive greater powers. It wished, in particular, to 
hurry into law the Infectious Diseases Bill of 2020, which gives the President, 
Minister of Health and Director-General of the NCDC extensive powers in 
managing infectious diseases (Abdulrauf 2020a). Controversy around the bill led 
to a court action – Sen. Dino Melaye v. The Clerk of the National Assembly of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and 4 Others – seeking its provisions declared authori-
tarian, undemocratic, and unconstitutional. In view of an outcry against the bill 
from state governments, civil society, and others, it was provisionally withdrawn.
The federal government’s pandemic response was informed by the decisions 
and guidance of international organisations. First, it was guided by the Africa 
Joint Continental Strategy for Covid-19 Outbreak, which was jointly established 
by the African Union and Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
(African Union and Africa CDC 2020). The Director-General of the NCDC was 
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co-chair of one of the working groups of the Africa Task Force for Coronavirus 
(AFTCOR), which is the coordinating body of the strategy. Secondly, Nigeria 
adhered to WHO guidelines on Covid-19. The WHO country representative 
in Nigeria was an active member of the PTF, which, as mentioned, is the coor-
dinating structure in place for the management of Covid-19 in Nigeria. For 
its part, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) merely 
issued statements and provided updates with which the Nigerian response was 
already in alignment.
19.4.3 State government action
Given that the federal government monopolised the pandemic response, states 
had to align themselves with its strategy and directives. This was illustrated by its 
National Covid-19 Pandemic Multi-Sectoral Response Plan, in terms of which 
federal agencies were dominant and state agencies assigned only a subsidiary 
role. The Response Plan ‘directed’ states to establish a Covid-19 Taskforce to 
be chaired by their governors or the latter’s designates and to establish a State 
Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) along the same lines as the federal NCDC’s 
EOC (FG 2020: 20 and 21).
In view of their constitutional competence in health, state governments, with 
varying degrees of effort, upgraded their health-care facilities and set up isolation 
centres. With the support of the NCDC, state governments established greater 
numbers of molecular laboratories in order to scale up virus testing. Lagos State, 
the epicentre of the pandemic, erected the largest number of isolation centres in 
the country, an effort that included converting the state sports stadium into an 
isolation centre.
Within their constitutional spaces, state governors, as chief security officers, 
put in place and enforced lockdown orders. The latter was tricky in that the only 
police force is the federal police (Okeke 2020: 5) and, as such, state executives do 
not have direct control of the police without recourse to the federal government 
(Elaigwu 2005). Nevertheless, they found the means to work around this con-
stitutional complexity. In the case of states controlled by the ruling party, they 
tried to ensure a harmonious working relationship with the police; as for states 
controlled by opposition parties, some established special taskforces to monitor 
their borders and thereby avoid alleged ‘sabotage’ by the federal police.
Despite the dominance of the federal government, various state governments 
still found the space in which to assert their autonomy. For example, when the 
federal government imposed a lockdown in the FCT and states of Lagos and 
Ogun commencing on 30 March 2020, the governor of Ogun postponed the 
start of the lockdown by five days to allow residents time to stock up on food and 
other necessities (Onwubiko 2020). Similarly, the Kano state government eased 
the centrally imposed lockdown even before its expiration date ‘to enable people 
to move out and make some purchases’ in preparation for the Muslim Ramadan 
fast (Mbah 2020).
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Generally, however, states willingly complied with the federal government, 
especially those controlled by the ruling party. Their pandemic responses were, 
accordingly, crafted along the lines of the federal government’s Covid-19 reg-
ulations of March and April 2020 and in adherence to the PTF. In expressing 
support for the federal government’s supremacy, the governor of Lagos State 
mentioned on two occasions that, in regard to the curfew, only the President 
who declared the curfew can decide on it otherwise. Similarly, when the fed-
eral government relaxed restrictions on inter-state travel, the governor of Cross 
River State said the state had surrendered its sovereignty and duly opened its 
boundaries as per the federal order (Punch Healthwise 2020b).
Since the states generally aligned their responses with the federal government, 
few of them felt compelled to devise innovative means to deal with the virus 
within their constitutionally permitted spaces (Okeke 2020: 6). However, the 
Lagos state government was creative in regard to contact tracing and adopted a 
relatively effective house-to-house testing initiative; it also set up testing cen-
tres in all LGAs and supported this initiative with an intensive publicity cam-
paign (Ihonvbere 2020). Similarly, the Lagos state legislature went above and 
beyond other state legislatures by enacting, on 26 March 2020, the Emergency 
Coronavirus Pandemic Law of 2020, which recommended penalties for default-
ers of lockdown regulations and empowered the governor to declare an emer-
gency for up to three months; the governor was also required to consult the 
legislature before issuing any regulations.
State governments undertook numerous initiatives to ameliorate the social 
and economic effects of pandemic control. For example, they gradually reversed 
lockdowns imposed by either themselves or the federal government. Because 
states had differing ideas about easing, there was no unified approach, albeit 
that they generally toed the federal line. Some were consequently quick to ease 
lockdowns, others, slower. The Oyo state government (controlled by the oppo-
sition PDP) began easing its lockdown in April even when infections were on 
the increase – the governor argued that ‘the economic health of the state is 
more important than public health’ and that this was in residents’ best interests 
(Feyisipo 2020). Lagos State also began to ease lockdown regulations so as to 
mitigate economic hardships.
Another common initiative was to provide material relief to vulnerable 
groups. Lagos State, at the start of the lockdown, announced several poverty- 
alleviation packages (Shaban 2020). In one of these, it budgeted for 200,000 
households – amounting to 1.2 million residents – to receive food rations. In 
another, it provided unconditional cash transfers to about 250,000 economically 
challenged persons listed with the Lagos State Residents Registration Agency 
(LASRRA); further initiatives included a school-feeding programme aimed at 
feeding more than 37,000 households in which school pupils were living. Other 
states, such as Kano, had similar initiatives in place (Murtala 2020).
Such efforts were supported by private donations to state governments and by 
the Coalition against Covid-19 (CACOVID), a private sector partnership with 
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the federal government. Yet as laudable as they were, it was – to echo similar 
remarks in the discussion above of federal government action – scarcely conceiv-
able that they could make any significant impact given the size of state popula-
tions. There were claims, too, that poverty-alleviation measures were deployed 
for political and/or corrupt purposes. For instance, in protests in April 2020 in 
Lagos and the FCT, the contention was that politicians were corruptly diverting 
relief-measure resources to their party loyalists or into their own pockets (Okon 
2020).
There were indeed instances too where states obstructed the implementa-
tion of necessary preventative measures. A notorious example is provided by the 
Kogi state government, which denied the existence of Covid-19 when its gov-
ernor declared that ‘[n]inety percent of the noise about Covid-19 is for political, 
economic, financial [or] material gain. The other 10% [is about] ordinary flu, 
like the common colds Nigerians generally suffer’ (Offiong 2020). The governor 
went on to refuse to allow testing in the state, threatening to quarantine the 
PTF delegation sent to Kogi to provide technical support. When two cases were 
reported, he dismissed them as ‘false allocations’, all the while rejecting federal 
intervention; finally, when he had to put in place a state Covid-19 taskforce, he 
refused to fund it.
Kogi’s case was all the more controversial because the state is located in the 
North-Central region and sits between states with a high number of infections. 
In a similar episode of state-level obstructionism, the Cross River state governor 
questioned the need for social distancing and cast doubt on scientific evidence 
regarding the coronavirus (Offiong 2020).
As at the federal level, the exigencies of the pandemic and need for speed 
meant that state-level accountability structures were relegated to the sidelines. 
State executives, like their federal counterpart, unilaterally took decisions where 
circumstances required. Although state legislative houses were closed in the early 
stages of the lockdown, they all reopened during its easing. Even so, they mostly 
played an insignificant role and rubber-stamped the actions of governors. Only 
in Lagos State was the legislature proactive in monitoring executive action.
It is worth noting, though, that even before the pandemic, state legislatures 
had long been under the thumb of too-powerful governors. Nor were the courts 
particularly useful either as accountability mechanisms: there were no cases chal-
lenging state government actions. While all state courts were closed for two 
weeks from 24 March 2020 – and thereafter indefinitely by the Chief Justice 
of the Federation, raising another concern for Nigeria’s federalism – they were 
subsequently reopened.
The overall response among states was mixed. While most of them willingly 
followed the federal government, a few attempted to assert their autonomy – 
some for no good cause. State responses were also indirectly influenced by party- 
political dynamics, but, all in all, it was the federal government that called the 
tune and directed state responses.
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19.4.4 Local government action
Local governments were not left out in the fight against Covid-19. In terms of 
the Constitution, LGAs are expected to participate in state matters concerning 
health services. However, they were not properly harnessed for this purpose, 
partly because LGA-maintained health care and basic education facilities are the 
worst in the country and notoriously corrupt (see Isa 2016).
Only in two areas were LGAs commonly used. First, they assisted states in 
the distribution of material support (mostly food packages), though not without 
criticism – Ihonvbere (2020) maintains that ‘[LGA] chairmen … politicized the 
distribution by only favouring their political party members’. Secondly, LGAs 
were deployed to support state governments in conducting public education and 
awareness-raising campaigns in rural areas.
In Lagos State, LGAs participated more actively and widely in the state gov-
ernment response. They formed part of the state Covid-19 taskforce and were 
involved in sample-collection surveillance at grass-roots level, but even in this 
case, it is apparent that their role was merely a supporting one. The fact that 18 
LGAs (out of 774) accounted for more than 60 per cent of confirmed cases in 
Nigeria at the time of this writing indicates that LGAs needed to be engaged 
substantively in the management of the pandemic.
As matters stood, they were generally underutilised by federal and state gov-
ernment alike. This led to occasions in which the federal government gave policy 
directions to LGAs directly – for example, the PTF threatened to impose a total 
lockdown on LGAs with high increases in confirmed cases. The implication 
is that the federal government was willing to bypass state governments, which 
are the entities constitutionally mandated to play a supervisory role over LGAs 
(Constitution, section 7(1)).
State governments generally have not allowed LGAs to flourish, a tendency 
motivated by the desire to reduce the costs associated with running LGAs. It is 
thus surprising that whereas the organised voice of this sector – the Association 
of Local Government of Nigeria (ALGON) – usually fights for the autonomy 
of LGAs, it was conspicuously silent when it came to Covid-19. Its Delta State 
branch appeared to be the only one seeking to ensure that the state’s LGA chair-
persons were united in enforcing social distancing in public schools (Igbekoyi 
2020).
19.4.5 Intergovernmental relations
A distinctive feature of federalism in Nigeria is that there is no active structure 
for intergovernmental relations (IGR) on high-level policy matters (Osaghae 
2015). The two constitutionally created IGR forums – the Council of State and 
the National Economic Council (NEC) – perform only advisory functions. The 
Council of State mainly advises the President on issues such as appointments and 
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the prerogative of mercy, while the NEC, as its name indicates, advises on eco-
nomic matters (Constitution, Third Schedule, Part I).
In terms of their composition, the NEC comprises the Vice President (VP), 
governors of all the states, and the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria; 
the Council of State has a broader membership, including the President, all for-
mer presidents, and all governors. Neither forum has representation from LGAs 
(Ikeanyibe et al. 2019: 1044). The NEC meets monthly to review the nation’s 
economic planning efforts; however, it was only in its meeting in May 2020 
that Covid-19 was at the top of the agenda. On that occasion, the NEC set up a 
committee to advise on the reopening of the Nigerian economy, with its mem-
bers consisting of a selection of governors and federal ministers. Its advisory role 
aside, the NEC has had to defer to the PTF when it comes to issues relating to 
linkages between Covid-19 and economic planning – a consideration that has 
not made it particularly useful as an IGR platform.
The implication of the foregoing is that the most authoritative body engaged 
in coordinating multilevel government response to the pandemic is the PTF. The 
PTF drew its membership from several ministries and parastatals. One of its key 
objectives is to ‘[p]rovide a coordinated and effective national and sub-national 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic’, thereby fostering relations between the 
various levels of government (FG 2020: 6). Apart from its coordinating function, 
the PTF was also to report directly to the President and give a daily press briefing 
to members of the public. As crucial as the task of the PTF appears, the extent to 
which it was able to achieve effective IGR remains questionable for two reasons: 
state governments (or their taskforces) were not represented on it, and state gov-
ernments were used only as implementers of federal policies.
The relationship between federal and state government in pandemic man-
agement was, overall, a lopsided one. Since the federal government, with the 
support of the Quarantine Act and Disaster Management Act, exercised over-
whelming powers over states, most of them had no option but to quietly fall in 
line; the powers the federal government wields over public finance are a further 
instrument for subjugating state governments. So, while it is difficult to assess 
the relationship between the levels governments, it is probably safe to say that 
what existed before the pandemic was not improved by it and may well have 
deteriorated.
The coldness of this relationship is worse where the units of government 
belong to different political parties – in such case, conflicts abound. Two exam-
ples suffice. The first is the case of the governor of Oyo State, an opposition-held 
state, who, contrary to the PTF’s stipulations and the advice of the medical com-
munity, organised a political rally on 19 March to spite the federal government 
and the ruling party (Babatunde 2020).
The second is the conflict between the federal government and the Rivers 
state government. The latter had imposed a state-wide curfew to curb the 
spread of the virus; meanwhile, the Federal Minister of Aviation authorised 
some helicopters to operate in the state, helicopters which violated the curfew. 
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The government of Rivers State, an opposition-held state, instructed the police 
to arrest the passengers and crew for violating the state-imposed curfew. In 
response, the head of the federal police force removed the state’s commissioner of 
police for enforcing a state law (by arresting crew and passengers) against federal 
orders (Chukwu 2020).
States also cooperated with each other to carry out joint efforts, especially 
in matters such as border control. For example, in a statement after its monthly 
meeting of April 2020, the Nigeria Governors’ Forum (NGF), an association 
of all 36 state governors, said, ‘Governors unanimously agreed to the imple-
mentation of [a two-week] interstate lockdown … to mitigate the spread of the 
virus from state to state’ (Reuters 2020). They also agreed to set up Covid-19 
regional committees comprising state commissioners of health and aimed at fos-
tering a coordinated pandemic response. Significantly, the governors called for 
the ‘decentralization of the Covid-19 response as the best chance of nipping the 
spread of the virus’ (Olaniyi 2020).
What is also notable, though, is that various of the NGF’s decisions appear so 
closely aligned with the imperatives of the federal government and PTF that they 
verge on the redundant and seem like mere affirmations purporting to suggest 
the NGF thought of them first. Still, some state governors jointly rejected certain 
federal measures. For example, the Northern States Governors’ Forum came 
together to reject federal lockdown measures due to their economic impact, 
holding that each state should adopt an approach suitable to its setting (Abraham 
2020).
Initially, the NGF was united as an IGR platform. State governors were uni-
fied in interacting with the federal government and among themselves, thereby 
fostering vertical and horizontal cooperation, respectively. However, once the 
federal government started allocating funds through its special intervention 
regime to support states’ responses, there seems have been a rift. This was due 
to the perception that some states, notably Lagos, were treated more favourably 
than others in being awarded a larger share of funding; the federal government 
argued that Lagos had invested heavily in pandemic response and warranted it 
(see below).
19.4.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Managing Covid-19 was an overwhelming fiscal venture in a country where 
the pandemic’s impacts on the economy and public finances placed severe strain 
both on the federal government and on an already complicated fiscal framework.
Public finance is governed by the Constitution, which stipulates that all reve-
nue raised by the nation is held in a federation account and shared via a formula 
approved by the National Assembly (Constitution, section 162). In 2020, the 
sharing formula was (in percentages) 53:27:20 for the federal government, state 
governments, and LGAs, respectively. However, the pandemic intensified inter-
state competition for the federation’s overstretched resources.
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As a result of Nigeria’s heavy reliance on oil revenue and the absence of fiscal 
autonomy for the regions, state governments generally rely solely on their allo-
cation of 27 per cent – only Lagos, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom states can sustain 
themselves without federal transfers. In view of the huge infrastructural deficit 
in their health and related sectors, states had to increase spending in order to 
cope with Covid-19 – at the same time at which the pandemic’s impact on the 
economy led to a significant downturn in federal transfers. The result is that most 
states were sliding into bankruptcy, with a collective debt of more than USD 
23.6 billion (DMO 2020).
The further result is that, in terms of Nigeria’s fiscal federalism, the federal 
government had to attempt to bail out states. States turned to the federal govern-
ment, which itself had to resort to taking out further loans to meet the demand – 
among other things, it sought, and on 28 April 2020 obtained, approval of an 
emergency International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan of USD 3.4 billion to pro-
vide support for states (Transparency International 2020).
The federal government augmented states’ financial allocation by way of a 
Stabilisation Fund of USD 150 million and granted a moratorium on states’ 
debts. Other major support was in the form of a Covid-19 Intervention Fund 
based on an amendment of the 2020 budget to include a fiscal stimulus of NGN 
500 billion (USD 3 billion) (Ejiogu et al. 2020). Funds were allocated to states 
based on the extent to which they were affected by the pandemic and the amount 
they had spent on critical infrastructure. By and large, it appeared that there was 
no specific formula for disbursement, but it was the case that Lagos State, the 
hardest hit, received the lion’s share.
As mentioned, this complicated IGR between federal and state governments, 
particularly given that the federal government denied Kano State’s request for 
NGN 15 billion, saying it ‘needs to be convinced by what it sees on the ground 
in the state to know how and what to support’ (Bello 2020). Conversely, it said 
it had allocated NGN 10 billion to Lagos State ‘only because it was satisfied that 
the government of Lagos started on the right footing, rolling out proper plans 
and mobilizing its fund to fight the pandemic’ (ibid).
Apart from special intervention funds, the most notable source of finance for the 
various levels of government was CACOVID. This, as also previously noted, is a 
private-sector taskforce that partnered with the federal government, NCDC, and 
WHO to mobilise resources across industries and avail funding as well as techni-
cal and operational support – among other things, CACOVID provided medical 
facilities that included testing, isolation and treatment centres, intensive care units, 
and molecular testing laboratories. By the end of May 2020, it had raised more than 
NGN 28 billion of a target of NGN 120 billion. Under this initiative, the federal 
government was responsible for the distribution of monies to state governments – 
indeed, the partnership was led by the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria and 
the funds were placed in a special account with the same bank.
Managing such large amounts of money will always arouse suspicion, especially 
in a country with pervasive corruption (Abdulrauf 2020b: 215). Consequently, 
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two significant efforts were made to guarantee accountability in regard to the 
sums raised by CACOVID and other federal government interventions. First, the 
Finance Minister stated that to enhance transparency, the donations would be 
spent only after appropriation through a supplementary budget of the National 
Assembly (Moshood 2020). Secondly, the Independent Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) – one of Nigeria’s anti-corruption 
agencies – noted that it was monitoring the management of these funds and had 
commenced auditing the state governments, agencies, and personnel that spent 
the funds (Moshood 2020).
Nevertheless, various state governments still made strong allegations of fed-
eral government’s corruption and discrimination (in favour of the North) in the 
distribution of these funds.
19.5 Findings and policy implications
The Covid-19 pandemic has presented an opportunity for a holistic assessment 
of Nigeria’s federal governance system, and in this regard arrived with perverse 
good timing at the height of clamour in the country for restructuring and quest-
ing after true federalism. Originally, federalism in Nigeria served the useful pur-
pose of holding together diverse regions and ethnic groups, but recent events 
show that there are deeper issues which federalism should address yet which still 
hang in the balance. Indeed, the nature, structure, and design of Nigeria’s fed-
eralism itself is a cause for concern. As Babalola (2019: 157) aptly remarks, ‘the 
political framework established to “cure” the country’s ills have become part of 
the illness’.
The handling of the pandemic has exposed the fault lines of Nigeria’s feder-
alism. It has shown that true federalism in Nigeria exists only in theory and that 
it is consequently not off the mark to refer to the current arrangement as ‘façade 
federalism’. This term has been used by Wright (1982) to suggest the diminish-
ing status and role of state and local government in a federal system. The more 
specific findings of the present study are enumerated below.
First, the federal government usurped state governments’ health-care powers 
and exercised overwhelming control in the management of the pandemic. It 
used several policies and fiscal strategies to further denude state governments of 
autonomy.
Secondly, in most cases, state governments did not oppose this and rarely 
made creative use of their constitutional space: they were comfortable with the 
master-servant relationship. Those few states that tried to differ from the federal 
government did not do so to assert their autonomy in the best interests of com-
bating the pandemic but rather for other reasons such as party-political affiliation.
Thirdly, within the narrow sphere of their operations, state governments 
further subjugated LGAs even though the Constitution grants the latter a sup-
porting role in health matters. LGAs therefore played an insignificant role in 
responding to the pandemic.
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Fourthly, the current fiscal framework in which state governments are heavily 
dependent on federal allocations has been further cause for states to maintain an 
inferior position in the federal arrangement.
Fifthly, in the absence of any formal IGR structure, no new IGR structure 
or practice emerged to help effectively coordinate the multilevel government 
responses. The Council of State and NEC did not have the formal constitutional 
powers to take on this role but existed merely as advisory bodies. The PTF that 
was established to coordinate multilevel responses did not function effectively 
as an IGR platform – it simply issued policy directions, indirectly through the 
President and directly to states without engaging with state governments.
Lastly, there was no federal spirit even in the National Assembly, where leg-
islators sought to ensure continued centralisation of powers with the attempted 
enactment of the Infectious Diseases Act of 2020, which grants the federal exec-
utive overwhelming powers over states.
These findings have long-term implications for Nigeria’s federalism. Two 
closing observations may be made in this respect. First, there were no strong 
voices or movements for greater autonomy and independence between the levels 
of government. All the previous calls for reforming the federal system fell still 
in this period, with few stakeholders recognising the potential long-term impact 
of highly centralised pandemic governance on Nigerian federalism at large. 
Secondly, and consequently, Nigeria moved ever-faster towards ever-greater 
centralisation, with the spirit of federalism all the while rapidly declining.
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GRAPPLING WITH THE PANDEMIC




The purpose of this chapter is to examine the theory and practice of intergov-
ernmental relations in the light of the experiences of federations in dealing with 
Covid-19. To this end, this chapter draws on the information provided by 18 
country case studies in this book, together with a study of the European Union. 
All cases have federal or quasi-federal systems of government. Otherwise, how-
ever, they are diverse in a wide variety of ways that include geographic and 
population size and configuration, economic development, political system, and 
the framework for federalism itself. Factors of these kinds influenced the ways in 
which each of these federations has responded to the pandemic, including, rele-
vantly for this chapter, the role of intergovernmental relations.
All the case studies were finalised towards the end of 2020, with the result 
that neither they nor this chapter take account of subsequent developments in 
intergovernmental relations as the pandemic continued to play out. As they 
stand, the cases are a rich resource yielding new knowledge and understanding 
of intergovernmental relations in federal systems in a context in which govern-
mental systems have been placed under extreme and unusual stress. The time 
limitation is relevant, nevertheless. As these chapters show, intergovernmental 
relations changed within federations in the course of 2020 in tandem with suc-
cessive ‘waves’ of the pandemic and policy responses to it. That evolution can be 
expected to have continued into 2021, when governments were still struggling 
to manage the pandemic and vaccines began to be rolled out.
The challenges presented by the spread of the Covid-19 across the world were 
a test of federal systems generally and intergovernmental relations in particular. 
The pandemic created two types of crises, one with serious implications for 
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public health and the other affecting national and subnational economies. 
These two sets of issues were typically seen as in competition with each 
other, albeit on the understanding that if the health crisis were managed 
quickly and effectively, they could be reconciled. How the tension between 
the two played out in any federation depended on a mixture of ideological 
preferences, the federal division of powers, and the realities on the ground. 
In every case, however, these complex, interlinked crises, affecting the lives 
of communities in so many respects, required an exercise of authority by all 
levels of government. Each level of government had a role of some kind to 
play, even where formal emergency powers were invoked. Failure was all too 
obvious, placing a premium on capability and performance. More often than 
not, an effective response required coordination across jurisdictional lines, 
both horizontal and vertical, in ways that also preserved the potential for 
localised divergence.
In the analysis that follows, intergovernmental relations are understood 
broadly as covering all instances in which governments in a federal systems work 
together across jurisdictional boundaries in the common interest. The term thus 
refers to activity that, strictly speaking, might be described as intragovernmental 
inasmuch as an institution of one level of government is constituted to incorpo-
rate representatives of another: the German Bundesrat, comprising representatives 
of Land governments, is an example. The term also includes relations between 
governments that, from the standpoint of the formal constitutional scheme, are 
constitutionally or legally mandated, as well as those in which joint action is vol-
untary. In addition, it includes situations in which joint action is top-down and 
in effect coercive rather than ‘cooperative’, to invoke another term often used in 
this context.
A broad and inclusive understanding of the subject is necessitated by the vari-
ety of approaches to intergovernmental relations in this range of federal-type 
systems, approaches which are manifested not only in the practices that are 
adopted but in the ways in which intergovernmental relations are conceived 
and described. A narrower approach would risk a partial understanding of how 
governments interacted with each other in responding to Covid-19. Conversely, 
it may be, as I will argue, that analysis of the range of responses to Covid-19 
enables a more nuanced, critical appraisal of intergovernmental relations which 
identifies practices that are more productive than others without necessarily 
excluding any from the field.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. To aid comparison, the next 
section identifies and explains aspects of each federal-type system that have a 
bearing on intergovernmental relations. section 3 considers the purposes for 
which intergovernmental relations were used by different federal-type systems 
in responding to the pandemic, while section 4 examines the modalities through 
which intergovernmental relations took place. The final section highlights the 
most significant insights gleaned from the experience of Covid-19 and serves to 
inform future research in the field.
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20.2 Contexts
The contexts in which federal-type systems operate differ in many ways that are 
relevant to an assessment of intergovernmental relations in response to Covid-19. 
This section draws attention to four of the most significant forms of differentia-
tion: geophysical characteristics, economic development, the form and operation 
of government, and the multifaceted framework for federalism itself. Each of 
these aspects of context is significant in its own right; they also combine in dif-
ferent ways in different federations to create distinctive settings that need to be 
understood before general conclusions are drawn.
For present purposes, geophysical characteristics include the geographical size 
of a country, its distribution into federated units, patterns of population settle-
ment, particularly around internal borders, and global location. The range can 
be grasped by comparing, for example, Switzerland and Austria with Canada and 
Australia. The former both have a relatively small land mass, divided into 26 can-
tons (Switzerland) and nine Länder (Austria). They have a population density of 
219 and 109 persons per kilometre, respectively, and external land borders shared 
with other densely populated countries on all sides. Both Canada and Australia, 
by contrast, have a large land mass divided into 13 provinces and territories 
(Canada) and eight states and territories (Australia) and a population density of 
4 and 3 persons per km2, respectively. They are located far from the huge, inter-
connected Eurasian continent.
In geographically smaller federations like these, conditions relevant to man-
aging the pandemic are less likely to vary significantly between units, while 
internal borders are likely to be porous, strengthening the case for harmonisa-
tion of policy settings and for cross-border cooperation. In geographically larger 
federations, however, the rate of infection and other conditions pertinent to the 
pandemic are more likely to vary between units, suggesting that intergovern-
mental arrangements should leave greater room for policy divergence around the 
country and increasing the importance of gathering information from localised 
sources. It may also be noted in passing that a larger number of units creates 
a different dynamic for multilateral intergovernmental relations than a smaller 
one, and may also have a bearing on the size and capabilities of individual units.
A second aspect of context is economic development. Less affluent countries 
have fewer options at their disposal to respond to the pandemic. Health sys-
tems are likely to be weaker and more readily overrun; resources are less likely 
to be available to support the isolation of those exposed to infection; supplies, 
including vaccines, may be hard and slow to obtain. These realities channel the 
policy choices available to governments individually or collectively. It may also 
be that, in circumstances of slow or recent economic development, all levels of 
government but, in particular, subnational levels, lack the capacity, in the sense 
of capability, to respond to the challenges of Covid-19 effectively. South Africa is 
a case in point, where the authors identify ‘incapacity, incompetence and corrup-
tion’ on the part of provinces and municipalities; problems that certainly also are 
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experienced in federations elsewhere. The likelihood that the centre will dom-
inate the Covid-19 response may be heightened in such cases by the federation’s 
design, which typically concentrates power at the centre and provides authority 
for central intervention in unit affairs when major problems arise.
Thirdly, the form of government influences intergovernmental relations in 
ways that were relevant to responses to the pandemic. Most obviously, the dis-
tinction between parliamentary and presidential systems affected some modal-
ities of intergovernmental relations in relation to Covid-19. Governments in 
parliamentary systems are more likely than those in presidential systems to use 
formal meetings of heads of government for the purposes of vertical coordina-
tion, if only because agreement between governments can lead easily enough 
to legislative action. Most of the parliamentary federations covered by the case 
studies used meetings of some kind between heads of government of the federa-
tion and federated units to coordinate aspects of their responses to the pandemic, 
although the frequency and significance of these meetings varied. By contrast, 
none of the six presidential systems (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, Russia, 
United States (US)) recorded systematic vertical meetings between heads of gov-
ernment, although horizontal meetings between the governments of some or all 
units were common and informal, often bilateral, contacts between the president 
and governors sometimes took place.
More authoritarian styles of government also affected intergovernmental rela-
tions during the pandemic, doing so in the adoption of approaches that were 
top-down, less likely to be consultative, and more likely to mandate action of 
specified kinds by the federated units. Russia is an example where, neverthe-
less, the sheer size of the country ultimately required some local diversity as it 
responded to the pandemic. A tendency towards top-down central action also 
was present in other federations in which a single party is dominant across all 
levels of government. The syndrome is evident across both presidential and par-
liamentary systems, as the examples of Argentina, Mexico, Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
and South Africa show, although it manifests somewhat differently in each case.
The cases show that the distribution and strength of party-political allegiances 
affected the intergovernmental response to the pandemic in other ways as well. 
Generally speaking, parties broadly on the right were inclined to prioritise the 
economy and eschew restrictions on individual movement for infection control, 
while those broadly on the left were more likely to prioritise public health. The 
mix of parties in office in the various jurisdictions, combined with the distribu-
tion of federal powers and responsibilities, thus helped to shape the outcomes of 
intergovernmental negotiations.
For example, in Australia, operating through a newly established ‘National 
Cabinet’, the particular admixture of interests and power had the effect of soften-
ing extreme positions, leading to intergovernmental US, deep compromises that 
proved effective in minimising transmission. By contrast, in the ideological dif-
ferences, both horizontal and vertical, served to deter effective intergovernmen-
tal arrangements altogether. Predictably, too, across a range of federations party 
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allegiances variously resulted in favouritism towards particular units, notwith-
standing formal intergovernmental arrangements; encouraged alliances between 
some units to the exclusion of others; and offered an alternative avenue to inter-
governmental relations. Equally, however, the significance of party affiliation 
should not be overstated. The exigencies of responding to the pandemic were 
experienced by all jurisdictions in all federations and were capable of creating 
common cause across party lines, at least until the worst of the crisis had passed.
The federal distribution of powers or competences is another contextual 
factor that affected the form and operation of intergovernmental relations. It 
has at least three dimensions that are relevant for present purposes: the contrast 
between dual and integrated federations, the categorisation of legislative powers, 
and the distribution of the powers and competences on which responses to the 
pandemic drew.
The categories of dual and integrated federations refer, respectively, to fed-
erations in which each jurisdiction administers its own legislation and those in 
which subnational governments can, or must, implement some central legislation. 
During the pandemic, intergovernmental relations in federations with features 
of integration often took the form of policy-making through central legislation 
that was implemented by other levels of government – an option which typically 
is not available to federations with a dualist design. The US is an example of a 
country in which integration is precluded, or at least restricted by a decision of 
the Supreme Court invalidating the ‘commandeering’ of State officials by federal 
law (Printz v. United States (1997) 521 US 898 (1997)). Australia may be another.
However, there also are variations within each of these two models that affected 
intergovernmental relations. Some integrated federations, including Germany, have 
formal procedures for consultation with federated units about the laws they are to 
implement. Others, of which Germany also is an example, allow substantial dis-
cretionary scope to federated units in the course of implementation. Some dualist 
federations, of which Canada is an example, do not constitutionally preclude imple-
mentation of central law by the federated units, or vice versa, if agreed between 
jurisdictions, although the device was not used in responding to the pandemic.
A second dimension of the federal division of powers that contributes to 
contextual differences that could affect intergovernmental relations is the cat-
egorisation of allocated powers. One familiar point of distinction lies between 
concurrent and exclusive powers; less familiar are differences in the understand-
ing of concurrency in different systems, differences that can also come into play 
in intergovernmental relations (Saunders and Dziedzic 2017). As a generalisation, 
there is a dividing line between federations in which concurrency is understood 
as involving joint action of some kind and those in which it merely involves iden-
tifying legislative powers which are potentially available for exercise by either 
level of government, subject to a rule about which law prevails if both seek 
to exercise the power. This difference in understanding may be attributable in 
part to the role played by concurrent power in the overall allocation of power. 
In some federations, of which Australia is an example, concurrency is used to 
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categorise in a single list most of the powers available to the central legislature, 
without there necessarily being any implication of joint action. In other federa-
tions, including, for example, India and South Africa, concurrent power comple-
ments two other lists of exclusive powers by identifying powers that are shared.
Whatever the explanation, different understandings of concurrency emerge 
from comparative analysis of intergovernmental relations in federations dur-
ing the pandemic. In some cases, of which Mexico, South Africa, and Italy are 
examples, concurrent power enabled the centre to provide a legal framework, 
of varying degrees of detail, within which federated units supplemented and 
administered the central legislation. In other cases, of which Australia is an 
example, both levels of government enacted and administered their own legis-
lation by relying on aspects of the same concurrent power and taking legislative 
precautions against invalidation for unintended inconsistency.1
In many cases, this familiar format for the structure of the federal division 
of power was modified or embellished, sometimes in distinctive ways. So, for 
example, Mexico distinguishes ‘coordination’ from concurrency;2 Argentina 
distinguishes ‘shared’ from concurrent power, describing the former as requiring 
‘ joint decisions’; Brazil provides separately for ‘concurrent’ legislative powers and 
administrative powers that are held ‘in common’ (Brazil, Constitution, articles 
23 and 24); Italy subjects ‘shared’ powers to principles prescribed in national 
legislation; and Austria specifically provides for the enactment of ‘framework’ 
legislation by the Bund, leaving ‘more detailed implementation’ to Land legisla-
tion (Austria, Constitution, article 15(6)). Some federations, including Belgium, 
rely entirely on exclusive powers and do not use concurrency at all. Notably, 
however, in Canada, where most powers also are characterised as exclusive some, 
of which public health is an example, have in practice become concurrent, in the 
sense of being shared.3 These and other similar features of the framework for the 
federal distribution of powers inevitably shaped the specific form that intergov-
ernmental relations took in the various federations.
The particular distribution of powers also mattered, inevitably. In most fed-
erations, the wide range of powers relevant to responding to the pandemic were 
distributed between two or, in some cases, three levels of government, provid-
ing the stimulus for intergovernmental relations with which this chapter deals. 
The precise formulation and mix of powers affected the dynamics, however. 
Federations in which significant relevant powers were vested in the federated 
units, such as Canada, operated differently to those in which a preponderance 
of power was exercisable by the centre, de jure, as in Austria, or de facto, as in 
Nigeria. In the context of the pandemic, moreover, the distribution of power 
to deal with emergencies was an additional consideration. In some federations, 
power to declare and respond to an emergency is conferred on the centre, directly 
or indirectly, expanding central power vis-à-vis the federated units, as occurred 
in Spain and Switzerland. In other federations, including Canada and the US, 
emergency power is distributed between the levels of government, requiring 
intergovernmental relations of some kind if coordinating action is required.
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A final set of contextual factors involves federal culture rather than the tech-
nical requirements of the federal division of powers. Considerations of this kind 
are more abstract, but no less relevant to intergovernmental relations. Some 
have a foothold in the relevant constitution, where they may play a reflex-
ive role in shaping culture (Frankenberg 2006). Certain federations, including 
Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland, expressly or implicitly prescribe a principle of 
loyalty or good faith which, in the context of the pandemic, had implications 
for cooperation and consultation, even if these played out in different ways. The 
European Union expressly acknowledges a principle of subsidiarity, which can 
affect the design of intergovernmental arrangements, generally and in applica-
tion to the pandemic. The Constitution of South Africa prescribes principles for 
‘cooperative government’, now given legislative shape in the Intergovernmental 
Relations Framework Act of 2005, which require, for example, coordination, 
consultation, mutual support, and good faith, all of which are relevant to the 
conduct of intergovernmental relations. The goals of intergovernmental rela-
tions are likely also to be affected by expectations in some federations about 
the equivalence of social conditions, expectations which have no counterpart 
in others. In Germany, for example, these have a foundation in article 72 of the 
Basic Law.
20.3 Purposes
In many, perhaps most, federations, the initial governmental response to Covid-
19 came from individual constituent units, or even local authorities, when the 
virus began to pose a threat. Typically, the core public health and police powers 
necessary to combat the virus were located in any event at the subnational level. 
Some of these early, localised actions were well targeted and effective, anticipat-
ing strategies that ultimately would be adopted elsewhere. Early steps taken by 
the Indian states, with Kerala the standout example, involved a range of measures 
to prevent and track spread of the virus and illustrate the point.
As the virus spread, and the scale of the crisis became apparent, central gov-
ernments intervened. In some cases, of which India again is an example, the 
intervention was comprehensive and top-down, severely restricting local dis-
cretion; in at least one other, the US, central involvement was limited and spas-
modic to the extent that it existed at all. Most federations operated on a spectrum 
between these two extremes, varying their approach over the course of the year 
in the light of experience. Whatever approach was adopted, however, at what-
ever point in time, intergovernmental relations played a role of some kind once 
both levels of government were engaged.
The value of intergovernmental relations is often assumed, without there 
being a critical examination of the contribution it makes to multilevel govern-
ment. Reliance on intergovernmental relations in federations across the world 
to deal with the complex challenges presented by Covid-19 offers a rare oppor-
tunity for such an examination in a practical context. This section considers the 
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purposes for which intergovernmental relations were used during this period, as 
a means of better understanding their potential and their limits.
A familiar purpose of intergovernmental relations, also on display in the con-
text of Covid-19, is ‘coordination’. Coordination is too general a term for present 
purposes, however. It can be focused by asking what was coordinated, between 
whom and to what degree. In the collective experience of these federations, the 
subject matter of coordination ranged from the overall strategy for managing the 
pandemic, as it stood at one point in time to another, to particular aspects of it. 
The former typically encompassed where and how the balance was to be struck 
between limiting transmission and preserving the economy – an example might 
be the length and extent of a particular lockdown. In either case, the function 
of coordination sometimes was to harmonise different powers and capacities, 
whether legislative or administrative, across the levels of government, so as to 
secure an adequately holistic response. Alternatively, coordination served to har-
monise the exercise of the same powers by the constituent units in the interests 
of meeting expected standards of equivalence or, sometimes, to enhance the sim-
plicity of messaging. It follows that coordination was sometimes vertical, involv-
ing all levels of government, and sometimes horizontal, involving all or some 
of the constituent units. Even where a working relationship between the centre 
and the constituent units was undeveloped or ineffective, as in the US or Brazil, 
coordination between units in the same region or sharing a similar ideology was 
a common feature of intergovernmental relations in responding to the pandemic.
The extent or degree of coordination sought varied significantly between 
federations, ranging from uniformity at one extreme, through various forms 
of harmonisation, to what in Canada was described as a ‘guidance framework’, 
on the other. These choices were driven partly by the opportunities that were 
presented by the scope of the authority of the respective levels of government, 
de jure or de facto. In addition, however, they were driven by considerations of 
what was necessary for an effective response to the pandemic, an assessment that 
sometimes changed over the course of the year in the light of experience. Spain 
offers an instructive example for this purpose, although it was not the only one. 
The constitutional ‘state of alarm’ triggered by the Spanish government early in 
the year centralised power and resulted in a top-down approach to management 
of the pandemic during the first wave of infections, which exposed the limita-
tions of what the centre could do effectively. When the second wave emerged 
later in the year, a state of alarm was again declared, but this time with the sup-
port of the autonomous communities and in a fashion that married coordination 
with significant decentralisation.
This example makes a broader point. Whatever degree of coordination was 
sought in response to the pandemic, in most federations some scope was left or 
taken for a level of local management in a form that assumed local diversity. 
Where this occurred, its potential advantages were to enable constituent units 
to respond to local conditions, to experiment with new approaches to a novel 
problem, and to strengthen accountability to local communities. This potential 
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was not realised where local capability was weak, as in South Africa. In some 
federations, including Ethiopia and Nigeria, limited opportunity combined with 
low capability also resulted in considerable asymmetry in the extent of local ini-
tiative that was taken. Otherwise, however, while the scope for more localised 
diversity as an element of coordination varied significantly across federations, it 
was sufficiently prevalent to challenge the automatic equation of coordination 
with uniformity, at least in tackling problems of this kind.
A second, related purpose of intergovernmental relations during the pan-
demic was to provide a framework within which consultation might take place 
between jurisdictions and across levels of government. Notoriously, consultation 
can take different forms, which in the current context might range from some 
opportunity for feedback on a predetermined course of action to active engage-
ment enabling perspectives to be shared as a basis for deciding on the action to 
be taken. The flow of information between jurisdictions in the course of the 
pandemic was patchy between federations. Even top-down communication was 
poor in some cases, causing unnecessary confusion: the failure of the govern-
ment of India to communicate with the states before imposing the nationwide 
lockdown in March 2020 was an example. In other cases, too, consultation was 
perfunctory, to the extent that it existed at all. Criticism along these lines was 
made in regard to South Africa, Mexico, and Argentina, for example.
Nevertheless, there was sufficient use of active, multilateral communication 
to demonstrate its usefulness for responding to the pandemic and to suggest that 
it constitutes a significant purpose for intergovernmental relations, hard though 
it sometimes may be to achieve. At its best, in the course of the pandemic it ena-
bled knowledge about local conditions to be fed into a federation-wide planning 
process; contributed to the dissemination of innovative ideas and good prac-
tice; and underpinned local ownership of intergovernmental solutions. Australia, 
Switzerland, and Spain provide examples. In some federations, consultation of 
this kind may be considered to be mandated by requirements of interjurisdic-
tional loyalty. Equally significantly, however, in the context of the pandemic 
it was driven by the need to maximise the effectiveness of the governmental 
response.
Other purposes of intergovernmental relations that were revealed by responses 
to the pandemic can be dealt with more briefly but are equally significant. In 
some cases, intergovernmental relations were used to solve a shared problem. 
The arrangements between neighbouring states in Australia to create a ‘bubble’ 
to protect border communities from differential lockdowns and border closures 
are an example; the ‘Atlantic bubble’ in Canada is another. In other cases, inter-
governmental arrangements involved the sharing of resources. The use of defence 
force personnel to monitor aspects of pandemic control in Canada is an example; 
the movement of scarce health equipment between states in the US, as needs 
rose and fell, is another. Another familiar purpose of intergovernmental rela-
tions during the pandemic was to achieve economies of scale or other economic 
benefits that flow from joint, usually central, action. Thus in many federations, 
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response to the pandemic involved central procurement of, for example, personal 
protective equipment, intensive-care beds and vaccine supplies for distribution 
to the constituent units. Insofar as these supplies were sourced internationally, 
procurement by the centre was indicated as well.
It is sometimes suggested that a purpose of intergovernmental relations in 
federations is to manage disputes, particularly in the form of legal action between 
jurisdictions (South Africa, Constitution, section 41(1)(h)(vi)). Intergovernmental 
relations can be assumed to have played some role in this regard during the pan-
demic by providing a framework for joint action to deal with a shared problem, 
albeit that the speed with which the various crises developed may have inhibited 
interjurisdictional litigation as well. Disputes resulting in litigation nevertheless 
occurred, and might have been averted by more effective intergovernmental 
relations, even though many were instigated by private parties in federations 
where such procedures are available (Aroney and Kincaid 2017). This chapter on 
Argentina gives several examples of litigation over competition between prov-
inces in the purchase of respirators and over the movement of medical person-
nel working in one province but living in another. In other federations, there 
were legal disputes over constitutional powers and responsibilities. Examples 
include India and Spain, where questions about the federal division of power 
were resolved by courts in favour of the centre and Brazil, where challenges to 
federal action were resolved in favour of the states. Judicial decisions of these 
kinds affected the dynamic of intergovernmental relations and, indirectly, altered 
the response to the pandemic.
Finally, intergovernmental relations were used in most federations to allevi-
ate the financial pressures on governments created by the pandemic due to the 
collapse of economic activity and tax bases and the heightening of expenditure 
demands. While these effects were felt at all levels of government, the generally 
superior financial position of the centre typically meant that subnational govern-
ments were more exposed. The full magnitude of the economic consequences of 
the pandemic are yet to be realised, and may call ultimately for a more radical 
adjustment of existing federal fiscal arrangements. The point made here, however, 
is that extreme fiscal pressures in some federations, of which Brazil, Nigeria, and 
the United Kingdom (UK) are only some examples, were mitigated in the short-
term in the course of the pandemic by forms of intergovernmental relations.
20.4 Modalities
Comparative studies of intergovernmental relations in federal-type systems 
across the world show that, at a level of generality, broadly similar types of 
arrangements, or modalities, are used (Poirier et al. 2015). They include legis-
lative schemes of various kinds designed to achieve a desired level of coordina-
tion; meetings of political and other representatives of participating jurisdictions; 
agreements between jurisdictions, as a framework for future action; joint or 
shared institutions; and fiscal transfers (Poirier and Saunders 2015).
Intergovernmental Relations 385
The actual design of institutions within each of these categories varies 
between federations, often significantly, depending on context. So does their 
scope. In federal experience, for example, intergovernmental arrangements 
may operate horizontally, vertically, or both; may involve bilateral or multilat-
eral relations; and may include any two or more levels of government. Practice 
also varies in terms of the legal authority for intergovernmental arrangements. 
Some arrangements have a framework in the constitution or legislation, or both. 
South Africa offers a still relatively rare example of constitutional provision for 
intergovernmental relations that purport to be comprehensive (South Africa, 
Constitution, Chapter 3), but many constitutions make provision for particular 
intergovernmental institutions or practices. The Inter-State Council in India 
(India, Constitution, article 263), the procedure for intergovernmental agree-
ments in Austria (Austria, Constitution, article 15(a)), and the requirement for 
loyal cooperation in Italy (Italy, Constitution, article 120) are examples. The jury 
is still out on whether the formalisation of intergovernmental relations enhances 
their effectiveness, although in principle it has advantages for transparency. 
Whether a legal framework exists or not, less formalised interaction between 
jurisdictions is a feature of almost all federations and is critical to understanding 
their operation in practice.
This section examines the modalities of intergovernmental relations used in 
the country case studies in dealing with the pandemic. It adopts the same broad 
categorisation of intergovernmental arrangements used in earlier studies, not-
ing, however, that some intergovernmental practices during the pandemic also 
departed from previous experience in ways that may have legacies for the future. 
Where this occurred, it seems to be due to the nature of the challenges presented 
by the pandemic itself: a fast-moving, inadequately understood, dire threat to 
the lives and well-being of entire populations, demanding speedy and effec-
tive responses from governments. Whether this diagnosis is correct or not, the 
account that follows shows that some apparently established intergovernmental 
institutions were bypassed or modified and that some replaced altogether. It also 
sheds light on practices that worked or not and that offer indication of directions 
for future change.
Legislative schemes of various kinds typically frame and support intergovern-
mental action when an enforceable, normative base is required (Poirier and 
Saunders 2015: 455–57). Legislation also played a role in intergovernmental 
responses to Covid-19. In emergency conditions in which legislatures often were 
bypassed, however, many rules were laid down in subordinate rather than pri-
mary legislation or, sometimes, executive decrees, to the extent that constitu-
tional systems allowed. Resort to ‘guidance’ rather than law was another, marked 
phenomenon in the response of many governments to Covid-19, one which also 
surfaced occasionally in intergovernmental arrangements. Thus in Canada, for 
example, ‘guidance frameworks’ were issued by the federal government, some-
times covering issues such as schools that are within provincial jurisdiction, but 
without the binding quality that would attract constitutional limitations.
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One common use of legislation to coordinate the actions of jurisdictions 
during Covid-19 involved the enactment of primary legislation by the federal 
legislature as an umbrella for action by the constituent units and, sometimes, 
local government. In some cases, of which Austria and Mexico are examples, 
the ordinary competences of the federal legislature were sufficient to support 
this action; in others, including Spain, Switzerland, and Italy, federal compe-
tences were expanded by the emergency conditions. In some federations, some 
or all the constituent units supported federal leadership, actively or passively, 
even when the limits of federal competence were doubtful; others were critical 
of overcentralisation. In a distinctive example of support for central legislative 
action, the devolved legislatures of the UK gave consent to the enactment of the 
Coronavirus Act of 2020 by the Westminster Parliament in the form required by 
the ‘Sewel’ Convention (Institute for Government 2020).
The bases on which central legislation engaged the constituent units varied. 
In some cases, as in Germany, Switzerland, or South Africa, the constituent units 
were engaged through the usual process of implementing federal legislation. In 
others, including Mexico, Brazil, and Ethiopia, the constitutional scheme per-
mitted the federal legislature to enact what in essence was framework legislation, 
within which constituent units could, or had to, act. In others, again, of which 
Russia and India were examples, the federal legislation was prescriptive, provid-
ing rules with which constituent units had to comply or mandating the action 
they were to take.
Whatever the legal basis for this form of joint action, key points of difference 
between federations in practice concerned the extent to which constituent units 
had discretion in applying and supplementing the federal law in local conditions; 
the extent to which units were consulted in relation to the form of the federal 
law and the action permitted or required to be taken under it; and whether units 
were accountable for their actions to their own communities or to the federal 
government. The spectrum ranged from Germany, where the Länder imple-
mented federal legislation in their own right under article 83 of the Basic Law, 
had considerable discretion in doing so, and were consulted through the institu-
tion of the Bundesrat in addition to other means, to India, where the states acted 
within the boundaries of unilateral Union legislation on which they were not 
consulted at all. In the case of some federations, the scope of authority exercisable 
by constituent units expanded in the course of the year, as experience suggested 
that there was likely to be benefit in relying on rules and processes of administra-
tion that were locally informed and could be adapted to local conditions. Spain 
was a notable case in point, moving from centralised control under the first state 
of alarm to a form of ‘co-governance’ during the second.
More dualist federations typically do not involve the constituent units in the 
implementation of regular federal legislation. Where legislation is used for inter-
governmental arrangements, the goal instead is to ensure that the legislation for 
which each jurisdiction is responsible is harmonised appropriately with that of all 
the others. Time did not permit the negotiation and implementation of elaborate 
Intergovernmental Relations 387
legislative schemes of this kind during the pandemic. The technique was used 
nevertheless in several ways in Australia and, to a lesser extent, in Canada and 
the US.
Any agreement on coordination, whether vertical or horizontal, relied on 
voluntary compliance by the parties, through legislation, including delegated 
legislation, where necessary. Decisions of the ‘National Cabinet’ in Australia, for 
example, were given effect in that way, as was coordinated action between neigh-
bouring constituent units in Canada and the US. Furthermore, in some cases, 
of which Australia again is an example, strategies or ‘plans’ for identifying the 
roles of the different levels of government in dealing with disasters generally and 
pandemics in particular had been developed in earlier years and had prompted 
implementing legislation that was coordinated to this extent. The use of plans is 
considered further below in the context of intergovernmental agreements. They 
could not have been expected to anticipate all the exigencies presented by the 
realities of the pandemic, but they offered at least a starting point.
Some of the practical difficulties of coordinating government action under 
the legislation of different jurisdictions are illustrated by an Australian contro-
versy early in the pandemic. The critical issue was uncertainty about whether 
officers of the federal government or of New South Wales had been responsible 
for allowing infected passengers returning from an international cruise to enter 
New South Wales and travel to other parts of Australia. An official inquiry con-
cluded that the responsibility lay with New South Wales, but neither level of 
government emerged from the Inquiry unscathed. The Commissioner recom-
mended that both bureaucracies develop ‘better levels of awareness of their own 
and each other’s roles and responsibilities … and more formal protocols for … 
interaction and communication’ (Special Commission of Inquiry 2020: 2.20).
A second core institution of relations between government comprises inter-
jurisdictional forums of various kinds that involve two or more participating juris-
dictions, whether operating vertically or horizontally (Poirier and Saunders 
2015: 458–63). The most high-profile of such forums involve heads of govern-
ment or line ministers, but many others involve bureaucrats at different levels 
or officeholders of various kinds across participating jurisdictions. This section 
focuses on intergovernmental forums involving political actors, while also not-
ing the practical contribution of others in responding to the pandemic, some of 
which, including, for example, the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network, are 
identified in the case study chapters.
In some federations, a forum for political collaboration between jurisdictions 
is built into the central law-making process. The German Bundesrat is a prime 
example, but second chambers in other jurisdictions, including South Africa, 
are constituted so as to represent the constituent units and have some, if var-
ying, potential to act in this way. Whether or not a federation has a second 
legislative chamber or equivalent that can contribute to effective coordination, 
other forums also may be used for the purpose that are more self-evidently inter-
governmental in design. When the pandemic broke out, some federations had 
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well-established intergovernmental forums through which political leaders could 
meet should they choose to do so. Examples include Australia, where a complex 
network of ministerial councils, with the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) at the apex, had existed since 1992; South Africa, where a President’s 
Co-ordinating Council (PCC) and supporting councils of line ministers were 
established by legislation in 2005, implementing Chapter 3 of the Constitution; 
India, where an Inter-State Council (ISC) was established in 1990 by presiden-
tial order under article 263 of the Constitution; Switzerland, where a system 
of largely horizontal inter-cantonal conferences was complemented from 1993 
by a Conference of Cantonal Governments (Schnabel and Mueller 2017); and 
Spain, where a Premiers’ Conference was established by the central government 
in 2004.
One of the more interesting observations from the collective experience of 
federations during the pandemic was how much of the intergovernmental status 
quo was found wanting in the face of this sudden and novel threat. This was not 
the case everywhere. In Germany, for example, less formal meetings between the 
Chancellor and the first ministers supplemented the limitations of the Bundesrat 
to coordinate the actions of governments in an area where so much authority lay 
with the Länder and seem to have been adequate to the purpose. In other federa-
tions, existing arrangements proved less satisfactory in a variety of distinct ways.
Federations where intergovernmental forums were already weak or non- 
existent, as in Mexico, had no obvious vehicle to bring heads of government 
together, prompting calls for better intergovernmental architecture in the future. 
In Mexico, ad hoc arrangements were made for a meeting, but not until August, 
when the pandemic was well advanced. In Ethiopia, where such forums also 
were lacking, coordination took place through party connections, to the extent 
that it took place at all. In others, including the US, Brazil and Nigeria, hori-
zontal meetings achieved some coordination to fill the gap partly, but typically 
these were not fully inclusive, bringing together governors connected by region 
or, sometimes, party affiliation.
More surprisingly perhaps, many federations in which intergovernmental 
forums were available altered them or did not use them at all. In some cases, 
they were bypassed in favour of bodies designed to coordinate action at the 
centre, initially with no constituent unit representation at all. Argentina, Italy, 
and Nigeria are examples. Relevantly for present purposes, however, in at least 
some cases, including Italy, intergovernmental forums were activated or reacti-
vated in the course of the year in the light of experience with the pandemic. In a 
similar vein, in some cases, of which the UK and Belgium are examples, central 
coordinating bodies were supplemented, permanently or on an occasional basis, 
by representatives of the constituent units. Along the same lines again but in an 
example of a different kind, in India, while the formal intergovernmental forum, 
the Inter-State Council, did not meet, eight less formal online meetings are 
reported to have occurred between the Prime Minister and the state premiers in 
the period covered by this chapter in this study.
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In some federations, experience with the pandemic proved a catalyst for 
change to intergovernmental forums. One phenomenon reported across sev-
eral federations is that intergovernmental forums, when they operated at all, 
did so from the top-down, in a demonstration of central leadership and control. 
In varying ways, this seems to have occurred in, for example, Spain, Austria, 
Switzerland, and South Africa. In the first three of these cases, the extent of cen-
tral leadership was accepted as a viable way to respond to the pandemic in that 
particular context. In Spain, however, top-down control by the centre through 
the Premiers’ Conference during the first phase of the pandemic subsequently 
changed to the much more interactive approach of ‘co-governance’, during 
which the Premiers’ Conference met 16 times, offering a model that may also be 
relevant for the future.
More dramatically still, in Australia, COAG, the existing forum for heads of 
government, was replaced early in the pandemic by a new, intergovernmental 
‘National Cabinet’, designed to operate quickly, efficiently and with minimal 
bureaucracy. The Australian approach had the advantage of recognising the dis-
tinct roles of each of the participating governments and leaving considerable 
discretion to each. This new intergovernmental architecture was developed 
speedily and to meet a single purpose, however. It remains to be seen whether 
it will survive into a post-pandemic era as the vehicle for coordination across a 
broad spectrum of intergovernmental action.
A third, more amorphous, category of institutions comprises boards and agencies 
of various kinds that serve an intergovernmental purpose (Poirier and Saunders 
2015: 467–9). Typically, these have specialist qualifications and operate at a 
degree of arms-length from government. Their primary function may be advi-
sory or regulatory, and they may be established or constituted by participating 
jurisdictions collectively or by one level of government alone, usually the centre.
In the context of the pandemic, most such bodies were health-related, although 
some were mandated to deal with responses to emergencies more generally, or 
to advise on the economic fallout of the pandemic. Their functions ranged from 
providing high-level epidemiological and related health advice, to the devel-
opment, coordination, and monitoring of the implementation of plans to man-
age the crisis by, for example, limiting community transmission. The mixture 
of specialist health and bureaucratic expertise required was met in some cases 
through reliance on multiple bodies and, in others, through the composition of 
a single agency or body. Given the involvement of all levels of government in 
responding to the pandemic, one challenge was to ensure that relevant specialist 
expertise was available to each level of government; another was to coordinate 
the reactions of each jurisdiction to the specialist advice they received.
The complexity of these arrangements, many of which also evolved over time, 
makes generalisation difficult. They can be seen, however, as falling into three, 
sometimes overlapping, categories. In some cases, the agency was established 
at and responsible to the national level of government, affecting action at other 
levels of government either through direction or through interaction between 
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agencies organised in an essentially hierarchical structure. The Brazilian National 
Health Regulator and the Nigerian National Emergency Management Agency 
are examples of the former, while the Indian Disaster Management Authorities 
are an example of the latter. In a second category of cases, the agency has inter-
governmental elements in its composition. The Austrian commission that pub-
lished risk assessments for the coronavirus ‘traffic light system’ is an example, 
comprising experts, civil servants, and Land representatives. The Epidemics Task 
Force in Switzerland might also be placed in this category.
In what might be considered a third category, both the centre and the con-
stituent units maintained specialist agencies of their own between which com-
munication took place. Australia and Canada, at least, took this approach. In 
Australia, each jurisdiction had a chief health officer to advise the government 
and, sometimes, exercise statutory power. These officers communicated infor-
mally with each other, however, and met regularly in an intergovernmental 
forum, the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC), which 
in turn advised the ‘National Cabinet’. In an era of suspicion of experts, it is an 
interesting question whether, as an aspect of multilevel government, the multiple 
sources of official expertise on which some federations relied during the pandemic 
strengthened trust in the decisions that were made or complicated matters further.
Agreements between participating jurisdictions are a familiar mechanism 
in intergovernmental relations, recording decisions about collective action to 
achieve particular outcomes or resolve particular problems (Poirier and Saunders 
2015: 469–74). The incidence of intergovernmental agreements varies between 
federal-type systems depending on context, including in this instance the legal 
and political system. Some agreements require legislative consent, while oth-
ers are made entirely through executive power. Some agreements are legally 
enforceable; others have, at best, the status of soft law.
At first glance, intergovernmental agreements played a relatively minor role 
in federations in responding to the pandemic in 2020. To the extent to which 
this is so, it may reflect the speed at which the pandemic spread, which required 
a government response that had no time for the lengthy negotiations between 
jurisdictions that agreements may require. On closer inspection, however, agree-
ments were a feature of intergovernmental relations during the pandemic as well, 
even if they were not negotiated for the purpose or, in some cases, referred to in 
those terms.
In the first place, the complexities of hospitals and health care in federa-
tions are such that there often are general agreements dealing with such mat-
ters, necessarily affecting the use of hospitals during the pandemic. The account 
of developments in Austria draws attention to the long-standing significance 
of health-care agreements under article 15(a) of the Austrian Constitution, but 
agreements of this kind exist elsewhere as well. Secondly, in a point that may be 
more specific to experience with the pandemic, in many federations the inter-
governmental response was described as being framed by pre-existing ‘plans’ or 
equivalent terms. Thus, for example, in Canada there was a Federal/Provincial/
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Territorial Response Plan for Biological Events, in addition to a range of sup-
plementary intergovernmental instruments; in Nigeria, there was a Pandemic 
Multi-Sectoral Response Plan; in the UK, a Coronavirus Action Plan; in 
Russia, a Corona Crisis Action Plan; in Spain, a National Early Warning and 
Rapid Response System; and in Australia, an Australian Health Management 
Plan for Pandemic Influenza, a National Strategy for Disaster Resilience and an 
Emergency Response Plan for the Covid-19 Pandemic, among others.
Several questions arise, not all of which can be answered with information 
presently available. It is clear that not all ‘plans’ that were put to use during the 
pandemic were intergovernmental in any relevant sense. In the examples above, 
both the Spanish ‘System’ and the Nigerian Plan seem to have been developed 
by the central government alone and so fall into this category. It is equally clear, 
however, that in some cases a plan is the equivalent of an intergovernmental 
agreement. This point is made specifically in the Canadian chapter, but it seems 
to reflect the understanding in other federations as well, including the UK. 
These circumstances prompt a question about what it is in relation to the manner 
in which the plan was developed, or its content, that causes the terminology of 
‘plan’ to be used in lieu of a descriptor that signifies collective agreement more 
obviously.
In yet another group of federations in which plans played a role during the pan-
demic, the ‘plan’ had an intergovernmental element of some kind. The Russian 
plan, for example, is said to have been adopted by all the constituent units; the 
Australian ‘Strategy’ was officially developed through COAG, as the intergov-
ernmental predecessor of what now is the National Cabinet. In these and other 
cases, however, there are questions about the extent to which the arrangements 
were informed by consultation with the constituent units and were consensual, 
at least in the sense signified by signature to an agreement. Insofar as many of 
these plans and other arrangements were laid down in advance with a view 
to managing future emergencies, there is another question about the extent to 
which they were adequate to the purpose as this particular emergency evolved. 
This issue is flagged most specifically in relation to Canada but, again, seems 
likely also to be relevant elsewhere. The difficulty of finding answers points to 
problems with transparency, to which the following section of this chapter refers.
One final set of intergovernmental mechanisms that require brief mention 
concern fiscal arrangements (Poirier and Saunders 2015: 474–6). The techniques 
themselves are familiar: fiscal transfers between levels of government, tax- sharing 
arrangements, and support for borrowing of various kinds. The fiscal dislocation 
caused by the pandemic through substantial additional expenditures and loss of 
tax and other revenues as economic activity slowed or stopped, made it inevitable 
that mechanisms of this kind would be a component of intergovernmental rela-
tions. More action can be expected on this front as the economic consequences 
of the pandemic become clearer over time.
In the short term, however, the chapters in this book record the use of trans-
fers to assist constituent units either generally or in relation to pandemic-related 
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expenses in, for example, Brazil, Nigeria, India, Russia, and Ethiopia; a renego-
tiation of the Barnett formula for revenue redistribution in the UK; assistance 
with the debts of constituent units in Brazil, Russia, and Nigeria; and the use of 
fiscal transfers in Germany not only to supplement Länder revenues but also to 
induce Länder compliance with a coordinated policy approach to aspects of pan-
demic management. There are indications in this chapter of longer-term impli-
cations of experience with the pandemic for intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
One, to which the Swiss chapter refers, is the impact of the Covid-19 experience 
on the viability of the continued use of the fiscal equivalence principle under 
article 43(a)(3) and (4) of the Swiss Constitution.
20.5 Insights
Intergovernmental relations were a feature of the response of all federations to 
the emergencies created by the pandemic. The ways in which intergovernmental 
relations were used varied, however, not only in the mechanisms employed but 
in the proportionate contribution of the centre and the constituent units, includ-
ing, in many cases, local governments. In some federations, among them, for 
example, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, India, Austria, and Russia, the centre 
dominated decision-making over the period covered by this chapter, once the 
scale of the problem had become evident. In others, of which the US, Canada, 
and Australia are somewhat different examples, the approach was more dualis-
tic, whilst nevertheless involving some interaction between governments. The 
experiences of the remainder lie between these two poles, striking a balance in 
a variety of ways.
Each federation ultimately will assess its own performance in response to 
Covid-19, including the adequacy of interactions between governments. On the 
evidence of the chapters in this book, some, including Germany and Canada, 
are broadly satisfied with the workings of intergovernmental relations, at least 
up to the end of 2020. In some cases, of which Spain and Australia are examples, 
the experience of dealing with the pandemic itself caused shifts in the conduct 
of intergovernmental relations the durability of which remain to be seen but 
which seem to have met with broad approval in the short term. In other cases, 
the chapters suggest either that the jury is still out on the effectiveness of inter-
governmental relations or that reform is indicated. In most of the cases in this 
latter category, including Brazil, Argentina, and the UK, the primary concern is 
over-centralisation. An overlapping concern, also in Mexico, is patchy and dys-
functional intergovernmental relations. In the US, the primary concern instead 
was a shortfall in leadership from the centre that exacerbated the problems of a 
dualist approach lacking the possibility of productive vertical interaction even 
when it patently was needed.
Despite the diversity of usage of intergovernmental relations during the pan-
demic, some insights are suggested by the collective experience. One is that, 
to maximise the potential of a federation for responding to crises such as those 
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presented by Covid-19, intergovernmental relations cannot be overly top-down. 
Central leadership is useful and may be necessary, but it should be understood as 
central leadership in a federation, in which the active contribution of constituent 
units contributes to informed and legitimate intergovernmental decisions and 
serves a variety of purposes.
This is not news in federations with a developed federal culture. Switzerland 
is such an example, where consultation with the cantons is prescribed by the 
Constitution and underpinned by the political process (Switzerland, Constitution, 
article 45 and 55). In other federations, such principles are undeveloped or imper-
fectly realised. In Canada and Australia, for example, the nearest equivalent is 
a principle of ‘cooperation’, which has evolved as a tool for understanding the 
scope of the legislative powers of the respective levels of government rather than 
as a standard for the manner of their collective exercise (Gaudreault-DesBiens 
and Poirier 2017). In Italy, central consultation and cooperation with the regions 
in the initial phase of the pandemic were described as ‘half-hearted’ despite a 
principle of loyal cooperation in article 120(2) of the Constitution – neither level 
of government appears to have adopted it adequately. Grappling with the pan-
demic changed principles of this kind from abstract goals to practical necessities 
in ways that offer new insight into what intergovernmental relations require.
A second, but related, insight is that the goal of effective intergovernmen-
tal relations is not necessarily uniformity. Some of the case studies, including 
Canada, Australia, and Germany, show approaches to intergovernmental rela-
tions that assumed significant diversity in policy and practice at the subnational 
level, for which subnational governments were accountable to their own institu-
tions and voters. In many other cases, including Spain, Italy, and Russia, initial 
assumptions about the need for uniformity gave way over time to increasing 
diversity at the subnational level, as experience with the pandemic showed that 
local discretion, responding to local conditions, could be advantageous. Less 
charitable explanations, about distributing blame, are possible too, but the trend 
is notable, nevertheless. The extent to which divergent policies and practices 
were useful and acceptable at the level of constituent units varied with con-
text, including the degree of actual difference in conditions on the ground and 
the strength of adherence to principles of equivalence in regulatory standards. 
The demonstration of the broader roles that intergovernmental relations can play 
without prioritising centralisation and uniformity is another useful outcome of 
the experiences of 2020 all the same.
Thirdly, the real demands that the pandemic placed on governments at all 
levels highlighted the importance of capacity, in the sense of capability. The 
capacity of the several levels of government to perform the roles assigned to 
them is a sine qua non of a working federation. Too often, however, the sig-
nificance of capacity, particularly of the subnational levels of government, is 
ignored or imperfectly understood, papered over by centralisation, including 
through intergovernmental relations. This becomes less possible when intergov-
ernmental arrangements require an active contribution from constituent units. 
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The challenges presented by lack of capacity at subnational levels of government 
in responding to the pandemic were experienced in many federations, including 
South Africa, Nigeria, and Italy. The lesson for the future is not only to design 
intergovernmental arrangements in ways that take capacity into account but also 
to work to build capacity, such that all levels of government can make contribu-
tions that realise the potential of intergovernmental relations.
One final concluding observation concerns transparency and account-
ability, notoriously victims of intergovernmental relations. The extent of the 
problem differs between federations. Transparency and accountability are less 
affected where, for example, there is a legal or constitutional framework for 
intergovernmental relations or a requirement for certain types of arrangements 
to be approved by legislation, if only because, in either case, aspects or rela-
tions between governments have greater public exposure. Almost by definition, 
however, intergovernmental relations typically rely to a considerable extent on 
meetings, agreements, and actions of other kinds in which the primary actors are 
members of the executive branch, interacting in relatively unstructured settings 
and operating in confidence.
Problems of transparency and accountability in intergovernmental relations 
were in evidence during the pandemic as well. Ironically, to the extent that 
each level of government had discrete roles for which they were accountable to 
their own voters; in some federations, there was a higher level of public under-
standing of and interest in who was doing what than often is the case. In other 
respects, however, familiar problems recurred, exacerbated by the need for speed 
in responding to the pandemic as it unfolded and, in many jurisdictions, even less 
parliamentary scrutiny than usual.
Two examples may be given. One is uncertainty about how and on what 
bases roles and responsibilities for dealing with the pandemic were allocated 
between governments. The Canadian chapter specifically queries whether the 
intergovernmental arrangements in the Response Plan were ‘actually mobilised’, 
but similar issues almost certainly have arisen elsewhere. The second example 
concerns the various intergovernmental forums through which the bulk of inter-
governmental relations occurred. Problems of accountability inevitably arise in 
relation to collective decisions of an intergovernmental body, the individual 
members of which are politically accountable to different institutions and dif-
ferent constituencies. These problems are greater if there is lack of transparency 
about the operating rules for such bodies, the influences that are brought to bear 
in the course of decision-making, and the decisions that are eventually made – 
matters in which practice differs between federations.
An Australian example, admittedly extreme, shows how such problems arise. 
The operating rules for the new apex intergovernmental forum, the National 
Cabinet, which was established early in 2020, have never been publicly explained. 
Decisions are announced briefly, by ‘media statement’, in terms that are predict-
ably general and opaque. Furthermore, in a complete break from earlier prac-
tice, the ‘National Cabinet’ is institutionally located under the umbrella of the 
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Commonwealth Cabinet, apparently in order to attract the same rules about 
solidarity and confidentiality, including protection from freedom of information 
legislation (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2020). Legal chal-
lenges to this arrangement can be expected. In the meantime, however, it stands 
as a reminder that designing intergovernmental arrangements in ways that ade-
quately meet democratic standards for transparency and accountability remains 
a work in progress.
Notes
 1 The power in question deals with ‘quarantine’ (s 51(xi)). Section 8 of the Biosecurity Act 
of 2015 (Cth), which exercises the power, includes a standard disclaimer of intention to 
limit a state law ‘capable of operating concurrently’ with the Commonwealth law.
 2 The Mexican chapter refers to ‘coordination’ (in the field of civil protection) as involving 
‘the creation of mechanisms of coordination and collaboration among orders of gov-
ernment in a specific policy area’, noting, however, that the procedure was not used in 
respect of the pandemic.
 3 The point is made by Johanne Poirier, in commenting on an earlier version of this chapter.
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FEDERALISM UNDER PRESSURE




The Covid-19 pandemic has been a ‘focusing event’ (Béland et al. 2020) for fed-
eralism like no other, placing it under the microscope and giving rise to the three 
questions set out in the introduction of this book. Each gives rise to a number of 
subquestions. First, how did federal systems respond to the pandemic during the 
first critical period of 2020, when quick, concerted, and effective action was nec-
essary to limit the virus and its dire socio-economic consequences? What were 
the modalities of action? How did they impact on the constitutional distribution 
of powers – did they lead to an increase in centralisation or decentralisation? Did 
intergovernmental relations (IGR), the lifeblood of federal systems, work effi-
ciently or at all? What happened to intergovernmental fiscal relations?
The second question is more evaluative: How well (or badly) did federal sys-
tems, which by nature involve dispersed decision-making, fare in combating the 
pandemic? How did federalism perform as a system of governance in the modern 
age when confronted unexpectedly with such a massive global crisis? Although 
most federations saw a trend towards centralisation, none of them lost their fed-
eral character entirely to become unitary states. The question then is whether 
the fundamental characteristics that Ronald Watts regarded as essential to the 
success of federalism were also relevant in combating the pandemic effectively. 
The ‘federal success factors’ Watts posits are
• a strong disposition to democratic procedures, which presumes the volun-
tary consent of citizens in the constituent units;
• multiple centres of political decision-making that give expression to the 
principle of non-centralisation;
• open political bargaining as a dominant means of reaching decisions; and
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• respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law, given that each order of 
government derives its authority from the constitution (Watts 2011: 16–17).
Conversely, did those federations that showed failures in respect of one or 
more of these characteristics perform worse in health and well-being outcomes 
than would have been the case otherwise? Were these federal ‘health’ factors 
relevant under an emergency situation and should the list be complemented?
The third question is this: Where changes in federal dynamics did occur due 
to Covid-19 – a movement towards decentralisation or centralisation – are they 
likely to have long-term consequences for that federal system? Will the impact 
of Covid-19 reverberate long after the health and economic consequences are 
more or less under control? Did the pandemic open or close a ‘policy window’ 
for more fundamental changes?
The 18 country studies show that during 2020 most of the federal systems under 
review became more centralised in response to the pandemic, but not uniformly 
or continuously so. IGR was often inadequate or non-existent, in the process 
fortifying centralised rule; the increased dependence of subnational governments 
on federal transfers also had a centralising effect. I conclude, furthermore, that 
some federal systems were resilient enough to deal effectively with the pandemic. 
In many if not most cases, however, the success factors, if at all present, came 
under pressure with predictable results. What contributing authors described as 
failures in their respective federal systems, led to poor outcomes both in respect 
of effective governance and lives lost as well as hardships incurred. These failures, 
mostly proceeding from pre-existing problems, can be labelled as ‘federal co- 
morbidities’: their presence in the federal body politic made the system less able 
to face the Covid-19 challenge successfully. In addition to the four characteristics 
mentioned by Watts, the capability of governments at all levels should join the list. 
Finally, although it is still too early to tell, Covid-19 might be a catalyst in some 
countries for greater decentralisation, in particular in the field of fiscal federalism.
Due to space constraints, these concluding remarks do not do justice to the rich-
ness of the country studies; the remarks are, inevitably, prone to generalisation that 
does not fit all the countries. Given that all the countries were subjected to the same 
coronavirus at the same time, and exposed to the same World Health Organization 
(WHO) information, world media coverage, and the scientific community, the 
responses were on the whole noticeably similar. However, drilling down to the 
detail, it is clear that the very characteristics (geographical, demographical, eco-
nomic, political, and governmental) which made each country a unique federation 
in the first place also shaped the individual responses to Covid-19.
21.2 The relevance of contextual factors
As Cheryl Saunders notes in Chapter 20, geophysical characteristics, economic 
development, the form and operation of government, and the multifaceted 
framework for federalism all had a significant influence on the conduct of IGR. 
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In this section, I sketch out how the other aspects of federalism may have been 
influenced by the same contextual factors.
First, geographical size mattered. Seven of the eight largest countries in the 
world are federations: Russia, Canada, the United States (US), Brazil, Australia, 
India, and Argentina. In such vast territories, infection rates varied from region 
to region, which allowed for differentiation in government responses. From the 
outset, emergency powers were delegated to Russia’s 85 constituent units to 
deal with local conditions; the eastern Canadian provinces could effectively self- 
isolate themselves as the ‘Atlantic bubble’, as did the state of Western Australia 
in closing its borders to the rest of the country. On the other side of the spec-
trum, in smaller federations, with high interconnectivity (e.g. in Switzerland 
and Belgium) the prospect of self-isolation of constituent units was limited.
Moreover, with seven of the 10 most populous countries in the world being 
federations (India, the US, Pakistan, Brazil, Nigeria, Russia, and Mexico), 
anti-pandemic measures had to be of enormous magnitude, requiring plentiful 
resources. With diversity along racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines lying 
at the root of the federal nature of 13 of the federations presented in this book, 
the pandemic brought divergent communities closer together in some instances 
but in others drove them further apart. On the positive side, to everyone’s sur-
prise, the Catalonian government worked remarkably well with the Spanish gov-
ernment, and the highly divided Belgium saw its two linguistic communities 
cooperating at the centre as never before. On the negative side, the pandemic 
was used to deepen cleavages in India (the promotion of anti-Muslim senti-
ment), in Nigeria, and, most tragically of all, in Ethiopia, where a political dis-
pute between the centre and the ethnic region of Tigray degenerated into civil 
war. Further, the marginalisation of voiceless indigenous communities in Brazil 
and Mexico was exacerbated. Poverty and unemployment among South Africa’s 
majority black population also increased, deepening inequality.
The high levels of urbanisation in most federations – as well as the large, 
densely populated cities in countries with low levels of it, such as India and the 
African federations – facilitated community infections. It was only when the 
‘traffic light’ regulatory system was introduced – that of differentiated unlocking 
and re-locking during the second wave of infection – that low-infected rural 
communities could become less subject to the overbroad national measures 
designed with urban areas in mind.
Economically, the selected federations represent most categories of income lev-
els. In terms of the World Bank classification (2020), 10 are high-income countries; 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa are upper-middle income; 
India and Nigeria lower-middle income; and Ethiopia low income. These clas-
sifications, of course, hide inequality levels within federations. It is particularly 
the upper-middle-income countries where inequality is most pronounced: Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina, and South Africa (by far the most). It is in these low- and 
middle- income countries that public health-care systems are underfunded, less 
testing is conducted, less infections are recorded, and poor medical care is provided.
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When it comes to governance, six of the 18 federations have a presidential 
system, while the rest have some form of parliamentary governance. Populist 
personalities seemed to thrive in presidential systems – the ‘denialist’ presidents 
of the US, Brazil, and Mexico, for example. The parliamentary systems, on the 
other hand, showed a strong tendency towards cooperation and coordination at the 
national level as well as with the states (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK)). But parliamentary systems 
also gave rise to dominant federal executives averse to cooperative governance 
(Austria, India, South Africa, and, as the worst case, Ethiopia). In both systems, 
authoritarian tendencies were noted: in Russia, Argentina, and Nigeria (presi-
dential) and India and Ethiopia (parliamentary).
Among the more dynamic factors that influenced the course of government 
action was the nature of the party system, and the selected federations reflect 
a wide variety. A few countries are dominated by a single party operating at 
federal and state levels and centrist in orientation (cf. Detterbeck and Hepburn 
2010). The primary examples are Russia, where President Putin’s United Russia 
controls the centre and all but nine of the 85 constituent units; India’s Bharatiya 
Janata Party, which controls Parliament and 21 of the 28 states; Ethiopia’s 
Prosperity Party, with near-total control of the federal legislature and nine of the 
10 regional states; and South Africa’s African National Congress, which controls 
the national Parliament and eight of the nine provinces. Although the ruling 
party in Argentina does not dominate Congress, opposition parties govern in 
only three of the 23 provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. Such 
dominance enabled ruling parties to use the party hierarchy as the primary IGR 
instrument.
On the other side of the spectrum are more competitive party politics, which 
in parliamentary systems have given rise to ‘grand coalitions’ in Germany or 
even to minority governments in Belgium, Canada, Italy, and Spain. Non-
entrenched majority parties with active opposition are found in the UK and 
Australia. None of the ruling parties of the British devolved units is linked to the 
Conservative Party in Westminster, while in Australia there is an even split, with 
the opposition Labour Party governing three of the six states and two territories. 
In Canada, the Liberal Party governs at the centre, while its very loosely con-
nected liberal counter-parts only led in two of the ten provinces. In the absence 
of a hegemonic party, cooperation at the national level and vertically with states 
was the order of the day.
In presidential systems with competitive party politics, for example, the US, 
Mexico, and Nigeria, presidential and federal legislative results were also reflected 
in subnational governments: in the US 26 states had Republican governors while 
24 states had Democrats. In Mexico, the split between the ruling party and 
opposition parties was even at state level. In Brazil, President Bolsonaro governs 
without party affiliation and a stable support in Congress and the majority of 
the state governors have no truck with him. In these federations, the common 
theme is that political ideology and partisanship were the driving force behind 
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decision-making, as was only too evident in the fact that distributions of funds 
were biased against opposition-held states.
21.3 The federal constitutional and legislative framework
The pandemic, by its very nature, impacted on numerous aspects of governance, 
ranging from international relations, in which nations were kept apart by border 
closures, to local government, where the effort was to keep individuals apart 
through social distancing. Nor were response measures to Covid-19 restricted to 
health care or disaster management: they also affected competences relating to 
education, social protection, social welfare, and the economy – all of which are 
particularly germane to federalism, given that the starting-point in a federation 
is the constitutional allocation of powers (with its possible suspension during a 
state of emergency being the exception).
21.3.1 Constitutional allocation of powers
The usual constitutional devices of allocating powers in federal systems also apply 
to health care and disaster management and range from the exclusivity of dualist 
approaches to the intermingling of powers in integrative systems (Poirier and 
Saunders 2015). In a significant number of federations, health care is predomi-
nantly a state function, as in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Nigeria, Switzerland, 
the UK, and the US. Such allocations are seldom watertight, though, result-
ing in varying forms and degrees of concurrency. In particular, federal gov-
ernments usually retain influence through the power of the purse in countries 
where they enjoy superior taxing powers. In the majority of countries, the two 
areas are formally concurrent or (de facto) shared functions in one or other 
form (see Steytler 2017), as is the case in Brazil, Ethiopia India, Italy, Mexico, 
Russia, South Africa, and Spain. The federal government usually develops gen-
eral frameworks and policy guidance, while the state governments provide the 
health services, resulting in intended or de facto executive federalism (Argentina, 
Austria, Ethiopia, Germany, South Africa).
With regard to these two main functions, local government plays only a periph-
eral constitutional role. In half of the federations, local government is a compe-
tence of the states and thus derives its mandate from state legislation. Although 
half of the federations constitutionally recognise the existence of local government 
as an order of government, very few attribute specific functions to it. Argentina, 
Brazil, and South Africa are unique in listing specific powers, including ‘municipal 
health care’, that local authorities exercise in conjunction with the other orders of 
government. In the rest of the countries, local government performs a range of 
statutory municipal functions, the most important areas of responsibility during a 
pandemic being water, sanitation, waste management, and control of public spaces.
A strong common thread is that health care and disaster management, as well 
as the other affected areas such as education and social welfare, are every level 
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of government’s business. All powers are to some degree concurrent – and are 
divided not only between two, but three or four tiers (the international one 
included) – circumstances which called out for coordination and cooperation in 
the face of a common enemy.
21.3.2 Emergency declarations
The constitutional division of powers (along with basic human rights) could 
be upset by a declaration of a state of emergency, which empowers a federal 
government to intrude on subnational constitutional space. In most countries, 
only the federal government may impose a state of emergency, usually entailing 
legislative approval and other checks and balances; in a few countries, states may 
also declare states of emergency in terms of their own constitutions (the US, 
Argentina, and Ethiopia).
A similar empowerment of federal and state executives can be obtained in 
most countries by using ordinary legislation dealing with disaster management 
and/or public health emergencies, a process usually not subject to significant 
legislative oversight. States in Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Switzerland have 
co-equal powers with the federal government to declare a state of disaster. Often 
a federal declaration of disaster or health emergency also provides a framework 
in terms of which subnational governments can make their own disaster dec-
larations because of the anticipated localised impact of a disaster or epidemic 
(Argentina, Italy, Nigeria, Russia).
Where federal legislation is couched with reference to disaster management, 
it usually includes the broad category of ‘epidemics’. Legislation may also refer 
specifically to ‘epidemic and health disasters’. In their responses to Covid-19, 
the federal governments of India and Nigeria relied on epidemic legislation dat-
ing back to the colonial area (Indian Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897; Nigerian 
Quarantine Act of 1926), which, of course, demonstrated scant regard for the 
federal system that had emerged subsequently.
21.4  Preparedness for a national disaster: 
The institutional framework
Preparedness for a pandemic requires nationwide federal institutions, structures, 
and processes which can act promptly, concertedly, and effectively. However, 
given that health care and disaster management are the responsibilities mainly of 
subnational government (which is thus where the capability lies, or should lie), 
the question is whether subnational governments participate in these national 
institutions.
All the federations under review had legal frameworks in place to deal with 
pandemics. Only a minority – Australia and the UK, for example – had to update 
their health epidemic laws during the pandemic for being outdated and not pro-
viding the federal executive with sufficient powers. Furthermore, all the federal 
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governments (except Switzerland) have a department of health (and sometimes 
one for disaster management as well), in addition to which most have national 
scientific bodies advising the government. Many such federal structures do not, 
however, provide for subnational participation (Austria (initially), Ethiopia, Italy, 
Russia, Spain). The lack of coordination between levels of government became 
painfully evident when problems with data collection came to the fore, as hap-
pened in Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, for example; there were no coordinated 
systems enabling the methodical collection of data, a fact which hampered get-
ting an accurate picture of the pandemic necessary for planning.
Australia and Canada seem to be exceptions. Well-prepared nationwide 
institutions were in existence and providing for subnational participation, all of 
which seeming to have proven effective when Covid-19 struck. Although the US 
had well-established federal institutions and plans for epidemics (with good IGR 
cooperation from state administrations), the budgets of these institutions had 
been reduced over the years, rendering their emergency plans less than effective.
In countries where there are national institutions and processes with an 
IGR dimension, these remained largely inoperative. In Switzerland, the Inter-
cantonal Conference of Health Ministers made way for a number of ad hoc 
taskforces. In South Africa, the national advisory Intergovernmental Committee 
on Disaster Management includes provincial representation but never convened; 
decisions were instead made by a national cabinet committee called the National 
Coronavirus Command Council.
Overall, most federations were unprepared for the unprecedented magnitude, 
swiftness of spread, and deadly consequences of Covid-19. Plans had focused 
mostly on past national crises such as terrorism and the 2008/2009 global finan-
cial crisis (true of the European Union (EU) in particular). The lack of pre-
paredness was compounded in low- to middle-income countries by chronically 
underfunded public health-care systems.
21.5 Rolling out of measures to contain the pandemic
Given the unpreparedness of most federations, Covid-19 required urgent action 
from federal and state governments alike where they shared responsibility for 
health care and disaster management. Cities that experienced the first signs of the 
pandemic were also called to intervene.
In the face of the approaching pandemic, the body politic on the whole 
showed solidarity, providing a conducive space for prompt federal action. The 
first response of political parties across the political spectrum was to rally together 
against the common threat and express support for the first lockdown steps taken 
by the federal government. There were exceptions: in Nigeria, the enmity fol-
lowing the 2019 election percolated through to President Buhari’s declaration 
of a health emergency, which the main opposition party opposed; in the face of 
denialist presidents, political solidarity in Brazil and Mexico was also a bridge 
too far.
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Bonhomie towards the national lead soon evaporated in the glare of party- 
political interests. In the US, while the first relief bills were adopted on 11 
March by huge bipartisan majorities, by June gridlock settled in between the 
Democratic-controlled House of Representatives and the Republican-controlled 
Senate. In other federations, disputes arose about the pace of loosening restric-
tions; left-of-centre parties argued on the side of health preservation, while those 
on the right-of-centre were more concerned with job losses and the economy.
Unheard in the political cauldron of mainstream politics were the voices of 
minority and indigenous groups. They remained as voiceless and powerless as 
before, although they were more prone, due to a variety of factors, to succumb-
ing to the virus. The situation of Brazil’s indigenous communities in Amazonia, 
falling within the jurisdiction of the federal government, became much worse 
under President Jair Bolsanaro. Mexico’s indigenous communities resorted to 
self-help by closing off their communities and taking their plight to the courts, 
where they challenged the distribution of information and health resources. In 
Canada a number of vulnerable indigenous nations erected borders around their 
communities, with the tacit approval of all orders of government.
21.5.1 Taking the initiative
With Covid-19 beginning to spread across the globe and the WHO declaring 
it a ‘public health emergency of international concern’ on 30 January 2020 and 
a pandemic on 11 March, federal rather than subnational governments made 
the first move. Most exercised their international relations competence by clos-
ing international borders to travellers from China and gradually also to those 
from other ‘hotspot’ countries. These preventative measures were usually too 
late, though: the virus rapidly gained footholds in cities which are globally well 
connected.
Facing at first a highly localised epidemic, states and cities directly affected by 
the virus took action to contain community infection through various lockdown 
measures (including internal border closures), while the federal governments 
looked upon from afar. In particular, it was the major cities, linked internation-
ally and experiencing the flood of first cases, that acted first: Milan, Moscow, San 
Francisco, New York, Sao Paulo. The city state of Lagos took the first steps as it, 
with its busy international airport, was the epicentre of the pandemic in Nigeria.
Preventative measures were not always uppermost in the minds of affected 
cities or towns, as the Austrian village of Ischgl illustrates. Ischgl is dependent 
on the ski-tourism that attracts visitors from around the world. When return-
ing tourists fell ill, the alarm bells rang from Iceland and Germany that it was 
a super-spreader location, but the responsible district administration vacillated 
about placing Ischgl under quarantine – a quarter of its jobs were tied to the 
hospitality sector. It thus took the federal government to cordon the village off.
Early intervention by states and cities, typically ones under opposition-party 
control, were spurred on by the denialist, anti-science attitudes of the presidents 
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of the US, Brazil, and Mexico. But states could also play partisan politics: the 
early declaration of emergency by the Tigray regional government had little 
to do with the pandemic and far more with affirming its autonomous political 
status.
In Germany, local governments, acting under the advice of the Länder, were 
the first to impose lockdown measures: Covid-19 infections were perceived as a 
localised problem that could be solved locally. However, as soon as it became 
apparent that the pandemic was widespread, particularly after holidaymakers 
returned from their ski-holidays in Ischgl, the federal government and Länder 
stepped in to declare a national lockdown. The federal principle of subsidiarity 
was in full operation: where a local authority could not perform a function effec-
tively, that function moved to the next level of government.
The time delay between states and cities taking the initiative with lockdown 
measures and the federal government’s acting was at most a week or two. The 
significance of these initiatives is not only that states or cities could act upon 
the competences they shared with the centre, but that, by doing so with public 
approval, they goaded the federal government into action it might not otherwise 
have taken as quickly as it did.
In a few countries, the federal government was the only player from the start, 
having absorbed subnational powers and delegated mere implementation duties 
to subnational governments (Italy, Spain, Austria, South Africa). In contrast, in 
Australia, Belgium, and the UK joint decision-making took place between the 
federal and state governments in which responsibilities were allocated in a coor-
dinated manner. In Canada, the provinces took the lead and remained the domi-
nant players, albeit working closely with the federal government from the outset.
21.5.2 Federal action
Covid-19 required prompt, nationwide action. As noted, federal governments 
intervened early with the gradual closure of international borders to curb 
infections coming from abroad. More problematic was getting to grips with 
community infections, where countermeasures fell into either the exclusive or 
concurrent domain of subnational governments.
21.5.2.1  Expansion of powers and declaration 
of emergencies or disasters
At the outbreak of the pandemic, federal governments had a range of legal 
instruments at their disposal to upset the constitutional allocation of pow-
ers by centralising them. In the event, with two exceptions (Argentina and 
Ethiopia), the federations under review did not declare a general state of emer-
gency, which would have triggered formal legislative checks and balances. In 
the case of Argentina, it had already been under its frequently used mode of 
governance – emergency rule – since December 2019 because of an economic 
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crisis; the Ethiopian emergency declaration had more to do with political insta-
bility than confronting Covid-19. Instead, most federal governments used ordi-
nary legislation to empower themselves with delegated law-making authority, 
placing themselves largely beyond the scrutiny of legislatures.
In a small minority of federations, no federal emergency of whatsoever kind 
was called. The Canadian federal government let the provincial declarations of 
health emergency take the lead, for among other reasons that they were suffi-
ciently effective for the job at hand. In Australia, the national Biosecurity Act 
of 2015 had already shifted powers to the centre – so closely as to being nearly 
constitutionally impermissible – and thus obviated the need to do it during the 
pandemic. Moreover, the Commonwealth government used its powers under the 
Act sparingly, allowing the states to exercise their competencies under this Act 
within a consensus framework.
Declarations of health emergencies rewrote the rule book, conferring powers 
over health care and related areas to the federal government. Even in the pre-
dominantly dualist federation of Belgium, the federal declaration (made with the 
support of the communities) shifted health care to the federal level. In more cen-
tralised federations where health care and related areas are concurrent functions, 
the declarations simply asserted the primacy of the federal government over state 
decision-making, reducing states to implementers of national rules and policies. 
In Spain, for example, the centre’s declaration of a ‘state of alert’ resulted in its 
assuming all powers over health care, which over time had been devolved to the 
Autonomous Communities.
An important consequence of some national declarations of a health emer-
gency was that they also devolved emergency powers to states, thereby enhanc-
ing state executives’ regulatory powers. Russia is an example in this regard.
21.5.2.2 Substantive measures
With or without enhanced powers from declaration of health emergencies, the 
federal government could perform a number of unique functions.
First, in the face of an unpredictable but deadly pandemic, national leadership 
sought to assuage citizens’ anxieties. As a rule, heads of governments were the 
principal communicators about the pandemic’s status and the various measures 
taken. Often, they were joined by the leaders of subnational governments to 
show joined-up government at work. In stark contrast were the presidents of 
the US, Mexico, and Brazil, whose non-scientific rhetoric conveyed a confusing 
message to the public. President Trump, for one, purposefully called upon citi-
zens not to obey states’ stay-at-home orders.
Secondly, where uniformity of measures was called for, federal governments 
provided that. In small- and medium-size federations with mobile populations, 
uniform lockdown measures gained popular acceptance.
Thirdly, because of the federal governments’ superior access to resources, rev-
enue and borrowing, they could address the harsh consequences that lockdown 
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regimes created. Where social protection in its various forms was a federal 
responsibility, federal governments could provide individuals and families with 
support through grants, top-ups and other means of assistance. Federal govern-
ments could assist ailing businesses and try to stimulate the economy back to life 
on a scale well beyond the reach of subnational governments. They could also 
support subnational governments with funds to execute the extra burdens they 
carried. Most federal governments also deployed the military to provide health 
resources (particularly medical personnel and the construction of field hospitals) 
and enforce lockdown regulations.
However, the limits of federal action were also manifest. First, although 
the need for centralisation of powers was accepted in many countries, a major 
unforeseen problem emerged: the federal government lacked capability. Because 
health care was the predominant or main domain of the subnational govern-
ments in Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, the federal government, on assuming that 
mandate, plainly lacked the capacity (skills and resources) to act swiftly and effec-
tively. Secondly, uniform measures often had disproportionate negative effects. 
For example, in Switzerland, the Federal Council directed all cantons that hos-
pitals should no longer do non-essential procedures and prepare only for Covid 
patients. However, because infection rates varied considerably between cantons, 
some cantonal hospitals ran out of work and income when Covid patients did not 
turn up in the droves that had been anticipated.
The value of federal Covid-related action was compromised even further 
by pre-existing political pathologies. First, entrenched cultures of corruption 
were simply aggravated by the pandemic. In our sample, a significant number 
of federations have a serious corruption problem: according to the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index of 2020, in descending rank order 
in the world were South Africa (69), Argentina (78), India (86), Ethiopia 
(94), Brazil (94), Mexico (124), Russia (129), and Nigeria (149) (Transparency 
International 2020; Vrushi and Kukutschaka 2021). Although corruption is per-
vasive at all levels of government, at the federal level it had the greatest financial 
and moral impact.
The increase in corruption was due to huge amounts of money becoming 
available overnight for the purchase of materials and services, the relaxing of 
procurement rules for the sake of urgency, and the fact that the usual counter- 
corruption measures, such as vigilant parliaments, went to sleep. Instead of the 
nation standing together, the few fed off its misery as scarce funds to combat 
the virus disappeared into the pockets of government officials and their cronies. 
Increased corruption was reported in South Africa, and Nigeria.
Secondly, some federal governments used both their extended powers and 
the centralised ethos the pandemic created to advance their own political agen-
das. As the old adage goes, ‘Never waste a good crisis.’ In Argentina, President 
Alberto Ángel Fernández sought the power to change the national budget uni-
laterally; India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi pushed through a parliamentary 
bill advancing the centralisation of agriculture and education; Russia’s President 
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Vladimir Putin used the pandemic in his campaign for constitutional amend-
ment, which, inter alia, extended the presidential term of office (his own, that 
is); and, as noted, the postponement of Ethiopian elections scheduled for August 
2020 had more to do with avoiding an election than countering a low level of 
Covid-19 infection.
21.5.2.3 Accountability
The drift towards the increase of executive powers vis-à-vis the legislature is 
evident in both presidential and parliamentary systems. In the former, presi-
dents ruled by decrees and orders that fell outside the legislatures’ legislative 
domain and the term ‘hyper-presidentialism’ has been applied to Russia and 
Argentina. In parliamentary systems, parliaments often gave prime ministers a 
free pass and played a muted role.
After initially suspending their activities out of compliance with social dis-
tancing measures, legislatures limped back into full or partial operation by 
holding their sessions online. The general complaint is that parliaments were 
marginalised, more often than not through actions of ‘self-disempowerment’. 
When called upon to pass enabling legislation and authorise support packages, 
they acted with astounding speed and expeditiousness. Within a single day – 
Sunday 15 March 2020 – the Austrian parliament passed the Covid-19 Measures 
Act, the President signed it into law, and it was promulgated. Where there was 
insufficient debate and scrutiny, the legislature became a mere rubber stamp.
The usual parliamentary subnational check and balance on a federal executive 
is through the second house that represents subnational interests. The useful-
ness of such a house was exemplified by the German Bundesrat, which approved 
both the declaration of a health emergency and Covid-related bills. Conversely, 
subnational interests could be replaced by partisan political concerns, the prime 
example being the US Senate.
In the absence of vigorous parliaments holding executives to account, courts 
became the next port of call for aggrieved parties, although the speed with which 
regulations were changed, renewed, or repealed often made slow-moving litiga-
tion unhelpful. The primary litigators were individuals, citizens groups, or com-
mercial enterprises whose interests (and rights) may have been compromised. 
There were only a few cases of intergovernmental disputes, because, as Saunders 
points out in Chapter 20, in some federations governments were subject to the 
cooperative government duty to avoid litigation or just avoided turf wars.
When confronted with challenges, the courts by and large displayed their cus-
tomary deferential attitude (cf Aroney and Kincaid 2017): they were not willing 
to second-guess the federal government’s reaction to a deadly and unprecedented 
disease. There were a few notable exceptions. First, in the context of Brazil’s 
president, the Supreme Court came down unambiguously on the side of the 
states when it affirmed the latter’s power to declare states of health emergen-
cies in contravention of the president’s express order to the contrary. Secondly, 
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the Austrian Constitutional Court played a vital role in asserting that differen-
tiated measures are important in avoiding unacceptably disproportionate out-
comes, which prompted the federal government to be more differentiated in its 
approach.
21.5.3 State action
As noted, the key policy areas affected by Covid-19, among them health care 
and disaster management, fell under the states’ exclusive or concurrent pow-
ers. However, in a significant number of countries this constitutional dispensa-
tion was disrupted by federal declarations of health emergencies in which states 
became implementers rather than policy-makers. In other countries where such 
declarations were either not possible or did not occur, states continued as before. 
Whatever the applicable regimen, states in some countries improved their sta-
tus by dint of their performance in dealing with Covid-19. Managing the pan-
demic enhanced the profile of the UK’s devolved units as no other event has 
done before; the voices of Mexico’s states were heard clearly, while in Spain the 
Autonomous Communities and central government moved towards collabora-
tion they called ‘co-governance’.
21.5.3.1 Powers of engagement
As noted, in a limited number of decentralised federations, states could, and did, 
declare their own health emergencies or disasters, independent of the federal gov-
ernment, thereby extending their executive powers. In the dualist federations of 
the US, Canada, Australia, states declared such emergencies; the federal govern-
ments in Canada and Australia specifically refrained from doing so. In Brazil, state 
governments had to approach the Supreme Court to assert this right. In the pre-
viously highly centrist Ethiopian federation, the breakaway of the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front from the ruling party resulted in the Tigray regional govern-
ment’s declaring a state of emergency two weeks before a national declaration, 
again, as mentioned, not so much because of Covid-19 but to assert its autonomy.
In a number of federations, the federal governments, acting upon their own 
emergency powers, delegated similar powers to state executives (Italy, Mexico, 
Russia). Russia provides an important example. Its 85 constituent units have 
limited exclusive powers and joint jurisdiction over health care, but through the 
federal declaration of a ‘heightened state of preparedness’, they were delegated 
the mandate for health care, and thus also burdened with tough choices between 
pursuing health measures or opening up the economy. With this delegation, the 
federal government sought not only to enable a diversity better suiting Russia’s 
vast heterogeneity, but also to minimise its own political responsibility by allow-
ing greater scope for localised crisis management and blame. Putin and his ruling 
party nevertheless remained firmly in control of the constituent units through 
informal IGR arrangements.
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In terms of the national declarations of health emergencies, states in central-
ised federations were assigned primarily implementation roles (Ethiopia, India, 
Italy, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain). However, the same also happened in decen-
tralised ones as a result of states’ participation in making the federal declarations 
(Belgium, Germany).
Getting into lockdown proved to be the easy part; easing the restrictions later 
on was far more difficult and controversial. With the heavy social and economic 
costs of the lockdowns becoming increasingly apparent, reopening economies 
and reviving social mobility brought states back into the decision-making loop. 
The common tool used across the world was the ‘traffic light’ system: the coding 
of the levels of infections according to locality, which allowed for a differentiated 
approach to unlocking and re-locking. Federations had the great advantage that 
localities had actors in place able to implement (or fine tune) the traffic light 
system.
The same system prevailed with the rise of the second wave of infections that 
began in Europe in the autumn and a month or two later elsewhere. In Germany, 
the Länder were given the power to impose new restrictions, but when they did 
so hesitantly, the Bund again ordered a national lockdown. The Swiss cantons’ 
reluctance to take responsibility for the lockdown, which the Federal Council 
was eager to pass on to them, springs from a different, federal, source. In terms 
of their system of equivalence, the financial responsibility lies where the power is 
exercised; as the cantons were not eager to shoulder this financial burden, a hia-
tus in governance ensued during this critical stage of the battle against Covid-19.
21.5.3.2 Substance of engagement
The substance of the engagement with the pandemic was, at least at the initial 
stages, about providing health care for the ill and seeking to prevent commu-
nity infection through lockdown or stay-at-home orders. As implementers of 
national policies and law, the states’ discretion was limited, but some excelled in 
putting up field hospitals, developing tracing apps, and so forth. Some Nigerian 
states, mostly opposition-held, performed small acts of defiance by implementing 
lockdown regulations late or reluctantly where they deemed them unreasonable.
Some states also sought isolation through the constitutionally suspect measure 
of unilateral closure of internal borders (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Mexico). Although the Mexican federal government contested such ‘unconsti-
tutional’ closure, it tolerated the action by some states. In Argentina, citizens 
successfully contested a number of state border closures. Australia’s High Court, 
by contrast, rejected a challenge to Western Australia’s border closure that was 
made on the ground that the latter was contrary to the constitutional provision 
that interstate commerce and movement must be ‘absolutely free’ (Australian 
Constitution, section 52), holding that the restriction formed part of an overall 
federal plan of action. In Canada, few challenged the decision and a sole court 
case dismissed the argument of unconstitutionality of provincial border closings.
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Ameliorating the plight of people and businesses impacted on by lockdown 
was mostly beyond states’ financial wherewithal, a reality that underlined 
their dependence on the federal purse. Where social protection had been the 
states’ responsibility before the pandemic, they continued to serve that func-
tion (Canada, Australia). Where states had policy discretion, the case studies 
revealed that the political leanings of the political party in control of a state were 
often determinative. In the US, the presence of a political ‘trifecta’ – in which 
the governor and the two houses of the state legislature were from the same 
party – had predictable outcomes: the ‘trifecta’ Republican states preferred lim-
ited restrictions and opening the economy, while the ‘trifecta’ Democratic states 
opted for stricter health measures. Policy differences could even creep into the 
same party, in this case driven by personalities. In Germany, the rivalry between 
two Länder’s first ministers vying to succeed Angela Merkel as the next leader of 
the CDU/CSU resulted in their respective Länder adopting differing Covid-19 
policies in order to distinguish the two contenders from each other.
More pervasive than the few cases of incapacity at federal level were inca-
pable subnational states that could not meet their responsibilities. Some South 
African provinces were incapable of providing effective health care. Similar 
situations prevailed in other low- to middle-income countries due to chronic 
under- investment in health care, as, for example, in India. In countries with a 
corruption problem, its manifestation at state level was sometimes worse than at 
federal level, given that in far-flung states their finances fell outside of the scru-
tiny of a watchful media.
21.5.3.3 Accountability
As occurred with the federal executive, power came to be concentrated in state 
executives, whether in terms of their own or federal declarations of health emer-
gency. Inasmuch as Argentina’s federal government is hyper-presidential in style, 
the same is true of its state governments. Where the pattern was of power con-
centration in the executive before the pandemic (as in Nigerian states), it was 
aggravated by the pandemic response. The accountability picture thus differed 
little from that at federal level. No heightened level of legislative scrutiny was 
reported: the usual story was that the state legislature, like its federal counterpart, 
would be suspended and slowly re-emerge transformed into an entity conducting 
virtual or semi-virtual meetings.
In the more centralised federations, the possibility of federal supervision 
loomed large: wayward actions could be swiftly countered. Although in some 
federations differences were tolerated (Mexico), instances of federal supervision 
occurred. In Russia, a strong party hierarchy enabled President Putin to exercise 
strict control over the constituent units, with a number of governors resigning 
after being criticised by a federal agency for the inadequacy of their measures. 
Putin also dismissed a governor in whom he lost confidence. In South Africa, a 
country also operating under a hegemonic party, the national minister of health 
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criticised the poor performance of one of his provincial counterparts, which 
eventually led to her dismissal from the provincial executive committee.
In contrast to their deferential review of federal measures, the courts might 
have been slightly more amenable to keeping state governors in line – for two 
possible reasons. First, states were occasionally egregious in their lockdown 
measures, as for example when imposing border restrictions beyond their com-
petences. Secondly, whereas courts might be reluctant to upset the apple-cart 
of federal disaster management and cause unforeseen nationwide consequences, 
that concern is not present at state level: any consequences are localised. Although 
further research is necessary, court decisions on the whole seemed to run against 
state executives in Germany, India, Italy, and Spain. At the same time, decisions 
favourable to states were seen in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, 
and the US.
21.5.4 Local government action
Local government, although not constitutionally recognised in most federations, 
asserted its presence during the pandemic as a valuable order of government. 
The role it played was strongly influenced by its size and nature in a country; its 
constitutional status, precarious as it was, proved to be of less importance. Most 
of the federations under review have a large number of local authorities, running 
into the thousands, most with very small populations. At the same time they have 
large, globally connected urban municipalities with considerable resources – 
it was these that typically experienced the early stranglehold of the virus and which 
provided curative as well as preventative health measures (San Francisco, New 
York City, and Sao Paulo, for example). The role of the myriad small local author-
ities should not be overlooked, however, since apart from carrying out their usual 
functions, they provided support for the most vulnerable in their communities.
21.5.4.1 Powers of engagement
Local government responsibilities flowed mainly from state law, but that was 
altered in a few instances by federal emergency rule. For example, in Italy, the 
local government’s health powers were centralised. New mandates were also 
imposed by the federal and/or state governments dealing with preventative 
health care and ameliorating the plight of the most vulnerable.
When the ‘traffic light’ system of differential application of lockdown rules 
was introduced, local authorities formed the base unit of measurement and were 
sometimes delegated the power to switch the lights up or down. So, for example, 
local government came to the fore in Belgium during the second wave: the fed-
eral government, facing a population that had become Covid-weary, devolved 
greater powers to mayors to decide on restrictive measures, including the 
power to target such measures at municipal ‘hotspots’. In contrast, when South 
Africa began to implement a differentiated ‘traffic light’ system, it remained 
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the prerogative of the national government to impose stricter lockdown provi-
sions in ‘hotspot’ municipalities. A similar position in the UK raised the ire of 
city mayors in England. In Australia, when a state-wide blanket lockdown was 
imposed during the second wave, municipalities in the state of Victoria argued 
unsuccessfully that they should decide on closing down and opening up measures 
in view of the disproportionate impact the state-wide lockdown would have on 
remote regions and local authorities where there was little or no likelihood of 
infections. The claim is thus that the state government did not exploit the vast-
ness of the country to impose differentiated measures.
Where local policy space existed, conflicts between cities and states also 
occurred. The same partisan politics characterising federal-state relations played 
out in battles between Republican governors and Democratic mayors and vice 
versa. But even within the same party, the public spat between the Democratic 
governor and mayor of New York state and New York City, respectively, had 
catastrophic consequences for inhabitants.
Given the important role that local governments played at grass-roots level, 
they became part of federal and/or state plans. Funds flowed from the federal 
purse directly to local authorities, strengthening (or even creating) the link 
between these two levels.
21.5.4.2 Substance of engagement
As noted, in most instances the primary task of local governments remained the 
delivery of basic municipal services: water, sanitation, electricity, refuse removal, 
and burials, all crucial for the health and well-being of communities. In those 
federations where local authorities also provided secondary or primary health 
care, they were a vital cog of the health machinery. For example, Argentinian 
municipalities own 15 per cent of health institutions; many German local author-
ities run local hospitals; and in the US, it was mainly cities and counties that were 
responsible for public hospitals.
Where the federal government or states were the primary responders to the 
pandemic, local authorities played a supportive role and generally did so enthu-
siastically. They were also allocated new tasks that included testing, contact 
tracing, quarantining, public education, food distribution, and enforcement of 
restrictions. Some municipalities saw it fit to impose stricter lockdown meas-
ures than their states (Brazil, Argentina). However, municipal border closures in 
these two countries were quickly slapped down by federal governments using the 
courts. In South Africa, a municipal attempt to impose compulsory quarantining 
at municipal facilities was stopped in its tracks by the national government.
Local authorities, as noted, played an important role in assisting the vulner-
able in their communities who fell through the national or state social welfare 
nets. Often, at their own discretion and due to their proximity to residents, they 
were able to identify and assist the most vulnerable by ways of food kitchens 
and shelters for the homeless; within their means, some could provide financial 
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assistance too. In South Africa, for example, some municipalities gave prop-
erty owners a tax holiday. Some large cities developed new online governance 
modalities. Moscow City managed the first lockdown in an innovative way and 
served as an example that other cities could emulate. This included developing 
an app for tracing purposes and using information technology to manage met-
ropolitan services.
Given the large number of local authorities in any given country, their voice 
is usually heard at the federal and state level through organised local govern-
ment, bodies which can also facilitate cooperation and mutual assistance among 
local authorities. During the pandemic, organised local government was largely 
muted, though. In Canada and South Africa, it played some lobbying roles, while 
in Mexico, organised along political party lines, it performed a similar function. 
Metropolitan governments most often dealt directly with the federal and/or state 
governments.
The problem of uneven capability among local authorities was also reported. 
The lack of capacity was, of course, exacerbated by corruption, which was in 
turn fuelled by the special funds that federal and state governments made availa-
ble for Covid-19-related measures.
21.5.5 Intergovernmental relations
In Chapter 20, Saunders sets out the essential elements of, and insights into, IGR 
during the pandemic in 2020, and considers how well or badly this important 
federal element impacted on the battle against Covid-19. For the sake of the 
completeness of this conclusion, and for the purpose of my argument advanced 
below, I raise a few key issues from this chapter.
First, Saunders highlights several specific purposes that IGR served: coordi-
nation that allows some discretion at subnational levels; establishing frameworks 
in terms of which such coordination could take place; the sharing of resources, 
including revenue raised nationally; and problem-solving. Not all federations 
pursued all or even some of these goals, much to the detriment of providing 
effective governance.
Secondly, the IGR modalities in terms of which the goals were pursued were 
the usual structures, mechanism, and processes found in federal systems. The leg-
islatures at the different levels of governments could play an important role dur-
ing the pandemic in regard to achieving some level of coordination between the 
different governments’ mandates; federal legislation that provided an umbrella 
structure for this purpose was useful. The absence of legislative coordination, 
which left uncertainty about who does what in a situation where speedy and 
decisive action is required, had profoundly negative consequences in a number 
of countries. As anti-Covid-19 action became the business mainly of executives, 
inter-jurisdictional forums stood to be crucial for coordinated action; the cases 
showed, however, that in some countries which had no pre-existing structures, 
none developed. Also, where such structures were weak, they remained so or 
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were not used at all. But there were also examples of neglected or new struc-
tures coming to life out of pandemic necessity. An integral part of effective 
IGR is reducing intergovernmental engagements to agreements. Although not 
the norm, in some federations they did emerge to manage detailed health-care 
functions, while in others they pre-dated Covid-19 as general plans for pandemic 
eventualities.
Finally, Saunders draws from the cases four insights that could maximize the 
potential of federations to deal with emergencies such as this pandemic. First, 
IGR should not be an overly top-down process: it needs the participation of 
subnational governments. Secondly, the goal of effective IGR is not necessarily 
uniformity, but should allow for diversity. Thirdly, all governments must be 
capable to perform their allocated roles effectively. Fourthly, the usual lack of 
transparency and accountability in IGR may have been exacerbated by the need 
for speedy action and less parliamentary accountability.
21.5.6 Intergovernmental fiscal relations
In most of the federations, the main tax sources fall under the domain of the 
central government, with the exceptions of Belgium, Switzerland, and the US. 
Generally, then, the revenue raised by subnational governments does not match 
their allocated responsibilities, resulting in vertical fiscal imbalance. Most thus 
rely on national transfers to balance the books, as subnational borrowing is also 
limited. Reliance on transfers varies between countries, as well as among states 
and local government in the same country. Countries where states are highly 
dependent on transfers are, by definition, the more centralised federations: 
Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, and 
Spain. Transfers are effected in a variety of ways. Certain tax bases are shared 
by percentages, VAT and GST being among the popular ones (e.g. in Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, India, and Nigeria); some are in terms of block grants based on 
formulas; and in all countries there are also conditional or tied grants.
From an economic point of view, for a number of countries the pandemic 
could not have come at a worse time. Italy and South Africa were formally 
in a recession at the beginning of 2020, while Argentina had already declared 
a state of emergency in December 2019 due to an economic crisis. The drop 
in the oil price also deeply affected revenue in Canada (Alberta), Nigeria, and 
Russia. Brazil was struggling to recover from a recession, the UK faced Brexit, 
and India’s growth rate was on a downward curve. They all struggled with high 
indebtedness.
Lockdown measures caused the largest economic downturn some countries 
had experienced since World War II. The impact was severe across the federa-
tions, with unemployment and poverty increasing dramatically. The immediate 
consequence was a massive drop in revenue collected at every level of govern-
ment. Where taxes are shared according to percentages, such as with VAT or 
GST, the impact was immediate in Austria, Brazil, India, and Nigeria. The dent 
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in federally collected revenue also reduced transfers to states and local govern-
ments, but in a moderate and gradual way. Local government, too, collected 
significantly less taxes and charges than usual. Concomitantly with dwindling 
revenue, the expenses of fighting the pandemic soared at all levels of govern-
ment. States and local governments were saddled with costly implementation 
responsibilities for old and new mandates. The costs to ameliorate the social and 
economic consequences fell mainly to the federal government’s account.
The net result was that all levels of government felt the sharp edge of Covid-
19’s ‘scissor effect’: while revenues dropped, expenditures increased. This effect 
was experienced differently both vertically and horizontally. In Canada and 
Russia, subnational governments, which carried the bulk of health-care respon-
sibilities, experienced the sharpest cuts. Horizontally, due to differing levels of 
economic activity and compounded by variation in infection rates, some states 
and local authorities felt the cut more keenly than others. Moreover, existing 
disparities among states and local governments deepened.
The federal response to the scissor effect was both to cut or reprioritise expend-
iture in non-Covid-related areas and to borrow more money to cover budget 
deficits. Federal expenditure cuts included decreases in the regular transfers to 
subnational governments, such as block grants. Given the severity of the budget 
shortfalls, new borrowings increased the high indebtedness and vulnerability of 
some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Members of the EU, 
on the other hand, enjoyed the cushion of the EU’s various support packages.
Without the ability to increase or create new taxes, states became increasingly 
dependent on transfers, which they received mostly as special grants earmarked 
for Covid-19-related expenses. Given the discretionary nature of such grants, in 
a few federations accusations of party-political bias in the allocations and size of 
such grants were made (Nigeria, Argentina). In the US, the provisioning of such 
grants became a political football. Whereas there was bi-partisan support in the 
Congress at the outset of the pandemic for relief bills, another bill gridlocked 
a few months later: the Republican-controlled Senate refused to pass a bill origi-
nating in the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives because, in terms 
of the bill, Democratic-governed states would have benefited more from the 
support packages given that they had closed their economies for longer periods 
of time.
Where regulatory control was in the jurisdiction of the federal government, 
some financial control measures were loosened and others tightened. The EU 
eased borrowing and deficit-budget restrictions on member countries. To facil-
itate emergency procurement, certain procurement regulations were suspended, 
which in some instances led to widespread corruption (e.g. South Africa) and 
in turn necessitated stricter controls. Special grants were often accompanied by 
strict control measures (e.g. Russia). The scope for subnational borrowing was 
slightly opened in Brazil, Russia, and Spain.
The response to Covid-19’s scissor effect on subnational governments – 
the provision of specific grants – was depicted in most country reports as the 
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centralisation of power due to increased federal control of the purse strings. This 
was particularly notable in Austria, Italy, Russia, and Spain.
The funding crisis in subnational governments, brought painfully to the fore 
by Covid-19, spurred public initiatives and calls for systemic intergovernmental 
fiscal reforms in Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Italy, and Mexico. Given the 
increased fiscal imbalance and subnational dependency, discussion arose on how 
this imbalance could be addressed in a more structured and equitable manner.
21.6 Findings and policy implications
At the outset of this chapter, three questions were posed: First, how did the fed-
eral systems under review respond to the pandemic – what were the modalities 
of the response and their effect on centralisation or decentralisation processes? 
Secondly, how well (or badly) did the federal systems fare in combating the pan-
demic? Were these systems, with decentralised decision-making remaining at its 
core, resilient enough to cope with the challenge? Thirdly, could the manner in 
which the systems responded – the changes brought about to federal dynamics – 
have a lasting impact?
21.6.1 How did federal systems respond to Covid-19?
If one sketches an overall storyline of how federal systems dealt with Covid-19 
during the initial period before vaccinations commenced, the following trends 
come to the fore.
Given that the pandemic required quick, concerted, and effective action 
which called for some form of centrist approach, federal governments in the 
majority of cases centralised powers concerning health care and disaster manage-
ment. However, expeditiousness was not always forthcoming, as most of them 
were unprepared for an eventuality of such unprecedented scale and ferocity. 
When they got their act together, it mostly entailed centralising power through 
declarations of public health emergencies. In Argentina, Austria, India, Nigeria, 
and South Africa, the centralisation trend was a continuation of pre-pandemic 
trends. At the other end of the spectrum, the ‘con-federal’ nature of the EU was 
criticised for its lack of centralised decision-making that could respond quickly 
and decisively; the EU is not empowered by the treaties to intervene directly in 
health matters, except in coordinating member states and public procurement.
The concentration of powers in federal executives also occurred: in many 
countries the overseeing legislatures were sidelined (often with the connivance 
of the legislatures themselves). In having a free hand, a few federal governments 
also used the pandemic to pursue objectives other than those to do with the pan-
demic. Courts, with a few exceptions, did not interfere in federal actions.
Although states took the first lockdown steps against the pandemic because 
they felt the threat more acutely than federal governments, in most cases, they 
soon became the implementers of federal strategies rather than co-planners. 
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In a few countries, the main responsibility for health care continued to lie with 
the states, either because the federal government had no jurisdiction (the US) or 
because the states were exercising their emergency health powers and the federal 
government might not have done any better (Canada). After the initial central-
isation of powers involved in imposing lockdowns, the need for differentiation 
in both unlocking after the first wave and re-locking due to the second wave 
became apparent and brought subnational governments back to centre-stage. 
Despite the general trend of centralisation, in a number of federations the posi-
tion of states was enhanced during the pandemic (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, the 
UK, and even Spain), showcasing their ability to respond swiftly, proportion-
ately, and relatively effectively to the pandemic.
Although local authorities played an important role in keeping communities 
going by providing basic municipal services, they did not, on the whole, assume 
a major autonomous role in fighting Covid-19, bar a few exceptions (the US, 
Brazil). Moreover, they did not become part of a whole-of-government deci-
sion-making network. The exclusion of local government from Australia’s new 
‘National Cabinet’, which brought the states and territories together with the 
federal government, serves as an example.
The trend of centralising decision-making was further consolidated by the 
intergovernmental fiscal system. The position of federal governments, which by 
and large already control the major sources of tax revenue, was strengthened by 
the pandemic. States and local government, feeling the scissors effect of increased 
responsibilities and reduced revenue, became more dependent than before on 
fiscal transfers. Although federal financial support was forthcoming, it did little 
to address inequality in services delivery; where inequality existed before the 
onslaught of Covid-19, it deepened.
21.6.2  How well (or badly) did the federal government respond?
In the case studies, contributors mounted critiques of how, in their countries, 
the federal system failed in practice, whether in small or large part, as an effec-
tive governance system in combating the pandemic. Although some critiqued 
the emergency health policy, the focus of the critiques was not on federalism as 
a system but on how in practice it operated sub-optimally in a range of areas and 
resulted in high infection and death rates. For example, poor coordination and 
cooperation (the antithesis of healthy federalism) may have led to higher mor-
tality rates. Equally lethal is the disproportionate impact of measures that caused 
social and economic harm which could have been avoided. As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, the factors for a healthy federal body, as identified by 
Watts (2011), are democracy, non-centralism, open bargaining, and the rule of 
law. These factors also give content to what Michael Burgess (2012) refers to as 
the ‘federal spirit’.
Did the case studies validate the importance of federal ‘success factors’ 
even during a health and economic crisis? Put differently, did the absence of 
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any of these result in poor governance outcomes, including high death rates? 
Contributors point out a number of features that inhibited effective govern-
ance, including unclear division of powers; lack of coordination and cooperation; 
uneven capability; dominance of party-political interests; and corruption. These 
problems usually pre-dated the advent of Covid-19: to use the Covid-19 health 
terminology, their presence, I argue, constitutes ‘federal co-morbidities’. Like 
their human equivalents, they are conditions of the federal body politic that 
make it prone to ill-health and less than resilient enough to contain and over-
come the pandemic. These might not necessarily be single-cause explanations of 
failure; as the name suggests, co-morbidities are factors that, collectively and/or 
in conjunction with other factors, could prove fatal for a federal system to pro-
vide effective governance during a pandemic.
21.6.2.1 Democracy
First, to what extent did democratic rule continue, and did it matter? In most 
countries, federal, state, or local elections scheduled for 2020 were held, as hap-
pened in Brazil, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the US; in addition, referenda were 
held in Russia and Switzerland (after an initial suspension). The only exception 
is the Ethiopian federal government’s decision to postpone the August 2020 fed-
eral and regional elections to 2021. Holding elections was certainly possible in a 
country with the lowest infection rate of all the federations surveyed, but it was 
not expedient for the ruling party; the postponement set a chain of events in 
motion that degenerated into a civil war in the Tigray region. More complex is 
the impact of the more authoritarian regimes which, by definition, have highly 
concentrated and centralised powers, as many factors come into play: Russia 
seems to have coped well, counterintuitively by delegating powers to constituent 
units rather than appropriating them; Argentina’s poor Covid performance is but 
a continuation of its record of poor governance; as for India, the link remains 
unclear; as is the case with Ethiopia and Nigeria where data are lacking.
In most countries, the legislatures, the prime institution of democracy, came 
under strain through the concentration of power in the executive; although leg-
islatures were initially suspended and then came back virtually, they did not 
excel in their constitutional role of oversight, which in any event was weak in a 
number of federations. The lack of scrutiny of the executive’s health policy, its 
choice between lives and livelihoods, as well as the disproportionate impact of 
some measures, was a general failure in democracies the world over. In federal 
systems it applied also at subnational levels. Poor oversight also facilitated the 
misappropriation of funds allocated for anti-Covid measures.
21.6.2.2 Non-centralism
The principle of non-centralism, which entails that a polity is underpinned by 
multiple centres of decision-making by democratically elected bodies, was placed 
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under pressure by the need for centrally led decision-making. In the majority of 
federations, the principle was attenuated through centralisation. However, there 
are important exceptions that confirm the value of non-centralism. In the US, 
Mexico, and Brazil, states performed a vital federal function by acting as checks 
and balances on federal governments whose presidents had gone on unscientific 
frolics of their own. As reported, Covid-19 related deaths in the US are likely 
to have been higher if the response was left solely in the hands of the Trump 
administration, unchallenged by states.
In the same vein, centralisation through the application of uniform lockdown 
rules often had a disproportionate social and economic impact on a landscape 
of varied infection rates. This led to the calling for, and in some countries, the 
return of, differentiated decision-making at subnational level.
21.6.2.3  Open bargaining as a dominant means 
of reaching decisions
Open bargaining as the dominant means of reaching decisions entails negoti-
ations and the give-and-take of compromises. The success stories among the 
federations in terms of low death rates are those where federal governments 
and states enjoyed close working relations: Australia, Canada, and Germany. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the absence of cooperation and coordination 
is directly linked to high mortality rates, as contributors argue in respect of 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the US.
Causes of this form of co-morbidity include a lack of institutions and processes 
that facilitate bargaining. Where no intergovernmental forums or processes 
existed before the pandemic, no new ones emerged. Also, weak institutions did 
not gain in strength during this crucial time but were eclipsed by ad hoc central 
bodies. Bargaining to reach common decisions was also stymied by divisive par-
tisan politics in a few federations.
21.6.2.4 The rule of law
The definition of constitutionalism usually includes the element of rule of law, 
the other two being democracy and limited government. The rule of law, in 
turn, covers a number of elements (Bedner 2010), three of which were high-
lighted in the case studies: rules must exist in the first place; they must be clear; 
and they must be enforced. The absence of these elements indicates a serious 
co-morbidity.
The first element – rule by laws rather than unbridled discretion – may be 
superficially present in Argentina, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, but is belied by the way 
that heads of government used their wide discretion for the purpose of distrib-
uting resources in a partisan manner instead of on the basis of need. It fuelled 
subnational resentment of the federal government and undermined the trust nec-
essary for effective coordination and cooperation.
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The second element is that rules should be clear so as to guide the conduct 
of governments. In particular, a lack of clarity about ‘who does what’ led to 
service and governance gaps detrimental to citizens, as occurred, for example, 
in Italy and Switzerland. Although not feasible to provide for watertight allo-
cations of powers, uncertainty in the vital areas of health care had devastating 
consequences.
The third element, enforcement of the rules, was conspicuous by its absence 
in countries with high levels of corruption. Because procurement during the 
pandemic required expedited procedures, corruption flourished in countries 
where lawlessness is woven into the weft of governance.
21.6.2.5 Capability to govern
One ‘success factor’ underlying effective federal systems is so self-evident that it 
is hardly mentioned in the literature, namely that each government, bestowed 
with a set of responsibilities, is capable of discharging them efficiently and effec-
tively. Several contributors point out the obvious adverse consequences of a lack 
of sufficient capability, whether at federal, state, or local level. In view of the 
pandemic, health care and other functions were centralised on the assumption 
that federal governments would be able to do a better, more coordinated job of 
carrying them out than states; likewise, functions are devolved to subnational 
governments on the assumption that they were capable of discharging them more 
effectively than federal governments. Where either of these assumptions proves to 
be groundless, a federal co-morbidity is evident. Where federal governments cen-
tralised subnational health functions, some of them had no pre-existing capacity in 
that field, with examples coming from Italy and Switzerland. In certain countries, 
capacity was unevenly spread among subnational governments. In Italy, some of 
the southern regions lacked the wherewithal to take the necessary curative and 
preventative measures; the same was true of some South African provinces.
In conclusion, the contributors identified federal co-morbidities in all the 
countries under review, with these co-morbidities having negative consequences 
in practice. The number, nature, and severity of the co-morbidities, however, 
varied considerably among the federations. It was beyond the scope of this study 
to measure the pathogenicity of each of them individually or collectively in 
terms of infection or death rates. The explanatory value that the presence or 
absence of federal co-morbidities carries for the trends in infection and death 
rates during the first 10 months of 2020 (see Introduction, Table 0.1), must thus 
be treated with great caution. Indeed, more research is needed for determining, 
inter alia, the accuracy of reported figures and the extent to which comparisons 
are meaningful; the weight and combination of co-morbidities; the role of geo-
spatial, demographic (including age profiles), economic, political and governance 
factors; and, above all, the nature of the relevant health policies.
The aim here is to identify federal co-morbidities that may be hindering the 
response to the pandemic. It is clear that if federal co-morbidities are accurately 
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highlighted, corrective action, where possible, can be taken during the course of 
the Covid-19 pandemic – at the time of this writing still ongoing and in some 
countries mutating into a third and even fourth wave of infection – and steps can 
also taken to put preventative measures in place for contending with future 
health and other emergencies.
21.6.3 Future changes?
The last question is whether changes that occurred in federal dynamics due 
to Covid-19 are likely to be long-lasting. Did the pandemic provide a ‘policy 
window’ for fundamental changes further down the road? The contributors are 
rightly hesitant to predict changes with any degree of certainty, and any predic-
tions remain speculative. The following can be noted, though.
In the majority of cases, no dramatic changes are predicted. Federations that 
were on a centralisation trajectory are likely to continue on it. In a number of 
them, however, changes towards greater decentralisation are a possibility: these 
are Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Spain, and the UK, in each case for different reasons. 
Because federal policy is so imbedded in the partisan politics of Mexico, changes 
in the current party political alignment may result in pro-federalists coming to 
the fore. In Brazil, the denialist President confirmed the importance of the states 
in times of crisis. The devolved units of the UK have increased their profile as 
competent governments enjoying higher trust than the central government and 
may even be the catalyst that pushes Scotland towards independence. In Russia – 
ironically, given the centralist trend and party dominance – the successful devo-
lution of powers to constituent units has bolstered their image as well. In Spain, 
the emergence of ‘co-governance’ may give Autonomous Communities a new 
spring in their step and bring the Catalan question back on the table.
More modestly, the strongest calls for change have been in the field of inter-
governmental fiscal relations, which during the pandemic produced greater 
dependence and inequity. Calls in Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Mexico, South 
Africa, and Spain may result in changes to reduce subnational dependency on 
federal transfers and at the same time ensure greater equalisation.
21.7 Concluding remarks
As the pandemic is still ongoing at the time of writing (March 2021) and the 
dynamics of vaccination are still to be played out, Covid-19’s full impact on the 
federal systems under review is still to be assessed. Once the health aspects are 
under control, the social and economic consequences will continue to reverber-
ate through the next few years. What this volume provides is a first-cut analysis 
of the crucial first ten months of 2020 when the shock to the federal systems 
was at its severest and federal co-morbidities were painfully revealed. Without 
attempting to explain the variations in infection and death rates, a framework of 
analysing the role that federal governance played is suggested. Further research is 
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called for on both the initial government actions as well as the continuing battle 
against Covid-19. It is hoped that this volume may provide a baseline study in 
this endeavour. In the meanwhile, the study may provide valuable lessons on 
remedying federal co-morbidities and preparing for the next calamity.
Note
 1 I wish to thank the contributors of the respective chapters for their corrections, com-
ments, and suggestions on this chapter which improved the text considerably.
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